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LIBERTARIAN MOTIVATIONS ON THE VINSON COURT

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Justice Frankfurter is fond of quoting an old English saying that "the devil himself knoweth not the mind of men."[1] The mind of a man who happens to be a judge is the center of many contending impulses when he is making it up, and an external reconstruction of the process is quite impossible. However, the rules of the game require that judges supply clues to their thought processes in the form of written opinions. In every major case decided by the Supreme Court, one or more of its members provide a written justification for the decision announced. The individualistic tradition of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, moreover, permits justices who do not agree with the views of their brethren to say so, and to give their reasons for dissenting. Thus the Supreme Court on decision day takes on the aspect of a small legislature in which votes are cast pro and con on significant issues of public policy, with accompanying explanations much more coherent and systematic and better-reasoned than are customarily available in explanation of votes cast, say, in the United States Senate.

While it has not been usual to do so, these judicial votes can be subjected to the same kinds of analysis as have been traditionally employed for the study of legislative voting behavior. Thus Table I undertakes to throw light on the attitudes of members of the recent Court toward civil liberties claims by recording their votes as favoring or opposing the claimed liberties in some 84 nonunanimous cases decided during the six terms from October, 1946 to June, 1952.[2]

Such a table is useful, however, only if the analyst has some tenable hypothesis about the nature of the relations between a justice's decisions and his personal convictions. It would be naive to assume that justices in deciding cases are completely free to vote their own preferences, or that a voting record necessarily mirrors a justice's inner convictions. On the other hand, it would be even more naive to assume that a Supreme Court justice merely "looks up the law" on a subject and applies it to the case in hand.[3]

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[1] See *Leland* v. *Oregon,* 343 U. S. 790 (1952).

[2] This covers the period since Vinson became Chief Justice. The deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in the summer of 1949, and their replacement by Justices Clark and Minton, account for the only changes of personnel during the period.

TABLE I. VOTING RECORDS OF JUSTICES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL LIBERTIES DECISIONS, 1946–51 TERMS

	No. Cases	For Free Speech Claims	For Alien Claims	For Criminal Defendants' Claims		Total
				Federal	State	
No. Cases		23	18	17	26	84
Murphy	42	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Rutledge	43	100	100	85	100	95
Douglas	72	100	64	87	96	89
Black	83	96	100	53	88	86
Frankfurter	82	50	76	82	42	60
Majority	84	26	33	53	37	37
Jackson	82	23	44	59	13	32
Clark	23	13	0	33	38	22
Burton	84	17	28	18	15	19
Minton	36	19	18	0	17	17
Vinson	84	13	33	0	12	14
Reed	84	22	6	12	12	13

A workable hypothesis on Supreme Court decision-making must be formulated with an appreciation of the operating conditions under which the judge makes his choices. In many respects his situation is quite comparable with that of any individual who must make decisions on important matters within an institutional framework which brings to him questions for decision and provides mechanisms for making those decisions effective. Appellate courts share with legislatures the problem of decision-making in a collectivity of equals, in contrast to the conditions of decision-making in a hierarchy. We may tend to think of legislators as having greater freedom than judges in arriving at policy choices, but upon reflection it becomes obvious that legislators no more than judges are able to vote as free agents. They must think about what is good for their party. They must give some account to the probable effect of their vote on the prospects for reelection. They may decide to vote for something they do not want in order to get support for something they want very much. They may decide to vote for less than they want because their practical judgment tells them that is all they can get.

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[3] Chancellor Kent once explained how he arrived at decisions. He first made himself "master of the facts." Then, he continued: "I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search the authorities. . . . I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the case . . . ." Quoted in Jerome Frank, *Law and the Modern Mind* (New York, 1930), p. 104.

A Supreme Court justice finds himself in much the same situation, though operating within a judicial rather than a legislative context does make for some differences. He does not have a constituency of electors or a party position to consider. But the rules and traditions of the Court supply institutional preferences with which his own preferences must compete. One of these institutional preferences, for example, is *stare decisis*, the rule of precedent. The individual judge may think that the precedents are wrong, or outmoded. If so, he may follow his personal preference and state his reasons for voting to change the law. He is free to do that. He is not free to ignore the precedents, to act as though they did not exist. He has free choice, but among limited alternatives and only after he has satisfied himself that he has met the obligations of consistency and respect for settled principles which his responsibility to the Court imposes upon him. His private views as an individual help to form and may be incorporated into his public views as a justice, but they are not the same thing.

What this means, in more concrete terms, is that when a civil liberties case comes to the Supreme Court, the justices are not asked whether they are more or less in favor of civil liberties. They are asked how the Court, consistently with its role as the highest judicial body in a federal system, should dispose of a proceeding, the basic facts in which have been found and the form of which has been given by lower judicial bodies. Under these circumstances some justices may not even choose to think of the civil liberties issue in the case. They may see the controlling problem as adherence or non-adherence to the precedents. They may think of the issue as judicial respect for legislative action. As participants in the judicial process they have a perfect right to choose from among the alternatives presented the ones which determine their view of the case.

Thus it is that a statistical table or "box score" such as Table I cannot be accepted as an index of personal attachment to libertarian values on the part of the justices. These votes were cast, not in their personal but in their judicial capacity, and represented their resolution of situations where many legitimate values may have been competing for attention. What the table does establish is the degree to which each member of the

Court found it possible or desirable as a judge to prefer libertarian values over others present in the proceedings. These are what Mark DeWolfe Howe calls "relational statistics," and while Howe is a bitter critic of the statistical method as applied to judicial decisions, he is willing to admit that if interpreted on this basis box scores may be acceptable. But he adds the warning that relational statistics "have significance only when discriminating account is taken of all the values which are brought into relationship."[4]

Obviously it is impossible to identify all the values which each justice may have related to the decision of a case. But our working hypothesis is that a decision involving civil liberties questions will be primarily influenced by the interaction of two factors. One is the direction and intensity of a justice's libertarian sympathies, which will vary according to his weighting of the relative claims of liberty and order in our society. Theoretically, positions on a liberty-order attitude scale could range from an individualistic anarchism at one extreme to rigid authoritarianism on the other. The orthodoxy required for a Supreme Court appointment ensures, however, that the spread of opinion among members of that body will be much narrower.

The second factor is the conception which the justice holds of his judicial role and the obligations imposed on him by his judicial function. Every justice in deciding a case must give some thought to what is appropriate for him as a judge to do. The pressures which bear upon him are many, and they are mostly toward a pattern of conformity—conformity with precedents, conformity with the traditions of the law, conformity with public expectations as to how a judge should act, conformity toward established divisions of authority in a federal system based on the principle of separation of powers. While no justice can be oblivious to these pressures, they are not self-enforcing, and he is free to make his own interpretations of their requirements in guiding his own judicial conduct. The attitude scale involved may be thought of as ranging from an expansionist to a contractionist judicial philosophy, from broad to narrow judicial review, from judicial activism to judicial restraint.

Any attempt to rank justices on these two scales in an absolute fashion would be hopeless, but it should not be as difficult to locate them relatively to each other, and particularly by reference to their deviation from the Court's majority position at any one time. Table I shows that five members of the Vinson Court—Murphy, Rutledge, Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter—voted for libertarian claims substantially more often than the Court majority. In the terms of our hypothesis, the extremely high rate of support for libertarian claims registered by the first four of these justices suggests that they are strongly positive on both scales; their personal preferences must be strongly libertarian, and they must have a conception of their judicial function which permits or even requires them to give judicial effect to their libertarian preferences. Without assuming any absolute identity of views on their part, the motivation of these four justices can be characterized as libertarian activism.

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[4] "Justice in a Democracy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 184, pp. 34–36 (Dec., 1949).

II

The intense belief of the four libertarian activists in the principles of an open society could be endlessly demonstrated by reference to their opinions, but this statement of Black's must suffice for the purpose:

> I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our governmental system rests and without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.[5]

The primacy which this view attaches to liberty over order has been given a theoretical form in the constitutional doctrine of the "preferred position" of civil liberties. This doctrine has fulfilled an essential purpose in strengthening the "clear and present danger" test as developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, and particularly in remedying a gap in Holmes' work. The rule which he normally applied in determining the constitutionality of legislation was the "reasonable man" test. As he said in his famous dissent to *Lochner* v. *New York*, he would not invalidate any statute "unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."[6] Yet when it came to the matter of enforcing the Espionage Act during the First World War, as applied against persons who had used their rights of free speech to try to induce resistance to the draft, Holmes developed a different test.

> The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will

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[5] *Milk Wagon Drivers Union* v. *Meadowmoor Dairies*, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).

[6] 198 U. S. 45 (1905). And in *Meyer* v. *Nebraska* Holmes refused to hold invalid a state law against the teaching of German language in the primary schools, because he believed that whether children in their early years should hear and speak only English at school was "a question upon which men reasonably might differ and therefore I am unable to say that the Constitution of the United States prevents the experiment from being tried." 262 U. S. 390 (1923).

> bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.[7]

To be sure, the constitutionality of the Espionage Act was not in question in the *Schenck* case. The clear and present danger test was being employed rather to determine how closely words had to be related to illegal acts in order to be infected with their illegality. But by 1927 Justice Brandeis, with Holmes' concurrence, had developed clear and present danger into a test for the constitutionality of statutes. In *Whitney* v. *California* Brandeis said that a legislative declaration that a danger existed justifying restrictions on speech and assembly created merely a "rebuttable presumption." If the conditions alleged by the legislature did not in fact exist, then the courts, guided by the clear and present danger test, should refuse to enforce the statute.[8]

Holmes and Brandeis never satisfactorily explained why legislation affecting First Amendment freedoms had to pass the clear and present danger test, while other legislative actions were held to the less stringent test of reasonableness.[9] It was this failure which the preferred position argument remedied. Widely attributed to Stone's famous footnote in the 1938 case of *United States* v. *Carolene Products Co.*,[10] the notion that courts and legislatures must observe higher standards when dealing with First Amendment values was accepted not only by the four libertarian activists, but also by Roberts in the 1939 handbill cases[11] and Jackson in the second flag salute case. Said Jackson:

> The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.[12]

Reenforced by the preferred position doctrine, the clear and present danger test was applied by the libertarians during the 1940's to a wide variety of new situations, from restraints on picketing to citations for contempt of court.[13]

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[7] *Schenck* v. *United States*, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).

[8] 274 U. S. 357 (1927).

[9] See Frankfurter's comment in *Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 59–62.

[10] 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938).

[11] *Schneider* v. *New Jersey*, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).

[12] *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). However, when Frankfurter reviewed the history of the concept in his concurrence to *Kovacs* v. *Cooper*, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), he contended that the preferred position argument as he understood it had been held only by the four libertarians, and had "never commended itself to a majority of this Court."

This inventiveness was motivated by a crusading conception of the judicial function which is well reflected in Justice Murphy's statement that "The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."[14] Unpopular citizens of recent years, or at least "underdogs" in terms of their power positions, about whom the Court's libertarians have been concerned are such groups as aliens, American Indians, Jehovah's Witnesses, injured workmen seeking compensation from their employers, Communists, and defendants in criminal cases.

Sympathy for the underdog can seldom be given effect without a corresponding rejection of the claims of the upperdog. A decision that Jehovah's Witnesses can operate their loudspeaker in a small park on Sunday devalues the claims of those who just want to sit in the park and relax.[15] The right of a fascist to harangue his followers involves some conflict with the right of the community to be free from riots.[16] The activist "infracaninophile"[17] consistently favors the injured few over the allegedly suffering many.

Libertarian susceptibility to the case for the underdog often seems grounded in the judge's sympathetic identification with his plight,[18] but where the judge embraces the activist solution there must also be operating a sense of personal responsibility for the *result* achieved by the Court's decision. This incubus can be avoided by a conception that the Court is operating within limits and manipulating its powers according to external standards provided by the legal system.[19] But the activist cannot accept this limited role. He cannot rid himself of the notion that the Court does have a range of discretion, that there are choices open to him. Consequently he must make the choice which will give the right result. He cannot reconcile himself to the idea that there can be a wrong without a remedy—and a judicial remedy, not merely a legislative or electoral remedy.

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[13] *Thornhill* v. *Alabama,* 310 U. S. 88 (1940); *Bridges* v. *California,* 314 U. S. 252 (1941); *Pennekamp* v. *Florida,* 328 U. S. 331 (1946); *Craig* v. *Harney,* 331 U. S. 367 (1947).

[14] *Falbo* v. *United States,* 320 U. S. 549 (1944).

[15] *Saia* v. *New York,* 334 U. S. 558 (1948).

[16] *Terminiello* v. *Chicago,* 337 U. S. 1 (1949).

[17] A useful word apparently invented by Christopher Morley, who defines it as "the helper of the underdog." See Preface to *The Complete Sherlock Holmes* (New York, 1953), p. xv.

[18] Differences of approach are illustrated by the deportation cases at issue in *Carlson* v. *Landon,* 342 U. S. 524 (1952). Reed's majority opinion veiled the impact of the proposed deportations by impersonal references to petitioners' "many years residence spent in this country" and "their integration into community life through marriage and family connections." From Black's dissent, on the other hand, we get such particulars as that Mrs. Stevenson's husband is doing the housework while she is "detained in jail as dangerous to our national security," and that her son "has long been subject to attacks of undulant fever"; that Mr. Zydok has two U. S.-born sons who served in World War II, sold $50,000 worth of war bonds during the war while serving as a waiter, and donated blood on seven occasions to the Red Cross.

Consistency for the libertarian activist is the consistency of seeking wherever possible the libertarian result. In one case this may require loose construction of a statute, in another strict construction. Take two illustrative cases. Federal legislation covering railroad injuries is hopelessly old-fashioned; railroads are liable only for accidental injuries to employees resulting from the "negligence" of other employees. The activist reaction is to bring the legislation up to date by broadly interpreting its standards. Thus a fireman who had contracted silicosis by breathing silica dust from sand that was used in locomotive sanding boxes alleged faultily to release excessive amounts of sand was held to have suffered an "injury" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and an "accident" within the meaning of the Boiler Inspection Act.[20]

Contrariwise, narrow construction was the libertarian reaction of Justice Black in *United States* v. *Alpers*,[21] involving a conviction for shipping obscene phonograph records in interstate commerce. Black dissented from the conviction, because the statute covered shipment of obscene books, pamphlets, pictures, films, "or other matter of indecent character," but did not mention phonograph records specifically. "Censorship in any field may so readily encroach on constitutionally protected liberties that courts should not add to the list of items banned by Congress," he said.

Again, the libertarian activist's attitude toward procedural requirements varies according to the results achieved. Where procedure is a restraint on interference with liberties, it is welcomed and even treated as a constitutional requirement. Thus in *Trupiano* v. *United States*,[22] the libertarian majority insisted that a search warrant was necessary to justify seizure of moonshining equipment, even though the operator of the still was lawfully arrested in the midst of the implements of his crime. But Murphy, who wrote *Trupiano,* is also authority for the view that justices should cut through "formal concepts" if they stand in the way of a libertarian result. As he said in *Carter* v. *Illinois:*

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[19] This view was well stated by Justice Gibson in *Eakin* v. *Raub* (1825), where he argued that justices are in the situation of jurors in capital cases, who "do not deprive a prisoner of life by finding him guilty of a capital crime; [they] but pronounce his case to be within the law, and it is therefore those who declare the law . . . who deprive him of life." Quoted from R. E. Cushman, *Leading Constitutional Decisions* (8th ed., New York, 1946), p. 218.

[20] *Urie* v. *Thompson*, 337 U. S. 163 (1949).

[21] 338 U. S. 680 (1950). Frankfurter and Jackson also dissented.

[22] 334 U. S. 699 (1948).

> Legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of ignoring plain facts before us, facts upon which a man's very life or liberty conceivably could depend. . . . But the *result* certainly does not enhance the high traditions of the judicial process.[23]

III

The Vinson Court's fifth libertarian, according to the evidence of Table I, is Justice Frankfurter. However, the substantially lesser degree of support for libertarian claims shown by his record indicates that he is either less libertarian, or less activist, or both, than the four justices who outrank him. There is a widespread impression that Frankfurter has not acted like a liberal on the Court. It derives from the position he has taken in such important controversies as the two flag salute cases,[24] the two sound truck cases,[25] *Dennis* v. *United States,*[26] *Feiner* v. *New York,*[27] *International Brotherhood of Teamsters* v. *Hanke,*[28] and numerous others.

It derives also from the bitter campaign he has waged against use of the clear and present danger test, with or without preferred position amplification, as a guide for judicial decisions in the civil liberties field. As the self-anointed disciple of Holmes on the Vinson Court, many have found it strange that he should so vehemently deny the utility of Holmes' principal contribution to free speech theory. His answer has been: (1) that the test was being used for a *purpose* other than Holmes intended—namely, to determine the constitutionality of legislation; (2) that it was being applied in much different *areas* than Holmes contemplated, including contempt of court proceedings, libel cases, and application of petty police regulations; and (3) that the *spirit* of its recent use was much different than Holmes would have approved.

On this latter point he said in *Pennekamp* v. *Florida:*

> "Clear and present danger" was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken from its context.

When viewed in context, he contended, the bias of the test was as much toward regulation as toward freedom:

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[23] 329 U. S. 173 (1946). Italics added.

[24] *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis,* 310 U. S. 586 (1940); *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette, supra.*

[25] *Saia* v. *New York, supra; Kovacs* v. *Cooper, supra.*

[26] 341 U. S. 494 (1951). [27] 340 U. S. 315 (1951). [28] 339 U. S. 470 (1950).

> In its setting it served to indicate the importance of freedom of speech to a free society but also to emphasize that its exercise must be compatible with the preservation of other freedoms essential to a democracy and guaranteed by our Constitution.

Consequently he concluded in the *Dennis* case:

> It were far better that the phrase be abandoned than that it be sounded once more to hide from the believers in an absolute right of free speech the plain fact that the interest in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy or than a determination of the people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the safety of government itself.[29]

These apparently anti-libertarian doctrines and results, however, can be explained on the basis of a libertarian theory—the theory that the primary responsibility of a liberal justice is to restrain the exercise of judicial power. This theory sees the Court not as crusader or advocate, but as one of the instruments of political and social accommodation and adjustment in a complicated governmental system. As opposed to the goal-orientation of the activists, this view might be called functionally-oriented. Its announced emphasis is not on securing a result conforming to the jurist's own scheme of values, but upon adherence to appropriate judicial standards and proper manipulation of judicial techniques.

Standards for determining the appropriateness of judicial reactions are derived from considerations of the position of an appellate court within the federal judicial system, and of the position of the entire judicial branch vis à vis the legislature and executive in a system based on the separation of powers. This point of view will be much concerned with fixing the boundaries of judicial power, and will conceive that it is the justice's primary responsibility to stay within the confines of those boundaries.

In application, this concern about judicial limitations has been responsible for strict construction of the Court's jurisdiction over "cases and controversies," for the doctrine of "political questions" which are immune to judicial review, for the various rules protecting acts of Congress from being declared unconstitutional, for the "reasonable man" theory of review of state legislation. Where the Court has in the past divided on application of these principles of judicial limitation, it has typically been the liberal justices who have stressed the necessity for judicial self-restraint, as opposed to the conservative practice of broad judicial review. It was a liberal minority which spoke through Justice Stone during the New Deal constitutional crisis with the now classic warning that "the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."[30] And it was in *Ashwander* v. *TVA* that the liberal trio of Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo reformulated the general principles of limited judicial review of constitutional questions.[31]

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[29] As for the "preferred position" doctrine, in *Kovacs* v. *Cooper* he refers to it as "a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity . . . . I say the phrase is mischievous because it radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it."

Frankfurter's attempts to apply these principles of libertarian restraint clearly account for many of the anti-libertarian results he has achieved. Because the Court is the least representative or democratically responsible of the three branches of government, he feels under great pressure to yield to both Congress and the executive.[32] Examples of his deference to the President are found in the Hawaiian martial law case, where he objected to the Court's second-guessing, from the safe vantage point of 1946, military decisions made in 1941 and 1942;[33] and *Ludecke* v. *Watkins*, where he foreclosed judicial review of presidentially-approved deportations of alien enemies.[34] Comparable examples of deference to Congress are *United States* v. *Lovett*, where he denied that it is a bill of attainder when Congress forbids specific individuals from being paid out of an appropriation act,[35] and *United States* v. *CIO*, where he was part of a majority which avoided declaring part of the Taft-Hartley Act unconstitutional by holding that it must not mean what Taft had said it meant.[36]

In the famous steel seizure case, Frankfurter was caught in the cross-fire between President and Congress, and could not be deferential to both. He chose Congress, but his opinion nonetheless gave respectful consideration to the case for the President, and he wound up with the suggestion that a very minor change in the presidential seizure formula might have legitimized the action.[37] In contrast, Black and Douglas, undeterred by conceptions of self-restraint, dogmatically condemned the President's action on the basis of a rigorous and naive interpretation of separation of powers. Black disposed of the entire controversy in thirteen paragraphs, and on such a plane of lofty moral and constitutional generalities that he did not bother to cite a single Supreme Court decision bearing on the substantive issue.

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[30] *United States* v. *Butler*, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).

[31] 297 U. S. 288 (1936). Roberts also joined this trio.

[32] In *Dennis* v. *United States*, *supra*, he wrote: "Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits."

[33] *Duncan* v. *Kahanamoku*, 327 U. S. 304 (1946).

[34] 335 U. S. 160 (1948).

[35] 328 U. S. 303 (1946).

[36] 335 U. S. 106 (1948).

[37] *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.* v. *Sawyer*, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Frankfurter said: "The judiciary may, as this case proves, have to intervene in determining where authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme of government. But in doing so we should be wary and humble. Such is the teaching of this Court's rôle in the history of the country." As to the change in formula, he wrote: "We must . . . put to one side consideration of what powers the President would have had . . . if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be determined automatically unless Congressional approval were given."

The principle of federalism is another powerful restraining force for Frankfurter, with state legislatures and courts as the principal beneficiaries. In upholding the Illinois "group libel" law, he contended that state legislatures must have the power to pursue "trial-and-error" methods in seeking solutions for social problems.[38] In *Colegrove* v. *Green* he denied an appeal to the federal courts "to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois."[39] In the *Terminiello* case he was appalled that a majority of his colleagues should have reversed a state conviction on a federal ground which the Supreme Court itself had discovered and which the parties had never presented:

> This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.

In *Uveges* v. *Pennsylvania* a somewhat similar eagerness to find error in a state court's action led him to say: "After all, this is the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, not a super-legal-aid bureau."[40] And in the infamous case of *Screws* v. *United States*, where a Georgia sheriff had murdered a Negro he had under detention, Frankfurter dissented against application of a federal civil rights law to a "patently local crime."[41]

Thus Frankfurter seems to have worked out and applied a fairly consistent policy of self-restraint in civil liberties adjudication. But how do we know whether this is the reflection of genuine libertarian restraint, or merely convenient rationalization for a fundamentally anti-libertarian set of personal preferences? One way of throwing light on such a difficult motivational problem[42] is to examine his voting reactions in situations where judicial restraint would not be required by his philosophy. Two of the four types of cases in Table I fall in this category—aliens and federal criminal prosecutions. Since both types involve federal action, there is no problem of deference to states. Since the alien cases practically all turn on matters of statutory interpretation, there is no problem of restraint to avoid declarations of unconstitutionality. The federal prosecutions do raise constitutional issues, but in the form of practices in the lower federal courts, over which the Supreme Court has rather complete supervisory responsibilities. In both types of cases Frankfurter's record is positively libertarian—in alien cases more so than Douglas', in federal criminal prosecutions more so than Black's. Thus Frankfurter's motivation appears to be genuinely that of libertarian restraint.

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[38] *Beauharnais* v. *People*, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).

[39] 328 U. S. 549 (1946).

[40] 335 U. S. 437 (1948).

[41] 325 U. S. 91 (1945). In *United States* v. *Williams*, 341 U. S. 70 (1951), Frankfurter carried the majority with him in adopting a restrictive interpretation for a companion federal civil rights statute.

[42] Another method, of course, is to review Frankfurter's record on civil liberties before he became a member of the Supreme Court.

IV

The two schools of libertarian thought on the Vinson Court have in a substantial number of cases found common ground to stand on against the views of less libertarian members of the Court.[43] But in other respects their differences are great. The strength of libertarian activism is that of a dedicated idealism to the cause of liberty which holds fast against the most powerful pressures. No one should underestimate or undervalue the courage manifested by the Black and Douglas dissents in the *Dennis* case, or fail to appreciate the strength of their conviction that "right" will ultimately triumph. It is very useful and provocative to have the pure free speech doctrine defended in such an influential forum. No matter how much Frankfurter may scorn "preferred position" as a judicial tool, such talk unquestionably has an educational value for an unsophisticated public.

But libertarian activism has the defects of its virtues. A Supreme Court justice has a task which is broader than that of safeguarding or enforcing one set of values. He must balance the competing claims of liberty and authority. If he automatically takes the libertarian side on every issue, he is scarcely functioning in a balancing capacity. The preferred position philosophy is the activists' way of justifying, or even of requiring, this extra emphasis on libertarian values. Actually, the preferred position argument is not incompatible with the balancing process; its result is simply to throw an extra weight on one side of the scales, like the butcher who consistently weighs his thumb along with the meat.

What does seem incompatible with the balancing process is "label thinking," which makes use of absolutistic standards or fixed categories. For Black, prior restraint is prior restraint, and therefore unconstitutional, whether the restraint is aimed at Jehovah's Witnesses ringing doorbells or the gigantic conspiracy of the Communist party. It would seem preferable that the determining factor in a judgment of constitutionality should be, not the label by which the restraint is called, but the seriousness of the threat to freedom and the justification offered for the limitation.

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[43] In 34 of the 194 nonunanimous decisions during the 1949–51 terms, Black and Frankfurter dissented together. Of these 34 cases, 22 raised civil liberties issues.

Label thinking unfits a justice to make distinctions based on matters of degree, and results in the kind of absolutistic standards seen at work in Black's steel seizure decision. Label thinking leads a judge into a world of abstractions in which the facts of particular cases are unimportant, as Douglas demonstrated by his unrealistic approach to the *Terminiello* case. Label thinking encourages a justice to apply to a statute legal rather than empirical tests, as Murphy did when he declared an anti-picketing statute unconstitutional "on its face" in *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*. Considering the subsequent difficulties the Court has had with the *Thornhill* doctrine, it would have been preferable if Murphy had set the holding in a framework of circumstances rather than of concepts. Paul A. Freund makes this point well in comparing the Court's treatment of commerce and civil liberties questions:

> A free market in ideas and a free national market in goods are basic processes in our constitutional system. Each must nevertheless submit to qualifications in collision with other public interests. If the Court has on the whole been more successful in finding serviceable accommodations under the Commerce Clause between a national free market and the claims of local welfare than under the First Amendment between liberty of the mind and the claims of public order, one reason may be the more empiric, particularistic approach that has generally characterized the performance of the former role.[44]

Frankfurter's consciously elaborated standard of judicial restraint raises problems of a different sort. He is clearly justified in wanting to develop and act on a sound, consistent philosophy of the judicial function in a democracy. But he has carried his preoccupation with restraint to almost pathological extremes in an effort to ensure and demonstrate that his own decisions are the product of legal principles operating under antiseptic conditions and untouched by personal preferences. In case after case he has prefaced his decision by a disquisition on the duality of Frankfurter the man and Frankfurter the judge. Mostly he has been concerned with showing why as a judge he has felt compelled to come to conclusions which as a citizen he would never support. Thus in the second flag salute case he explained his refusal to hold unconstitutional the compulsory flag salute in public schools as follows:

> One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not

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[44] "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term: Foreword—The Year of the Steel Case," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 66, p. 97 (1952).

> likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should whole-heartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime.[45]

In *Haley* v. *Ohio* he referred to the fact that as a judge he could not give effect to his personal disbelief in capital punishment.[46] In the curious case of *Louisiana* v. *Resweber*, where a condemned man had failed to die in the electric chair because of its faulty mechanism, Frankfurter supplied the fifth vote for the Court's ruling that a second trip to the chair would not be double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment. He said:

> I cannot rid myself of the conviction that were I to hold that Louisiana would transgress the Due Process Clause if the State were allowed, in the precise circumstances before us, to carry out the death sentence, I would be enforcing my private view rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Constitution.[47]

But how does Frankfurter propose to find standards which are external to his own value system? In the electric chair case, he professed to rely on "the consensus of society's opinion." But how did he know what the consensus of opinion was on a subject that had never arisen before? Instead of the result at which he arrived, could he not have assumed with equal validity that his own personal aversion to sending this man on a second trip to the electric chair was what any normally sensitive human being would have felt?

In the *Haley* case he went further, indicating that judicial humility, plus self-administered psychoanalysis, was the answer:

> Humility in this context means an alert self-scrutiny so as to avoid infusing into the vagueness of a Constitutional command one's merely private notions. Like other mortals, judges, though unaware, may be in the grip of prepossessions. The only way to relax such a grip, the only way to avoid finding in the Constitution the personal bias one has placed in it, is to explore the influences that have shaped one's unanalyzed views in order to lay bare prepossessions.

These statements afford fascinating glimpses into a sophisticated judicial mind at work, but as public bulletins of successful inner purgation they carry a "holier than thou" inference with respect to disagreeing justices which seems quite unjustified. For Frankfurter's accounts certainly misstate or oversimplify the problem of judicial motivation. No matter how conscious or even heroic the efforts, the man and the judge can never be separated, and the gratifications of deprivation are as personally rooted as the gratifications of indulgence.

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[45] *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette, supra.*

[46] 332 U. S. 596 (1948).

[47] 329 U. S. 459 (1947).

Frankfurter's major guides are negative in character—judicial self-restraint, deference to the legislature, the executive, and the states. But deciding Supreme Court cases is a positive job. There are responsibilities of judging which the Court cannot put off on a state court or a legislature. Frankfurter has on occasions come too close to abdicating this responsibility. Thus in the *Feiner* case he deferred to the New York Court of Appeals because it was an able and sensitive court. Application of this rule would give the preposterous situation of the Court's responsibility varying in different cases depending upon the reputation of the supreme court of the state from which the appeal came.

Both activism and restraint, then, have their limitations as working principles for libertarians on the Supreme Court. Neither emotional zeal which prejudges the issues, nor judicial neutralism which seeks ways of avoiding the substantive questions, will do. A Supreme Court justice must be able, and willing, to balance some of the most delicate, intangible, yet superlatively important issues that can arise in a democratic society. He must be a creature of the times and sensitive to the same currents of opinion as move legislators, to the end that the standards of reasonableness by which he judges legislative action will not be detached from reality. But he must at the same time be sensitive to the system of expectations which has made the Supreme Court the American conscience, with the responsibility, not merely of preaching to legislatures, but of passing judgment on their actions in the light of the great libertarian principles of the Bill of Rights.

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN BRITISH POLITICS

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I

Britain may fairly be called the classic home of two-party government. This claim is justifiable because of some characteristics for which the system, as employed in Britain, is distinctive. Chief among these is its long duration. Although there is room for disagreement among historians about the time and circumstances of its birth, it would be difficult to deny that two-party government was established earlier, has lasted longer, and at the present time is probably more firmly rooted there than in any contemporary state. Indeed, the practice of simplifying the complexities of politics into a contest for office between a pair of major claimants has endured in Britain through a catalogue of changes which would assuredly have wrecked a less effective system. In that country it has survived the evolution from an oligarchy of aristocrats to a democracy of the whole people; the transfer of power from monarchy to parliament and then from parliament to cabinet; the rise of large-scale industry with its social aftermath; the switch in economic policy from mercantilism to laissez faire and from this to state planning; and withal, the expansion and subsequent shrinkage of Britain's international might.

Especially in recent decades, moreover, both major parties have developed a strength of organization and tightness of discipline, to which New Zealand offers the nearest parallel inside the British Commonwealth and no similar approximation exists outside. For this reason, Britain, whose two powerful parties differ so sharply from the plethora of groups in France, also stands in contrast to the United States. What we have in this country can more accurately be described as two party systems rather than a two-party system. In the election of Senators and Representatives and in the conduct of congressional business, the size and diversity of the United States have fostered a multiplicity of groups more akin to the politics of France than of Britain. Every four years, however, in order to capture the presidency, these groups amalgamate into two large and loose coalitions—like federal unions within a federal union. But even during a presidential election the cohesiveness of the Democrats and Republicans is far from matching that of the Conservatives and Laborites.

Many studies have been made of parties which examine their structure and organization, the interests they represent, and the programs they espouse. Also plentiful, because of the controversies surrounding proportional representation and because of the political experiences of various European nations, are discussions about the pros and cons of having two parties or many. Relatively less attention has been paid, however, to the problem of explaining why one or the other system emerges and survives and to that of detecting the circumstances which accompany and may cause the respective systems. With this problem, as it relates to Britain, the present article is concerned. It is written in the belief that a science of politics needs to devote more attention to the diagnosis of causation and that the comparative study of government can offer the best approach to its elucidation. The study of a single country, as is evident, can lead to conclusions which are valid for it alone and do not in themselves warrant a wider application. But such conclusions will suggest hypotheses for testing in other contexts, so that, when these are checked by a comparative method, a reliable body of argument can be pieced together.

The pitfalls on the way are, of course, many and deep. Frequently in efforts to analyze causal relationships there is much that consists of assertion rather than evidence; of assumed, instead of established, connections; and of effects mistaken for causes. Moreover, there is the danger in a complex situation of seeking the simple explanation of a single cause and believing one has found it. If these traps are successfully avoided, it should be possible to state, with more certainty than can be done at present, what conditions are responsible for the generation and operation of each type of party system; whether the causes that sustain it are identical with those from which it initially derived; whether similar factors, reproduced in like combination in different places, always yield the same results; and whether the same consequences may sometimes flow from dissimilar causes.

To avoid misunderstanding, a few preliminary clarifications are necessary, since discussion can otherwise be sidetracked and mired down in a semantic bog. A state has a two-party system if it satisfies the following conditions:

(1) Not more than two parties at any given time have a genuine chance to gain power.

(2) One of these is able to win the requisite majority and stay in office without help from a third party.

(3) Over a number of decades two parties alternate in power.

Such a statement has the merit of being politically realistic. It recognizes that, even where two giant organizations dominate the political process, some Lilliputian groups may exist alongside of them. Only if one of the latter should succeed in holding the balance between the principal contenders does the two-party system cease, as is the case, for instance, in contemporary Australia. The list of conditions further permits the possibility that a major party may dwindle and decline and eventually be replaced by a newcomer, just as the British Laborites supplanted the Liberals. While this is happening, of course, a three-party system may emerge temporarily (witness Britain in the period from 1918 to 1931). It is also compatible with a two-party system for a major party to suffer a prolonged eclipse and be overshadowed by its rival in a series of elections, as the Whigs overwhelmed the Tories from 1714 to 1760 and the Liberals led the Conservatives between 1846 and 1874, and the Conservatives in their turn prevailed from 1886 to 1905. The presence within the system of minor parties which are unable to affect the control of power; a lengthy ascendancy of one party; even the extinction of a major party and the rise of a new one; these phenomena do not signify the abandonment of the two-party system provided that the previously stated conditions are fulfilled. What really matters is that over the long run government through two parties be clearly revealed as the norm, from which any departure is only temporary and to which the system always returns.[1] Judged by these criteria, Britain may be said to have operated the two-party system for two and a half centuries. Thus the long Whig ascendancy that began in 1714 did not prevent a Tory resurgence in 1760. Domestic conservatism during the Napoleonic period and immediately afterwards did not make impossible the Liberal-sponsored reforms of the 1830's. The Conservatives split in 1846 over the protection of home-grown wheat, but were reassembled by Disraeli so as to triumph in 1874. The Liberals were splintered in 1885–86, but came firmly into power in 1905–6. The Laborites were divided and routed in 1931, yet returned to sweep the country in 1945. A three-party system existed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century because of the Irish question and the talents of Parnell, and again in the 1920's when Laborites were rising and the Liberals were declining. But the two-party system reasserted itself after each of these seeming deviations.

Another problem, which is one of both definition and interpretation, concerns the meaning of the term "party." The statement made earlier that the two-party system in Britain is characterized chiefly by its longevity assumes that certain features persist continuously for centuries. But was there in fact anything in the politics of the eighteenth century that can properly be called "a party"? Is it perhaps a misnomer to use the same word to refer to the varied political associations that mark the eras of the Pelhams and the Pitts, of Grey and Peel, of Gladstone and Disraeli, of Asquith and Balfour, of Attlee and Churchill?

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[1] In suggesting that British politics are characterized by a two and a half party system, Carl J. Friedrich overemphasizes the deviations. *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (rev. ed., Boston, 1950), p. 414.

The truth is too plain to require argument that the lapse of more than two centuries has wrought changes that are substantial and profound. British politics a couple of hundred years ago were decidedly oligarchical and the government of those days was cast in a wholly aristocratic mold. After a hundred years had elapsed, the urban middle class had broken the earlier monopoly of aristocrats, but the majority of the public were still denied an influential voice in decisions that affected them. The principal differences between the older and more modern "parties" are to be found in the interests they represent and the structure of their organizations. The parties of today cohere together in a disciplined fashion which assuredly has no earlier parallel. Between them, their leadership and their followers include members of each class and of all the interests that comprise the national life. Such changes are, of course, explicable in terms of the fact which is fundamental to the politics of a fully developed democracy: the number who participate in its processes. When all adults have the right to vote, and eighty three or four per cent of them exercise it, as happened in the British elections of 1950 and 1951, the coalescing of millions and the harmonizing of their interests become the job of the political party.

But when all this is said, as say it we must, is the existence of parties before the modern era to be denied? No such conclusion is necessitated by the facts. The point that modern parties are greatly changed from their predecessors applies not only to them but to every institution of British government. The twentieth-century parliament, cabinet, monarchy, judiciary, civil service, and local authorities have all evolved into forms unlike what existed earlier. But though the cabinet under Churchill differs from its archetype under Walpole; though the figurehead monarchy of Elizabeth II is a far cry from the personal supremacy of Elizabeth I; though the Commons of Bevin and Bevan is many stages removed in functions, work-load, and membership from that of Pym and Hampden—nevertheless the identical terms are rightly used because of the unifying theme that has persisted throughout the variations. This may be done without abuse to language or to sense, provided that there be a substantial continuity of the institution concerned and reasonable comparability of the functions it performed then and performs now. Do the parties meet this test? In my judgment they do. Essentially a party is a group of people who are sufficiently likeminded to work together in order to secure control of the government and apply the policies that promote their interests. Within the breadth of that definition may be included a clique of aristocrats, an association of middle-class entrepreneurs, or a mass movement drawing millions to its banners. In that sense the label "party" can be applied alike to the gatherings that followed a Walpole, Peel, or Baldwin, for though these differed in the nature and number of their adherents, there is an unmistakable continuity that underlies the objectives they sought and the role they played.

II

Many reasons have been offered for the existence in British politics of two-party government. The various explanations are broadly of two kinds. Sometimes the system is interpreted as the outcome of specific institutions which supposedly lend themselves to the formation of two major parties and no more than two. Alternatively the roots of the two parties are traced to the foundations of British society and economics. Let us examine each of the suggested "causes" in turn.

The theories which seek to derive the two-party system from the structure of British political institutions have not failed to pay honorable mention to the cabinet. Indeed it was only to be expected that attempts to solve the riddle of the party system would connect it in some way with the cabinet, the latter being the key institution in British government. To assert, however, that a relation exists between factor A and factor B is one thing; to prove that in that relationship A is the cause, and B the effect, is quite another. This difficulty is well borne out by the course of the discussion over this very assumption that cabinet government caused two-party government. When A. Lawrence Lowell wrote his *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, he argued:

> The result [so long as the ministers cling together] is that the members either group themselves about the ministers, and vote with them through thick and thin, or else they attach themselves to an opposition party, whose object is to turn out the cabinet, and then take office itself and carry on a different policy. The normal condition of the parliamentary system, therefore, among a people sufficiently free from prejudices to group themselves naturally, and possessing enough experience to know that the practical and attainable, and not the ideal, is the true aim in politics, is a division into two parties, each of which is ready to take office whenever the other loses its majority. . . .
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> A division into two parties is not only *the normal result* of the parliamentary system, but also an essential condition of its success.[2]

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[2] (Boston and New York, 1896), Vol. 1, pp. 71-72. My italics.

By the time that he published *The Government of England*, Lowell's position had shifted. He was still convinced that a causal connection existed between the cabinet and the party system. But he had now veered round to the view that, instead of the cabinet system causing the formation of two parties, it was the parties which preceded and caused the cabinet system, though he did think that the consequence had later reacted on its cause.

> Neither the parliamentary system nor the party system, neither the responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons nor the permanent division into two parties, grew up in a day. Throughout the eighteenth century the principle of cabinet responsibility was but dimly recognised; while parties at times disintegrated, and the wheels of government were kept going by means of corruption, which has served in all ages as a lubricant for ill-adjusted political machinery. But little by little, with halting steps, the rivalry of parties built up the responsibility of ministers, and this in turn helped to perpetuate the party divisions; for the parliamentary system, like every rational form of government, reacts upon and strengthens the conditions of its own existence. It is based upon party, and by the law of its nature tends to accentuate party. . . . The parliamentary system, as it has grown up spontaneously in England, is *in its origin* and nature government by party, sanctioned and refined by custom.[3]

Lowell's afterthoughts were more accurate than his first impressions, for the notion that the two-party system is a by-product of the cabinet system encounters some fatal objections. There is, for example, the elementary chronological fact that the clustering of political factions into two major groups occurred at an earlier date than the emergence of the cabinet and thus could not have been caused by that institution. Like complex tapestries, the Whig and Tory combinations were woven of many strands, some of which connect directly with the Civil War between Parliamentarians and Royalists, while others may be more deviously and tenuously traced to the religious controversies of the sixteenth century or to earlier feuds among the nobility such as the Wars of the Roses. Certain it is, however, that after the last and most stupid Stuart was compelled to abdicate, the reigns of William and Mary and of Anne did witness the more orderly beginnings of bipolar politics with its essential corollary of alternation in office. For if it was the Whigs who understood Britain's interest in the War of the Spanish Succession, who pitted the nation's strength against the Sun-King, and who discovered the first genius with the surname Churchill, it was the

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[3] *The Government of England* (New York, 1912), Vol. 1, pp. 457, 458. My italics. See also Vol. 2, p 86.

Tories who divined when the time for peace had come and negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht.

The cabinet system, however, postdated these events. Its central principles—that the Crown should select as ministers only those who are supported by a parliamentary majority and that these should be collectively responsible for the acts of one and all—could be applied in practice only because the parties were already there to make them work. Indeed, as G. M. Trevelyan has observed, the party was the vital difference through which cabal was converted into cabinet.[4] Add the fortunate accident of personality that a Walpole's talents were available to exercise among Englishmen the arts of leadership which a German-tongued Hanoverian prince could not, and thus the same party system which produced the ministry endowed it with its prime minister.

Comparative evidence presents another difficulty to adherents of the view that the cabinet produces two-party politics. Such evidence, it is true, must be cautiously employed, since it is impossible to prove by means of imported data that something must have, or could not have, happened in a particular country. Nevertheless, the fact remains that virtually all the countries of continental Europe which have adopted cabinet government also have multi-party systems. This suggests that the cabinet, *per se*, was not the prime cause of the party system in Britain, for, were that the case, it might reasonably be expected that when cabinets were installed elsewhere, they would give rise to the same consequences. Since the cabinet system, however, can be found associated in more cases with multi-party systems than with a two-party system, and since the latter instances occur only within the British Commonwealth, the existence of two parties would appear to be the product of other elements that are peculiar to the British tradition.

One such element, which some political scientists have proffered in argument, is the cabinet's use of the power to dissolve a parliament. How this is supposed to discourage the formation of more than two parties is thus explained by Harold F. Gosnell:

> In Great Britain the two-party system is also perpetuated by the type of parliamentary government which the British have evolved. The Prime Minister can dissolve Parliament and declare new elections. This gives the party in

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[4] "The party bond introduced a principle of unity among Cabinet Ministers other than that of mere individual obedience to the orders of the King. For that reason, party is the real secret of the step upwards from Cabal to Cabinet. The mutual loyalty of members inside the Cabinet was a reflection of the habit of party loyalty among the same persons in the world outside." *The Two-Party System in English Political History,* Romanes Lecture, (Oxford, 1926).

power a firm grip over its members in the House of Commons, and discourages their trying any insurrections or new ventures, since re-election is a troublesome and uncertain matter. In doubtful British constituencies, winning an election is difficult, and the support of a major party is almost a necessity. The party in power keeps its members in the House from straying, and the opposition party is well disciplined because this is the only way that it can hope to come to power.[5]

The case is further buttressed by a reference to France, the classic example of multi-party politics. Because under the Third Republic the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies was used only once and then became obsolescent, people often assume that this fact helps to explain why the legislature, dominated by the cabinet in Britain, dominates over it in France. This line of reasoning scarcely supports the pretended conclusion, since it omits a number of considerations that point in another direction. The argument assumes that a ministry is better equipped to enforce party regularity among its followers in the Commons because it alone can take the initiative of deciding when to hold a general election and, if defeated in parliament, may prefer to go to the country rather than tamely resign. But precisely how this flexibility in the timing of elections strengthens the disciplinary control of the cabinet is not proven. Such a control does, of course, exist. But it rests primarily on other foundations: the cost of winning a general election; the centralization of party finances; the dependence of many members on their salaries; the power of the party leadership to endorse local candidates; and the absence of any requirement that a candidate must reside in his district, which makes him depend for his seat more on the leaders and less on his constituents. In the light of such potent considerations, it makes relatively little difference to most back-benchers whether a general election will be called this year, next year, or two years hence. At some time, as he well knows, the day of reckoning must come. Whenever it does, he depends for renomination on the favor of the leadership, and that dependence would still hold good in Britain even if elections were held there with the clock-work regularity of the American system.[6]

The point is clearly illustrated by the experience of the country whose politics approximate most nearly to the British model. New Zealand has a similar two-party pattern; both parties are well disciplined; and its cabinet, of the familiar British type, dominates the legislature. For six decades after 1889, however, the power of dissolution was never employed. Elections were regularly held every three years, save on three occasions when Parliament extended its own life. Even when the power of dissolution was resuscitated in 1951, the circumstances in no way involved the survival of the ministry, a split in the government party, or a parliamentary stalemate. A system of two tight-knit parties, therefore, does not depend upon a power to dissolve and the practice of having irregularly spaced elections.

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[5] *Democracy: the Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948), p. 242.

[6] It is worth noticing that though the intervals between British elections are irregular, the average length of Parliaments corresponds to the term of the President. Between 1832 and 1952, there were thirty general elections in one hundred and twenty years. Moreover, the change from the Septennial Act of 1715 to the quinquennial term provided under the Parliament Act of 1911 made no difference in this respect. From 1832 through 1910 twenty elections occurred in almost eighty years; from 1911 to 1952, ten were held in four decades.

Furthermore, if the power to dissolve were actually such a deterrent to party rebels as is believed, how does one explain the cases of defiant party members, and actual splits that have occurred? The ministerial power of dissolution did not deter Disraeli from rising against Peel in 1846, or Chamberlain and the Liberal Unionists from crossing over to the Conservatives in 1886, or Henderson and his cohorts from breaking with Macdonald in 1931. Indeed, there may even be occasions when a group of dissidents, so far from coming to heel, withdraw their support from ministers and deliberately provoke a dissolution in the hope that an election may work to their own advantage, as was clearly Parnell's stratagem when he switched from Gladstone to Salisbury in 1885.

Nor can French politics during the Third Republic be properly adduced as evidence that the absence of a power to dissolve modifies the character of the party system. That reasoning is fallacious because it takes for granted, instead of proving, the point which is really in issue. What has to be explained is why a power that was explicitly written into the Constitutional Law of February 25, 1875,[7] and was employed as early as 1877, was never used again. The answer is, of course, that, owing to the politics of the *Seize Mai* affair, a trick which the monarchists had devised against the republicans recoiled upon the heads of its promoters, for it was the republicans who won the election which their rivals engineered. Henceforth the Right feared to risk a second attempt, so that even Doumergue failed to reactivate the power of dissolution in the early 1930's; and the Left were reluctant to invoke it, since they remembered 1877, and in any case they were unlikely to enlist the necessary consent of the conservatively-inclined Senate. But the implications of this truth have often been misunderstood. The truth is that the power to dissolve atrophied because the structure of the party system precluded the use of its potentialities. When there are many parties, and every government is a coalition, it is harder to reach agreement about the time to dissolve than when a single party takes the decision. It was the parties, in other words, that determined the use, or rather disuse, of the power to dissolve, and not the latter which determined the character of the parties. Possibly, moreover, although it is still too early to speak with assurance, the same will prove to be true of France's Fourth Republic. Whilst the Constitution of 1946 reincorporates a power of dissolution,[8] the parties of the "Third Force" coalition, which could have staged the requisite *crises ministerielles*,[9] and precipitated an election in 1948 or 1949, showed a marked reluctance to brandish a weapon which might be twisted from night-stick into boomerang.

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[7] Article 5.

Of all the attempts, however, to interpret the parties as the product of other political institutions, the most popular view attributes the existence of two parties to the operation of the electoral system. Perhaps no commonplace is so widely held, and so seldom questioned, among students of politics, as the notion that single-member districts combined with plurality victories foster a two-party system, with its corollary that proportional representation promotes a multiplicity of parties. Thus, in a recent work Robert G. Neumann categorically states: "The existence of a two-party system in Britain is an historical accident which has been preserved by the plurality system of elections and the single-member constituency."[10] Similarly, but with more general application, V. O. Key has written:

> Among the influences leading the electorate to divide itself into only two major groups, great weight must be attributed to the system of choosing representatives from single-member districts by a plurality vote in contrast with systems of proportional representation which, of necessity, are based on multi-member districts. In a single-member district only two parties can contend for electoral victory with any hope of success; a third party is doomed to perpetual defeat unless it can manage to absorb the following of one of the major parties and thereby become one of the two parties itself. Parties do not thrive on the certainty of defeat. Faced by this prospect the only alternative is to support one or the other of two parties. The single-member district thus molds parties into the bipartisan pattern.[11]

How does this argument apply to the case of Britain? Does it fit the facts of that country's politics? There are some important respects in which it fails to do so.

In the first place, the effect of the plurality requirement has to be considered. If victory in the election required a majority of the votes cast, it is true that a two-party system would be more likely to arise, since groups would be encouraged to coalesce in order to build up the necessary strength.[12] But that is not the British system. On the contrary the mathematics of victory by a bare plurality would, if not counteracted by other influences, foster the politics of a multi-party system, because the larger groups could expect to win seats without entering into wider unions. As for the single-member districts, the proponents of the theory ignore the awkward truth that in Britain these postdated the rise of the two-party system. Prior to the Reform Act of 1832, the House of Commons contained a total of 558 members, of whom only 74 (13%) were returned from single-member districts.[13] As a result of the redistributions of 1832, 1867, and 1885, districts with a single member were gradually substituted for those with two members. But it was not until 1885 that the former became the rule.[14] From that date through 1952, eighteen elections have been conducted in this new style. What has been the effect of the change?

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[8] Article 51.

[9] As defined in the Constitution, *ibid.*

[10] *European and Comparative Government* (New York, 1951), p. 142.

[11] *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (2nd ed., New York, 1947), pp. 218–19.

It is customary to point to the decline of the Liberals in the 1920's as definitive proof of the hypothesis that single-member districts, plus election by plurality, operate adversely upon the weaker or weakest group and thereby cause a two-party system. The argument owes much —too much indeed—to Ramsay Muir's Book of Lamentations, which has been uncritically accepted at its face value.[15] Thus E. E. Schattschneider in his provocative study of American party politics allows himself to write:

> Many other instances of the operation of the single-member district system could be found. Outside the United States the most conclusive demonstration is to be seen in the fate of the Liberal party in England under an analogous election system. Here was a party that had every advantage—money, prestige, able leadership, a glorious history, and a large body of devoted followers—yet it was strangled by the election system. The Liberal party had the great misfortune to become a third party, and once caught in this position, was destroyed by the statistical tendency of the single-member district system.[16]

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[12] As happens in the election of the President of the United States through the electoral college. Only once since the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment has the party system failed to produce this majority.

[13] See L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (2 vols., London, 1929), Vol. 1, pp. 79–80.

[14] Note the comment of Morley in his *Life of Gladstone:* "The election [of 1885] ran a chequered course (Nov. 23–Dec. 19). It was the first trial of the whole body of male householders, and it was the first trial of the system of single-member districts." Vol. 2, Bk. 9, Ch. 2 (2nd ed., New York, 1906), p. 486.

[15] See his *How Britain Is Governed* (4th ed., London, [1940]), Chs. 4–5.

[16] *Party Government* (New York, 1942), p. 79.

To say that it was the electoral process which "strangled" or "destroyed" the Liberals is a gross exaggeration. Their demise was due primarily to other, and far weightier, factors operating quite independently of the method of apportionment and voting. One has only to study the history of the four decades from 1884 to 1924 to see what these factors were. The Liberals declined as a party because the British economy and social order were overcome by cumulative changes for which neither their philosophy nor the combination of interests they had erstwhile represented permitted a solution. The swing of manufacturers from free trade to protection, because they suffered increasingly from German and other competition; the pressure of the newly enfranchised masses for social services and further regulation of business; the consequent need to substitute a positive program of governmental action for the negativism of laissez faire; the task of governing an Empire (and especially Ireland) which gave no qualms to Conservatives, but did give to Liberals a sense of guilt; the impact of World War I and the experience of a coalition in which some Conservatives were liberalized, but rather more Liberals were conservatized; and finally the sorry spectacle of discordant leaders squabbling among themselves and hence splitting their followers: these were the long and short term causes of the Liberal debacle. As compared with them, the electoral machinery *per se* had no more weight than the proverbial last straw. The Liberals, like the camel's back, could not have been broken without the accumulation of the innumerable and much weightier straws preceding the last.

But in any case, to use the decline of the Liberals as "proof" that Britain's electoral system perpetuates its two parties by driving the minor groups to the wall fails to explain how Labor ever succeeded in getting their start and becoming a major party. Thus Schattschneider, who contends that "the American two-party system is the direct consequence of the American election system,"[17] also emphasizes that "no minor party in American history has ever become a major party, and no major party has ever become a minor party."[18] This is not true at all, however, of Britain. The "statistical tendency" of the electoral system, which is alleged to have strangled the Liberals in their old age, ought to have suffocated the Laborites in their cradle. Why did this not happen? From 1900 through 1910, Labor won a smaller percentage of seats than the percentage of their votes—the fate that befell the Liberals in the twenties. Yet the one party surmounted this handicap, while the other did not. Does it not appear then that the causal significance of the electoral system has been greatly overrated?

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[17] *Party Government*, p. 69.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

Nor is the British experience an isolated one. Again it is New Zealand which offers a combination of factors precisely parallel to Britain. There too, with the same electoral machinery, the formerly potent Liberals dwindled and died between 1908 and 1931 and Labor supplanted them. So far from Labor's development being arrested by the mathematics of single-member districts, the New Zealand Liberals were not even able, while they still possessed a majority, to stem the oncoming tide by altering the electoral law to suit themselves. At the elections of 1908 and 1911 they employed the second ballot, with the provision that the only contestants at the "run-off" could be the two candidates who were placed highest at the first election. This made not the slightest difference, however, to the rise of the one party and the fall of the other—a process that was due to causes quite unconnected with the electoral system.[19]

The thesis that the nature of the electoral system determines the character of the party system runs into still more difficulties when France is brought into the discussion. If single-member districts plus plurality victories are supposed to create two parties, how did the multiparty system persist so obstinately in France even though *scrutin d'arrondissement* was adopted there in 1927? This question is a clear example of a non-existent difficulty which has been conjured up only because the argument of which it is a part begins with an incorrect premise and thence proceeds to a false conclusion. Consider the logic of the following syllogism. The major premise is the proposition that the party system is determined by the electoral system. There follows the minor premise that two parties are the product of single member districts. These errors are then compounded by a fallacious conversion, and it is assumed that where single member districts are established, two parties must ensue as a consequence. In France, however, the multiparty system maintained itself as tenaciously as ever. How is this undeniable fact explained away in order that the theory may be saved? The answer is that the theory's proponents refer to the system of *ballottage* (i.e., run-off elections) and point out that the second contest was normally confined to only two or three candidates, "which," writes V. O. Key, "approached the bi-partisan form."[20] They approached it in truth about as closely as many golfers approach the green on their second shot! The withdrawal of forlorn candidates after the first election; the negotiation of deals with the leading candidates; a network of temporary *mariages de convenance* in critical districts—all this was still a far remove from the essentials of two-party politics. Moreover, although within many constituencies the electorate fell into two or three groups on the second ballot, throughout the whole of France more than three such groups were formed, so that nationally the Chamber of Deputies continued to be split many ways.

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[19] For details about the effect of the second ballot in New Zealand, see my *Politics of Equality* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 190–91.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 219. Key cites the "French experience as a limitation on the single-member district theory," as do others. But the limitation and the difficulty are of their own making.

The French case, however, cannot be judged in its proper perspective unless all the electoral vicissitudes of the Third Republic (and not merely its last experiment) are considered together. Actually the Third Republic opened with single-member districts (1876–85), then switched to the list system (1885–89), returned again to single-member districts with plurality elections (1889–1918), swung over to *scrutin de liste* along with preferential voting (1919–27) and finally in 1927 reverted to single-member districts plus *ballottage*. During the entire period 1875–1940, therefore, more elections were fought under the single-member district plan than under proportional representation. But the point to be noted is that the overall character of the party system remained the same despite these oscillations from one method of voting to another. Surely this must indicate that the electoral system could have had only a slight effect, if indeed any, upon the party system. Otherwise one would expect to find some changes in the structure of parties, with alternate increase and decrease in their number corresponding to and consequent upon the electoral changes. That these cannot be detected should have served as a warning that the major premise of the theory examined above and the minor one are both at fault. That party systems are in some way related to systems of voting appears true. But which is the cause, and which is the effect? Students of comparative government would do well to reverse their initial hypothesis and then review the facts in a new light. There is, in my judgment, at least as much evidence to show that the parties are the prime determinants of the electoral system as that the latter determines the parties. In other words, to say that as go the parties, so goes the electoral system, may be as true as or truer than the converse. The predominant parties, whether two or more, select the brand of apportionment and voting procedure which they think will work to their best advantage. While it is then true that electoral mechanics serve to reinforce the parties—acting as a buttress, however, rather than as a foundation wall—the party structure continues thereafter to shape the operation and results of the electoral process to a greater extent than the latter is able to mold the parties.

III

The preceding discussion contains a clear implication: namely, that the character of the party system depends on and derives from factors more fundamental than the structure of political institutions. To understand these factors one must turn to the society within which the parties have their roots and grow. A political party is a collection of individuals clustering around an interest whose furtherance they make an issue and whose value they generalize into an ideal. Anything about which men cohere and feel deeply may become the basis for political activity and conflict. Interests may be simple or complex and their adherents more or less numerous. People may group and regroup in several combinations whose membership is not identical. Hence the party structure takes its substance from the interests which men engender in society and its form from the relations that are organized between them. This poses the question: what sort of divisions can be found in British society which provide the basis for partisan opposition? If sectional, cultural, religious, or economic cleavages occur, how have these been represented by the parties?

It is an arguable hypothesis that the two-party system emerged in Britain because the social order of that country was relatively homogeneous and offered little possibility for a multiple splintering of parties. This is to say that in a number of matters which are fundamental to society such a preponderant majority existed on one side of the question that the arena of practicable controversy was much restricted, and conversely the remaining issues on which two sides were opposed in nearly equal strength were few and the divisions between them fairly simple. Thus, if the small territorial expanse of the British Isles precluded the formation of sectional groups, the numerical superiority of Anglo-Saxons and Protestants prevented the rise of a Celtic or Catholic party. Likewise the dominance of agriculture until the end of the eighteenth century, and of urbanism since the middle of the nineteenth, clarified the battle-lines of economic conflict since it was impossible in the earlier period to dedicate a party wholly to the interests of city-folk, or more recently to those of farmers.

These generalizations are true in the main, but they need to be explained and in certain particulars qualified or corrected. Take, for example, the question of sectional influences on British party organization. It is, of course, doubtful whether parties are ever founded anywhere on a purely sectional base. Even in states that cover a huge area a section acquires much of its political relevance from other factors which happen to be reinforced by geographical concentration. Certainly in a country whose total area slightly exceeds that of Oregon, and where even the hillier terrain does not approach the contours of a Switzerland, there is less occasion for that sense of a separate political identity which physical remoteness can at least abet or aggravate. To the extent that sectional forces have obtruded into British politics, they have done so because they largely coincided with the boundaries of cultural and religious diversity and represented a genuine economic antagonism. The one clear instance of a party confined to a single section where it predominated is that of the Irish Nationalists. In nine successive elections from 1885 to 1918 their parliamentary seats showed a small variation between a high of 86 and a low of 80. The decision to form a separate bloc, instead of working inside one of the major parties, was based on Parnell's calculation that he could hold the balance between the Liberals and the Conservatives and disrupt the United Kingdom by obstructing its parliament. Theirs, however, was a solitary and special case and serves as the exception to point the rule. Stemming from cultural, religious, and economic differences, the ardent nationalism of the Irish was fostered by the existence of a water barrier and by embittered memories of past warfare. But the significance of the religious cleavage in this whole complex can be gauged by the fact that Ireland ceased to be politically solid in the counties of the north-east where Protestantism was strong and the opponents of Home Rule voted Conservative.[21]

The contrast between Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland and Wales, on the other, is instructive. The two latter communities, though both belonging to the "Celtic fringe"[22] and maintaining their own brands of nationalism, did not develop a separate Welsh or Scottish party. Why was this? One may suggest that a hilly border has produced among Scots and Welshmen less of an isolationist psychology than a sea channel can do; that their economic grievances were less acutely felt than those of the Irish; and that the divisions between Protestant churches were more easily bridged than the gulf between Protestant and Catholic. Instead of creating sectional parties, the Scots and Welsh have preferred to pursue their objectives within the fold of one or other of the two major organizations. The commonly accepted generalization assigns the Celtic areas to the Liberals at least during the nineteenth century, which was true in the main, though Disraeli was able to make inroads on the Liberal strength at the time of the Conservative victory of 1874. But the generalization does not apply to Scotland in the eighteenth century, and, of course, has little force today. In the first half of the eighteenth century Scotland had a politically split personality. Its Jacobite sympathies endowed it with Tory leanings; while those who were antagonized by the Stuart preference for Catholicism sided with the Whigs. Later in the same century the talents of Dundas and his skillful use of jobbery consolidated the Scottish votes into a solid Tory bloc, which was placed—for a price—at the disposal of Tory ministries. The Liberal decline in the twentieth century has proceeded more slowly in Scotland than in England, and still more slowly in Wales than in Scotland. What little is left of the Liberal organization nowadays might be called the last protest of the Celt against the Anglo-Saxon. Those Celtic constituencies where it formerly dominated have been partitioned between Labor and the Conservatives. To the former have gone the Welsh coal-mining areas and most of the "industrial waist" of Scotland; to the latter, the Scottish counties.

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[21] Outside of Ulster the Nationalists almost always carried every Irish constituency, except for two in Dublin. Outside of Ireland the only seat they could win was the Scotland division of Liverpool where many Irish resided. See Lowell, *Government of England*, Vol. 2, p. 128.

[22] As K. B. Smellie calls it. See his *A Hundred Years of English Government* (London, 1937), p. 196.

Sectional and cultural differences have had less effect on the general development of the British party system than religious dissension. Not only the origins of the Whig and Tory parties in the years from 1660 to 1700,[23] but their continued rivalry in the following century and the subsequent opposition of Conservative to Liberal, would be inexplicable unless viewed in the light of those religious controversies that have plagued the country since the reign of Henry VIII. But how did this issue contribute to the growth of a two-party system? On this point Carl J. Friedrich has commented: "England escaped the religious division (and the consequent development of a Catholic party) on account of the overwhelmingly Protestant nature of the country, buttressing this religious uniformity by depriving Catholics and other religious dissenters (nonconformists) of political privileges until well into the nineteenth century."[24] That is a curious statement because it both explains too little and implies too much. If being "overwhelmingly Protestant" means having "religious uniformity," why did some Protestants think it necessary to deprive others of "political privileges"? What "political privileges" were these, and, if uniformity was so securely "buttressed," did the relations between churches cease to be relevant to the strife between parties? Finally, by the same logic, why did the overwhelmingly Catholic character of France or Belgium not promote a two-party system in either of those countries?

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[23] On which see W. C. Abbott, "The Origin of English Political Parties," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 578–602 (July, 1919).

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

The fact is that in the seventeenth century the kingdom was split by religion into three segments. In the middle stood the adherents of the Church of England, who were flanked on one side by the large group of Puritans and on the other by the smaller Catholic group. When the monarchy was restored in 1660, the Anglicans turned the tables on the Puritans, who had predominated in the Cromwellian decade, and wrote their triumph into the Clarendon Code. Though subsequently challenged, the central principles of that Code continued in force and formed the line of demarcation between those Protestants whose church was established and those whose churches were not. The threat of a Catholic revival under James II temporarily solidified the Protestant ranks. But when their victory was assured in 1688, the old cleavage re-emerged. In essentials the politics of the revolutionary settlement amounted to a deal between the two major factions. Parliamentary supremacy was accomplished by the Whigs, Anglican supremacy by the Tories. Neither party was wholly satisfied with this *modus vivendi*. Both, therefore, strove to undo that portion of it which favored their rivals. But the balance of forces was so nearly equal that two generations had to elapse before the agreement could be fundamentally amended. With George III on the throne the Tories assisted in the recrudescence of monarchical power. Owing to the debacle of the monarch's American policy, however, and his later fits of insanity, the principle of parliamentary authority was rammed down their throats.

To secure a Tory acceptance of religious toleration took longer. Throughout the entire eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth, the Tories were identified with the Church of England and championed its establishment. The Whigs were thus cast in the role of representing the Protestant nonconformists, whose numbers were notably swelled by the impact of the one great spiritual force that appeared in eighteenth century Britain—to wit, John Wesley. The political disabilities of the nonconformists were not total, however, and their influence was far from negligible. The intent of the Test and Corporation Acts was to debar dissenters from holding public office. But by no statute were they disfranchised. Still less were they prevented from giving financial assistance to the Whigs. Even the ban on their taking office was not rigorously enforced, and regularly after 1727 an annual Indemnity Act was passed by Parliament to exempt from legal penalties those office holders who did not swear the necessary oaths. The truth is, therefore, that eighteenth century Britain contained not religious uniformity, but religious dualism; and this was carried over directly into a two-party system. Nobody has expressed this with greater clarity than G. M. Trevelyan in the following passage:

> . . . From the Restoration to the latters years of the nineteenth century, the continuity of the two parties in English politics was very largely due to the two-party system in religious observance, popularly known as Church and Chapel. . . . The dualism of the English religious world, and the disabilities imposed on Dissenters, form a large part of the explanation of the peculiarly English phenomenon of two continuous political parties in every shire and town of the land, surviving even when obvious political issues seem asleep or settled, or when the party programmes seem in certain important respects to have changed hands. . . . The dualism in the religious life of the nation reflected itself in a political dualism.[25]

Because this political inequality survived on the statute-book for over a century and a quarter, the time-hardened pattern of a Tory affinity for the Anglicans and a Whig alliance with nonconformists continued to exist long after the decade of the 1820's when the disabilities of the latter and of the Catholics were at last removed. Even in modern times, therefore, it has made some sense to generalize about the church-frequenting Conservative and the chapel-going Liberal or Laborite.

How was this split over a religious issue connected with conflicts of economic interest? Or, to put the question another way, what "durable source of factions" was present in the sphere of economics which could give rise to partisan opposition, and especially to a division into two parties and not more?

Until the end of the eighteenth century British society was primarily rural and the farming interest predominated in the economy. The commercial interest, though far from negligible, was secondary. Under such circumstances party opposition admitted only one possibility. The landowning aristocracy divided into a majority who formed the Tories and a minority who united with the commercial interest to constitute the Whigs. Since the country squires were mostly Anglican, while the leaders of commerce were largely nonconformist, the religious split complemented the economic—a fact that contributed materially to a two-party system. Thus founded and fortified, the system had more than a century in which to settle down before encountering its severest test—the impact of rapid technological changes on the economic and social order. The cumulative effect of such changes has been to substitute an overwhelmingly urban society for one that was rural and to make farming yield pride of place to industry.[26] How did the parties adapt themselves to so major a transformation? Were the old bottles able to hold the new contents?

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[25] *Op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

The answer is that the system, though subjected to an agony that was acute and prolonged, did in the end survive the strain. But during the course of readjustment, both great parties were respectively the victims of a major shock, whose results crippled one patient for thirty years and killed off the other. The first of these crises occurred when the manufacturing interest had grown to such proportions that it could challenge the farming interest and assert its predominance by altering to its advantage institutions which formerly favored the owners of land. That was done in the political reform of 1832, amending the franchise and the apportionment of seats in the Commons, and in the ensuing economic reform of 1846, which abolished the protective tariff on food. The immediate sufferer was the Conservative party, which cracked under the blow. The Peelites, including Gladstone, separated off and within a few years coalesced with the Liberals. The Conservative residue followed Disraeli. He, having correctly prophesied the permanent decline of British agriculture and knowing that a party devoted to a minority interest could not win majorities, looked around for a new source from which to replenish its strength—a task that occupied three decades.

At the very time that the Conservatives were emerging with renewed vitality, the crisis of the Liberals was beginning; for the same causes that helped the former harmed the latter. The contest between manufacturers and farmers amounted to a vertical division in the British economy wherein industrial wealth was arrayed against landed wealth. But with industrial predominance secured, a horizontal fissure soon opened in urban politics and poverty now challenged riches along class lines. The factory workers, in order to obtain improvements in their living and working conditions, besought the same voting rights that their Liberal employers had gained in 1832. On this issue there occurred in 1866 the first of the splits that were to prove fatal to Liberalism, since many a manufacturer was unwilling to see his employees enfranchised. When the suffrage was extended in 1867, the statute was enacted by a coalition of the minority Conservatives and the progressive wing of the Liberals. To whom would the huge new labor vote be given? For several decades it was actually divided between the two parties, since some working men voted for the Liberals as champions of nonconformists and social progress, while others were attracted to the benevolent paternalism of Disraeli's "Tory democracy" and to the hope of an imperial market for their products. Gradually, however, as the Liberal party weakened after a further split on the Irish question, and as tariff-conscious manufacturers drifted over into the Conservative camp, more Laborites began to whisper: "A plague on both your houses." The birth of a separate Labor organization ushered in temporarily a three-party system which lasted until, and ended with, the depression of the early nineteen-thirties. Even as they broke asunder, however, the Liberals continued to serve their country well, for, by entering the other parties, they made reform more palatable to the Conservatives and the constitution more palatable to Labor.

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[26] In recent British censuses less than 20% of the population are classified as rural. About 5% of the gainfully-employed are engaged in farming.

IV

Throughout this entire process, the timing and the order of events have evidently been crucial to the retention of a two-party system. Its early development, as Friedrich has stressed,[27] gave the system an initial advantage, and it was particularly fortunate that the main outlines of the constitutional system were already settled before the social order was convulsed by industrialism. But there is another important aspect of the timing which has received insufficient emphasis. What distinguishes Britain's political history in the nineteenth century is the gradualism whereby the franchise was extended to successive waves of new voters. The great reform acts were spaced at such intervals—1832, 1867, 1884—that the two-party system, already established prior to the first reform, was able to guide, absorb and assimilate the additions to the electorate. Each new interest, as its members received the suffrage, was thus mobilized by and embraced within the system. Every extension of voting rights stimulated more intensive organization by the parties in order that the recently enfranchised might be registered and captured, and better organization reacted upon the parties and fortified them. For purposes of contrast the experience of France is illuminating. That country went to the limit and adopted adult male suffrage in 1848—prematurely, as the result showed, since Napoleon III's *coup* shortly followed. The same broad franchise was reintroduced at the birth of the Third Republic, and with it simultaneously appeared the multi-party system which reflected the diversity and conflict of interests in French society. British gradualism in this respect was better adapted to the rise and retention of a two-party system than French universalism.

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[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

If this survey of the causes of the two-party system in Britain warrants any general hypothesis, it is that parties appear primarily to be the product of their society and are only secondarily the offshoot of governmental institutions. Though the latter are not without influence upon the party structure, they serve mainly to brace and bolster a system whose foundations are deeply embedded in and shaped by the cultural, religious, and economic components of a nation. Moreover, before wider application can be given to evidence drawn from a single country, allowance must be made for any unique elements in its history, which in the case of Britain are certainly the timing sequence and the rate of political adjustment to socio-economic upheaval. Finally, this last word of caution must be offered to those who would diagnose causation: to have shown what caused a certain party system in a given country is not to demonstrate that these causes, and only these, are necessary to produce it in any and every country.

POLITICAL ISSUES AND THE VOTE: NOVEMBER, 1952

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In March, 1952 the Carnegie Corporation made available to the Social Science Research Council a research grant to support a major study of factors influencing the popular vote in the 1952 presidential election. Under the sponsorship of the Council's Committee on Political Behavior[1] this project is currently being carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

The study was developed around six major objectives:

1. To identify the voters and non-voters, Republicans and Democrats, within four major geographical areas, in regard to
    a. socio-economic characteristics;
    b. attitudes and opinions on political issues;
    c. perceptions of the parties and the candidates.
2 To compare these groups to the corresponding groups in the 1948 presidential election.
3. To trace the resolution of the vote with particular attention to the undecided and changing voters.
4. To study the impact of the activities of the major parties on the population.
5. To analyze the nature and correlates of political party identification.
6. To analyze the nature and correlates of political participation.

Data designed to meet these objectives were gathered by means of nationwide sample surveys conducted in October and November, 1952. Two thousand and twenty-one persons, chosen by methods of probability sampling to represent all citizens of voting age living in private households in the United States, were interviewed by the Survey Research Center field staff shortly before the election; 1614 of these people were interviewed again shortly after the election.[2] The data of the present article are all based on the sample of 1614 people who were interviewed both before and after the election.

It is apparent that the full analysis of the data of this study will require many months. No major publication from the project is expected before 1954. However, because of the unusual interest in the study, it has seemed desirable to prepare one segment of the data for publication at the earliest possible date in order to acquaint students of political behavior with the nature of the project and of the kinds of analysis which are being carried out. The present article was prepared with this purpose in view.

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[1] The members of the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior are V. O. Key (chairman), Conrad M. Arensberg, Angus Campbell, Alfred de Grazia, Oliver Garceau, Avery Leiserson, M. Brewster Smith, and David B. Truman. The Committee is in no way responsible for the present article.

[2] Two hundred and twenty-two of the original 2021 respondents, who constituted an extra loading of the sample in the Far West, were dropped from the November sample. An additional 185 respondents could not be reinterviewed. Statements of the sample design and sampling errors and copies of the questionnaires may be obtained from the Survey Research Center upon request.

THE OBJECTIVES

Studies of political behavior and particularly sample surveys related to voting behavior have demonstrated that during recent years the followers of the two major political parties have differed substantially in their views on the pressing issues of the day.[3] In 1948, for example, the amendment of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act became an issue of such heat that it divided Republican and Democratic voters almost as clearly as the question as to who was to become president. It has recently been proposed that party identification and attitudes on partisan issues may exercise reciprocal relationships producing uniformity among party followers, some identifying with the party because of its stand on issues, others adopting positions on issues in order to conform to party position.[4]

The major purpose of the present article is to make available new data concerning the role of political issues in a presidential election campaign. Although a short appendix presents data showing the voting records of the major demographic groupings in the 1948 and 1952 elections, the primary intent of the article is to carry further than has hitherto been possible the analysis of the relationship of the voter's attitudes on partisan issues to his actual vote.

Limitations of space and the preliminary state of our analysis preclude any exhaustive treatment of the relation of issues to voting behavior in the recent election. We will concentrate, therefore, on two of the most striking characteristics of the 1952 vote—the unusually large turnout, and the shift to the Republicans after a generation of Democratic rule—and attempt to show how these phenomena were related to the issues covered in this study. The first two sections of this article, therefore, will be mainly concerned with the following two questions:

> How were issues related to the movement of citizens from the passivity of non-voting into the act of voting in the 1952 presidential election?
>
> How were issues related to changes in voting behavior whereby blocs of voters were lost by one party and gained by another party?

In addition to the study of campaign issues, another familiar method of analyzing the presidential vote has been through comparison of the voting records of various easily defined sub-groupings of the national electorate. Past research has corroborated common-sense impressions that, during the last twenty years, there has been a tendency for labor union members, college educated people, residents of large cities, farmers, Catholics, Southerners and members of other such social classifications to cast their votes rather predominantly for one or the other party. This has in fact led to the proposition put forward by Lazarsfeld and his associates that voting may be largely understood as an expression of the individual's conformance to his basic sociological environment.[5]

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[3] Angus Campbell and R. L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor, 1952); Warren E. Miller, "Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948–1951," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 45–60 (March, 1953).

[4] George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 601–23 (Winter, 1951–52).

Although these relationships between socio-economic groupings and the vote have usually been considered separately from the relationships between campaign issues and the vote, the two analytic approaches overlap in many ways. As politicians have recognized in shifting their arguments to suit their audience, many issues have differential meaning and importance for different segments of the population. An analysis which systematically examines the differential relation between issues and the vote in different sub-groupings of the national electorate should provide added insight both into the meaning of the issues and the reasons for intergroup voting differences. Although such a systematic analysis is beyond the scope of the present report, some preliminary data bearing on this problem will be presented. The third section of this report will be mainly concerned with the following question:

> Were the relationships between specified issues and voting behavior in the 1952 election essentially the same for all major sections of the electorate or were there important differences between people in different socio-economic groupings?

THE DATA

A full investigation of public attitudes on the political issues of the 1952 campaign would have required a very extensive interview devoted entirely to this objective. Because of the pressure of other interests it was decided to restrict this aspect of the present study to seven questions, three relating to domestic issues and four to foreign policy issues.[6] They were asked as part of the pre-election interview. These questions were chosen on an *a priori* basis as representing areas of relatively clear party difference and covering a broad range of governmental activities.

A major characteristic of the items is that they are all issues on which the Truman Administration accepted responsibility for a particular position. Adherence to this criterion means, of course, that these particular questions cannot be thought of as a representative sample of all the questions which might have been asked concerning the issues of the campaign. It will be noted, for example, that no inquiries were made regarding "corruption" or "communism in government" although these accusations were prominently featured in the oratory of the campaign.[7] The questions were selected with the following broad considerations in mind: The issues should encompass fundamental, long term party differences (e.g., governmental social welfare activity, U. S. foreign involvement), they should tap both ideological orientations and the less sophisticated "bread and butter" reactions (e.g., Taft-Hartley, FEPC, U. S. entry in the Korean war), and they should provide information on recent partisan controversies (e.g., U. S. China policy, current U. S. Korean policy).

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[5] P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948).

[6] The seven questions are reproduced in Appendix II along with a detailed statement as to how the answers to these questions were categorized for purposes of the present analysis.

[7] A separate analysis of the importance of these charges, based on the coding of certain open-ended questions in the interview, will be included in a later report.

It is possible that a different choice of questions might have yielded results different from those which are presented here. However, the questions which were used were chosen because they bore on issues which appeared to be of major significance and it is not probable that other questions bearing on these same issues would have yielded substantially different results.

Each of the seven questions was scored as to whether the respondent expressed an opinion supporting the policy of the Truman Administration or opposing it. For each question there were some respondents who did not offer a clearly pro- or anti-Democratic opinion, either because they knew nothing about the question (as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act) or because they did not hold any clearly partisan position regarding it. In the presentations which follow, the proportions of supporting, opposing and neutral-uncertain responses total to 100 per cent for each of the groupings which is being represented. For the convenience of the reader, an Index of Partisanship is also included. This is obtained by subtracting the proportion of responses opposing the Democratic position from the proportion supporting it.

Each of the respondents was asked in the November interview how he had voted on November 4th. Seventy-four per cent of the sample said they had voted.[8] The two-party division of their two-party vote was 58 per cent for Eisenhower and 42 per cent for Stevenson, indicating a slight bias in favor of Eisenhower but well within the sampling error of the survey. When the opinions of these Democratic and Republican voters on the seven issues are compared it is possible to see the extent to which these particular questions divided the followers of the two parties (Table I).

The absolute values which are presented in this and the following tables are much less important for the present analysis than the relation of these values to each other. The significant conclusion to be drawn from Table I is the fact that on all of the seven questions Democrats and Republicans, taken as total groups, differ in their opinions and differ in the direction of their party position. Throughout the seven issues one finds more Democratic than Republican voters supporting Democratic policies. On four of the items there is both a preponderance of Democratic support for Democratic policies and, at the same time, a comparable balance of Republican opposition to the same policies.

It will be noted that the issue of FEPC was least discriminative of all the seven issues in separating Democratic and Republican voters. Attitudes on this issue are also found to have markedly different relationships to voting patterns than do attitudes on the other six issues. Because of the unique character of this issue, possibly resulting from its strong racial and regional components, it is not included in the analysis which follows. A detailed statement of the interrelations of all the issues studied will be presented in a subsequent report.

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[8] It must be remembered that the sample excluded the institutional population, the "floating" population, people living in military establishments, etc. Such people are estimated to total nearly ten million and it may be safely assumed that they are very largely non-voters.

TABLE I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT AND ATTITUDES ON SEVEN 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	Vote—1952	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	D	33%	62	5	100%	+28
	R	19%	50	31	100%	−12
Taft-Hartley	D	32%	56	12	100%	+20
	R	9%	55	36	100%	−27
FEPC	D	51%	4	45	100%	+ 6
	R	40%	6	54	100%	−14
U. S. foreign involvement	D	43%	13	44	100%	− 1
	R	28%	7	65	100%	−37
U. S. China policy	D	60%	23	17	100%	+43
	R	38%	24	38	100%	0
U. S. entry in Korean war	D	52%	16	32	100%	+20
	R	34%	20	46	100%	−12
Current U. S. Korean policy	D	52%	7	41	100%	+11
	R	36%	8	56	100%	−20

Number of cases: Democratic voters—494
Republican voters —687

The respondents of the survey were not only asked their 1952 vote; they were also asked how they voted in 1948.[9] When these two reports are combined for each respondent it is possible to subdivide the sample into politically meaningful groupings which have more analytical interest than the sample taken as a whole. The discussion which follows deals with five such groups:

The regular voters.

1. The regular Democrats, people who voted for the Democratic presidential nominee in both the 1948 and 1952 elections, hereafter referred to as DD's (362 cases).

2. The regular Republicans, people who voted for the Republican nominee in both 1948 and 1952, hereafter referred to as RR's (385 cases).

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[9] The authors are aware of the dangers of error in recalling a vote cast four years previously. Examination of the data on the reported 1948 votes shows evidence of some random error in report, but no serious systematic error. The question on 1948 vote was asked in the pre-election interview.

The new voters.

3. The new Democrats, people who did not vote in 1948, either because of age or other reasons, but who voted Democratic in 1952, hereafter referred to as ND's (104 cases).

4. The new Republicans, people who did not vote in 1948 but voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as NR's (125 cases).

The switching voters.

5. The Democrats turned Republican, people who had voted Democratic in 1948 but who voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as DR's (165 cases).[10]

I. THE NEW VOTERS

The data of the survey show that those voters of 1952 who were non-voters in 1948 were composed, about one to three, of young people eligible to vote for the first time and older people who, for one reason and another, had not voted in the 1948 election. Both classes of new voters voted in very nearly the same proportions as did the rest of the population, the young people giving General Eisenhower a 57–43 majority of their two-party vote, and their older counterparts voting 53–47 for Republican electors. Inasmuch as the divisions within these two groups were not significantly different from the division within the rest of the population, it is apparent that, given no other changes, the elimination of the 1948 non-voters from the 1952 electorate would not have altered the proportionate distribution of the popular vote.

The fact that both these classes of new voters followed the national trend very closely in their choice of candidates indicates that they were not activated into the role of voters by any common point of view regarding current issues. On the contrary, it would appear that the ND's and the NR's must have differed about as much in their perceptions and attitudes as did the rest of the voters.

In order to reveal the possible relationships which may have existed in these groups between positions taken on the issues with which this study deals and preferences for one or the other candidate, it is necessary to compare the opinions expressed by the ND's and the NR's in answer to the different questions asked. This is done in Table II, which also includes the responses given by the "regular" voters, DD's and RR's.

An overall inspection of this table makes apparent a clear polarity in partisan attitudes on each question, with a strong tendency toward a pro-Democratic position among the DD's and an anti-Democratic position among the RR's. The ND's tend to resemble the DD's and the NR's to resemble the RR's.

It will be noted that the ND's are more consistently similar to their DD associates than the NR's are to the RR's. The distributions of the ND opinions differ only slightly from those of the DD's, in two cases appearing to be slightly more partisanly Democratic than the DD's and in the other four cases somewhat less. On the other hand, the differences between the distributions of the NR's and the RR's are generally larger and in every case the NR's tend to be less clearly Republican than the RR's.

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[10] There were also a few people who had voted Republican in 1948 but who voted Democratic in 1952. Their number was too small to warrant statistical analysis.

When one considers the positions of the previously non-voting groups on individual issues, it may be seen that for the ND group four issues (governmental social welfare activity, Taft-Hartley Act, U. S. China policy, and U. S. entry in Korean war) show a significantly larger number of pro-Democratic than anti-Democratic attitudes. On the questions of U. S. foreign involvement and current U. S. Korean policy the ND's are so evenly split as to make any statement about the relationship between *attitudes* on those questions and *behavior* in voting most tenuous.

TABLE II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PATTERNS OF 1948–1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948–1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	ND	37%	52	11	100%	+26
	NR	29%	49	22	100%	+7
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	−24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	ND	27%	63	10	100%	+17
	NR	13%	63	24	100%	−11
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	−37
U. S. foreign involvement	DD	44%	11	45	100%	−1
	ND	46%	13	41	100%	+5
	NR	31%	7	62	100%	−31
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	−46
U. S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	ND	51%	24	25	100%	+26
	NR	43%	24	33	100%	+10
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	−12
U. S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	ND	58%	14	28	100%	+30
	NR	36%	21	43	100%	−7
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	−19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	ND	46%	3	51	100%	−5
	NR	46%	4	50	100%	−4
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	−28

On only one issue, U. S. foreign involvement, did the NR's show greater partisanship as a group than did members of the ND group. On most of the other issues they were clearly less homogeneous in their views. It may be concluded that except for the foreign involvement issue and, possibly, Taft-Hartley, the voting behavior of the NR's was only casually or occasionally related to their stands on those issues explored in the survey. Furthermore, the issue-vote relationships were markedly smaller for the NR's than for the ND's.

This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that for each NR voter some one or two issues, but not the remaining issues, were relevant for activating his or her Republican vote. This is a necessary reservation which applies to all such analysis conducted at this level. The absence of direct relationship between factors X and Y insofar as any *group* of individuals is concerned does not mean that the relationship does not exist for any individual within the group. It does mean, however, that in this instance the existence of a factor "X" (attitudes on an issue) is not the influence which alone produced the factor "Y" (Democratic or Republican vote) which is held in common by all members of the group.

It is possible to compare these relationships between the attitudes of "regular" voters and "new" voters in 1952 to comparable data obtained in a Survey Research Center study in 1948. In the earlier study a similar sample were asked how they had voted in the 1948 and previous elections.[11] A summary of the data from the two studies is presented in Figure 1. It should be noted that the relative partisanship of the different voting groups is represented in this figure by dividing the number of responses in the group supporting Democratic policies by the sum of the responses supporting and opposing Democratic policies. Thus, a point above the 50 per cent line represents a pro-Democratic plurality; a point below the line represents an anti-Democratic plurality (although not necessarily a majority).

Figure 1 suggests that the role played by issues in activating former non-voters was different in 1952 than it had been in 1948. In the 1948 election voters who had previously been non-voters tended to take positions on issues with a degree of partisanship at least as great as that of the "regular" party voters. The plurality of ND's (individuals who usually had not voted but who voted Democratic in 1948) supporting Democratic policies in 1948 was approximately the same as that found among members of the DD (Democratic voters in 1944 *and* 1948) group. The NR's were in even greater agreement in supporting Republican policies than were their RR cohorts.

The 1948 election was, it seems in retrospect, by and large a party election. Neither candidate was overly attractive to people who were not confirmed party followers, the campaign was hardly the exciting, arousing campaign of 1952, and the outcome may have appeared to be so certain as to discourage

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[11] The questions about earlier voting behavior were not exactly the same in the two surveys. In 1948 the respondents were asked, "Have you voted in any presidential elections before this one? Have you usually voted Democratic or Republican?" In 1952 they were asked "In 1948, you remember that Truman ran against Dewey. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election? Which one did you vote for?"



FIG. 1. Change in relationships between summary scores on campaign issues and presidential vote: 1948–1952.*

Score: Number of responses supporting Democratic policies divided by the total number of responses supporting *and* opposing Democratic policies.

* ND 1948: Usual non-voters voting Democratic in 1948
ND 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
DD 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Democratic in 1948
DD 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
DR 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Republican in 1948
DR 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
RR 1948: Usual Republican voters who voted Republican in 1948
RR 1952: Republican voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
NR 1948: Usual non-voters who voted Republican in 1948
NR 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952

usual non-participants from leaving their firesides to vote. In the absence of magnetic candidates or an exciting campaign, it may be argued that those usual non-voters who did vote in 1948 must have done so because of party loyalty or out of personal concern over particular political issues. If this supposition is valid, it then follows that the ND's and NR's of 1948 were largely party followers who knew the party line on the campaign issues, or they were citizens drawn into the political conflict primarily because of the issues. In any event, the ND's and NR's in a year of abnormally low turnout proved to be well aware of the political implications of their attitudes on issues and an unmistakably high relationship between their stand on issues and the direction of their vote resulted.

When the 1952 side of Figure 1 is examined it is seen that the degree of resemblance of the two groups of "new" voters to their "regular" counterparts is not the same as it had been in 1948. The attitudes of the ND's appear to be only slightly less Democratic in their direction than are those of the DD's. The NR's, however, who had been particularly partisan in 1948, were very near an even division in their attitudes in 1952.

The 1952 campaign differed from that of 1948 in a number of important respects. It presented two new candidates, one of whom was one of the most widely known and respected men in contemporary American life. It was featured by an intensity of campaigning and general political activity far beyond that of 1948. It was distinguished by the prominence of charges against the party in power, charges which were not issues in the sense used in this article but accusations of "corruption," "communist infiltration" and the like. It brought into focus more acutely than had been the case in 1948 the problem of over-extended one-party rule, the "time for a change" argument.

If it is surmised that the impact of these non-issue elements of the 1952 campaign was favorable to the Republican candidate, the issue positions of the ND and NR groups are not difficult to understand. It is known that the pool of 1948 non-voters, from which both the ND's and NR's came, was largely Democratic in usual party preference.[12] It was this fact that gave rise to the popular supposition before the 1952 election that an increase in turnout would be advantageous to the Democrats. If the "new" voters in 1952 had come into the ranks of voters solely on the basis of party loyalty or party-linked issues, their total vote would very likely have favored the Democratic candidate. However, the other forces at work in the campaign apparently succeeded in changing this Democratic majority into a slight Republican majority. Presumably the 1948 non-voters of a Republican inclination were joined in 1952 by enough defectors from the pool of non-voting Democrats (probably those least firmly committed to a Democratic position on issues) to create an NR group slightly larger than the remaining ND group. Considering this defection of recently, and perhaps only partially, converted Democrats in the NR ranks and the probability that irregular voters of both parties are less likely than their more regular cohorts to be sufficiently involved in politics to hold highly partisan attitudes, it is not surprising that the issue positions of the NR group should not be as partisan as those of the "regular" Republicans (RR's).

In summary, the data presented in this section appear to justify the following statements:

1. As a group Democratic voters were significantly more likely than Republican voters to support Democratic policies on all of the issues subjected to inquiry in this study.

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[12] As shown in the 1948 Survey Research Center study and in as yet unpublished data from the present study.

2. The distributions of the attitudes of "new" Democrats were very similar to those of "regular" Democrats.

3. The distributions of opinions of "new" Republicans were generally less "Republican" than those of the "regular" Republicans. The general issue of extent of American involvement in world affairs was the only one on which this group was highly partisan.

4. A comparison of the voting of "new" voters in 1948 and "new" voters in 1952 suggests that differences in the electoral situations of the two years resulted in gains for the Republican party in 1952 which were not primarily associated with partisan issues as defined in this study.

II. THE "SHIFTING" VOTERS

A brief study of the reported previous voting behavior of the 1952 voters is enough to reveal that former Democrats who voted for Eisenhower held the balance of power in the 1952 election. While sizeable numbers of 1948 non-voters were coming into the ranks of 1952 voters, dividing their favors rather equally between the two presidential aspirants, smaller numbers of people who had voted in 1948 were withdrawing from the political arena to become non-voters in 1952. The net result of these additions and subtractions left the Republicans with an added six per cent of the population supporting their cause. In the same way, the Democrats picked up slightly more than two per cent of the population. As these sizeable, but to some extent compensating, shifts were occurring, some eleven per cent of the citizens were deciding to change their votes from 1948 Democratic to 1952 Republican (DR's). Although the net gain realized by the Republicans from the movement to and from active or inactive voting status was enough to jeopardize the Democrats' slim margin of 1948, the movement of changing voters away from the Democrats (offset only by a shift of one per cent in the other direction) was of crucial importance. The switching of the DR changers was not only a movement of a larger number of people, it was also a movement of double importance inasmuch as each Republican gain was also a Democratic loss.

All told, some 25 per cent of the final Republican vote came from 1948 Democrats. Given this added Republican support, only an extreme combination of pro-Democratic shifts among other parts of the total electorate could have salvaged the Democratic party hopes for victory. Conversely, if these "shifting" voters had remained Democrats, DD's instead of DR's, the other shifts which took place within the groups moving into and out of the active electorate would, at best, have been barely sufficient to create an Eisenhower victory.

When the attitudes of these "shifting" voters are compared to those of the "regular" voters of the two parties it will be seen that they occupy a position between the extremes on every issue (Table III). Their disagreements with the position of the "regular" Democrats are about equally great for both domestic and foreign issues. It must be noted, however, that these former Democrats do not go all the way to the "regular" Republican position on any of these issues. In this respect they differ from the DR's of 1948 whose partisanship on the issues of that year was scarcely less Republican than that of the 1948 RR's (see Figure 1).

The issue positions of the 1948 Democrats turned 1952 Republicans (DR's) resemble those of the 1952 Republicans who had not voted in 1948 (NR's). It will be recalled, however, that the NR's are made up of people of both Democratic and Republican party preference. Their intermediate position on issues appears to result from combining these two unlike groups as well as from their relatively low level of political involvement (as inferred from their non-voting in 1948). This is not the case with the DR's; they were all voting Democrats in 1948. The fact that the distributions of their attitudes digress so clearly from those of the "regular" Democrats may be explained in either of two ways:

TABLE III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHIFT OF VOTE, 1948–1952, AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948–1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	DR	22%	54	24	100%	−2
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	−24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	DR	12%	61	27	100%	−15
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	−37
U. S. foreign involvement	DD	44%	11	45	100%	−1
	DR	35%	7	58	100%	−23
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	−46
U. S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	DR	47%	25	28	100%	+19
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	−12
U. S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	DR	41%	16	43	100%	−2
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	−19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	DR	38%	6	56	100%	−18
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	−28

1. The 1952 DR's may have been people whose attitudes had never been as "Democratic" as those of other Democrats, who had voted Democratic in 1948 out of a sense of party loyalty and the lack of any impelling reason to do otherwise, but who were jolted loose from the Democratic party in 1952 by some non-issue factor or combination of factors which was present in the electoral situation of that year.

2. The 1952 DR's may have been no more or less Democratic in their views on issues in 1948 than were other Democrats. During the ensuing four years they may have been

converted from their Democratic point of view to a more nearly Republican position on issues. Having made this ideological transition it was natural for them to vote Republican in 1952.

It is probably safe to assume that both these mechanisms were at work in creating the 1952 DR's. If the process had been mainly one of conversion one might have expected that the foreign policy issues might have shown greater discrepancies from the "regular" Democratic position than would the domestic issues, considering the events of the 1948–1952 period. The fact that this is not true suggests that the "switching" voters were largely people who were not sufficiently bound to the Democratic party by conviction regarding its position on issues or by simple party loyalty to withstand the pressure of other factors which were important at the time of the campaign.

This section may be summarized in the following statements:

1. The "shifting" voters fell between the "regular" voters of the two parties in their attitudes on the issues presented in this study.

2. No single issue appears to have exerted any special influence in the defection of 1948 Democrats to a 1952 Republican vote.

3 It is suggested that the "switching" voters were particularly susceptible to factors favoring the Republicans because of their comparative lack of conviction regarding the Democratic position on partisan issues.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPINGS WITHIN THE ELECTORATE

The two preceding sections have dealt with the relation between voting behavior and six issues of the presidential campaign, with particular emphasis on the change in voting behavior between 1948 and 1952. In this section we will be concerned with the question of whether the relations between these issues and voting behavior were essentially the same for all classes of people within the electorate, or whether there were differential relationships for people in different socio-economic groupings. Since space does not permit a discussion of all relevant demographic groups, the discussion will center around four of the variables generally associated with the New Deal-Fair Deal coalition—occupation, union membership, education, and religion. We will compare the "regular" voters (DD's and RR's) found in these different groupings on their *overall* issue stand[13] and on their attitudes on two selected *individual* issues.

Inter-group Comparisons on Overall Issue Stands. The distributions of attitudes of the different voting groups within demographic categories are presented in Table IV. Comparing the distributions of the "regular" Democratic voters (DD's) from group to group, and examining the inter-group comparisons of the "regular" Republican voters (RR's), one finds a very high degree of similarity within the demographic groupings. This is particularly true of the Republican voters (RR's). Catholic and Protestant, union member and non-union member, businessman and farmer—all classifications of "regular" Republicans took very nearly the same overall Republican position on issues.

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[13] By "overall issue stand" we mean a summary score based on the attitudes on all six issues, rather than the attitude on an individual issue.

The "regular" Democrats show somewhat more variation from group to group. For example, there is a tendency for better educated DD's to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than their less highly educated party associates. These distributions are based on small samples, however, and the differences which appear are not large.

Although the "shifting" voters and the "new" voters are not presented in Table IV, some mention may be made of their distributions. The DR voters, shifting to the Republican candidate from a Democratic vote in 1948, take a general issue position between the "regular" Democrats and Republicans in nearly all of the socio-economic groupings considered. The ND's and NR's also tended to follow the ND and NR issue pattern described in the first section of this report in all of the demographic subgroups studied. The samples of these voting groups are too small to support detailed presentation.

Inter-group Comparisons on Two Individual Issues. It might be reasonably objected that the failure of these data to show any sizeable differences in attitudes between people drawn from very different circumstances of life may have resulted from the combining of scores from six separate issues. It is possible, for example, that two RR groups that are similar in their distributions of combined scores might show significant differences on individual issues, differences that cancel each other out when the issues are combined. An intensive analysis of all six issues for all demographic groups is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, to give some indication of the additional variations revealed by an analysis of individual issues, inter-group comparisons were made for the DD's and RR's on the most general domestic and foreign issues, those pertaining to government social welfare activity and foreign involvement. The data are presented in Tables V and VI.

These tables show a number of variations from the pattern described in Table IV. Perhaps most striking is the fact that the different RR groups, which showed such similarity in their overall issue scores, differ considerably on these two individual issues. This is particularly evident when the RR's of the different occupational groups are compared. The Republican voters of higher occupational status take a more Republican position on the general domestic issue than do the lower status occupation groups, but are less Republican on the general foreign issue. "Regular" Republicans among "blue-collar" workers are as a group extremely "isolationist" in their views on foreign involvement but they do not support the Republican position on the role of the federal government in domestic welfare programs. As might be expected, the variations among the "regular" Republicans of different educational background follow the same pattern as those associated with occupational differences.

Following the general "cross-pressure" hypothesis,[14] one might be led to explain some of these differences among "regular" Republican voters of different educational and occupational groupings as resulting from the interaction of party position and group position in determining attitudes on issues. Thus, when the issue position dictated by one's party choice comes in conflict with

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[14] P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, cited in n. 5.

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUMMARY SCORES ON CAMPAIGN ISSUES AND PATTERNS OF 1948–1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948–1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position*	Neutral or Uncertain*	Oppose Democratic Position*	Total	Index of Partisanship*	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	56%	21	23	100%	+33	60
	RR	28%	19	53	100%	−25	127
White collar	DD	49%	25	26	100%	+23	33
	RR	27%	22	51	100%	−24	51
Skilled and semi-skilled	DD	48%	26	26	100%	+22	136
	RR	23%	27	50	100%	−27	75
Unskilled	DD	46%	27	27	100%	+19	49
	RR	21%	27	52	100%	−31	20
Farm operator	DD	42%	28	30	100%	+12	29
	RR	21%	23	56	100%	−35	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	55%	22	23	100%	+32	143
	RR	24%	24	52	100%	−28	74
Non-union	DD	44%	29	27	100%	+17	219
	RR	25%	22	53	100%	−28	311
Education:							
College	DD	57%	21	22	100%	+35	33
	RR	28%	16	56	100%	−28	94
High school	DD	52%	24	24	100%	+28	171
	RR	24%	25	51	100%	−27	193
Grade school	DD	44%	29	27	100%	+17	157
	RR	22%	24	54	100%	−32	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	50%	28	22	100%	+28	119
	RR	26%	23	51	100%	−25	66
Protestant	DD	46%	26	28	100%	+18	207
	RR	24%	22	54	100%	−30	308

* These figures were obtained by adding the scores for all six issues and dividing by six.

TABLE V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY AND PATTERNS OF 1948–1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948–1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	51%	49	0	100%	+51	60
	RR	15%	41	44	100%	−29	127
White collar	DD	27%	70	3	100%	+24	33
	RR	14%	47	39	100%	−25	51
Skilled and semi-skilled	DD	34%	61	5	100%	+29	136
	RR	24%	51	25	100%	−1	75
Unskilled	DD	24%	76	0	100%	+24	49
	RR	37%	53	10	100%	+27	20
Farm operator	DD	36%	61	3	100%	+33	29
	RR	8%	42	50	100%	−42	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	36%	62	2	100%	+34	143
	RR	27%	43	30	100%	−3	74
Non-union	DD	33%	63	4	100%	+29	219
	RR	13%	45	42	100%	−29	311
Education:							
College	DD	42%	55	3	100%	+39	33
	RR	13%	35	52	100%	−39	94
High school	DD	37%	59	4	100%	+33	171
	RR	15%	48	37	100%	−22	193
Grade school	DD	29%	68	3	100%	+26	157
	RR	20%	47	33	100%	−13	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	28%	71	1	100%	+27	119
	RR	19%	47	34	100%	−15	66
Protestant	DD	32%	63	5	100%	+27	207
	RR	15%	44	41	100%	−26	308

TABLE VI. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND PATTERNS OF 1948–1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948–1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	61%	2	37	100%	+24	60
	RR	33%	3	64	100%	−31	127
White collar	DD	41%	15	44	100%	−3	33
	RR	33%	2	65	100%	−32	51
Skilled and semi-skilled	DD	45%	7	48	100%	−3	136
	RR	22%	4	74	100%	−52	75
Unskilled	DD	42%	7	51	100%	−9	49
	RR	0	10	90	100%	−90	20
Farm operator	DD	22%	11	67	100%	−45	29
	RR	14%	9	77	100%	−63	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	143
	RR	19%	7	74	100%	−55	74
Non-union	DD	40%	7	53	100%	−13	219
	RR	26%	3	71	100%	−45	311
Education:							
College	DD	69%	9	22	100%	+47	33
	RR	37%	2	61	100%	−24	94
High school	DD	46%	6	48	100%	−2	171
	RR	25%	4	71	100%	−46	193
Grade school	DD	40%	8	52	100%	−12	157
	RR	11%	6	83	100%	−72	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	119
	RR	24%	5	71	100%	−47	66
Protestant	DD	39%	6	55	100%	−16	207
	RR	24%	4	72	100%	−48	308

the position that is congruent with one's membership in a given socio-economic grouping, one might predict that there would be a compromise between the two extremes. Conversely, when a group position coincides with a party position on an issue, the result might be expected to be a position more extreme than either would have been without the other. Accordingly, one might explain the failure of "blue-collar" Republicans as a group to support the Republican position on the government welfare activity issue as the result of a position dictated by socio-economic group interest counteracting the position associated with party choice. On the other hand, the extremely homogeneous support that the "regular" Republicans of lower education give to the Republican position on the issue of U. S. foreign involvement might be thought of as resulting from a reinforcement of the restricted world view common among people of lower education by a congruent party position.

Although this interpretation may be appropriate for these variations among the "regular" Republicans of different education and occupations, it does not explain other variations which appear in the tables. Unlike the patterns of the RR's, which are different for the two issues, the inter-group occupational and educational patterns for the "regular" Democrats are the same for both issues. On both the foreign and domestic issues there is a tendency for DD's of higher occupational status (professional people and businessmen) to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than that taken by "blue collar" workers, and there is a similar tendency for greater support of the Democratic position to be associated with higher education. In terms of socio-economic group interest one might have expected "blue collar" Democratic voters to show more support for activity of the federal government in social welfare programs than would be shown by Democrats of professional or businessman status, whereas, as indicated in Table V, they tend to show less.

A similar discrepancy appears when differences between the attitudes of the "regular" voters of the two main American religious groupings are examined. If one were to assume that American Catholics might have special reasons to support an internationalist position in current foreign policy, one would expect that Catholics of each party would react more favorably to the foreign involvement question than Protestants within that party. In fact Catholic Democrats do support the foreign involvement policy in somewhat larger proportion than do Protestant Democrats, but among Republicans there is no difference between Catholics and Protestants on this issue. So far as this issue is concerned, religious group position appears to have some reinforcing influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Democratic party, but no modifying influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Republican party.

It is clear that these analyses of the interaction of the influences of party and socio-economic position are hazardous in the absence of the careful control of possible "third factors." More elaborate treatment of these data is not possible in the present article.

The data presented in this section may be summarized as follows:

1. When attitudes on the six issue questions are combined into a single score, the positions of "regular" Republicans among the basic occupational, union, educational and religious classifications are seen to follow very similar distributions. This is also true of "regular" Democrats in these different categories.

2. When distributions of attitudes on two individual questions are considered, differences between demographic groupings within the two parties are apparent and significant.

3. The determination of variations between socio-economic groupings within parties in their attitudes regarding issues is too complicated to be adequately described by the simple juxtaposition of party position and socio-economic position.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis presented in this article was intended to show how the followers of the two major parties in the 1952 presidential election divided in their views regarding prominent campaign issues. It also sought to determine the extent to which shifts in voting behavior, from non-voting to voting and from one party to the other, were associated with attitudes on issues. Finally, it compared the issue positions of people of different socio-economic groupings within each party in order to study the influence of demographic position on relations between issue positions and votes.

Although questions might be raised regarding the selection of the specific issues which were chosen for study, it is noteworthy that all of the issues presented proved to be highly partisan, in the sense that they divided the Democratic and Republican voters to a degree that cannot be attributed to factors of chance. Although other questions might have been asked which would not have divided the voters significantly into party groupings, it is apparent that Democrats and Republicans differed in 1952 in their attitudes on the important issues tapped by the questions asked in this study.

It is also clear that "regular" party followers were as a group more partisan in their views on these issues than were people who do not vote regularly or who switch from one party to the other. The irregular voters as a group held attitude positions midway between the attitudes of regular Democrats and Republicans.

Those people who had not voted in 1948 but who voted in the 1952 election divided their votes between Eisenhower and Stevenson in about the same ratio as the rest of the population. There was a clear difference, however, in the degree to which these new Democratic or Republican voters shared the partisan position on issues of the party they supported. On the issues considered in this study, new Democrats were virtually as partisan as regular Democrats; new Republicans were significantly less partisan than regular Republicans. It is hypothesized that this discrepancy resulted from factors in the campaign situation, not associated with issues as defined in this study, which worked to the advantage of the Republican party.

In the same manner the shifting voters, those who had voted for Truman in 1948 but supported Eisenhower in 1952, were not as partisan as either the regular Republicans or Democrats in their views on the issues presented in this study. This leads to the supposition that these defectors, who made a critically important contribution to the total Eisenhower vote, were susceptible to the forces which led them to change their vote partly because they had no firm commitment to the Democratic position on foreign and domestic issues. By the same token, the fact that many of them have not accepted the Republican position on these issues implies that that party's hold on them is precarious.

Although the present article could not examine the effects of socio-economic position in great detail, the data are sufficient to indicate that they do not follow an entirely consistent pattern. Although in some cases factors associated with socio-economic position appeared to counteract party position as a determiner of attitudes, in other instances attitudes associated with party position seemed virtually unaffected by socio-economic differences. This question requires much fuller exploration before it can be adequately answered.

Finally, the reader is reminded again that the present article is a preliminary analysis taken from a study of much broader scope. It is hoped that some of the questions which are left unanswered in this presentation will be more adequately treated in the more comprehensive report which will be forthcoming.

APPENDIX I

The preceding discussion has dealt with demographic characteristics and the vote only as these characteristics related to differential commitment on a number of campaign issues. Since there may be some interest in data on the overall distribution of the 1952 vote in different demographic groupings, and a comparison with the comparable distributions in 1948, the following tables are presented. They show comparisons between the 1948 and 1952 vote of the occupational, educational, and religious groupings discussed in this report, as well as a number of others on which there are comparable data.[15]

The most striking impression gained from these tables is that the shift toward the Republicans in 1952 was a general one which affected many different classes of the population. Some components of the "Democratic coalition"—skilled and semi-skilled workers, Catholics, young voters, union members—showed large scale defections from their Democratic preference in 1948. The shift toward the Republicans was equally marked among groups which are not usually considered to be members of this "coalition." White collar workers, for example, went from an even vote distribution in 1948 to a ratio of almost 2 to 1 in favor of the Republicans; farmers, who had favored the Democrats in 1948, swung heavily into the Republican column in 1952. Except for the Negro group, the only groups which showed no shift in favor of the Republicans were those which already had a traditionally heavy Republican majority—the high status occupational and educational groups.

The numbers of cases of the separate demographic classifications do not always add to the total sample of 1614 respondents. This results from the omission of small numbers of respondents who did not fall into the classifications represented or from whom the relevant information was not obtained.

TABLE 1. RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Occupation									
	Professional and Managerial		Other White Collar		Skilled and Semi-Skilled		Unskilled		Farmers	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	15%	27%	38%	28%	52%	40%	33%	40%	25%	24%
Republican	57	60	39	52	15	34	12	19	13	42
Did not vote	25	12	18	19	29	26	49	41	54	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	1	5	1	4	*	6	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	117	333	79	155	164	462	85	174	105	178

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

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[15] The figures for the 1948 vote are based on the study of the 1948 election conducted by the Survey Research Center.

TABLE 2. INCOME IN RELATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Income					
	Low†		Medium†		High†	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	28%	22%	36%	35%	29%	28%
Republican	16	31	24	40	46	57
Did not vote	53	47	33	24	20	14
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	*	7	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	179	312	327	852	149	415

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† Low income: 1948, $0–$1,999; 1952, $0–$1,999.
Medium income: 1948, $2,000–$3,999; 1952, $2,000–$4,999.
High income: 1948, $4,000 and over; 1952, $5,000 and over.

TABLE 3. RELATION OF LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	"Does Respondent or Head of Family Belong to a Labor Union?"			
	Yes		No	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	56%	42%	25%	26%
Republican	13	33	32	46
Did not vote	27	24	38	27
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	150	439	493	1165

TABLE 4. RELATION OF EDUCATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Grade School		High School		College	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	35%	30%	34%	34%	17%	24%
Republican	16	31	29	46	55	65
Did not vote	44	38	33	20	20	10
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	4	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	293	660	266	712	99	238

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 5. RELATION OF RELIGION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Protestant		Catholic	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	25%	26%	49%	43%
Republican	28	45	25	41
Did not vote	43	29	20	15
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	*	6	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	461	1156	140	343

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 6. RELATION OF TYPE OF COMMUNITY TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Population Classification					
	Metropolitan Areas†		Towns and Cities		Open Country	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	47%	33%	27%	31%	24%	25%
Republican	32	43	30	42	12	41
Did not vote	17	22	38	27	59	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	2	5	*	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	181	438	354	928	127	248

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† "Metropolitan Area" includes the suburban areas and a few rural areas surrounding the big cities. When only the actual big city dwellers are considered, the distribution of the 1952 vote shows an approximately equal Democratic-Republican division, not the 4 to 3 ratio indicated in this table.

TABLE 7. RELATION OF RACE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Race			
	White		Negro	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	33%	32%	18%	26%
Republican	29	46	10	6
Did not vote	33	21	64	67
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	585	1453	61	157

TABLE 8. RELATION OF SEX TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

	Sex			
Voted for:	Male		Female	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	36%	34%	29%	28%
Republican	28	45	26	41
Did not vote	31	20	40	31
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	5	*
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	303	738	356	876

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 9. RELATION OF AGE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

	Age							
Voted for:	21–34		35–44		45–54		55 and over	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	32%	31%	38%	34%	33%	33%	27%	27%
Republican	18	37	24	41	37	45	31	48
Did not vote	44	32	33	25	25	21	36	23
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	6	*	5	*	5	1	6	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	198	485	174	381	126	284	156	442

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

APPENDIX II

Reproduced here are the questions related to the seven campaign issues which were explicitly included in the questionnaire. The code categories following each question give in detail the manner in which responses were combined to indicate Pro-Democratic, Anti-Democratic or Neutral attitudes on each issue:

> GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY: "Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?"

Pro-Democratic
  Definitely should do more
  Should do more
  Should do more on some, don't know or same on others
Anti-Democratic
  Should do less
  Definitely should do less
  Should do less on some, don't know or same on others
Neutral
  About right, OK
  Should do more on some, less on others
  Don't know

FEPC: "There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people having trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government ought to take an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out of this problem? Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other ways that will handle it better? Do you think the national government should handle this or do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way? Do you think the state governments should do something about this problem or should they stay out of it (also)?"

Pro-Democratic
  National government should pass laws *and* do other things too
  National government should pass laws
  State government should pass laws *and* do other things too
  State government should pass laws
  Government should take an interest, not ascertained how
Anti-Democratic
  Government should do other things *only*
  National government should stay out, *but* state government should take action
  Government (national and state) should stay out entirely
  Respondent favors restrictive legislation (include here clear anti-Negro statements)
Neutral
  Don't know

TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR LAW REVISION: "Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Law? (If yes) How do you feel about it—do you think it's all right as it is, do you think it should be changed in any way, or don't you have any feelings about it? (If should be changed) Do you think the law should be changed just a little, changed quite a bit, or do you think it should be completely repealed?"

Pro-Democratic
  Completely repealed
  Changed quite a bit—in favor of labor
  Changed quite a bit—not ascertained in whose favor
  Changed a little—in favor of labor
Anti-Democratic
  Changed quite a bit—in favor of management
  Changed a little—in favor of management
  Changed a little—not ascertained in whose favor
  All right as it is
Neutral
  Changed, not ascertained how much
  Don't know
  Never heard of Taft-Hartley

U. S. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT: "Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?"

- Pro-Democratic
  - Disagree, with qualifications
  - Disagree
- Anti-Democratic
  - Agree
  - Agree, with qualifications
- Neutral
  - Pro-con, depends
  - Don't know

U. S. CHINA POLICY: "Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went communistic—others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it How do you feel about this?"

- Pro-Democratic
  - Nothing we could do to stop it
- Anti-Democratic
  - It was our fault
  - It was our fault, with qualifications (partially our fault)
- Neutral
  - Don't know

U. S. ENTRY IN KOREAN WAR: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago or should we have stayed out?"

- Pro-Democratic
  - Yes, did the right thing
- Anti-Democratic
  - No, should have stayed out
- Neutral
  - Pro-con
  - Don't know

CURRENT U. S. KOREAN POLICY: "Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do *now* in Korea?" (1) Pull out of Korea entirely? (2) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement? (3) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?"

- Pro-Democratic
  - Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement
- Anti-Democratic
  - Pull out of Korea entirely
  - Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China
  - Unable to choose between above two alternatives
- Neutral
  - Don't know

THE REGION OF ISOLATIONISM

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Isolationism, a persistent refrain in the history of American foreign policy, has received its full share of recent investigation.[1] These investigations have followed a number of approaches, varying from historical research into the interaction of isolationist and interventionist groups and individuals in the pre-World War II period to studies of the underlying causes of isolationist thinking. It is the purpose of this paper to consider one of the ambiguities that still remain; that is, the commonly accepted assumption that in recent decades the Midwest has been the hard core of isolationism.

Midwestern isolationism is actually only one part of the larger question concerning the existence of a regional or geographic isolationist sentiment. On the untested assumption that isolationism is regional has rested the geographic explanation that isolationism is strongest in interior states because of the sense of insulation from international affairs that such location fosters. In this paper certain non-regional factors will be examined for their possible relationship to geographical centers of isolationist strength. Non-regional, socio-political factors might actually form the basis for several separate studies, and their consideration here is only intended to be suggestive of the further limitations these factors impose on a simple geographic explanation of isolationism.

Problems of Definition. The terms in this subject are corrupted by popular usage yet still used by scholars. Neither "Midwest" nor "isolationism" has an exact meaning. The Midwest as defined by some scholars includes five states; as defined by others, it includes fifteen. The variations in definition are endless.[2] Howard Odum, who has devoted considerable attention to careful definition in his study of southern regions, includes eight states (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio) in what he terms the "Middle States." Odum bases his definition on approximately seven hundred indices of socio-economic and political characteristics of states.[3] The Census Bureau, to take another example, divides the nation into a West North Central group of seven states (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, the Dakota's, Kansas, and Nebraska) and an East North Central group of five (Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio). For convenience, these two groups are commonly combined as the Midwest by those using census data.[4]

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[1] For examples of recent inquiries, see Samuel Lubell, "Who Votes Isolationist and Why," *Harper's*, Vol. 202, pp. 29–36 (April, 1951), and *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952), pp. 129–57; Survey Research Center, *America's Role in World Affairs* (Ann Arbor, 1952); George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*, (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 133–74; Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951); Thomas Bailey, *The Man in the Street* (New York, 1948), pp. 238–55; William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation* (New York, 1952); Frederick Williams, "Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 9, pp. 38–50 (Spring, 1945).

[2] See *Regionalism in America*, ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison, 1951). Though this entire collection of essays is relevant to the question of regional definitions, see particularly Vernon Carstensen, "The Development and Application of Regional-Sectional Concepts, 1900–1950," pp. 99–118.

[3] H. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (Chapel Hill, 1936), Ch. 3. Also, H. Odum and H. Moore, *American Regionalism* (New York, 1938).

The variety of possible combinations does not end with these two. Cortez Ewing in his studies of presidential and congressional elections points out that by generous definition one could easily boost the number of possible regional combinations throughout the United States to more than a hundred.[5] Geographer Nevin M. Fenneman, heading a special committee of the Association of American Geographers organized to define the natural divisions of the United States, found eight physiographic divisions.[6] Other regional groupings appear in the writings of Arthur N. Holcombe, who found various regional patterns in his studies of political sectionalism.[7] The National Resources Committee in 1935 summarized the views of a panel of experts on regionalism in this manner:

> It seems to be agreed that regional boundaries are usually indefinite, being zones rather than lines. In the majority of instances, therefore, any boundaries which may be drawn will be necessarily arbitrary. It appears, however, that it is desirable to draw boundaries, providing their arbitrary nature be admitted.[8]

Most of the other studies defining national regions have recognized the problems noted in the Resources Committee's report. Some of them also mentioned the arbitrariness of following state boundaries in defining a region.

These difficulties in definition lead one to conclude that a region can be defined most usefully with limited criteria in mind. A geographer studying soils finds one regional pattern; a sociologist studying educational standards defines another; and a political scientist studying isolationist strength finds still another. Thus our question should not be "Is the Midwest the outstanding area of isolationist strength?", but rather "Is there any region of outstanding isolationist strength?" Then, after such an isolationist region is found (if possible), it can be compared to a consensus Midwest region derived from the definitions of those who use the phrase "midwestern isolationism."

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[4] The Census Bureau's geographic divisions are most frequently used as the basis for regional designations because census data are so commonly used by regionalists.

[5] Cortez Ewing, *Presidential Elections* (Norman, Okla., 1940), p. 9. Ewing defines a seven state Midwest: Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio.

[6] Nevin M. Fenneman, "Physiographic Divisions of the United States," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 6, pp. 19–98 (1916).

[7] See his *The Political Parties of Today* (New York, 1924), pp. 105–9; *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 78–85; "Present Day Characteristics of American Political Parties," in *The American Political Scene*, ed. E. B. Logan (New York, 1938), Ch. 1; *Our More Perfect Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 71. In 1924, Holcombe defined the Midwest as a combination of eleven states: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. A different regional pattern was described in 1938 and 1940. In 1950, basing his delineation of regions on a new, non-political basis, Holcombe described a third regional pattern.

[8] National Resources Committee, *Regional Factors in National Planning* (Washington, 1935), p. 145. Thirty-four regional classifications, based on such varied criteria as retail shopping areas, soils, politics, and farm income, were presented in the Committee's report.

The term "region" itself requires definition. A region includes only contiguous territory: though the region need not be symmetric or balanced, its component units must be connected and its area reasonably compact. Some common characteristic, in this case strong isolationist sentiment, binds the components together and separates the region from the surrounding area.

Isolationism offers similar problems of definition. Is isolationism accurately represented by the sentiments of John Adams when he wrote, "I confess I have sometimes thought that, after a few years, it will be the best thing we can do to recall every minister from Europe, and send embassies only on special occasions."?[9] Is it represented by the words of George Washington when in his Farewell Address he advised against political entanglement in the affairs of Europe? Or perhaps Thomas Jefferson's words, "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," best serve to define American isolationism.[10] One finds considerable variety in sentiments which historically have been labeled "isolationist." Thus in 1934 isolationists were said to have opposed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, an economic matter, while in 1939 it was maintained that isolationists opposed fortification of Guam, a Far Eastern matter. Some isolationist sentiment was used to justify opposition in 1934 to the Inter-American Highway program, a Western Hemisphere matter. But spokesmen for what has been termed isolationism have in recent years included certain parts of Europe in the American defense sphere, and supposedly isolationist statements have included recommendations for the stationing of American troops and the maintenance of American bases around the world.[11]

Perhaps it is most accurate to consider isolationism as one end of a continuum, the other end of which can be considered anti-isolationism.[12] Though rare, advocates of complete isolationism have probably existed—isolationism in its true sense of complete lack of intercourse with any other nation. Such extreme isolationists would advocate American abstention from participation in the international activities—political, economic, and social—of even the Western Hemisphere. The opposite extreme can be termed anti-isolationism (perhaps internationalism or interventionism). While the isolationist favors inaction and non-participation by the United States in world affairs, the opposite extremists would favor constant and world-wide American international action. At least one variety of anti-isolationist would consider the negation of nationalism in favor of world government as his goal. There are probably few people at either end of the scale. Furthermore, a man might be an isolationist on one type of issue and an anti-isolationist on another. An attitude of political isolationism might be combined with an economic internationalist position. A senator might support measures to increase American trade with other lands and yet oppose all other participation by the United States in world affairs. To the extent that he supports American withdrawal or non-participation he would be an isolationist. Whichever view dominates his voting in the Senate determines the group in which he would be counted. According to this definition, therefore, the more isolationist person believes that the role of the United States in world affairs should be more restricted, non-entangling and less active than that envisaged by the less isolationist viewpoint.

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[9] *The Works of John Adams*, ed. C. F. Adams (Boston, 1853), Vol. 8, p. 37.

[10] *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. H. A. Washington (New York, 1861), Vol. 8, p. 4.

[11] For example, in the Chicago *Tribune*, Feb. 1, 1951, a map of American defense zones and an accompanying editorial indicate that the United States should defend Spain, the British Isles, Africa, Iceland, and areas in the Far East and Southeast Asia as well as other points within the "Western Hemisphere Zone of Defense."

[12] For examples of definitions used by others writing on the subject, see Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation," this REVIEW, Vol. 34, pp. 539–47 (June, 1940); William C. Rogers, "Isolationist Propaganda (September, 1939—December 7, 1941)," unpubl. diss. (U. of Chicago, 1943), pp. 5–6; Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making* (New Haven, 1946), p. 17; Raymond L. Buell, *Isolated America* (New York, 1940), p. 66; Richard W. Leopold, "The Mississippi Valley and American Foreign Policy, 1890–1941: An Assessment and an Appeal," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 625–42 (March, 1951); Nathaniel Peffer, *America's Place in the World* (New York, 1945), pp. 29–31; J. F. Rippy and A. Debo, *The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation*, in *Smith College Studies in History*, Vol. 9, p. 72 (1924). See also the Survey Research Center, *Ameria's Role* (cited above, n. 1), for a definition similar to the one used here.

Votes in Congress As a Source of Data. What data can be used to determine whether an isolationist region existed during the past two decades? Three possible sources of data exist: election returns, public opinion polls, and congressional roll call votes. The third source, congressional roll call votes, is the most useful. Foreign policy issues in Congress were many and varied during the 1933 to 1950 period. Many of these issues were of the type to divide the members of Congress into more isolationist and less isolationist groups, and many of these produced roll call votes.

Though some objections can be raised to using these record votes to denote degrees of isolationism, none seem formidable. Certainly caution must be exercised in selecting the votes. Key amendments, motions to recommit, and borderline amendments must all be examined carefully. The issues themselves cannot be evaluated without investigation into the situation behind the mere wording of the proposal. However, when adequate care is observed in the selection of votes to be tabulated, sufficient data can be obtained from the voting in Congress to warrant considering one congressman or senator more isolationist than another.

Some objection might also be raised to transferring the voting record of a congressman to the district he represents. Does a congressman or senator vote his own mind, the mind of his party, or the mind of his constituency as he appraises it? If it is the mind of his constituency, and if the representative's appraisal is correct, then the transferral is valid. One of the basic assumptions in using this source of data to locate an isolationist region is that the congressman's ear is attuned to his district regularly enough to justify the transferral in the long run and over a large number of roll calls. The mere bulk of the evidence would tend to offset the occasions when the member of Congress is unrepresentative of the politically active portion (particularly the "foreign affairs public") of his constituency. Members of Congress register the *effective* opinion on foreign policy, and this is important. Furthermore, by examining the voting pattern in the lower house more closely than that in the Senate one would tend to narrow the margin of error, if the representative is assumed to be usually closer to his district than the senator is to his state-wide constituency. Congressional voting records, primarily votes on issues in the House of Representatives, provide the basic data used here for finding the region of isolationism.

A Region of Isolationism? Seventy-three roll call votes in the House and eighty-eight in the Senate were used in this analysis. They were distributed over the eighteen-year period as follows:

Congress	Number of Record Votes	
	House	Senate
73rd (1933–1934)	6	2
74th (1935–1936)	2	7
75th (1937–1938)	4	4
76th (1939–1940)	10	11
77th (1941–1942)	9	9
78th (1943–1944)	5	7
79th (1945–1946)	12	14
80th (1947–1948)	9	11
81st (1949–1950)	16	23
	73	88

Each of these roll calls was on a foreign affairs issue that divided the more isolationist element from the less isolationist (or more internationalist) group. The issues brought forth record votes on American participation in international organizations, on neutrality, foreign aid programs, the trade agreements program, lend-lease, and on similar foreign policy issues of the period. Such issues were frequently the centers of many amendments and moves of parliamentary strategy. When the votes on such side issues caused more than a minor change in voting alignment, they were used in this analysis together with the vote on the main issue. When the number of such supplementary roll calls warranted, a sampling process was used in order to avoid over-weighting the total number of votes tabulated in favor of one type of issue. The votes in the House of Representatives divide into subjects as follows: reciprocal trade, 10; aid to Allies (pre-1942), 13; international organization, 16; aid programs involving large appropriations, 33. There are other subject divisions that could be made, but this division shows that no one issue dominated. The issues involving authorizations for costly foreign aid included such questions as pre-World War II aid to the Allies, the European Recovery Program, Greek aid, lend-lease, the British loan and Far Eastern aid. These four subject categories are not mutually exclusive.

The ratio of isolationist votes to total votes cast by a state's representatives can be expressed as a "percentage of isolationism" for that state. This percentage can be compared to the "percentage of isolationism" found in a like manner in other states. The states can then be ranked in order of isolationism, with the state having the highest "percentage of isolationism" ranked as most isolationist. This same procedure can be followed for the Senate or for individual districts in the House of Representatives. Figures I and II present the states ranked according to isolationist strength in the House and Senate respectively for the period 1933–1950. Figure I presents the data derived from roll call votes in the House.



Fig. I. Isolationist Voting by States in the House of Representatives (73rd–81st Congress, 1933–1950).

When examined carefully, the data upon which the map is based support the conclusion that a broad band of isolationist strength existed across the northern portion of the United States as compared to a relative lack of isolationism in the southern and southwestern states. North Dakota was the most isolationist state in the nation. It was followed in order by Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The existence of this broad northern band of isolationism is the most obvious conclusion drawn from the data. The votes also indicate that a multi-state region of isolationism centered in the North Dakota to Kansas belt. This region included Ohio in the East and Idaho in the West and reached as far South as Kansas. Included in this region are eleven of the twelve most isolationist states, only Vermont being excluded.

The Senate voting records (Figure II) suggest a slight modification of these conclusions. The northern half of the nation is again distinctly more isolationist than the South. However, the region of isolationism in Figure II, though roughly similar, is not exactly the same as that found in House voting. North Dakota is again first in isolationist rank as it was in the voting in the House. Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Idaho, and Nevada follow in order. Thus four states—North Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Idaho—are among the first six isolationist states in each house of Congress. In the Senate, as in the House, the core of isolationism in this period centered in the North Dakota to Kansas area.

The votes in the House of Representatives are more useful and more accurate for this analysis of the isolationist region than are the votes in the Senate. Not only are the basic assumptions more sound in the case of the lower house, but also the votes can be examined for the congressional district, a smaller and more useful unit than the state. Figures III and IV show the districts in order of isolationist strength. Redistricting after the 1940 census necessitates dividing the period into two maps. These district maps must be viewed with some caution, since they are obviously not based on population, while the statistics presented on them are basically related to population density. Thus within the state of New York a small dot on the map represents an area including as many as twenty districts, while one district of roughly equal population is represented by an area twenty times as large. Not only must this differential be kept in mind in viewing individual states, but it must be observed in comparing low population states such as Montana with heavily populated eastern states.



FIG. II. Isolationist Voting by States in the Senate (73rd–81st Congress, 1933–1950).

It is obvious from Figures III and IV that no one region of the nation had a monopoly on isolationism in the 1933–1950 period. Heavily isolationist districts appeared in states from California to Maine and were found, in many cases, adjoining non-isolationist districts in their own states. The district breakdown does show, as did the maps by states, that isolationism existed in a northern belt and was relatively weak in the southern half of the nation. Proximity to the coast was not an absolute deterrent to isolationism. Some districts in coastal states elected and constantly reelected isolationist representatives, while some inland districts were represented throughout the period by non-isolationists. However, there were relatively more isolationist members of the House representing inland districts within the Ohio-Idaho region than districts in coastal states, as can be seen in the state totals represented in Figure I.



FIG. III. Isolationist Votes in the House of Representatives, 1933–1942, by Congressional District.

It is not possible to locate any large regions of isolationism on the maps based on districts. This is due in part to the area, rather than population, basis of the map. But even if one could overcome this handicap, the patchwork of isolationist districts next to non-isolationist districts indicates that no multi-state regions existed. This patch-quilt pattern disappears when the state figures are used because state percentages are actually averages of the districts within the state, and therefore hide the variations. The maps by districts, the most accurate units, suggest definite limitations to the conclusions drawn from maps by states.

In using House roll call data, controls can be exercised that enable one to make comparisons of state or regional isolationist strength on various types of issues. The region of isolationism identified in Figure I can be further examined by withdrawing roll call data on certain types of issues from the totals and then examining the resultant pattern for shifts in isolationist concentrations. For example, does the region of isolationism disappear as a region or, perhaps, center in another part of the country when all votes on reciprocal trade issues are excluded from the totals? Do the anti-reciprocal trade congressmen come from a different area than the anti-lend lease congressmen? Is there a region consistently reappearing throughout such variations in the data? It is also possible to divide the data into periods and examine the pattern of isolationist strength for shifts corresponding to time changes. Furthermore, the effect of political party affiliation on the voting pattern can be examined by studying separately the group of roll call votes on bi-partisan issues—those issues on which a majority of both parties voted on one side of the issue. Partisan influence on the data can be minimized by another method, that of studying the pattern of isolationism in the voting records of each party separately. This will show whether there were regions of isolationism within the Republican party and Democratic party in this period.



FIG. IV. Isolationist Votes in the House of Representatives, 1943–1950, by Congressional District.

Analysis of ten roll calls in the House dealing with the Trade Agreements Program reveals a North-South break on this issue similar to the pattern in Figure I. All of the twelve most isolationist states on these ten issues are located north of the Kansas-Illinois-Ohio line. Of the twenty-four most isolationist states on this group of issues, only Florida and Nevada are south of the northern band of isolationism discernible in Figure I. All of the other twenty-two states are in the northern half of the country. Though the basic North-South cleavage follows the overall pattern (Figure I), the regional concentration within the North is considerably different. Two isolationist regions are easily identified in the reciprocal trade votes, a New England region and a Northwest region. Of the twelve most isolationist states on reciprocal trade issues, four are located in New England (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts). The remaining eight are dispersed in an area reaching from Minnesota to the Pacific Coast. The effect of excluding the data on these ten roll calls from the total tabulation is to make the Ohio to Idaho region an even more pronounced isolationist region than is shown by Figure I.

Data for other groups of issues can be handled in a manner similar to the analysis of reciprocal trade issues, but none reveals as great a deviation from the basic regional pattern. Thus if the votes on issues concerning aid to the Allies, issues concerning United States participation in international organizations, and issues concerning foreign aid or relief programs involving large expenditures are analyzed as separate groups, the results in regional distribution follow a pattern quite similar to the original overall regional pattern in Figure I. With the exception of reciprocal trade issues, the region of isolationist strength remains consistently centered in the North Dakota to Kansas group of states.

The same general consistency is found when the data for the eighteen years are divided into two equal periods. Two exceptions to this general consistency are found, however. Relatively greater isolationism appears in New England before 1942, and increased isolationist inroads into the South appear in the post-1942 period. When the roll calls are divided into three equal time periods these two exceptions become more pronounced. In the 1933–1938 period the four northern New England states are solidly more isolationist than any other grouping of contiguous states in the country. In the 1945–1950 period two states, Louisiana and Mississippi, form an obvious "island" of southern isolationism.

In spite of these deviations from the overall regional pattern of Figure I, there is, with the possible exception of New England in the 1933–1938 period, sound basis for drawing the boundary line of the isolationist region along lines similar to the Ohio-Kansas-Idaho region in each of the shorter periods. Of the twelve most isolationist states, this region contained six states in 1933–1938, eleven in 1939–1944, nine in 1945–1950, eight in 1933–1941, and ten in 1942–1950. The significance of the New England isolationist region appearing in the early years of the period should not be minimized. Fewer issues were tabulated in the early period than in the last six years. Therefore the totals as shown in Figure I are weighted in favor of the later years. Actually, during at least the first third of the eighteen year period, northern New England was as isolationist as any other four-state region in the country.

If any one region of isolationism existed during the total period it was the region consisting of Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming, and Idaho. This eleven-state region contained within its boundaries a consistently high number of leading isolationist states, as evidenced by voting in the House of Representatives. There is sufficient evidence in the district data, however, to support the thesis that this region had no monopoly on isolationist congressmen. And there is evidence to support the conclusion that in the early years of this period there was no single region, and that isolationism shifted from the East to the West during the period. However, the region most consistently isolationist on the greatest number of types of issues and over the longest time period is the eleven-state region depicted in Figure I.

When partisan affiliations are taken into account, the region of isolationism becomes even more pronounced. A total of eighteen bi-partisan issues were used in this tabulation. All occurred in the last six years of the period. On these issues, ones in which a majority of both parties voted on the same side of the question, party affiliation certainly had a minimal effect on voting behavior. When these bi-partisan roll calls are tabulated as a separate group the same regional pattern appears as on the total tabulation. Eleven of the twelve most isolationist states are located in the region defined above.

If another means of eliminating the effect of party affiliation is applied, somewhat the same result occurs. That is, if the votes of Republicans on all issues are tabulated separately from those of Democrats, the regional pattern within each party can be studied. Of the states that frequently sent Republicans to Congress in the eighteen-year period, Nebraska, North Dakota, Illinois, Idaho, Michigan, and Montana ranked as the six most isolationist. Among the states that sent Democrats with some consistency, Idaho, Nebraska, Mississippi, Montana, Iowa, and Minnesota ranked as the most isolationist. These most isolationist states within each party lie in the Ohio-Kansas-Idaho region, Mississippi being the single exception. Elimination of the effects of party does not, therefore, affect the basic regional pattern seen in Figure I.

The Isolationist Region and the Midwest. The region of isolationism having been located, does it coincide with the midwestern region of the country? Actually, it is more difficult to locate the Midwest than it is to locate a region whose boundaries are determined by one criterion, isolationist voting in Congress. As previously indicated, there are many "Midwests." Whose definition is to be accepted? It is possible to derive a "consensus Midwest" from the many definitions used in lay and professional literature. There is a basic core of agreement, a group of states which rarely fall outside of varying definitions of the region. Included in this core are six states: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. Surrounding this core are six states, part or all of which are sometimes included in the Midwest. These can be considered the midwestern fringe states: Ohio, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska.

How does this consensus Midwest compare with the isolationist region? The isolationist region extends further to the west than does the Midwest. Idaho and Wyoming lie outside of the midwestern region. Furthermore, the core of the isolationist region—Nebraska, Kansas, and the Dakotas—lies in the western fringe of the Midwest. One state in the Midwest fringe, Missouri, is not included in the isolationist region; and two core states of the consensus Midwest, Illinois and Indiana, are outside the most isolationist group. The two regions do overlap, but they do not coincide, nor is either region wholly included in the other.

In summary, what can be said about a regional pattern of isolationism in the period studied? First, the most obvious concentration of isolationist sentiment, as represented in Congress, was in a broad band reaching from coast to coast covering almost all of the northern half of the country. The absence of isolationist strength in the South and Southwest was in striking contrast to its presence in states of the North. This was generally true when partisan influence was eliminated from the data as well as when groups of issues and time periods were studied separately.

Second, the northern states themselves showed considerable variation in isolationist strength within state boundaries. Some of the most isolationist districts were located in Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan in proximity to non-isolationist districts. Almost all eastern, midwestern and western coast states contained some districts ranking high in isolationist strength. Distance from the ocean was no accurate gauge of isolationist strength.

Third, with certain qualifications, a region of isolationism is discernible in the eleven-state area that includes Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming and Idaho. The most isolationist center of this region lies in four states, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The qualifications on this definition of a region of isolationism are important enough to require restating. First, in the early portion of the eighteen years, New England was a second strong region within the northern band of isolationism. Secondly, throughout the period one or more very isolationist states existed outside the region. For example, when the Democratic votes were analyzed as a separate group, Mississippi and Louisiana appeared high in isolationist rank. A final qualification is suggested by the analysis of the data by districts. This analysis by smaller units makes it obvious that no region held a monopoly on isolationist sentiment, nor did the eleven-state region appear as an area of uniformly strong isolationist sentiment.

Fourth, the region of isolationism so defined fits only partially the midwestern region of the United States as defined in a consensus. The two regions overlap, but they do not coincide.

Non-Regional Factors. Are there factors other than regional location which characterize isolationist districts? Is there some socio-economic or political factor which is consistently found in an isolationist district but is absent from the anti-isolationist area? A region of isolationism was found to exist, with limitations, in the Ohio to Idaho portion of the country. Perhaps a non-regional correlate exists which will suggest further restrictions on a geographic explanation of isolationism based on the existence of such a geographic region.

It is possible to compare population characteristics such as urban-rural residence, economic level, educational level, percentage of foreign-born, and partisan affiliation of isolationist areas to non-isolationist districts. In each comparison, the counties of the isolationist and anti-isolationist districts within the same state can each be compared to the state average for the particular factor. By using the state average and comparing districts within the same state, variations due to regional differences can be eliminated. For example, the educational level in counties composing the two or three most isolationist districts in Illinois can be compared to the average educational level of the whole state. If 20 per cent of the isolationist counties have a higher educational level than the state, this "percentage higher" can be compared to a similarly determined percentage figure for the non-isolationist counties in Illinois. This procedure can be repeated in other states where a wide range in degrees of isolationism existed, permitting a comparison of the educational level of the most isolationist counties (components of the most isolationist districts) with the non-isolationist.[13]

Turning first to a consideration of rural-urban residence, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that rural areas were more frequently represented by isolationist voting congressmen than were urban areas in the same state. Twenty four percent of the counties composing selected heavily isolationist districts were more densely populated than their respective states; the comparable figure for anti-isolationist counties within the same states was 34 per cent.[14] This difference of ten percentage points corresponds to results of other comparisons. When the isolationism of heavily populated areas in fourteen states was compared to the strength of isolationism in the state as a whole, in only one case was the urban community more isolationist than the state as a whole.[15] In the other thirteen states, on the other hand, state exceeded urban isolationism by a sizeable margin. In four instances the state percentage of isolationism was more than twice that of the urban area. In six other cases, the state percentage was more than 50 per cent greater than the urban figure.

Another means of comparison can be used. If the strongly isolationist districts are classified as metropolitan, urban, semi-urban, and rural, the totals in each category can be compared with those in similar classifications of non-isolationist districts.[16] This comparison is presented in the following table:

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[13] Statistics on socio-economic characteristics of the population, unless otherwise stipulated, were obtained from the Census of 1940.

[14] Twenty-three districts with high "percentage isolationist" rankings were selected for this and other similar comparisons. These districts were located in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The same number of relatively anti-isolationist districts were selected from the same states. The anti-isolationist districts contained fewer counties than did the isolationist districts.

[15] The urban areas and states used were as follows: Los Angeles County and San Francisco, California; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan; New York City, New York; Philadelphia and Alleghany County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania; Boston, Chelsea, and Cambridge, Massachusetts; Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; Denver, Colorado; Baltimore, Maryland; Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Cleveland and Cincinnati, Ohio; Birmingham, Alabama; St. Louis, Missouri; Louisville, Kentucky.

[16] The classifications are used by Arthur Holcombe, *The Political Parties of Today*, pp. 62–63. Metropolitan districts are those formed in or containing an urban area consisting of a city of at least 200,000 inhabitants. An urban district contains a city of at least 100,000 population; semi-urban districts contain a city of at least 50,000 persons but none of 100,000. Rural districts have no city as large as 50,000. In this comparison the isolationist districts were all those having a percentage of isolationism greater than 80 per cent.

SELECTED ISOLATIONIST AND ANTI-ISOLATIONIST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF URBAN POPULATION

	Total Districts Classified	Per Cent Metropolitan Districts	Per Cent Urban Districts	Per Cent Semi-Urban Districts	Per Cent Rural Districts
(1933–1942)					
Isolationist	63	15.8	12.7	25.5	46.0
Anti-Isolationist	42	47.6	16.7	2.4	33.3
(1943–1950)					
Isolationist	16	0.0	6.2	25.0	68.8
Anti-Isolationist	24	79.2	8.3	4.2	8.3

Metropolitan and urban districts are those controlled by urban populations. In many semi-urban and in all rural districts, the rural population dominates. The division into two periods was made necessary by redistricting following the 1940 census. In both periods, the districts dominated by urban populations are found in relatively larger numbers in the anti-isolationist group. On the other hand, the isolationist group is dominated in each period by a preponderance of semi-urban and rural districts. The obviously frequent co-existence of isolationist strength and rural population dominance in a district points to the same conclusion as stated previously. Non-urban and rural areas are more frequently isolationist in Congress than urban and metropolitan communities.

A second non-locational factor, economic level, shows little relationship to isolationist strength. Whether one defines economic level in terms of rural level of living or of per capita income, analysis of congressional districts indicates little correlation between it and isolationism. Comparing the county rural level of living index to the respective state index in each case, we find that the indices of the isolationist counties are higher only two per cent more frequently than those of anti-isolationist counties. Per capita income comparisons yield similar results.

Educational level shows a somewhat more positive correlation with strength of isolationism than did economic level. In contrast with public opinion poll findings,[17] analysis of the districts found to be isolationist or anti-isolationist leads to the conclusion that isolationism tends to be stronger in the more highly educated communities. Comparing the portion of the population in isolationist counties that finished the fifth grade and the percentage that finished high school to the similar part of the population in the non-isolationist counties, the isolationist counties were found to be more highly educated in both cases. Al-

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The anti-isolationist districts had less than 5 per cent isolationism and were located in the same states as the isolationist districts.

[17] Most opinion polls show that higher education is correlated with less isolationist sentiments. Of thirty-nine postwar polls presenting educational breakdowns on foreign affairs questions, thirty-six found college educated less isolationist than high school educated. In thirty-eight of the polls high school educated persons were found to be less isolationist than grade school educated.

most 49 per cent of the isolationist counties were above their respective state levels for fifth grade education; only 34 per cent of the anti-isolationist counties bettered their comparable state percentages. The comparable figures for high school education are 28.4 per cent higher for the isolationist and 20.4 per cent for the anti-isolationist counties.

There is little doubt that some correlation existed between the degree of isolationism in the 1933–1950 period in a particular community and the strength of certain foreign-born elements or foreign white stock in that community. A general correlation existed but there were many exceptions. The maps (Figures III and IV) showing isolationism by districts were compared to Census Bureau maps showing the proportion of the natives of various countries to the total population in 1890. One census map showing "The Proportion of the Natives of the Germanic Nations to the Aggregate Population," was very useful in these comparisons. Similar maps for Irish and Scandinavian elements were used, as well as maps based on the censuses of 1910 and 1920.[18] Close comparison of the census maps to Figures III and IV made it possible to study the pattern of isolationism in relation to the distribution of foreign-born population. Other census data on foreign-born and foreign white stock in isolationist and non-isolationist counties were also useful.

In some areas a high degree of correlation was found. For example, the most isolationist areas of California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Minnesota were relatively heavily populated with persons of Germanic origins. In general, the broad isolationist areas of the northern and eastern parts of the country were more heavily settled by Germanic peoples.

Important exceptions were found, however, and when smaller areas were analyzed more carefully, the more heavily German population did not always appear as the most isolationist, nor did all isolationist districts show a significant foreign-born population. For example, the isolationist areas of Tennessee and Kentucky appeared to be uninfluenced by foreign stock. Idaho and North Dakota, most isolationist of all, appear as relatively unpopulated by foreign born of German background. In Missouri, heavily Germanic St. Louis is the least isolationist portion of the state. The southern portions of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana show similar inconsistencies.

Comparisons with other than Germanic population maps yielded similar exceptions to the general correlation. The Irish element in New England is an example. If Irish birth or parentage could be considered a link to isolationist sentiments in the period of American friendship and cooperation with England, one would expect to find isolationism stronger in heavily Irish southern New England than in northern New England where the Irish element is relatively sparse. However, Massachusetts was less isolationist than either Vermont, New Hampshire, or Maine, each of which is relatively uninfluenced by foreign-born population. This is not to suggest, however, that a general overlapping of Irish and isolationist areas was not common. It merely supports the conclusion that the generally close relationship of certain foreign-born and foreign-stock population elements with isolationist strength had many important exceptions.[19]

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[18] These maps appear in *Statistical Atlas of the United States* (for the Eleventh Census, 1890, Washington, D. C., 1898), Maps 56–61. See also similar statistical atlases based on the 1910 census, plates 146–184, and the 1920 census, plates 147–180.

Partisan affiliation was closely related to isolationist voting. Of all votes cast by Democrats, 10.8 per cent were on the isolationist side. More than 57 per cent of the Republican votes supported the isolationist position. As indicated above, the partisan factor seemed to have a relatively small effect on the regional location of isolationism; that is, even with party influence eliminated the same region of isolationism was definable from the data.

In summary, this examination of non-regional factors suggests additional limitations on the importance of geographic region as a factor in isolationist strength. It seems clear that regional concentration of isolationism in the 1933 to 1950 period was but one of several identifiable characteristics: rural-urban residence, foreign origin or background, partisan affiliation and, to a lesser extent, educational level are characteristics joining together the isolationist districts and separating them, in some cases only slightly, from non-isolationist areas. Partisan affiliation and rural-urban residence were the strongest non-regional factors. Republicans were considerably more isolationist than Democrats. Rural areas were, with rare exception, more isolationist than urban districts within the same state. Though analysis does not indicate any relationship between economic level and isolationism, it does reveal a higher level of education in isolationist districts than in nearby non-isolationist districts. With important exceptions, heavily Germanic population areas tended to be more isolationist than neighboring areas of different national origins. Analyses of other nationality groups indicate similarly general relationships with isolationism and also suggest important limitations to any generalizations on this one factor. Thus, not only is the definition of a region of isolationism surrounded by doubt; but, if defined, the importance of the regional factor is lessened by the fact that other, non-regional correlates are readily discernible.

This analysis allows one only to speculate as to the causes of isolationism. No cause and effect relationship, no explanation of isolationism, can be stated firmly from these conclusions. But if one were to speculate, the soundest explanation would undoubtedly lie in the direction of a combination of these factors—regional and socio-economic—and others. Certainly no single or double factor explanation is possible. Each of these needs further investigation if we are better to understand isolationism, and, more generally, the attitudes of Americans toward foreign affairs.

[19] Findings in this research do not support the relatively strong statement of relationship between isolationism and national origins found in Samuel Lubell's works, *n. 1.* Though the relationship exists, it is but one of several such correlations, and does not seem to be the strongest.

AGRARIAN SYNDICALISM IN POSTWAR FRANCE

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In an age of mass movements and pressure groups, even the most rugged individualists find that organization pays. So it is that the French peasants, surely among the most rugged of all individualists, have embarked since World War II on a major experiment in syndical unity. In place of their prewar organizations, which were relatively weak and deeply divided, a single *Confédération Générale de l'Agriculture* has brought together approximately 80 per cent of all French farmers.[1] In the lobbies of Parliament, in the antechambers of the ministers, in the Economic Council, and in some 280 government commissions, the CGA represents the interests of the agricultural profession. Its existence plainly constitutes a new socio-political factor in the Fourth Republic.

Potentially, a united farmers' organization would seem destined to be the most powerful pressure group in France. Organized labor has mass voting support; the organized employers have rich financial resources; but only the farmers possess both of those weapons.[2] Yet the CGA today, after eight years of existence, continues to be a somewhat marginal power factor in French politics. Its dues-paying membership has dropped off markedly since the 1947 peak; its lobbying activities have produced only spotty results; its central organs are weakened by internal feuds and tensions. Critics proclaim from time to time that the CGA has no real influence among its members and no real prestige in the nation; they predict that it is doomed to disintegration or collapse. Clearly, the organization has not yet fulfilled the hopes of its founders. Nevertheless, it survives, and each year of survival strengthens the likelihood that some kind of agrarian syndicalism on a mass scale is here to stay in France This essay proposes to examine the CGA's record to date, and to assess its actual and potential role in French politics.

I

Farm syndicalism in France is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although the first such organizations were formed in the 1880's, none of them developed mass support until the last decade of the Third Republic. As late as 1929, not more than one peasant out of seven belonged to a syndicate,[3] and as a rule his chief motive was to get cheaper fertilizer rather than to express a sense of class solidarity or to ensure the defense of agricultural interests. Furthermore, this organized minority of peasants was split into several different syndicates, each with its own political color. The impact of the depression speeded up syndical activity in rural areas, so that by 1940 one peasant out of three or four had been "unionized."[4] But division rather than unity continued to be the rule; there still existed no peasant syndicate which could inspire politicians with the respect or fear which the labor unions, for example, could command. Such political influence as the peasantry possessed (and that influence was traditionally very great in France) came through the massive bulk of their voting power, and through the curious electoral system which made the Senate their special preserve. Even before 1940, however, some farm leaders were becoming convinced that their amorphous electoral strength was no longer enough; that to it, there must be added a new organized syndical strength. Vichy's Peasant Corporation was in part the product of this prewar sentiment. Whatever the Corporation's faults (and they were many), it did give the peasantry a taste of unity and potential power which some of them were determined to preserve.

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[1] This figure was given by Secretary-General Lamour at the CGA's 1947 congress. He added that the seven component federations in the CGA had two million adherents in all (P. Lamour, *Pour un statut paysan* [Paris, 1947], p. 3). The largest of the federations, the FNSEA, claimed 1,750,000 dues-paying members in 1949 (*Annuaire de la CGA 1949–1950* [Paris, n.d.], p. 18).

[2] *Cf.* the Paris weekly *Samedi-Soir* for Jan. 7, 1950, which described the CGA as the most powerful special-interest group in France. According to the 1946 census, about one-third of the active French population (7,290,000 of 21 million) is engaged in agriculture or stock-raising (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, *L'espace économique français* [Paris, 1951], p. 35). The financial resources available to the organized farmers cannot be measured, but they are doubtless potentially greater than those which organized labor can command from its own members.

The origins of the CGA go back to this Vichy period—to 1943, when French patriots could begin to envision the end of the German occupation and could begin to plan for a brave new world. It was conceived by Pierre Tanguy-Prigent, a young Breton peasant who had entered politics in 1936 as a Socialist deputy. Tanguy, who had sought unsuccessfully to build a strong Socialist organization among the farmers before the war, realized that the liberation might give him a new chance. Late in 1943, with a few friends, he sketched out plans for a unified national confederation which would parallel labor's CGT. An underground newspaper, *La Résistance Paysanne*, was founded to propagandize for the cause, but there was barely time to publish two issues before the Allied forces landed in France.[5]

With the rout of the German armies and the collapse of the Vichy regime, Tanguy's rudimentary plans were threatened from two quarters. First, the Algiers government of General de Gaulle decreed in July, 1944 that all prewar farm groups which Vichy had abolished were to be resuscitated. Such a return to the prewar pattern of division and weakness, Tanguy felt, had to be blocked. Tanguy's chance soon came when de Gaulle, on the recommendation of resistance leaders, named him Minister of Agriculture in the first post-liberation cabinet. One of his first acts was to abrogate the Algiers decree, and to order instead that a single peasant organization be authorized to exist.

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[3] M. Augé-Laribé estimates that in 1929 only 600,000 peasants were members of syndicates or cooperatives of any kind (*La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940* [Paris, 1950], p. 477). At that time, there were almost four million farms in France.

[4] Augé-Laribé's estimate for 1939 is one million peasants in farm organizations of some sort (*loc. cit.*). Meanwhile, the total farm population had dropped. The largest syndicate of the 1930's—the UNSA—claimed at the time to represent 1,200,000 families.

[5] After the liberation, efforts were made to inflate the CGA's resistance record. The first issue of *La Libération Paysanne* in October, 1944 asserted that the CGA had been founded in 1941. One ex-official of the CGA claims to possess an issue of *La Résistance Paysanne*, circulated just after the liberation, which bore the serial number 31.

The second threat came from the Communists. Throughout large parts of central and southern France, they had built a network of peasant resistance groups—the so-called Committees of Peasant Defense and Action (CDAP). At the liberation, these groups seized control of local farm newspapers and Vichy Corporation offices; and their leaders (notably Léopold Rambeau and Jean Laurenti) convoked a CDAP congress at Toulouse in November at which they planned to create a permanent national organization. With some difficulty Tanguy persuaded the Communist leaders to abandon these plans and to merge their CDAP with the new CGA. Evidently the Communists decided that they could effectively colonize and control the larger organization from within. At any rate, they converted the Toulouse congress from a baptismal into a funeral rite, and the CDAP disappeared in an orgy of speechmaking.

Meanwhile, Tanguy's plans were rapidly taking shape. In October, 1944, he appointed a National Committee of Agricultural Action to build the framework for the CGA. He also set up local committees for each department of France, to supervise the establishment of village and departmental units. The National Committee, hand-picked by Tanguy, was remarkable for its high proportion of Socialists and its low ratio of peasants. Only five of the seventeen members were farmers, and the key figure, Philippe Lyonnet, was a high official in the electricians' union.[6]

The task of blueprinting the machinery for so complex and unwieldy an organization as the CGA was a forbidding one. Although in theory the planners were starting from scratch, in practice a complicated series of farmers' organizations still existed at the end of the war. Almost ten thousand cooperatives of varying size were scattered throughout the country; even Vichy had not been able to fuse them effectively into national units. Likewise, separate hierarchies of mutual aid societies and of farm credit associations had grown up over several decades. More important still were the so-called "specialized associations" which grouped the wheat growers, the sugar-beet producers, the wine-growers, and so on. These groups had sprung up during the two decades before 1940, and had come to be the most effective of all farm pressure groups. Finally, there were the remnants of several prewar farmers' syndicates whose leaders, of Leftist sympathies, were free of the Vichy taint. On the other hand, those prewar syndicates which had rallied to Vichy (and the largest ones had done so) were doomed to extinction, and their leaders were excluded from any share in planning the CGA.

This inherited complexity made it clear that the CGA, as its name indicated,

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[6] Tanguy later explained his choice of Socialist technicians rather than peasants by admitting that his "peasant" resistance movement had been made up of the former. "Could I repudiate the friends who had shared with me the risks of the resistance?" he asked (*Congrès d'unité paysanne* [Paris, 1945], p. 52). For details of the CGA's beginnings in 1944–45, see Lyonnet's report to the first CGA congress, published by the CGA in the pamphlet just cited; and J. Serve, *Le syndicalisme agricole* (Paris, 1945).

would have to be a *con*federation rather than a unitary structure. As finally worked out, the blueprint provided for seven national federations as the component units of the CGA. Three of them would bring together the principal technical branches of farm organization: the cooperatives, the mutual aid societies, and the farm credit associations. Three others would represent certain special segments of the rural population: the agricultural technicians and the farm laborers (the latter divided between a Catholic and a Communist federation, as in prewar days). The seventh federation would be the most novel and potentially the most significant. Labelled the *Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles* (FNSEA, or Farmers' Federation), it would be open to all active farm operators, whether owners, tenants, or sharecroppers. In it, the whole agricultural population except absentee landlords and farm laborers would be represented directly. In the other federations, in contrast, the peasants would be represented indirectly through cooperative or mutual aid officials (generally technicians or bureaucrats rather than farmers). The FNSEA, therefore, would rest upon remarkably broad base of some two and one-half million peasant families, whose consolidated voting strength might give the Paris politicians something to think about. Here, rather than in the CGA above it, would be the peasants' own trade union.

Tanguy-Prigent and his associates, however, intended no such dominant role for the FNSEA. They aimed, rather, to make it one subordinate segment of a powerful CGA, with the confederal organs functioning not as a mere capstone linking seven autonomous federations, but rather as the central agency of guidance and decision. Such was the nature of labor's CGT, within which the various federations were only parts of a greater whole. The voice of the FNSEA would be influential in CGA councils, but its desires could presumably be overridden by the votes of the technicians, bureaucrats, and farm-labor organizers. And these latter groups, as Tanguy and everyone else of course knew, were predominantly Leftist in their political views.

But Tanguy and his advisers had in mind something more than building a Socialist political machine among the farmers. Their principal aim in this rosy liberation epoch was to revolutionize French agriculture. This did not mean (as their enemies then and since have alleged) that they aimed to collectivize French farming on the Soviet model.[7] What they wanted, rather, was a planned, renovated, efficient agriculture in place of the old heterogeneous agrarian structure which contained everything from the medieval to the ultramodern. They proposed the rapid mechanization of agriculture; the cooperative use of machinery; the consolidation of small scattered strips of land into larger units; the expansion of cooperative buying and marketing; and the planning of crops on a rational, nation-wide basis. Such a program could not be carried through by the peasants themselves; it could be achieved only by governmental action working through the technicians with the consent of the peasants. The CGA was envisaged as one of the major agencies for carrying out this agricultural revolution; therefore the balance of power within it would have to favor the technicians and bureaucrats rather than the peasant mass.

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[7] The charge that the CGA's founders aimed at outright collectivization has been made repeatedly: e.g., R. Maspétiol, *L'ordre éternel des champs* (Paris, 1946), p. 518; R. Cercler, "Le syndicalisme agricole et les Chambres d'Agriculture," *Revue politique des idées et des institutions*, May 15, 1949, pp. 274–79; A. Rougié, *Peints par eux-mêmes; la vague marxiste sur l'agriculture* (n.p., 1947), pp. 60–85.

With these aims in mind, the CGA's planners moved rapidly from the blueprint to the construction stage. It is worth noting that in this process, the CGA's confederal organs were set up first, and the most important federation—the FNSEA—last. In a sense, therefore, the CGA was built from the top down. Late in 1944, under the guidance of Tanguy's local Committees of Agricultural Action, peasants met in villages throughout France to form local CGA units and to elect their officers by show of hands. In the Center and Southwest, this process was simple: the local CDAP, usually under Communist leadership, simply took over the CGA label. The problem was more difficult in regions where the local peasant elite had supported Vichy. Tanguy's appointees saw to it that Vichyites were shunted aside, but it was not always easy to find other village leaders in their place. By March, 1945, however, the ground had been prepared for the CGA's first national congress. Delegates from almost every part of France gathered in Paris to celebrate the achievement of peasant unity, and to consider the proposals of Lyonnet's preparatory committee.

On the face of it, the congress was a great success for the planners. Oratory flowed in profusion: Tanguy-Prigent greeted the delegates at such length that one peasant said he must have been speaking for both Tanguy and Prigent. Lyonnet's report was approved almost without debate, and the Lyonnet group was left in control of the CGA's permanent machinery. Still, some signs of peasant dissatisfaction were already apparent. One Catholic delegate got the floor to declare that syndical unity could be nothing more than a facade; that the French peasantry was too varied to be represented by a single organization. He was promptly howled down, for the *mystique* of unity was still powerful in that post-liberation era. The malcontents managed only to get several more non-Socialists added to the CGA's top council, and to extort from Tanguy a promise that a more representative congress would be held within a year.[8] Some weeks later, Tanguy retreated before Catholic pressure and promised that syndical liberty would shortly be restored. He insisted, however, that the CGA's temporary monopoly of the right to form farmers' organizations would have to continue until the CGA had been completely built. Otherwise, he argued, peasant unity might be wrecked by selfish political rivalries.

The chief remaining organizational task was the establishment of the Farmers' Federation (FNSEA). All of the other federations, as well as the CGA capstone, were in place and functioning by mid-1945. But the FNSEA, if it were to mean anything at all, could not be set up by decree and direction from above: it required free elections at the grass-roots level. Such elections would be the first real test of peasant opinion since the CGA planners had begun their work; the outcome might have a vital effect on the CGA's future. Shortly before this critical moment arrived, Tanguy took one last step to keep the new FNSEA within bounds. He decreed that the syndicates would be denied the right to engage in business activities: e.g., to buy fertilizer or to market their members' crops. The prewar farm syndicates had gotten their start through such prosaic but useful operations, and had held their members' loyalty mainly through such services. Now, however, those functions were to be monopolized by the cooperatives, while the FNSEA would confine itself to purely syndical activities. This decision, while logical enough, left many peasants skeptical about the purpose and utility of the FNSEA.

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[8] Despite the idealistic tone which pervaded the congress, the liveliest applause went to a delegate who demanded that the national dues be reduced from 20 to 10 francs, on the ground that "We don't intend to maintain a collection of bureaucrats in Paris."

Early in January, 1946, the peasants went to the polls. There had been some controversy in Paris over the question of eligibility to vote; according to rough estimates, only about one-third of the three million farm operators had formally adhered to the CGA or to one of its technical branches. It was finally ruled that all farmers might vote, and that the act of voting would automatically make them members of the FNSEA. In each commune, delegates were to be chosen to a departmental assembly of the Federation; and from these assemblies would come the delegates to the first FNSEA congress in Paris.

What proportion of the peasants responded to the election call is still obscure. CGA officials announced triumphantly that approximately 70 per cent had turned out, and that the farmers had proved their passionate interest in syndical unity. Hostile observers placed the figure at about one-third; but as no statistics were ever published, an accurate estimate is impossible.[9] Far more important was the character of the vote cast; and CGA leaders had less reason to rejoice when they saw the kind of delegates who had been chosen. Jubilant conservatives claimed that 80 per cent of those elected had not previously been active in the CGA. At any rate, a strong trend away from the Left was evident almost everywhere except in central and southern France. In Tanguy-Prigent's home department of Finistère, only three Socialists were elected. The Communists too were sorely disappointed, despite a number of victories in the Center and Southwest. Their candidate for the national presidency of the FNSEA, Waldeck Rochet, could not even win election to the presidency of his departmental unit in Saône-et-Loire.

This FNSEA election represented in part a conscious peasant revulsion against the organizers of the CGA, whose interests seemed to them to be urban and political rather than rural and professional. Even more, however, it represented a natural village tendency to choose tried and trusted local spokesmen:

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[9] On the 1946 elections, see the reports by Lyonnet and Rambeau at the first FNSEA congress (published as separate pamphlets by the CGA); E. de Felcourt, "La législation agricole depuis la libération," *Monde français*, May, 1948, p. 199; R. Cercler, "L'organisation professionnelle agricole en France," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, May 10, 1946, pp. 132–44. Some Communists feel in retrospect that the worst error in CGA history was the decision to let all farmers vote in 1946, rather than active adherents alone (*Le Paysan du Sud-Ouest* [Toulouse], May 15, 1951).

the same men who had been active in prewar farm syndicates or cooperatives and, often, in the Vichy Corporation. The rural elite in France is small; the liberation did not magically produce a new elite to take the place of the old. In most cases, therefore, the peasants returned to the leaders whom they knew. In areas where the village elite had been Leftist (notably in the South and Center), those same Leftists were elected in 1946, but throughout most of the northern half of France, the Christian Socialists or Rightists swept the polls. In the first national congress of the FNSEA which followed shortly, the posts of command went to centrists and conservatives. Eugène Forget, a Christian Socialist smallowner from the Angers region, became president; and the number two post of secretary-general fell to an unrepentant Rightist—René Blondelle, a large-scale operator from northeastern France. Both men had held positions in the Vichy Corporation—Forget in a minor role, Blondelle near the top. Clearly, a new phase in CGA history was about to begin.

II

The first phase in the CGA's development (1944–46) had been concerned mainly with organizational problems, and had been dominated by Leftist planners. The second period (1946–1950) was marked by a sporadic internal conflict over the structure and spirit of the CGA. Three major factions were competing in this "cold war." The Leftists (mainly Socialists, with a minority Communist wing) still clung to control of the CGA's confederal organs, and sought to keep the locus of power there. Their rising star, rapidly eclipsing Lyonnet as the chief Leftist spokesman in the CGA, was Philippe Lamour—a colorful and controversial figure who had been chosen secretary-general of the CGA in 1945. Lamour had had a checkered but intriguing career: a brilliant young lawyer in the 1930's, a prolific novelist and world traveler by avocation, he had been forced to abandon his legal practice shortly before 1940 and had taken to operating a large farm—first near Vichy, then in the deep south near Nîmes. Lamour's political record was as bizarre as his professional career: he had been a Radical Socialist candidate for deputy in 1936; had served as one of Ana Pauker's lawyers in Rumania in the same year; had allegedly gone through a brief Pétainist stage in 1940; and had emerged after the liberation as an unaffiliated Leftist. Although his enemies scoffed at Lamour as a "comic-opera peasant," his unflagging energy, his persuasive oratory, and his personal charm brought him to the top in the very first months, and kept him there long after other Leftists had been shunted aside.

The Rightist faction found its natural center of gravity in the FNSEA; its aim, therefore, was to shift power from the confederal organs to the separate federations, and to make the FNSEA virtually autonomous. The ablest spokesman for this viewpoint was René Blondelle, whose vigor and tenacity balanced the dynamic brilliance of Lamour. Blondelle had a record of twenty years' activity in agrarian syndicalism in the Aisne department, where he rented and operated a 600-acre farm. His social conservatism had led him in the direction of corporatist doctrine before 1940, and he had therefore been a natural supporter of Pétain. After the liberation, the farmers of the Aisne had at once reaffirmed their confidence in him by reelecting him as head of their local organization.

Between the Left and the Right, the Christian Socialist element held the balance of power during this transitional era, and sought to find some compromise which would preserve peasant unity. Eugène Forget, its principal spokesman, was one of the most remarkable rural leaders to emerge in the postwar period. A sincere and selfless man with a purely local reputation before 1946, Forget was overwhelmed by the unexpected honor which came to him when he was chosen first national president of the FNSEA.[10] During his three years in office, he strove unceasingly to mediate between the factions in his organization, and to shift the CGA's focus from the peasant as producer to the peasant as human being. In his few spare moments, Forget managed to commute to his 40-acre farm, and to keep it a model of efficiency and modern methods. Forget's more cynical critics treated him as naive and "soft," useful only as a buffer during a period of internal stress. But to many of those who knew him, he served as a kind of symbol of personal integrity and sincere dedication to the welfare of rural France.[11]

The CGA's inner tensions during this transitional period are not easy to analyze, for politics, personalities, and differences of principle all played a part. The central fact, however, was the struggle for power between the Leftist technicians and planners in the cooperatives and at the top of the CGA, and the Rightist element in the FNSEA whose emphasis on "the organized profession" smacked more and more of corporatist doctrine. René Blondelle brought the dispute into the open at the FNSEA'S second congress in November, 1947. The peasants' new union, he declared, was hamstrung by the confusion of authority between the CGA and the FNSEA. Housed in the same building, sharing the same secretarial services, the officials of the two groups were continually stepping on each others' toes and disputing over the locus of authority. The solution, he argued, was to strip the CGA confederal organs of everything except a small secretariat. He proposed to make it merely a coordinating organism, while all of the CGA's essential services (including the official newspaper, *La Libération Paysanne*) would be transferred to the FNSEA. Such a change, declared Blondelle, would drive politics out of the organization, and would leave syndical interests supreme. Blondelle also proposed that minority factions in the FNSEA be squeezed out of the Federation's Bureau (the top policy-making body) by allowing the majority to elect the entire Bureau.[12]

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[10] Forget was allegedly lifted out of obscurity by a prominent Catholic farm leader from Lyon named Genevrey, who for personal reasons could not be elected himself.

[11] It was typical of Forget that, although eligible for a high priority to buy a new automobile, he insisted on waiting for two years until his regular turn came up. During an official tour of the United States with other farm officials, Forget left the party at Kansas City and flew home in order to meet a prior commitment to make a "whistle-stop" speech near his home town.

[12] On the 1947 congress, see N. Drogat, "Y a-t-il une crise de la C.G.A.?," *Travaux de l'Action Populaire*, pp. 34–41 (Jan., 1948); and R. Blondelle, *Rapport moral sur l'activité de la F.N.S.E.A.* (Paris, 1947).

Blondelle's blunt assault stirred up a violent debate; and while his report was adopted by a large majority, most of the thorny issues contained in it were referred to a committee for further study. No group wanted to take the initiative in forcing a showdown which would have split the CGA; the facade of unity was therefore maintained. For two more years, the internal bickering went on, but it was clear that the Blondelle faction was steadily consolidating its hold. One factor which strengthened the Rightists was the revival of the prewar "specialized associations" (such as the Wheat Growers' Association) and their partial absorption by the FNSEA. Several of these groups were wealthy, powerful, and aggressively led; they were potentially dangerous to the CGA either inside or outside it. In 1947 they were finally brought into the FNSEA as semi-autonomous units, with separate budgets and separate representation on the FNSEA's national council. Their most vigorous spokesmen were Rightists who threw their support to the Blondelle group, and who exercised an influence out of proportion to their numbers.

Meanwhile, the Leftists in the CGA were being progressively weakened. One symbolic blow was the fall of Tanguy-Prigent from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1947, and his replacement by Pierre Pflimlin of the MRP.[13] Another setback was a split in the cooperative movement; some of the largest and oldest cooperatives seceded from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives which the Leftists had founded after the liberation.[14] Still another source of weakness was the Communists' effort to carve out a special preserve for themselves within the FNSEA. Disgruntled at their poor showing in the FNSEA elections, the Communists decided to try to split the 700,000 small tenants and sharecroppers away from the main body of peasants. Late in 1946 they suddenly announced the creation of a Tenants' and Sharecroppers' Association which, as they planned it, would have been a completely autonomous unit within the FNSEA. This maneuver was partially blocked by the various non-Communist elements, who joined the new organization, got their man elected president, and voted to make it merely a "section" of the FNSEA rather than an autonomous "association." The new Tenants' and Sharecroppers' Section (SNPBR) failed to develop much momentum during the years that followed, but its existence further divided and weakened the Left-wing element within the CGA.[15]

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[13] Some time before his fall, Tanguy had finally been forced to restore syndical liberty, so that groups rivalling the CGA could be legally formed. In fact, few such groups were created. One exception was the *Fédération Nationale de la Propriété Agricole*, an extreme-Right organization which represents the interests of large landlords, many of them absentee. Its official organ is *La Renaissance Agricole.* The MRP abandoned its plan to set up a rival syndicate when the 1946 FNSEA elections strengthened its position within the CGA. Likewise, certain prewar syndicates in the provinces which had been demanding full independence decided to remain affiliated with the FNSEA when the latter showed signs of moving to the Right. Such was the case, notably, in the Nord, Finistère, and Côtes-du-Nord departments.

[14] The seceding cooperatives formed a new union of Rightist tendencies, linked closely with the Wheat Growers' Association on the rue des Pyramides.

[15] Useful details on the origins of the SNPBR may be found in the MRP's farm weekly,

By 1950, the Rightists were ready to take over outright control of the FNSEA, and to inject into it a more aggressive and intransigent spirit. At the fourth national congress in March, President Forget announced his resignation, remarking sadly that his efforts at mediation and persuasion had found little echo either in syndical or in governmental circles. He was replaced as president by René Blondelle, while another Rightist, 300-pound Jean Laborbe, took over as secretary-general. The last remaining Communists, and most of the Socialists, were pushed off the Bureau of the FNSEA. A new strategy of mass peasant demonstrations, buyers' strikes, and direct political action was promised by the Blondelle leadership.

Since that time, the Rightists have completely dominated the FNSEA, and the FNSEA in turn has increasingly dominated the CGA. It is true that Philippe Lamour still clings to his post as CGA secretary-general, and that a prominent cooperative official, Pierre Martin, has been CGA president since 1950. These, however, are exceptional cases. In the CGA's central offices behind the *Opéra* in Paris, only a handful of bureaucrats from the 1944–46 era remain. Socialists and Christian Socialists are clearly outnumbered in the CGA's national council, and the Communists have been totally excluded from posts of influence.[16] The CGA no longer holds an annual congress; only the component federations such as the FNSEA meet in full session. Outwardly at least, 1950 seems to have marked the end of factionalism, and the achievement of syndical unity and solidarity.

III

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Behind the facade of harmony and unity, both the peasants and their leaders have been in frequent internal conflict. At the top, the old Left-Right feud still smolders, and flares up briefly at intervals. In April, 1952, for example, René Blondelle (president of the FNSEA) and Pierre Martin (president of the CGA) were rival candidates for the national presidency of the revived Chambers of Agriculture.[17] Blondelle won, but by a

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Monde Paysan, for April 30 and Sept. 24, 1947. The SNPBR's newspaper admitted in 1951 that fewer than 200,000 tenants and sharecroppers were dues-paying members, and that very few of them took the trouble to read the official organ (*Le Fermier et le Métayer*, April, 1951).

In 1952 the non-Communists took full control of the SNPBR, and replaced every Communist who had held a high post in it. The Communists then proceeded to organize a new subdivision of the SNPBR, of dubious legal status, and confined to fifteen central and southern departments where Communist rural strength is great (*La Terre*, March 13 and 20, 1952). They denounce M. Bajeux, the new secretary-general of the SNPBR, as a "*gros fermier capitaliste du Nord.*" When I visited M. Bajeux's farm in 1951, I found this "big capitalist" stripped to the waist in his barn, putting in hay along with two hired hands.

[16] The only high-ranking Leftist who is still a full-time official in the CGA central offices is Director-General Henri Canonge. The chief remaining stronghold of the Christian Socialists is in the mutual aid societies, whose elected boards supervise the social security system in rural areas.

[17] The Chambers of Agriculture before 1940 were public organisms in each department with power to recommend programs of rural improvement and to speak on behalf

margin of only 47 to 37 votes; his victory has increased the restlessness of the Leftist element in the cooperative, mutual aid, and farm credit federations of the CGA.[18] The same conflict appears when a Rightist cabinet like that of Antoine Pinay adopts measures which irritate the peasantry. Then the FNSEA's Rightist majority is torn between loyalty to the cabinet and a desire to protect farm interests, while the Leftist element denounces the government with redoubled fervor.

But there are other lines of cleavage in the CGA as well. Once the Rightists had won clear control of the organization, they could afford to revive their own internal differences. One issue which soon arose was the question of direct CGA intervention in politics. Most of the Rightists favored such intervention in the 1951 elections, but only part of them advocated the creation of a separate peasant party rather than activity within the established parties.[19] Partially linked to this issue was the broader question of corporative doctrine: some CGA leaders still insist that the parliamentary republic must be modified or replaced by a corporative structure, founded upon the organized professions.[20] Still another controversy has brought to grips the "expansionists" and the "malthusians" within the CGA. Until 1948 at least, all factions in the CGA had rallied to the "expansionist" doctrine of the CGA's founders, who preached that French agriculture should vastly improve its productivity and expand its production in order to become a great exporting branch of the national economy. From 1948 on, however, the farmers' optimism dimmed as their production began to catch up with demand, and as the favorable price scissors began to turn against them. A "neo-malthusian" doctrine began to make headway among certain farm leaders, who urged a return to the prewar tradition of limited production for a highly-protected domestic market. Such a policy was frankly proposed at the FNSEA's congress in 1951 by Jean Deleau, head of the Wheat

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of farm interests. They were elected by the peasants and by organized farm groups, and had a regular though small source of income from taxes. Vichy suspended them in 1940, and their surviving members demanded that they be reactivated after the war. CGA leaders resisted this demand for several years, on the ground that the CGA had taken over the functions of the Chambers, and that useless rivalries between the two would split the peasantry. A compromise was finally reached which permitted the revival of the Chambers, with slates of candidates jointly drawn up by Chamber and CGA leaders. Early in 1952, these slates were elected without opposition in most parts of France. No clear division of functions between the Chambers and the FNSEA has yet been made, but so long as Blondelle remains president of both organisms, there should be no problem of rivalry.

[18] In June, 1952 these three federations held a joint congress and decided to coordinate their activities through a new permanent committee. *Le Monde* described this decision as a "defensive reflex" against the growing encroachment of the FNSEA (*Monde*, June 27, 1952). The debates at the congress, summarized at length in *Libération Paysanne* for July 3, 1952, give clear evidence of this resentment at FNSEA domination.

[19] I have described the CGA's recent political ventures in an article entitled "French Farmers in Politics," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 51, pp. 356–65 (July, 1952).

[20] Such a proposal was advanced in the FNSEA's 1952 congress (*Monde*, Feb. 1, 1952). Blondelle had hinted at the same thing in the 1949 congress.

Growers' Association. The proposal split the Rightist leadership in the FNSEA. President Blondelle himself opposed the malthusian thesis, which was also vigorously fought by Philippe Lamour and the Leftist minority. Together, the Blondelle and Lamour factions have been able to keep the CGA officially committed to expansionism, but there is increasing unrest in some farm circles.[21]

Differences continue to exist, then, at the top of the CGA. To what extent do these differences reflect similar cleavages within the farm population as a whole? This is perhaps the most significant question which must be answered in assessing the future of agrarian syndicalism in France. CGA officials like to proclaim that "the peasantry is less divided than its leaders"[22]; and some observers even claim to detect the growth of a sense of class solidarity among the peasants analogous to that which inspires the city workers.[23] If this viewpoint is valid—if there is really a rising sense of unity and class-consciousness at the base—then the feuds in the CGA are mere temporary aberrations which will pass in time.

The loudest exponents of the opposite viewpoint are the Communists. For several years they have been asserting that the rural population is deeply divided along social and economic lines, and that the CGA has cut itself off from the mass of small farmers by adopting policies dictated by the large capitalist operators. So clear is this class bias, say the Communists, that the small farmers have been abandoning the CGA in droves. They point out that some departmental units of the FNSEA have become mere skeletons; that 22 of the 90 departmental sections were denied voting rights in the 1950 congress for inability to pay their national dues, and that 19 of these 22 departments were located south of the Loire, where small farming is most general, and where farm incomes are relatively low.[24]

There is some real evidence, and much superficial evidence, to support the Communist case. The dominant element in the FNSEA is undoubtedly conservative in its political and social ideology; it is strongly attracted to corporatist doctrines, and to the idea that social stability is more important than productivity or material well-being. Within the FNSEA, the influence of a few dynamic leaders representing the specialized associations balances, and perhaps even outweighs, the influence of those delegates who represent the individual peasants. Furthermore, the greatest decline in FNSEA membership since 1947 has occurred in small-farming regions with a Leftist tradition, and in part has reflected dissatisfaction with FNSEA leadership.

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[21] See P. Drouin in *Le Monde*, April 13, 1951. The CGA officially favors the creation of a "green pool" in Europe to provide a common market for agricultural products. It has also supported the Schuman Plan for a coal and steel pool. On the other hand, CGA leaders boast that they were instrumental in blocking a Franco-Italian customs union somewhat similar to Benelux. Italian competition, they insist, would ruin many French farmers unless food-importing countries could also be brought into the union.

[22] E. Forget in *Libération Paysanne*, March 16, 1950.

[23] N. Drogat, *loc. cit.*, p. 36; *cf.* also P. Couvreur, "La C.G.A. et les grandes lignes d'une politique agricole," *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, p. 16 (Jan. 1950).

[24] The Communists asserted in 1950 that two-thirds of the CGA's members had left the organization (*La Terre*, Nov. 16, 1950). No accurate membership figures are available, but this estimate seems to be grossly exaggerated. It is true, however, that seven departmental units are totally moribund, and had to be suspended in 1952 for failure to pay any national dues for three years (*Libération Paysanne*, Feb. 7, 1952). All of these departments are in the southwest. It is also true that fifteen or twenty other departmental units are in bad condition. Some are kept afloat by a strong cooperative organization, which assumes the burden of collecting FNSEA dues. In three departments where Communist influence is strong (Corrèze, Landes, and Haute-Garonne), the FNSEA unit has split into two rival syndicates, with the non-Communist organization officially recognized by the Paris leadership.

Even so, it is a gross oversimplification to reduce the cleavages within the peasantry to a simple two-way pattern of class struggle, and to interpret the CGA's record according to that pattern. It is easy to show that small and middle farmers are in the majority in the national councils of the CGA and the FNSEA, and that large capitalist operators like Blondelle and Deleau are the exception rather than the rule.[25] True, the Communists argue that these small farmers are the prisoners or the henchmen of their big colleagues, but such an argument is more convenient than convincing. Political and social conservatism are by no means monopolies of the big owners. It can be proved, too, that the sharp decline in FNSEA membership has other causes than the small farmers' revolt against the national leadership. Alongside small-farming departments where the FNSEA is moribund, one can find other departments of similar social structure with vigorous and sizeable FNSEA units.[26] Where syndicalism has decayed, the cause has often been apathetic leadership or bitter political squabbles. Finally, it ought to be said on behalf of the FNSEA leadership that its record has not been one of pure reaction or of the cynical defense of big agrarian interests at the expense of the small peasantry. Some of the FNSEA and CGA leaders are sincerely concerned with the small farmer's problems, not only for the sake of social stability but also from a sense of obligation to the largest group in their "trade union."[27]

[25] FNSEA officials assert that three-fourths of the members of their National Council operate "family farms" (*Libération Paysanne*, April 6, 1950). Among them are some of the most influential of the Federation's leaders: e.g., honorary president Eugène Forget (40 acres), secretary-general Albert Génin (25 acres); assistant secretaries-general Fernand Van Graefschepe (60 acres) and Lucien Biset (40 acres); vice-president Clément Bardet (70 acres). Van Graefschepe is often described in the Communist press as "*un très gros exploitant du Nord.*" The average size of French farms, according to the 1946 census, is about 40 acres.

In FNSEA congresses, there was some discrimination against populous but poor departments prior to 1947. Representation then was based on a combination of membership and total value of farm production in a department. Thus, Seine-et-Marne with only 7,448 farmers had three delegates, and Ariège with 19,106 farmers had only two. Since 1947, representation has been based on membership alone; this democratic gesture has been partially nullified by allotting 76 delegates to the specialized associations.

[26] On this point, see J. Laborbe in *Libération Paysanne*, March 30, 1950. It is true, however, that the FNSEA has more often disintegrated in subsistence-farming regions than in prosperous small-farming areas.

[27] The CGA's program to aid the small peasants has both progressive and regressive aspects. In the latter category one might classify the CGA's constant efforts to keep farm taxes low. In 1950 Blondelle boasted that the number of peasants subject to the agricultural profits tax had been cut from a million and a half to 593,000, thanks to the CGA's

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that peasant unity is still a slogan and a myth rather than a reality. The basic weakness of agrarian syndicalism in France lies in the nation's complex agrarian structure—in the varied social and economic status of the farmers, made still more complicated by a wide and deep variety of political traditions. On almost every practical or doctrinal issue which the CGA must face, the interests of various farm groups are bound to diverge and conflict. Thus, for example, small farmers will often benefit by regional price variations, while large producers are likely to prefer a uniform national price high enough to let most marginal peasants survive. Or, again, the interests of one wine-producing region may clash sharply with those of another area. The urban workers constitute a fairly coherent class, but the rural world, like the bourgeoisie, is made up of a whole congeries of classes.[28] And each of these rural classes is further divided by a varying religious and political heritage.

Agrarian syndicalism is likely to be hampered for years to come by the diversity of the base upon which it rests. It will be weakened, too, so long as the purpose of syndicalism remains controversial. For most peasants, its *raison d'être* is the defense of farm interests against those of rival social groups.[29] For a few of the more far-sighted farmers, and for many CGA leaders, its most important function is to educate and to modernize, not merely to defend what exists. Defense alone may mean stagnation; but education is likely to be a painful and unpopular process, for it may require the conversion of many farms to new types of production, and the disappearance of many marginal peasants. Even those CGA officials who believe that French agriculture must be thoroughly shaken up, and that "there are a million peasants too many" on the land, dare not say so openly.[30] When demagogues of Left and Right stand ready to distort any reform proposal, it is safer for syndical leaders to take a dema-

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lobbying (*Libération Paysanne*, May 4, 1950). On the other hand, the CGA has sponsored a number of constructive projects designed to aid small farmers in technically backward areas, for example, to furnish them with selected seed at low prices.

[28] *Cf.* R. Gendarme, "Esquisse d'une théorie du revenu des agriculteurs," *Revue Economique*, Vol. 3, pp. 357–60 (July, 1952).

[29] The tendency of the peasants to consider themselves constant victims of injustice is well illustrated by an opinion poll carried out in 1949. The respondents were asked to rate seven social categories (industrialists, workers, peasants, etc.) in the order of their economic status. Virtually all of the farmers rated themselves in the bottom three categories, while all other groups rated the farmers in the top three categories (*Sondages*, August, 1949).

[30] An outspoken young Christian Socialist named René Colson used this phrase in *Témoignages Chrétiens* (April 13, 1951). His thesis, borrowed from one of the ablest Catholic agricultural experts in France, was that there are too many marginal farmers on the soil, and that real rural prosperity cannot be attained until these marginal operators disappear from agriculture. Colson's article was loudly denounced by farm leaders of both Right and Left, especially by the Communists, who called it proof that the CGA wishes to destroy the small peasantry. Most CGA officials who are interested in rural progress agree privately that many marginal peasants must and will disappear. Men like Eugène Forget, however, prefer to save as many as possible through technical aid and better planning of crops.

gogic line themselves, and to declaim loudly that they are the best defenders of what exists.

Some of the more severe critics of the CGA believe that the organization has no real authority over its members, and that it is doomed to extinction or disintegration.[31] It is futile, they contend, to preserve the appearances of unity when irreconcilable diversity is the basic fact. The critics disagree, however, in predicting the future character of farmers' organizations. Most of them believe that the technical associations such as the cooperatives and the mutual aid societies have an assured future, no matter what happens to the CGA. Pure syndicalism, however, as represented by the FNSEA, is on shakier ground. Some prophets expect it to wither away at the local and departmental levels, and to survive only as a central coordinating agency for the various specialized associations. Others hold that the FNSEA should disappear entirely after it has served its purpose (which, as they see it, is to build a solid structure of cooperatives and mutual aid societies throughout France). Still others suggest that some new semi-public organization with official status and with an assured income from taxes (such as the recently-revived Chambers of Agriculture) may gradually take over the FNSEA's functions. Some FNSEA leaders, on the other hand, seem to envisage a powerful quasi-corporative structure through a kind of fusion of the Chambers and the FNSEA.

The future form of agrarian syndicalism, then, is obscure, but the survival of one or more mass movements to represent the farmers seems certain. Divided though the peasantry may be, there is a new self-consciousness in the French rural districts which is likely to grow in strength and to manifest itself in some institutional form. Traditionally, the peasants have been aggressively independent and impervious to organization. But the idea is rapidly spreading that they have too long been the passive objects of government and of economic forces. In a variety of ways, and for a variety of ends, they are determined to share actively in shaping their own destiny. The spirit in which they use this new self-consciousness, and the kind of leadership which they can produce and are willing to follow, will do much to shape the course of the Fourth Republic.

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[31] See, for example, R. Cercler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 276–77; and J. François in *Cahiers du clergé rural*, March, 1951, pp. 122–23. On the other hand, N. Drogat in *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, Vol. 43, pp. 572–73 (Nov., 1950), holds that the CGA has a great educational role to play, and that it may survive not as a mass organization but as an agency grouping the rural elite. Most of the views about the CGA's future summarized in this paragraph were gathered in conversations with syndical and cooperative officials in Paris and the provinces.

AN AMERICAN VIEW OF EUROPEAN UNION*

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The official American policy regarding a United Europe has developed rapidly since the end of World War II and has already gone far toward committing the United States to the establishment of a European Union of some kind. The first important overt act in this development was the declaration of policy in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. One purpose of this legislation, Congress declared, was "to encourage these countries [that is, European participants in the Marshall Plan] through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts as set forth in the report of the Committee on European Economic Cooperation, signed at Paris on September 22, 1947." With this encouragement the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was soon effected. The next step was to extend the area of American interest from the economic to the military field. One of the purposes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was "to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest." This legislation led eventually to the effort to organize a European Defense Community capable of playing an important role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A further step was the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which declared American policy to be "to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe." Thus the American government finally became involved in the projected establishment of a constitution for a United States of Europe.

This was a bold undertaking. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, and others, whom Americans are too prone to call Europeans without adequate evidence that such is in fact their proper political classification, were quick to point out what seemed to them the fallacy of the simple and naive belief that, because a few isolated American states were able to form a useful and durable federal union a century and a half ago, it would be feasible to repeat the performance in modern Europe. Important advantages possessed by eighteenth-century Americans could not be expected to recur in twentieth-century Europe. In the first place, Americans had become accustomed to the idea of union through long association in a common subjection to Great Britain. Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, *et al.*, unhappily were more accustomed to fighting one another than to united action for any but the most trivial purposes. Moreover, the secrecy with which the proceedings of the Federal Convention of 1787 were conducted had facilitated the process of reconciling their conflicting economic and political interests by acceptable compromises. Such secrecy would be impossible under the changed technological conditions of modern times. Further, the draft of a Constitution, which the Convention of 1787 eventually produced though not without overcoming many obstacles, was referred for final adoption to special conventions in the states, which could act more independently and rationally than the regular legislative bodies many of whose members would have been influenced by adverse interests of their own. A draft European constitution would have to be submitted to national parliaments with at least equally important adverse interests among their members. These procedural difficulties alone, to say nothing about the more substantial differences between eighteenth-century Americans and twentieth-century Europeans, promised no easy triumph for the new American policy.

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* Based on observations made during a visit to Europe in 1952 primarily for the purpose of lecturing on federal government at The College of Europe at Bruges in Belgium.

To an American, who observes the contemporary European political scene with a reflective eye, the case for federal union in Europe naturally seems strong. In his own country the federal system has eased the transition from a loose confederation of imperfectly assorted states without an effective general government to a tight union with a strong national government and an illogical but not too inconvenient set of decentralized institutions for administering local affairs. What Americans continue to call their federal union is a political structure that is radically different from what originally passed under that name, but it still serves to combine in an acceptable and serviceable form the solid advantages of local self-government in matters of primarily local concern with those of a vigorous central authority in greater matters. A political principle which has served Americans so well, it is easy to conclude, should be useful also in an area like Europe, where there is obvious need for the greater centralization of political power and equally manifest reluctance to jeopardize established systems of local and territorial self-government. Nothing seems more timely and reasonable than a convention, like that in Philadelphia one hundred and sixty-six years ago, to form a more perfect union of the European states, or at least of such of them as do not fall within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.

Why can't Europeans follow where Americans have already shown the way? It is evident that the difficulties are greater than those so happily overcome by the American founding fathers. Doubtless the foremost difficulty is the scarcity of Europeans in the political sense of the term. There are of course plenty of people on European soil to provide the material for a European federal union of high political potential. The six states, which have within a year successfully formed the Coal and Steel Community Organization, comprise a population approximately equal to that of the United States, and, if able to join in a viable federal union, would constitute a powerful body politic. But it is easier for Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians, Belgians, Hollanders, and Luxemburgers, to say nothing of others, to behave like Americans, after a few years on American soil, than to behave like Europeans in their native habitat. The mystic chords of memory, to borrow Lincoln's fine phrase, which bind native-born Americans to their ancestral country, may not add much to the strength of the pragmatic bonds of shared hope, which tie the immigrant to the land of his adoption. But at least national sentiments are not forces of disunion as in Europe. A Frenchman's or a German's intellect may bid him press forward with schemes for European Union, but his heart will hold him back. It is not enough to convince him by rational argument that he should behave like a European; it is necessary also to put him in the right mood for such behavior.

There is another hard question, the answer to which Americans could take for granted, but for which the advocates of federal union in Europe must find an answer. What are the states which should join in forming a European federal union? That is to say, for the purposes of European federation what is Europe? It takes no more than a quick glance at a good map to see that some parts of Western Europe are naturally adapted to a much closer relationship than is possible under the existing system of independent national states. Somewhere about the mouths of the Rhine, for instance, there should be a great sea-port to serve the needs of the rich hinterland drained by that historic stream. Nature seems to have intended that the greatest port in Europe should spring to life in that highly favored region. But unnatural political boundaries stand in the way. No American tourist can drive his car across the German frontier at any point between the Swiss border and the North Sea without feeling keenly the absurdity of such artificial barriers to good neighborly living. Nor can one drive across the French border anywhere between Basle and Dunkirk without forming a strong conviction that this political boundary also is ill-suited to the requirements of strong and prosperous independent statehood under the developing economic conditions of our time.

The case for a federal union of at least France, Germany, and the Low Countries is supported by economic considerations of the most urgent and compelling kind. It is not equally clear what other European countries should be included within a federation organized primarily for economic reasons. Consider, for instance, the case for the inclusion of Great Britain in such a federation. The British have certainly some important common interests with their neighbors directly across the Channel and North Sea, but they also have interests overseas which they do not share with Continental Europeans, and which strengthen the sense of independence derived from their insular position. It is the Italians who have been quickest to see substantial advantages to their country in joining a federal union which would include also France and Germany. A land with a shortage of coal and iron and a surplus of labor obviously stands to gain much from the establishment of a union which would assure better access to supplies of the essential raw materials of modern industry and better opportunities of employment for its unnaturally depressed workers. The Scandinavian states, on the other hand, appear to have less to gain from joining a West European Federation which, while lowering the barriers to trade with their neighbors to the south, might raise new obstacles to trade with good customers and suppliers in the British Isles. Spain and Portugal, and also Greece and Turkey, to say nothing of the countries behind the Iron Curtain, have economic interests of their own which, like those of the Scandinavian states, make the case for a federal union on economic grounds less urgent and compelling than it must seem to the peoples of the nuclear group of states in the middle of Western Europe.

Yet there are persuasive economic reasons for a broadly planned European Union of some kind. General Marshall's original offer of economic aid, contingent upon a beginning of closer union among the European states, brought an immediate response, not only from the eligible states of Western Europe, but also from some of those farther east within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The resulting Organization for European Economic Cooperation, despite its name, eventually left a large part of Europe outside its membership, but its history clearly demonstrated that no narrow concept of Europe can satisfy all the needs which help to create the current demand for some sort of European Union. The OEEC proved to be the most comprehensive European community organization which it has been possible to establish up to now. It included besides the British Isles and Iceland all the West European states except Spain together with Austria in Central Europe and also Greece and Turkey in the Southeast. But the actual membership of the OEEC manifestly did not supply a definitive answer to the basic question, what is Europe for purposes of federal union.

Among Europeans the foremost advocate of European Union since World War II is generally considered to have been Winston Churchill. His key-note speech at Zurich in 1946 made an impact on European political thinking even greater than that of his "iron curtain" speech in the same year at Fulton, Missouri, on the political thought of Americans. Churchill was undoubtedly the most outstanding political figure at the Amsterdam Congress in May, 1948, where the nascent European Movement put in train the course of events which culminated in the establishment of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg a year later. Leading continental advocates of European Union were greatly disappointed that the British Labour Government, then in power, was unwilling to cooperate in establishing as powerful an organization at Strasbourg as they desired and, but for the reluctance of the British, could probably have brought into being. Later, when Churchill returned to power at Westminster, high hopes were formed of the help to be received from him in strengthening the Council of Europe and making it better able to accomplish the purposes of its creators. But these hopes were disappointed and Churchill's credit among European Unionists was badly damaged.

Closer attention to Churchill's speeches on the subject of European Union might have prevented some of the unhappy disillusionment with his leadership of the European Movement. Speaking on May 14, 1947, at a United Europe meeting in London,[1] he clearly indicated his point of view. "There are several important bodies," he observed, "which are working for the federation of the European States and for the creation of a Federal Constitution for Europe." And he immediately added: "I hope that may eventually be achieved." But he had yet to indicate the role of the British in such an undertaking. "It is not for us at this stage," he declared, "to attempt to define or prescribe the structure of constitutions. We ourselves are content, in the first instance, to present the idea of United Europe, in which our country will play a decisive part, as a moral, cultural and spiritual conception to which all can rally without being disturbed by divergencies about structure." When he reached the question, what are the political and physical boundaries of the United Europe you are trying to create, he refused to face the problem of determining which countries should be included and which should be left out. "It is not our task or wish to draw frontier lines," he exclaimed, "but rather to smoothe them away."

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[1] Winston S. Churchill, *Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 and 1948*, ed. Randolph Churchill (Boston, 1950), pp. 77–85.

But Churchill did make clear his profound conviction that the idea of European Union must be subordinated to the grander conception of world government. "We do not of course pretend that United Europe provides the final and complete solution to all the problems of international relationships. The creation of an authoritative, all-powerful world order is the ultimate aim towards which we must strive. Unless some effective World Super-Government can be set up and brought quickly into action, the prospects for peace and human progress are dark and doubtful." To make his meaning doubly clear he took pains to describe the relationship of Britain to Europe more precisely. "We accept without question the world supremacy of the United Nations Organization. In the Constitution agreed upon at San Francisco direct provision was made for regional organisations to be formed. United Europe will form one major Regional entity. There is the United States with all its dependencies; there is the Soviet Union; there is the British Empire and Commonwealth; and there is Europe, with which Great Britain is profoundly blended. Here are the four main pillars of the world Temple of Peace." Was Great Britain to figure at the same time and in the same way as material for two of these main pillars? Churchill did not say.

In his great speech before the Congress of Europe at The Hague, May 7, 1948,[2] Churchill was more precise. "We aim," he asserted, "at the eventual participation of all European peoples whose society and way of life . . . are not in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and with the sincere expression of free democracy." He now thought that the governments of the countries which had become associated for the purposes of the Marshall Plan could most conveniently take the lead in planning definite arrangements. He still insisted that nothing should be done which would conflict with the paramount authority of a world organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, he declared, "a Council of Europe was a subordinate but necessary part of the world organisation." As for the relations between the British and the Continental peoples who would join in a United Europe, Churchill reminded his audience that "we in Britain must move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth, . . . undue precipitancy . . . would hinder and not help the immediate mission we have to fulfill."

It was evident that Churchill was thinking of United Europe as a European Defense Community rather than as an Economic and Social Welfare Community, and that he was reserving a more independent role for Great Britain as head of the British Commonwealth than would be practicable or proper for the democracies on the European Continent. He still clung to his concept of regional organizations as necessary pillars of a world organization for peace. "We must do our best to create and combine the great regional unities which it is in our power to influence, and we must endeavor by patient and faithful service to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting upon the main groupings of mankind." Advocates of European Union were plainly put on notice that Churchill's dominating purpose was the organization, not merely of Europeans, but above all of mankind.

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 310–17.

The meaning of Churchill's speech was not lost upon his listeners. Those who advocated the immediate creation of at least a European customs union, if not a genuine political federation, realized that they could not count upon his aid. Accepting the view that any form of constitutional or organized union was impracticable, and that close consultation between governments was the most that could be hoped for at that time, the leaders of the Congress of Europe at The Hague consented to settle for the comparatively modest scheme embodied a year later in the Council of Europe. This embyronic European Union was established with a roving Committee of Ministers without executive power and a Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg without legislative power. Such a purely deliberative Assembly, Churchill contended, in a speech delivered towards the end of 1948 at a United Europe Exhibition in London,[3] would not develop into an irresponsible talking shop, as many of his associates in the European Movement feared. On the contrary, he assured his friends, "The Assembly will perform an essential task and one which cannot be performed by governments; the task of creating a European public opinion and a sense of solidarity among the peoples of Europe." But obviously Churchill was losing his earlier interest in European Union, as the danger of aggression from the East grew more menacing and urgent, and turning his attention toward new plans for a defense organization originating beyond the Atlantic.

The organizers of the Council of Europe were unable to persuade all the European states belonging to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to join the new organization. Eighteen countries, if West Germany, Austria, and Trieste may be so described, eventually became active members of the OEEC, but only fourteen of them have been represented in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. Austria and Trieste lacked the necessary political independence, Portugal was not wanted, and Switzerland wished to preserve the appearance of neutrality. Meanwhile American statesmen had conceived the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to supplement, and eventually to supplant, the OEEC, and friends of European Union, who regarded a European Defense Community as more urgent than a European Economic and Social Welfare Community, under whatever name, were bound, like Churchill, to shift their interest from the economic and social to the military reasons for a Union of Europe. The organizers of NATO, however, were not even able to persuade all the European states belonging to the Council of

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 465–66.

Europe to join the new organization. The Federal Republic of Germany was ineligible, Ireland was uninterested, and Sweden deemed it prudent to abstain. The only additional state gained for the new organization was Portugal. In the nature of things, nevertheless, such advocates of a United Europe as Churchill, like the Americans, threw their support to the new and more vigorous organization.

The history of the Council of Europe[4] has been a history of constant struggle between the Committee of Ministers, seeking to keep the Consultative Assembly within the narrow limits prescribed by its original constitution, and the majority of the Assembly, seeking to obtain for that impotent body some genuine legislative powers. The struggle has been unequal. More powers could not be obtained for the Assembly except at the cost of losing some of its members; none of its members could be spared, if the Assembly was to perform its essential task, the promotion of West European solidarity. The greatest obstacle to the strengthening of the Assembly's powers was the reluctance of the British Labour Government to involve itself more deeply in the political affairs of the Continent. It could not find a suitable adjustment between its traditional obligations to its old associates overseas in the Commonwealth and its growing responsibilities to its new associates in the Council of Europe across the Channel. The Scandinavian states were unwilling to abandon Britain, with which they were connected by important ties. The minor states on the Continent, particularly Belgium and the Netherlands, were unready to face their more powerful neighbors, France and Germany, in an Assembly possessing important law-making authority without a third major power to hold the balance between these two powers. Frenchmen and Germans, however eager they might be to bury the past and turn toward a brighter future together, could not form an acceptable federal union by themselves alone.

It is not surprising that the advocates of a United Europe should seek escape from their dilemma by trying a new approach to the problem of European federation. In the Spring of 1950 the harbinger of a new phase in the organization of Europe appeared in the form of the Schuman Plan. A beginning was to be made without further delay by bringing together the states which had the most to gain by forming a single joint organization to govern the production of coal and steel and a single common market to regulate their sale and distribution. The formation of a Coal and Steel Community would be a functional approach to the problem of European federation. The successful formation of such a community might be expected to attract other European states. Likewise, the approval of the method might be expected to lead to the formation of other functional communities among them. In fact the aggression upon the Korean Republic shortly after the publication of the Schuman Plan and the menace of further aggression elsewhere led immediately to the proposal of the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community. It was clear that plans for other functional organizations would follow and that, if they should be adopted, the necessity for their coordination by some suitable political agency would eventually lead to a genuine federal union of the European states belonging to these various community organizations.[5]

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[4] For an excellent account of this organization, see Frederick L. Schuman, "The Council of Europe," this Review, Vol. 45, pp. 724–40 (Sept., 1951).

The triumph of the functional approach to the problem of European federal union was facilitated by the attitude of Churchill. When he became Prime Minister for the second time in October, 1951, European federalists looked to his new Government for more constructive cooperation than they had received from the Labour Government. They did not get it. The new British Government was manifestly more interested in the development of a European Army under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and was not disposed to become involved in the efforts by Continental statesmen to transform the Council of Europe into a genuine federal union. British statesmen vigorously supported American efforts to strengthen NATO, while the West European leaders resolved to push on with the Schuman Plan and other proposals for the organization of special limited-purpose communities, regardless of the stand-offishness of the British. The Schuman Plan was duly ratified by the nuclear group of states, and the organization of the European Coal and Steel Community was completed in the Summer of 1952. The High Authority, which was to serve as the executive of the new Community, established its headquarters at Luxemburg, and the Common Assembly shared the facilities of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. It was a modest but auspicious beginning of the federalization of what European federalists liked to call "Little Europe."

The European federalist leaders, particularly Spaak of Belgium, the most active and influential member of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly, Foreign Minister Schuman of France, who maintained the cause of European Union through a long succession of French ministries, Chancellor Adenauer of the West German Republic, who staked the life of his Government on the issue of European Union, and Prime Minister De Gasperi of Italy, who persistently asserted the claims of his country to an equal place in any European federal union, skillfully utilized the interest of British and also American statesmen in one of the plans for a special limited-purpose community, namely, that for a European Defense Community, to exploit the functional approach to the formation of a more perfect European Union. This plan was of the greatest importance to the sponsors of NATO, since it was designed for the purpose of integrating German forces into a West European army. The same group of nuclear states, which formed the Coal and Steel Community, were to be the original members of the European Defense Community. The plan further called for the establishment of a parallel set of institutions, a Common Assembly to meet at Strasbourg, an executive organized like the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, and a court which might be identical with that of the Coal and Steel Community. The Defense Community would need much more money than the Coal and Steel Community, but in general its structure and procedures would be similar.

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[5] For a scholarly account of these developments, see Clarence C. Walton, "The Fate of Neo-Federalism in Western Europe," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 366–90 (Sept., 1952).

The master-stroke of the federalist leaders was the insertion of a provision in the Defense Community plan authorizing its Assembly, as soon as it should be organized, to prepare a plan for organizing a European Political Community with power to coordinate the Coal and Steel Community and Defense Community organizations, together with any other special limited-purpose community organizations that might be established. Such a coordinating agency would necessarily be a genuine federal union of "Little Europe" with a population at the beginning not inferior to that of the United States, and with good prospects of eventually attracting additional members until it should become a veritable West European federal union. Such a federal union the British might not wish to join, but certainly they would hesitate to put obstacles in its way in pursuance of their alleged traditional policy of keeping Europe divided in the interest of a successful balance of power.

The interest of the six nuclear states in a European Defense Community is not necessarily identical with that of its principal sponsors. British and American statesmen doubtless are primarily concerned to make a show of organized force great enough to deter the Soviet Union and her satellites and associates from beginning a third world war. But they also wish to create a military establishment strong enough to help win such a war, if unhappily it should occur. The governments which have been in power in the nuclear group of West European states certainly have shared the first of these objectives. It is not so clear that they or their successors are or will be equally devoted to the second. There is undoubtedly a substantial body of opinion in the countries which suffered most cruelly in World War II that another world war would be a greater evil than the anticipated alternative of subjection to the aggressor, costly and painful as such subjection might prove to be. There is perhaps an even greater body of opinion which is willing to support a policy of well-organized rearmament for the purpose of intimidating possible aggressors, but which deliberately refuses to consider a present choice of alternatives in anticipation of the event that the policy of organized intimidation should fail to preserve peace. It is not surprising that even within the nuclear group of West European states there should be more opposition to the proposed European Defense Community than to the plan for a Coal and Steel Community.

The European federalist leaders shrewdly resolved not to let their plan for establishing a genuine Federal Union of "Little Europe" remain contingent upon the prompt organization of the proposed European Defense Community. As soon as the Coal and Steel Community Organization was established, the Committee of Ministers invited the Common Assembly to create a special Consituent Assembly, consisting of its own members together with three additional representatives of the French, German, and Italian Governments, respectively, for the purpose of preparing a plan for a European Political Community.[6] This special Constituent Assembly was to be further strengthened by the admission of observers from states belonging to the Council of Europe but not to the Coal and Steel Community. The original purpose of this procedure was to avoid the delay which would ensue if the charter for the European Political Community were to be framed in accordance with the provisions in the plan for the European Defense Community. It was fortunate that this more expeditious procedure was adopted. In some respects the plan for the European Defense Community had been less carefully prepared than that for the Coal and Steel Community. Controversies over details of the plan, and growing differences over the relations to be established between the armed forces to be put under the control of the Defense Community and those to remain under the control of its member states, caused unexpected delay in the ratification of the Defense Community Treaty. It began to seem likely that, instead of the European Defense Community becoming one of the pillars of the European Political Community, the latter would pave the way for the Defense Community.

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[6] *Europe Today and Tomorrow*, Nos. 18–19, p. 8 (Sept.–Oct., 1952).

At the present writing the plan for the European Political Community is in process of preparation. The special Constituent Assembly was directed to report a draft in March of the present year as a basis for further proceedings. The draft was duly reported and was obviously the product of many compromises. There are still many difficulties to be overcome, many conflicting interests to be reconciled. It is of course possible that the obstacles will prove insurmountable at this time. The vagaries of French politics are unpredictable. General elections in Germany and Italy may bring radical changes in the political scene. It is enough to observe that the drive for the establishment of a genuine Federal Union of "Little Europe" enjoys the good will of all the members of the Council of Europe and has developed greater momentum than seemed possible only a short time ago.

The attitude of the British Government toward the unexpected turn in the road to European Union gave deep concern to the European federalist leaders. Since the British would not participate in the formation of a more perfect Union of West European states, it would have to choose between benevolent nonparticipation and obstruction. There were fears that the latter policy might prevail at Westminster, even under a Government headed by Churchill. The traditional British policy toward the Continent had seemed to favor the multiplication, or at least the preservation, of independent sovereign states, regardless of inconvenient boundaries or irrational economic systems, in order to facilitate the management of the balance of power. Churchill apparently had lost interest in the obsolete system of a European balance of power, but would his Government actively support federalist efforts to organize a United States of Europe, or such part of it as might be capable of organization at this time? Or would the Conservative Government under his leadership put further difficulties in the way of the European federalists, in addition to the immediate difficulty resulting from the absence of a Great Power widely regarded as an almost indispensable component of a well-balanced and stable federal union which would include the major Continental powers? Happily from the European federalists' viewpoint the Churchill Government decided to cooperate with the Coal and Steel Community, and also with the special Constituent Assembly, as closely as possible without compromising its own constitutional freedom of action.

The American attitude has always given less concern to European federalists. Certainly the policy of the government at Washington to encourage the further unification of Europe had been made plain at every convenient opportunity. In the Autumn of 1951 the Congress had gone so far as to authorize a conference of Senators and Representatives with the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. A frank and interesting discussion took place in November between a strong Congressional delegation and a representative delegation from the Consultative Assembly.[7] But earlier there had been some misgivings concerning the possible reaction of American statesmen to European Union. Churchill himself had confessed in his keynote speech in the 1948 Congress of Europe at The Hague that he had been anxious at first lest the United States of America should view with hostility the idea of a United States of Europe. It may have been that he suspected the development of an attitude across the Atlantic, since the United States had become a major world power with a special responsibility for the maintenance of world peace, similar to that in Churchill's own country during the long period when it had accepted a major responsibility for the maintenance of peace through the manipulation of the balance of power. But he rejoiced, he was quick to declare on that occasion, "that the great Republic had risen far above such moods."

The immediate problem of American policy is not to decide whether to support or oppose the further unification of Europe, but rather how far to go in trying to influence the nature and extent of a European Union. When Paul G. Hoffman was speaking for the United States as head of ECA, he seized every convenient occasion to point out the economic advantages of a common market for at least that part of Europe that had joined in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. When General Eisenhower was speaking for the United States as head of SHAPE, he was equally diligent in pointing out the advantages of an organized European Political Community in order to provide for the common defense of Western Europe. In a well-publicized speech before the English-Speaking Union in London on July 3, 1951, he associated himself explicitly with the Churchillian approach to European unity. "Winston Churchill's plea for a United Europe," he declared, "can yet bear such greatness of fruit that it may well be remembered as the most notable achievement of a career marked by achievement." Eisenhower was also truly Churchillian in his devotion to the cause. "The difficulties of integrating Western Europe," he conceded, "appear staggering to those who live by ritual"; but he presumably did not live by ritual. Be that as it may, the difficulties did not stagger him.

The plan for forming a European Political Union, incorporated in the European Defense Community Treaty, signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, provided that the Union should be a federal union and that its frame of government should be based upon the principle of the separation of powers and should include a bicameral legislature. All of these provisions might eventually have been adopted without any advice from Americans, but American influence undoubtedly helped to secure their acceptance at that time. The official spokesmen for the American policy toward European Union seemed to be committing themselves to the project of a West European constitutional convention for the purpose of doing for Western Europe what the Federal Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 had done for the United States. This did not prevent putting the influence of American representatives in NATO behind the functional approach to the problem of uniting Europe, when the prospects for that kind of approach began to seem brighter than for the more generalized political approach. The improving outlook for the adoption of the Schuman Plan for a Coal and Steel Community naturally increased American interest in schemes for building a European political community upon the foundation of a number of limited-purpose and limited-membership functional communities.

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[7] Council of Europe, Secretariat-General, *Official Record of Debates*, Conference of Strasbourg, Nov. 19–23, 1951.

It is easy to conclude that American interests will be best served by the adoption of a permanent constitution for a European Federal Union, based as far as possible on approved American principles of constitutional government, and that American influence in Europe should be exerted to the utmost to bring such a European Union into existence. But such a conclusion disregards some important considerations. One is, that the approved American principles of government give no answer to the question, what European countries should be included in the United States of Europe. Particularly, should Great Britain be included, as most Continental federalists would prefer? Or should a beginning be made with the West European states which have already formed the Coal and Steel Community, in accordance with the plans of the functionalists who now control the European Movement and are taking the lead in the work of the provisional Constituent Assembly?

Another important consideration is, that the democratic monarchies and republics of Western Europe have developed some principles of government of their own to which their peoples have grown accustomed and in which they have greater confidence than in principles developed across the Atlantic. The European arrangements for distributing the executive power between kings (or republican presidents) and ministers, for distributing the legislative power between ministers and parliaments, and for utilizing political parties as instruments of representative government, differ greatly from the corresponding arrangements in the American system of government. In the United States there is constitutional government and there is also party government, and the relations between the two are important but obscure. Recent legislation designed to ensure that presidential electors will vote for the regular candidates of the parties whose nominations they seek raised questions of constitutional law which only the Supreme Court could decide, and some of its judges thought they were decided wrongly. The theory of party government is by no means generally understood. In Europe the importance of party government has long been recognized and legislation designed to preserve and extend the role of the parties in the governmental process has long been accepted, as is plainly indicated by long-continued experiments with partisan election laws and proportional representation. The American system of bi-partisan politics is not for export to the Continent of Europe.

A federal constitution is not only a written description of a scheme of government for a group of states, but also a kind of treaty of peace between the states providing systematic arrangements for elaborating the terms of the peace settlement and ensuring their enforcement. The process of constitution-making resembles in many ways the process of treaty-making. Good treaties are those which confer mutually acceptable and lasting advantages upon all parties to them. They can only be made with the concurrence of the parties themselves. It is still true, as Washington declared long ago, that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation." The details of a European federal constitution, as well as the determination of the states which shall be parties to such a constitution, must be left to the decision of those primarily concerned, if the business of constitution-making is to prosper. Up to now the West European federalists have managed their affairs with impressive skill and assiduity. Success, though in the nature of things uncertain, and in a quieter age perhaps unlikely, is in these unsettled times a reasonably promising political speculation.[8]

Winston Churchill, speaking originally for himself alone but implicitly for the Government which he now heads, defined an attitude toward European Union which deserves the closest attention of American policy-makers. It was a consummation devoutly to be wished, he believed, which might well be encouraged by the British Government in all convenient ways not compromising British independence. But it was not to be regarded as a final end of British policy. It was rather as an integral part of a larger scheme for world organization that European Federation stirred his imagination and found a place in his program for political action. The great dominant purpose of his political planning was the preservation of international peace through the universal reign of law. A general international organization for this purpose would in his judgment be stronger and more serviceable if there were a suitable European Union capable of functioning as one of its supporting pillars, than if the West European states remained divided against themselves. Nevertheless, he wished above all, as he expressed it at The Hague in 1948, "to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting upon the main groupings of mankind."

American policy toward European Union has run a logical course. First, the objective was economic recovery, and incidentally such a degree of European Union as might be helpful to that end. The next objective was military strength, and therefore a closer union of such portion of Europe as might be persuaded to unite in order to provide for the common defense. This, however cannot be a final end of American interest in European Union. American commitments to encourage the political federation of Europe have been made in pursuance of an ulterior purpose which happens to have been suitably expressed by Winston Churchill. Nothing short of making the United Nations Organization itself strong enough to keep the peace can be accepted as the logical fulfillment of the American policy of encouraging European Union. The export of the principle of federalism can not stop until its use has been extended to an organized world.

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[8] For a less sanguine view see M. J. Bonn, *Whither Europe—Union or Partnership?* (New York, 1952).

POLITICAL FACTORS IN U. S. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION, 1945–1950

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International cooperation through multilateral organizations sharply distinguishes the post-World War II economic policies of the United States from those it employed following World War I. After World War I, the United States eschewed any form of international economic organization, which some governments thought should be continued; early in the more recent conflict, United States officials pressed hard for the acceptance of world-wide institutional cooperation. The purpose of the present article is to review, through an examination of its policy toward multilateral financial arrangements, some of the important discussions and decisions which moved the United States towards internationalism in economic relations; to emphasize the role of political factors in the development of financial organizations, in the retreat from international "democracy," and in the growth of regional cooperation; and to examine some of the difficulties of international financial cooperation.[1]

A primary objective of the United States government's postwar policy preparations was the re-creation of a *method* of conducting international economic transactions which would not result in economic warfare; the major technique was that of international agreement on accepted rules for conducting transactions. Government officials considered that this approach was not only desirable but also possible, in view of the success of wartime collaboration. Administration officials were so determined to take advantage of wartime cooperative attitudes that they set about, even during the war, to obtain agreement among the United Nations on the international administration of relief assistance, on a short-term exchange balancing mechanism, and on an agency to make loans for reconstruction and development. This early emphasis on obtaining international agreement stemmed from the belief that it would take considerable time to develop concrete proposals and that substantial progress along these lines was a necessary part of the overall military strategy.[2]

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[1] In order to limit the scope of the study, only the cooperative arrangements in the disbursal of grants and loans by the United States are considered. Thus, though political factors are found in United States lending and in the development of postwar commercial policy agreements, their study is excluded. For a recent masterly treatment of both the economic and political factors in the collapse of cooperation projected under the International Trade Organization, see Wm. Diebold, Jr., "The End of the ITO," *Essays in International Finance, No. 16*, Princeton University, International Finance Section, October, 1952.

[2] This view is well stated in the following portion of an introduction to the early proposals on the International Monetary Fund, written in 1942: "The people of the anti-Axis powers must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid international ground, they must be given to understand that a United Nations victory will not usher in another two decades of economic uneasiness, bickering, ferment, and disruption. They must be assured that something will be done in the sphere of international economic relations that is

Many official statements were made during the war and postwar periods to the effect that the postwar world had to be offered a type of international collaboration that was both "new and different." One of the main purposes of the method of international cooperation was the avoidance of economic conflicts and use of economic power for political purposes. All international organizations were to be "de-politicized," in that the use of political methods by which small countries are dominated by larger ones and the injection of political factors into what were then considered purely technical questions would be avoided. In this way, it was hoped that instead of the much discussed postwar "blocs" of nations there would emerge a more inclusive "world-wide" cooperation of the allied and associated nations.[3] The new internationalism was to embrace countries of varying races, creeds, and economic and political systems. Events in the postwar period forced a reversal or modification of such ideals and policies, and led to the creation of other types of international financial cooperation which recognized the presence and force of political considerations.

I. INTERNATIONALISM: WORLD-WIDE (A-POLITICAL) COOPERATION

The world-wide (functional) approach to international financial cooperation —with an international agency responsible for coordinating members' actions in a narrow and specified field, as distinct from a regional organ performing several different functions—was first made concrete in the United Nations

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new, that is powerful enough and comprehensive enough to give expectation of successfully filling a world need. They must have assurance that methods and resources are being prepared to provide them with capital to help them rebuild their devastated areas, reconstruct their war-distorted economies, and help free them from the strangulating grasp of lost markets and depleted reserves. Finally, they must have assurance that the United States does not intend to desert the war-worn and impoverished nations after the war is won, but proposes to help them in the long and difficult task of economic reconstruction." (Harry D. White, "Preliminary Draft: United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations," U. S. Treasury Department, March, 1942, pp. 3–4. This document and some others cited *infra* may be found among the papers of Harry D. White, former Chief of the Division of Monetary Research and later Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, which have been donated to the Princeton University Library. Citations of manuscripts and documents found among these papers will hereinafter refer to White's *Papers*.)

[3] Cordell Hull wrote that during 1943 both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were in favor of establishing regional organizations (particularly in Europe, the Far East, and the Americas) to guide postwar political and economic relations. Each of the "Big Three" (Britain, Russia and the United States) would be represented in one of these regional organizations. A supra-regional council of the "Big Three" would coordinate the work of the regions. Secretary of State Hull and most of his staff were in favor of a world-wide association under the conviction that an international organization would eliminate any need "for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests." These officials hammered at Roosevelt until he agreed and set the stage for the UNO and related economic organizations. See *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), Vol. 2, pp. 1640–48.

Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The experience with UNRRA provides a good example of the difficulties of intergovernmental cooperation in financial disbursements and was a prominent factor in shaping the organizational structure of cooperation in aid programs in the years 1947–1950.

The United States was greatly concerned that the provision of relief supplies (particularly food) should not be used as a political weapon by elements within the liberated and devastated countries or by neighboring countries. Administration officials based their plan for an international organization on the belief that only through multilateral responsibility could economic assistance be divorced from the political intentions of the granting and receiving nations and be administered without preference as to the political affiliation, race, or creed of recipients. In its request that Congress approve U. S. participation in UNRRA, the Administration stated that the fact that assistance was to be provided by a multi-national agency was a most important aspect of the program, since only through such an organization could this non-discriminatory end be gained. It pictured UNRRA as the initial effort towards postwar international cooperation, without whose success the future of all subsequent collaboration would be endangered: "If UNRRA should fail, there is grave doubt that any collaboration of the United Nations can survive the test of practical application."[4]

The "world-wide" character of UNRRA is evidenced by the fact that 47 nations signed the agreement in 1943, among them Russia and several of the Eastern European countries. It was precisely this world-wide character which disturbed many members of Congress, who believed that the inclusion of Russia would cause UNRRA to fail of its purpose of being politically non-discriminatory. Some of them opposed the program as likely to aid the spread of Communism by giving Russia a voice in its administration and by supplying most of its assistance to Eastern European countries. Congressional supporters of the Administration's view held that this form of international organization was the only way to familiarize peoples of various nations with each other's problems and ideas and to gain adequate spread of information whereby tolerance and peaceable relations would be maintained.[5] Those dissatisfied with the international aspect of UNRRA argued that the U. S. government should retain full control over the relief and distribute it through the Army and Navy or the American Red Cross in order to prevent "misuse" of the funds it contributed and to gain for itself the good will resulting from aid.[6] Such proposals were rejected, however, on the ground that, besides being the "least cost" way of providing relief since other nations would contribute, UNRRA was the first step toward a continuing international cooperation which was necessary to secure the peace.[7]

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[4] Testimony of Herbert Lehman (first UNRRA director-general and former chief of the State Department's section responsible for preparing postwar policy on relief). *To Enable the United States to Participate in the Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Hearings on H.J. Res. 192,* House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., p. 120 (Dec., 1943 and Jan., 1944). See also a similar statement by the United Kingdom delegate before the second session of the UNRRA Council on September 21, 1944, UNRAA *Journal,* Second Session of the Council (Washington, 1944), p. 47.

[5] This viewpoint is a reflection of the Cobden-Bright idea that international contacts are the basis of knowledge which, in turn, is conducive to peace. There are some analogies between this idea and the foreign economic policy of Hull and his followers from 1934 to 1947. The principle is questionable even in conditions under which it was supposed to operate; when a nation's external relations are channeled through government agencies, whatever validity exists in the concept becomes inoperative. In 1951 a State Department official admitted that the advantage of "keeping a window open" by trade is a fiction

The same principle of international sharing of responsibilities, costs and risks to avoid "political" influence and tensions arising from unilateral action by one or a few nations was applied to the Bretton Woods Agreements. Under these Agreements, 44 nations contributed funds to be used in supplying short- and long-term capital to member countries for the purposes of helping to balance international payments and of hastening reconstruction and development. These institutions also were supposed to be world-wide in membership; although the Axis countries were not initial members, provision was made for their later admission. Russia attended early consultations on the Fund and Bank, and its representatives signed the Bretton Woods Agreements. The Administration stated categorically that the economic organizations were appropriate to any kind of economic or political system and that the institutions were to be "non-political," in that political relations would have no direct effect on the decisions of the agencies.[8]

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when trade is conducted through state trading agencies. See *Mutual Security Program Appropriations for 1952, Hearings,* Part 1, House of Rep., Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, September, 1951, p. 404. In any case, no support for the idea that such cooperation leads to mutual understanding, tolerance and peace can be gained from the experience of UNRRA.

[6] The program for government and relief in occupied areas administered by the Army and the Navy was even larger than UNRRA's. One UNRRA official has since argued that UNRRA should have been merged with the Army's program or that at least Army officers should have been assigned to important UNRRA posts to assure their cooperation and the use of their experience and knowledge, and perhaps also for political reasons. See Marvin Klemme, *The Inside Story of UNRRA* (New York, 1949), pp. 214–18. The Red Cross, too, could almost certainly have built up an organization as quickly as UNRRA did to handle the problem. The case for UNRRA as against the Army and Navy or the Red Cross seems to have rested almost solely on the merits of international cooperation.

[7] United States officials were not alone in urging international financial cooperation as a means of alleviating disaster and of gaining peace. See, for example, the statement of Hugh Dalton in defending the Bretton Woods Agreements and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, 417 H. C. Deb. 5 s, December 12, 1945, col. 443.

[8] The question of the role of politics arose over a statement of Secretary Morgenthau before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency that the United States "has the greatest interest in seeing that international trade and investment are determined by economic and not by political considerations":

"Senator Fulbright: It occurred to me that before the war we did business with such countries as Japan and Spain without any regard to political considerations. It does not seem to me that in the future we can isolate the economic from the political; and in stating several times that this must be done on an economic basis without regard to politics, that is not quite correct. . . .

Congress, however, took a different view, and in order to assure that the foreign economic policy of the United States would be coordinated with its political policy, it established a National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems composed of Cabinet-level members (including among others the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce). The Council was charged, *inter alia*, with fixing United States policy in the Fund

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Is not this a part of the political international arrangement?

"Mr. Morgenthau: Senator Fulbright, the discussion at Bretton Woods was based on the economic needs of a country and not on the political needs. And the thought all through the discussions was, particularly as affecting the small countries, such as Greece, Czechoslovakia––

"Senator Fulbright: And the Argentine and Spain.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I did not put them in.

"Senator Fulbright: But you will be faced by that situation, is what I mean.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I can only report to you—and the two American delegates that are sitting here at this committee table can either affirm or deny what happened—but the thought was——

"The Chairman: I have just checked with Senator Tobey, and neither one of us heard any politics at all at Bretton Woods.

"Mr. Morgenthau: The thought was that those countries could come to a world bank or a world fund and get their financial needs taken care of without having to sell their political souls. And that was the whole idea. I am sorry, Senator Fulbright, but I would not be honest if I did not stick to my guns on that, and that is my conception of Bretton Woods. These are to be financial institutions run by financial people, financial experts, and the needs in a financial way of a country are to be taken care of *wholly independent of the political connection.*

"Senator Fulbright: Then if this country has no foreign policy and blunders along as it did for the last 20 years, you would go ahead and finance, say, the Argentine, regardless of what you thought it would do, and the same as to any other country.

"Mr. Morgenthau: You put me in an embarrassing position, but I will have to answer.

"Senator Fulbright: I do not mean to embarrass you, but do want to know what the idea is.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I understand. But I will go through with it: If the Argentine was a member of the Bank and the Fund, and she needed certain financial help to meet her requirements, being a member her requirements are to be taken care of independent of her political ideology. *I choked on it, but I went through with it.*

"Senator Fulbright: It seems to me that is going pretty far, and I do not quite agree that that is a sound policy.

"Mr. Morgenthau: That is in the record, too.

"Senator Fulbright: It would seem to me that it means the fund will have no relationship to the State Department. But let us assume the State Department does develop some consistent policy in foreign relations, I cannot help but believe that our financial policy should be subservient to the political policy as established by the State Department. It does not seem proper that our various relationships with other countries should be conducted entirely separate from and without any regard to other relations.

"Mr. Morgenthau: I would rather not answer that on the record. . . .

"Senator Taft: Do you think when a board is set up, composed of the great nations and the small nations of the world, they are not going to be affected by politics about the making of a loan to a nation?

"Mr. Morgenthau: I am repeating myself on this, but the institutions will carry out their work as far as it is humanly possible to do it—and it depends on the people running it—on a strictly business basis.

"Senator Taft: We may be as noble as we are pleased to hope we will be, but what and Bank; thus, United States foreign economic policy was subject to review and determination by those also responsible for political policy.[9]

Another aspect of U. S. postwar foreign economic policy which shows that its early orientation was world-wide and without restriction as to foreign political or economic systems was the Administration's consideration in 1944-45 of a large-scale loan to Russia for reconstruction and development.[10] That this loan was never negotiated was due in part to Russian recalcitrance with reference to other foreign economic policies of the United States, in part to the growing recognition of the importance of political considerations, in part to fortuitous circumstances in the postwar period, and in part to the reluctance of the Administration to precipitate in later years (1947 and 1948) a full-scale congressional debate on Soviet-American relations.

II. INHERENT POLITICAL FACTORS

Basic contradictions existed between the Administration's attitude toward international financial cooperation and the world in which the agencies had to

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justification is there for the theory that the English, the Russians, and other people will take that position? Aren't they going to use any weapon they have for their purposes in Europe?

"Mr. Morgenthau: Gentlemen, I hope you will believe I am very sincere. I think in these things like Bretton Woods we have to assume the nations of the world have learned something while going through this bloody war we are just emerging from in Europe, and that we have the right to assume as between nations there is going to be a new conception of dealings one with another. If there is not, the world is lost.

"Senator Taft: I certainly would be glad to be able to join you in that hope. But I think it hard to imagine having an international body of this sort free from politics resorted to by people sitting on the board.

"Senator Fulbright: *I don't see why it should be.* I think politics is not such a disreputable thing that it cannot be accepted in this or any other international organization, if by politics is meant some regard for the best interest of one's own country. . . .

Therefore, I don't think the administration should say we are not going to have any consideration for politics in various countries. It seems to me to be perfectly proper to say, 'Yes, we are, but we are going to try to be intelligent about it.' That does not mean we are going to try to control Europe's internal politics. That is quite different from saying that all the internal affairs of a country is of no interest to us, which seems to me also rather stupid."

(*Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Hearings on H. R. 3314*, U. S. Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Congr., 1st sess., June 1945, pp. 14–16; italics added.)

[9] The desirability of some such council was urged earlier by Secretary Morgenthau himself, who in July, 1944 wanted to place in a new committee, of which he would be chairman, all questions of international financial relations and aid to foreign countries so as to coordinate all financial policy under a single authority and maximize the good will obtainable from foreign aid.

[10] The Treasury Department drew up a proposal for a $10 billion loan, to be repaid over 35 years in raw materials. The plan was discussed in 1944 in the Treasury and communicated by Secretary Morgenthau to President Roosevelt in January, 1945 with the argument that it would contribute greatly to ironing out difficulties with Russia over postwar policies. Memoranda on the proposal evidence no concern over political relations between the U.S. and Russia and provide no basis for a conclusion that the loan was for political purposes in any direct sense. (The author has in preparation a study of this loan and the developments surrounding it.)

operate. Far from being the "non-political" enterprise its originators intended it to be, the cooperation was, unavoidably, political. The organizations' members were governments whose delegates were government officials. These delegates were hardly able to examine a problem solely on its economic or financial merits and quite apart from the political consequences of the solution for the power and prestige of each member.[11] Nations are, by their very nature, political and cannot act governmentally without considering political implications (in the sense of national interests and of relative national position in the world) unless they deny the basis of their existence. Thus, for example, in intergovernmental organizations the mere question of membership becomes political. Again, the movement of international investment and the extension of foreign aid are fraught with political implications concerning the balance of power within and among regions.

It is only necessary to pose the question of what would be the characteristics of an a-political international economic organization to show the difficulty of divorcing its operations from political considerations. First, what would be its membership? Would the exclusion of any nation be discriminatory and thus lead to political tensions? Second, how would decisions be taken? By simple majority? How would coalitions of nations be prevented so as to avoid exercise of political influence? Should each member have one vote, or should voting power be weighted according to some criterion of power or responsibility? Third, how would the "experts" representing each nation be chosen? How would they be politically divorced from their government? If an expert were politically divorced, what responsibility or authority would he have? Could he count on support of his political parent? If not, would his decisions be of any avail? If so, would his decisions not take on a political character immediately? To what degree would any member government guarantee to abide by a-political decisions of a group of "disinterested" experts? Is any nation likely to surrender sovereignty to such an institution? Finally, do not the facts that any decision has to be politically ratified and that any member has the power to withdraw require that political power and position be taken into account by each and every international economic organization in some degree?

These questions were not publicly debated, but the Administration's policies in promoting the technique of international economic cooperation were questioned not only, as noted above, as to their inherent political character, but also with regard to the problems of sovereignty and of whether Russian participation would make the agencies unworkable. On the latter point, the standard reply of Administration officials was that international cooperation required the participation of Russia even if its being a member appeared contradictory to the purposes of the economic organizations established, as in the case of the International Monetary Fund.[12] With reference to the question of sovereignty, the Administration argued that joining an international organization was not a surrender of sovereignty but an exercise of it and that the ability to withdraw protected the ultimate freedom of action of any government.

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[11] The fact that members had not decided questions on purely technical grounds was the basis of Australia's plea during the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C., for a "non-political and impartial approach" to problems before the Fund. By this time United States officials and others recognized, and so asserted, that political positions and viewpoints could not be disregarded. (Fund Session No. 3, September 11, 1951.)

The question of sovereignty is not so easily answered. Even if voting is perfectly "democratic" (whatever that may mean as to the weighting of voting among nations represented[13]), those being out-voted lose some freedom of action; they must now conform to something they do not desire, or find escape from it under the agreement, or withdraw and face some degree of moral, political or economic suasion. To assume that a nation with a very large stake in the results of an agreed-upon international policy will accept the decision of the majority, if it is in the minority, when most of the responsibility for carrying out the decision successfully will rest on its own shoulders is, again, naive in view of the historical relations of nations.[14]

The problem of sovereignty is pointed up in the fact that nations have as yet shown no propensity to forego popular domestic policies or programs merely to conform to what other nations might desire—and it should not have been assumed that the war had made any change in this respect, especially in light of the conflicts even on the technical level during negotiations of postwar agreements. Thus, national programs of land reform, of redistribution of income, of full employment, and of social services, for example, were instituted in spite of conflicts which arose with the aims of some international economic organizations, and to state in the International Monetary Fund Charter that certain actions of members would not be objected to merely because of underlying "domestic political and social" policies and programs begged the question and showed a willingness to become blind to reality in order to obtain agreement on high-sounding principles. The degree of incompatibility of domestic policies with principles which can be agreed upon internationally is shown by the number of exceptions and escape clauses attached to the implementation of the principles by the nations party to the Bretton Woods Agreements and the ITO Charter.

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[12] The impact of Russian policy on international cooperation is discussed below.

[13] The principle of "one nation, one vote" is itself, of course, a method of "weighting." It was employed under UNRRA and was a reason for many of its difficulties. This particular means of practicing "democracy" among nations is necessary and desirable where broad policies are to be decided by an international body but have to be ratified by national legislatures; otherwise, a minority of governments may cause friction by attempting to impose policies on a larger number of nations. However, when the mere allocation of financial assistance is involved, and when the funds are contributed by a few member nations, the practice of weighted voting has much to commend it as a means of preventing misuse of the funds by the recipients. If voting is weighted, giving some nations more authority than others, these then have a pragmatic responsibility not to impose their will on others when trivial or technical questions arise, yet it is equally foolish for them to refrain from using their voting authority to support national viewpoints on policy questions.

[14] An interesting case arose during 1949–51, in the disagreement over the price of gold as set by the International Monetary Fund, with a few nations deciding not to adhere to the policy adopted by the majority and eventually forcing a change in this policy. See our discussion of the Fund's "gold policy" in the 1949, 1950, and 1951 volumes of *Survey of United States International Finance*, by Gardner Patterson and Jack N. Behrman (Princeton University, International Finance Section, 1950, 1951, and 1952).

Any program of international financial cooperation which does not recognize and make provision for the dominance of larger and more powerful nations in the economic and political relations of the world, or for the existence of "national interests," or for the desire to retain freedom of action over domestic policies and programs, is incompatible with the conditions of international economic and political relations. The following discussion of postwar experience emphasizes that attempts to "de-politicize" inter-governmental economic organizations were doomed to failure and that, given the current nationalist mentality, international organizations set up without adequate recognition of the preoccupation with "national interests" will most likely be circumscribed or circumvented by crippling exceptions and escape clauses, leaving the principles without adequate means of implementation. On the other hand, recognition of the power-relations of nations and of their preoccupation with domestic policies will mean that a much narrower field of international cooperation is possible; it would probably, however, be a more active field. Such a limited agreement would not preclude agreement on the general principles which all nations would strive to implement "in due time and when conditions permitted," and provision could be made for continuous consultation on the possibility of putting the principles into effect. International economic cooperation is not impossible, but the framers of international organizations should recognize the circumstances (both political and economic) within which they will operate. As is shown below, almost total absence of this recognition was what brought disappointment to the United States in the operations of UNRRA and a reversal of its "de-politicization" policy, which in turn disappointed some other nation-members of the Fund and Bank, and led to a new form of international financial cooperation under later aid programs.

III. A BI-POLAR WORLD AND TRUNCATED INTERNATIONALISM

The Administration adopted the position that it would be necessary for the success of international cooperation to have full participation by Russia in each organization. In the field of economic cooperation, where Russia was bent on state-controlled trading, there were significant reasons why its participation would not have been advantageous to the United States.[15] But there was reason to encourage its participation in relief and reconstruction assistance so long as political relations continued on a friendly basis,[16] both to prevent the charge of imperialism against any nation and to spread the financial burden. The United States was concerned that relief aid should not be used to place any particular regime in power or to bolster the influence of a foreign power in the recipient's economy. This "non-political" use of aid was the espoused aim of the United States in cooperating internationally in UNRRA. But there were several political reasons why Congress, at least, was to become dissatisfied with UNRRA and why the Administration abandoned it before its work was completed.

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[15] See, for example, the arguments by Jacob Viner, "International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 34, Suppl., pp. 315–29 (March, 1944); Raymond F. Mikesell, "The Role of the International Monetary Agreements in a World of Planned Economies," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 55, pp. 497–512 (Dec., 1947); and M. Hoffman, "Problems of Trade between Planned Economies," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 41, suppl., pp. 445–55 (May, 1951).

[16] UNRRA's official historian has concluded that administratively the several nations

Major disappointments to Congress were the lack of gratitude on the part of recipients and the large volume of aid sent to nations sympathetic to communism. In justification of these results, it must be understood that the Articles of Agreement of UNRRA provided that it should operate through the existing governments, which were largely unwilling and unable to distribute the aid on other than a "political" basis. And the feeling of some U. S. officials that the aid was not distributed in such a way as to maximize goodwill for America (see below) did not take into account the fact that wartime propaganda from the Allies promised that liberation would be followed immediately by relief and that strong resistance by the peoples of the enemy-occupied countries would hasten that day.[17] Thus, when relief supplies came, governments felt little obligation to play up the fact that the goods were supplied from an international or United States source, since they were considered a "reward" for the country's participation in driving out the enemy. Also, the charge made by some members of Congress that UNRRA had aided Eastern European countries more than it should have in comparison to other countries was invalid, although that area received by far the largest allocation of aid. The allocation had actually been made in the light of United States insistence that countries able to pay with international reserves do so, thus leaving Eastern Europe as the primary area (besides China) to receive aid.

A further source of discomfort to Congress consisted of reports that Russia, through its membership in the UNRRA administration,[18] was hampering the operations of the organization, especially in countries bordering it, and was using the supplies sent to areas under its shadow to strengthen the hands of

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did work together effectively until their willingness to cooperate diminished and then disappeared with the growing ideological and political conflict. (G. Woodbridge, and others, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (N. Y., 1950), Vol. 2 pp. 535–52.)

[17] The attitude on the part of liberated countries that aid was "due" them was stressed by the Russian member of the UNRRA Council during 1946 when he stated: "Peoples of occupied countries had been promised assistance. These promises had inspired them to greater resistance, which in turn had led to greater destruction of their resources. People who had borne the burden of invasion and had suffered so much destruction of their property had earned the right to assistance." (UNRRA *Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, Atlantic City, N. J., March 19, 1946, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 6.)

[18] The fact that Russia contributed only to the administrative budget of UNRRA and not to its operating budget made its actions all the less palatable to Congress, since Russian representatives were partially controlling the use of funds contributed largely by the United States.

those favoring the spread of communism.[19] There appeared to be substantial evidence that the distribution of supplies was not "non-political," especially within recipient nations, as was intended by the United States,[20] and the political question of repatriation of displaced persons was injected into UNRRA's deliberations and operations.[21] Even the problem of personnel recruitment be-

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[19] The author has been told privately by a former UNRRA staff member of an instance in which the Russian official in charge of purchasing items for aid would not approve orders for small tractors (such as would be used on small, individually-held farms) to be sent to Eastern European countries, but insisted on the procurement of large tractors and combines, to be used on collectivized farms. Another UNRRA official, noting the modern and large-scale types of agricultural machinery sent to Czechoslovakia, writes: "They included about everything that would be used on a modern farm in Kansas or Iowa. However, the item that particularly struck me was the one of eighty-five grain combines with accompanying tractors . . . at that particular time, the Russians were playing a very prominent part in saying which supplies went where." He concluded that the equipment was destined for later use on collectivized farms in Czechoslovakia or for re-shipment to the Ukraine. (Klemme, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–41.) UNRRA's official historian, however, writes that, contrary to reports that equipment was inefficiently used and distributed politically, " . . . the records of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Divisions give every evidence that farm machinery and equipment sent to UNRRA countries were utilized fully and completely, with the aid of UNRRA technicians where necessary" (Woodbridge, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 487). The lack of adequate observation and reporting of distribution in many countries casts some doubt on this conclusion, and the UNRRA historian does not come to grips with the question of whether distribution of supplies was political. He merely repeats that recipient governments were responsible for distribution under the Agreement and that UNRRA officials [wholly inadequate in number to do the checking] reported "that they were satisfied that the receiving governments, in so far as they were able, distributed UNRRA supplies in accordance with the council directions" which included instructions that distribution be non-political and non-discriminatory (Vol. 2, p. 50).

Klemme also states (p. 144) that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Russia took from returning DP's any food distributed to them by UNRRA on their departure, thereby forcing a change in UNRRA policy.

[20] And at least verbally by others; for example, even in 1946 the Czechoslovakian member of the UNRRA Council warned that "UNRRA was a humanitarian, international organization, and should not be mixed with international politics." (UNRRA *Journal*, March 20, 1946, p. 4.)

[21] As UNRRA's historian states, repatriation was a political problem and outside UNRRA's early intent of mere care of the DP's. See Woodbridge, Vol. 2, pp. 313, 522. The question of forcible repatriation of DP's was a sharply controversial issue between Eastern and Western European nations, with the United States and the United Kingdom arguing against it and the Communist governments favoring it. See the remarks in UNRRA's *Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, by members from Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the United States, on March 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28. 1946. An interesting account of the background of these positions is afforded in Klemme, pp. 126 ff.

Political considerations were involved also in discussions of the extension of aid to ex-enemy countries (e.g., Italy) and to those not occupied during the war (e.g., India). See on the Italian question, *Journal*, Second Session of the Council, September 6, 1944, pp. 104–25. They arose also over a resolution that UNRRA should requisition land and other resources in occupied countries for use in relief—particularly in Austria, which was jointly occupied. Communist delegates argued that this question was outside the jurisdiccame political.[22] Despite the political overtones, the U. S. Administration argued until late 1946 that UNRRA be allowed to continue its work mainly to prove that international organizations could function successfully.[23]

Apart from the political aspects injected by other nations or by general circumstances into UNRRA's operations, the United States implicitly attached some political strings of its own. Many members of Congress and other officials apparently intended that UNRRA should instill a sense of "internationalism" in the countries around the Soviet border and assist in preventing the spread of communism. This interpretation is supported by the continued stress placed on the "goodwill" factor before Congress in the Administration's testimony and in the congressional desire to impose conditions on the recipients which would make it difficult for them to turn to communism. The Administration was slightly more subtle than Congress in its approach, since it stated that an absence of restrictive conditions on the aid would gain more goodwill. The Administration was apparently operating on the basis that neutrality as to conditions imposed is a vote for the status quo and that, if the United States attached conditions, Russia would in turn insist on imposing conditions in

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tion of UNRRA. The U. S. member argued first that he thought the relief aspects could be divorced from the political considerations, but later remarked that "it would be a course of cowardice to retire because there might be political aspects connected with the problem, and both UNRRA and the whole cause of international organization would suffer as a result." (*Journal*, Fourth Session of the Council, March 27, 1946, p. 4; see the debate on the days of March 27, pp. 1–4 and March 29, pp. 1–3.)

At the Fifth Council Session, August, 1946, at Geneva, the "USSR member, N. I. Feonev, pointed out that friendly criticism of UNRRA had not always been given due attention; thus, contrary to the USSR's counsel, the Korean program had been delayed, little progress had been made with the repatriation of displaced persons between the Fourth and Fifth Council Sessions; and now the Director General's Report mentioned the presence of occupational troops in Austria and some actions of Soviet occupation authorities—questions clearly within the scope of other international bodies and discussion of which the USSR had warned, would endanger UNRRA's reputation as a nonpolitical international relief organization." (Woodbridge, Vol. 1, p. 47.)

[22] The hiring of personnel was not intended to be at the suggestion of governments, but because of the pressure of officials in all governments to gain employment for "favorites," the lack of information on applicants (especially from Russia), and the presence of technicians mainly in government already, UNRRA's selection of personnel felt the impact of political pressure. In the case of Russia, its suggested personnel were accepted "usually without preliminary interviews." Russia also opposed strongly the employment of ex-enemy nationals, neutrals, or nationals of non-member governments; UNRRA Headquarters finally approved their employment in principle, but only a few were actually employed. In evaluating the effect of political and social factors on personnel recruitment, UNRRA's historian concluded that " . . . it is not easy for an organization to profess efficiency and simultaneously to implement policies politically and socially in advance of customs of the society in which it functions" (Woodbridge, Vol. 1, pp. 242, 246; Vol. 2, p. 542).

[23] See letter of July 3, 1946 from W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to Senator Kenneth McKellar, Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1946, p. 35.

favor of its political and economic policies.[24] The Administration could have supported its position with the argument that once aid was stopped there would be no assurance that the conditions previously imposed would continue to be accepted by the foreign country, and that in fact a reaction against them would be likely to occur merely because of their imposition from outside. Any such reaction would have militated against the success of the Administration's long-term plans for postwar reconstruction; it was reluctant to set a precedent for attaching conditions to any subsequent economic assistance and it fought long and hard in later programs of economic aid against any extra-administrative conditions on the receipt of aid and any overt or explicit injection of political pressure.

But after so strongly supporting UNRRA in mid-1946 as a successful organization in administering relief assistance, the State Department, in giving its position at the end of 1946 on proposals for continued international relief under the United Nations after the end of UNRRA,[25] flatly rejected the use of an international organization for relief: " . . . the United States does not believe that post-UNRRA relief should be conducted by an UNRRA type of organization."[26] Acting Secretary of State Acheson then denied the charge that "the United States is abandoning international cooperation in refusing to participate in relief on an international basis" and the charge that "the United States intends to use food as a political weapon."[27] He stated that these charges were disproved by the facts that relatively few nations needed relief and that these could best be supplied by direct request to the U. S. government, which would clear the requests through the United Nations:

> In this manner, nations receiving free relief must prove their need for it, and they can be held to a much closer and fairer accountability of the use of food and other free supplies. Those in power will be compelled to distribute relief food on the basis of need. *They will not be allowed to feed their political supporters and starve their political opponents.*

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[24] This question of imposition of conditions on recipients of aid from an international agency shows clearly that political aspects were not absent and should, at the time, have placed grave doubts on the feasibility of Russian-American cooperation as long as each so ardently desired adherents to its system; but who will argue that the experiment should not have been made?

That the successful operation of any international organization in which each country has an equal voice and which includes both Russia and the United States (so long as they continue to support their present ideologies) precludes the attaching of conditions to assistance appeared never to strike Congress; nor was the point ever presented publicly by the Administration in just this way. For additional comment on the feasibility of Russian-American cooperation in such a relief organization, see Philip C. Jessup, "UNRRA, Sample of World Organization," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 22, pp. 372–73 (April, 1944), and J. Perry, "Why UNRRA Has Failed," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 192, pp. 84–85 (Jan., 1946).

[25] UNRRA Director-General LaGuardia had proposed the establishment by the UN of an Emergency Food Fund of $400 million (*New York Times*, November 29, 1946).

[26] Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1946, p. 1107.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 1107–8.

> The people of the United States and the Congress of the United States have made up their minds that the relief problems of the near future are not of a character which would warrant grants of enormous sums of money from the United States Treasury *under conditions which would leave little or no effective control by the grantor of these funds.*[28]

The italicized phrases indicate that the end of UNRRA was grounded more in politics than in cessation of its need, and that relief was no longer to be "depoliticized," notwithstanding Mr. Lehman's previous admonition that "failure" of UNRRA would betoken failure of other world-wide economic cooperation. The word "failure" should not be construed as meaning that UNRRA failed in alleviating suffering, preventing the spread of disease, and sustaining large numbers of people: it was successful in its relief work despite some waste of its resources. Nor did it fail as an experiment in international administration: as long as its member governments were willing to cooperate, the officials worked as well together as could be expected, given differences in backgrounds, methods, and procedures in handling similar problems. Where UNRRA "failed" was in meeting the unrealistic expectations of U.S. officials and members of Congress that it would operate independently of political pressures and yet bring international goodwill to the United States. That is, the concept of the pooling of national resources to assume a common burden in a non-political manner was unsound.[29]

Thus, the primary factor in the United States policy of withdrawing support from an international agency it had fostered as "a-political"was the political use of internationally supplied goods coupled with the necessity of considering some of the problems it faced (such as DP's) in the light of changing political conditions.[30] In the post-UNRRA aid program there was no attempt to conceal the fact that the aid would not be given to countries sympathetic to

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 1108 (italics added).

[29] Klemme asserts that UNRRA was a failure if success is measured by whether its funds were spent "in the most efficient manner for the benefit of the maximum number of deserving people." He charged that "International politics got mixed up in the selection of personnel and in the acquisition and distribution of supplies" (*op. cit.*, p. 296). For an interesting discussion of how and to what extent UNRRA failed, see Woodbridge, Vol. 2, pp. 535–52.

[30] In presenting the post-UNRRA aid program to Congress for approval in 1947, the Administration testified that the aid was necessary to keep the current economic and *political* situation in the recipient countries from turning into one which the United States did not want. In the debate on post-UNRRA aid, many members of Congress stressed the misuse of UNRRA funds by Russia and the extension of its aid to Communist countries as practices to be guarded against in the new program. (*Congressional Record*, April 22 and 23, 1947, pp. 3822 ff., 3861 ff., and 4167 ff., and May 21, 1947, pp. 5610–15.) Congressmen asked for "plain talk" from the Administration as to the political character of the new aid program, which they conceived to be a result of not being able to "do business" with Russia. The Administration admitted (after the decision in early 1947 to aid Greece and Turkey had pointed up the rift with Russia) that a prime difficulty had been the inability to cooperate with Russia and that its postwar policy had been predicated on the assumption of four-power cooperation in relief and reconstruction. See testimony by Dean Acheson and Tyler Wood on June 25, 1947, during the House Subcommittee on Appropriations' *Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1948*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 968 ff.

Communism, and aid authorized to Poland and Hungary was not extended because each was soon taken over or dominated by the Communists.

The changed attitude of the Administration and Congress toward international financial cooperation was evidenced again by the failure to propose that Greek-Turkish aid be provided through the UN, though the purposes of the program were much wider than the extension of relief or the improvement of bilateral relations. The Administration justified the bilateral approach, in the face of grave doubts in Congress, on the grounds that it could not have presented the requests to the UN because (1) the governments addressed them to the United States, (2) Congress had not taken a position on American participation in any UN program of such assistance, (3) the UN had no funds and Congress would have to appropriate some anyway, (4) the UN would have had to call a special session and would not have gotten a program through in time, and (5) it would be better to support the UN by quick, direct action than to foist off on it a job it could not handle effectively. Congress approved this approach so decidedly that only a few voices were raised to question the further retreat from international (world-wide) cooperation to a policy of regional cooperation through bilateral arrangements as under the European Recovery Program (1948) and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (1949).

These developments showed that the "non-political" character of international financial cooperation, as earlier conceived by the United States, was incompatible with the existence of two (or more) parties having diametrically opposed ideas as to the proper form of world political and economic organization. Recognition of this opposition and the apparent dislike of having to provide information to other countries about internal affairs were factors in Russia's withdrawal from further international financial cooperation. Russia's policy of avoiding membership in international economic institutions was evidenced first in 1945 by its non-ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreements, which its representatives had signed. This abstinence presaged a growing policy of non-cooperation, since it was accompanied by Russia's expression of unwillingness to negotiate promptly a settlement of wartime lend-lease. The Russian attitude was reflected most clearly in its decision not to accept a bid to join in the European Recovery Program and even to keep its satellites from participating.[31] In offering to include Russia in the Marshall Plan, the United States ostensibly supported international (world-wide) financial cooperation even after Russia had shown that it was not only unwilling to cooperate but was more likely directly to oppose the reconstruction of the world under the policies of the United States, as witnessed by its indirect support of the Greek guerrillas and its pressure on the borders of Turkey during 1947.

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[31] The account of Russia's initial negotiation in the Marshall Plan talks with Britain and France and its withdrawal and initiation of a Molotov Plan is given in many places. For the official U. S. view of the Russian attitude, see "The European Recovery Program," *Sen. Doc. No. 111*, 80th Congr., 1st sess., December, 1947, pp. 47–48, 151–58; see also S. B. Fay, "The Marshall Plan," *Current History*, Vol. 13, pp. 129–34 (Sept., 1947), and the newspaper accounts during July, 1947.

This pressure and opposition of Russia was a primary (but by no means the sole) reason for the failure of the system of world-wide economic cooperation envisaged by the United States to remain a-political, and for its abandonment after 1947. But in 1944–45 there were no strong indications that the assumption of four-power collaboration was inappropriate. The majority of the United Nations had considered that, although Russia would not itself support a multilateral, nondiscriminatory trading system, it would seek to attain and maintain peaceful political and economic relations by means of mutual cooperation. In addition, the major part of the burden of postwar reconstruction assistance was expected to be borne by the "Big Four" (China was considered unable to contribute directly to the financing of any economic programs). This four-power collaboration was a key to the successful restoration of physical plant and to the reopening of trade channels to the mutual benefit of all, especially because of the ability of at least the Big Three (Russia, Britain, and the United States) to provide needed goods; their cooperation would have been effective in removing the disease and unrest left in the wake of battle. Both political and economic stability would have been fostered had such cooperation been forthcoming. The world did not expect and was not prepared for the overt hostility to, and outright sabotage of, its long-range plans by the Soviet Union.

Given this hostility, certainly the hopes of the United States for establishing world-wide economic cooperation in the reconstruction of the world were bound to be dashed, and the type of internationalism which could be made effective was changed. This change was reflected both in the type of aid programs after 1946 and in the attitude of the United States toward the administration of and transactions by international financial organizations.

Some Administration officials realized that the United States' own attitude toward the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund was crucial in making them "international" (in the sense of non-domination by a few members).[32] Other officials, however, had shown by 1946 that they considered the institutions largely "American" in character, to be tied at least indirectly to the political foreign policies of the United States. This attitude was revealed in the early negotiations on the location of the two institutions and on the extent of supervision of the Fund over the use of its resources. During the Bretton Woods Conference, Lord Keynes had pressed for their location in London, to maintain the dominance of that city in financial matters of the

[32] "It is important that governments, too, recognize that the Fund and Bank are international institutions. No country, however great or strong, however dominant its economic position in the world, can take the attitude that these institutions are its own creatures. Nothing could destroy the usefulness of the Fund and the Bank more surely than a feeling in other countries that they are subservient to the United States Government.

"And nothing would more enhance the world prestige and influence of the United States Government than a demonstration of its appreciation of the basic international character of international institutions." (J. W. Pehle, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, "The Bretton Woods Institutions," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 55, p. 1139 (Aug., 1946).

world; when this move failed because of American objections, he urged that they be located at the situs of other international organizations,[33] but the American delegates finally gained acceptance of their proposal to locate them in the United States. Many persons were concerned that they might be located in Washington and thus tend to be politically-oriented institutions. Arthur Krock reported, however, that in Washington, "There is a feeling against locating an international institution in the capital city of any nation, and this will probably prevail."[34] Those having this feeling had reckoned, evidently, without taking into account the views of Secretary of the Treasury Vinson. After stating that Keynes had tended to take for granted that the Fund and Bank would be located in New York with the UNO, R. F. Harrod writes that Keynes has the following account in his notes on the meeting at Savannah:

> " . . . in New York they would be in the daily contacts which can be provided by a great centre of international finance; they would be sufficiently removed from the politics of Congress and the nationalistic whispering gallery of the Embassies and Legations of Washington; and they would probably be sufficiently near to the seat of UNO to be able to co-operate closely on the economic and statistical side of their work with the Economic and Social Council.
>
> ". . . Mr. Vinson told me that the American Delegation had decided that both institutions should be placed in Washington and that this was a final decision the merits of which they were not prepared to discuss. The U. S. Administration, he said, was entitled to decide for themselves what location within the U. S. was to be preferred."[35]

Because of this and other more or less unilateral decisions by the American delegation, Keynes had a foreboding that the institutions might assume a political character under which every action " 'shall not be for its own sake or on its own merits but because of something else.' "[36]

Keynes' fear was not wholly justified by the actual operations of either the Fund or Bank; but neither has functioned without political implications or has avoided some "dictation" by American officials.[37] The possibility of the latter arose, also at an early stage, concerning the question of whether the Fund's role should be active or passive: that is, whether it should be a "schoolmistress" and assert a positive control over the use of its resources or whether the drawing rights would be "automatic" at the volition of the member (once declared eligible within the Articles of Agreement). United States officials had agreed in principle (but apparently only under pressure from other countries) to the latter role during most of the negotiations prior to and during Bretton

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[33] See *New York Times*, July 12, 1944.

[34] *New York Times*, December 19, 1945.

[35] *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (New York, 1951), pp. 629–30. Harrod goes on to report that this decision was a personal one of Mr. Vinson, having the support of the President but not of the U. S. delegation. Nevertheless, what the other members saw was a unilateral decision of the United States which had political coloring.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 632.

[37] A probable strong source of friction and resentment among members is the fact that a creditor nation in the Fund is given increased voting power while a debtor suffers a reduction; debtors do not generally agree with the U.S. view that responsibility for their deficit is wholly theirs and that creditor countries should therefore have added power to direct Fund policy.

Woods; but at the Savannah Conference in late 1946 the American delegation reverted to its initial stand, arguing that two full-time directors would be required to represent each major country or group of countries because of the importance of operational questions.[38] Harrod reports, again, that the American view carried because the United States was in a dominant bargaining position and was not beyond using that position for its own purposes.[39] Keynes considered that the Savannah meeting showed that national power had been "used, for irrelevant motives, to frustrate a good purpose, and he had been denied by the possibility of the defeat of the British Loan in Congress the weapons to which a combatant was entitled."[40] There is no evidence that the United States used the resources of the Bank or the Fund for political purposes in the sense of imperialism or that its national power was used for unimportant purposes.[41] But, as intended by Congress, the guidance of the U. S. executive director on the Fund and Bank by the National Advisory Council (a Cabinet-level body) lends a political air to American participation.[42]

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[38] Raymond F. Mikesell, who was a technical adviser to the U. S. delegation at Bretton Woods and attended the Savannah meeting, has written that, in the decisions on the role of the executive directors and on the location of the Fund in Washington, the United States injected political considerations into the Fund's operation but that such a result was inevitable when policy questions were involved, since only government representatives could make the decisions. See his "The International Monetary Fund, 1944–1949," *International Conciliation*, No. 455, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 1949, pp. 843–47. For similar comment on the decisions at the Savannah Conference, see E. A. G. Robinson, "John Maynard Keynes," *Economic Journal*, March, 1947, p. 65.

[39] Harrod (cited above, n. 35) pp. 634–35. This view of the events at Savannah in 1945 is supported by Herbert Feis, "Keynes in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, p. 572 (July, 1951): "The American Government, speaking through Mr. Vinson, made it plain that it intended to assert its power as provider. American wishes would be most influential if not dominant. Further, the task was not to be left to sheltered experts and officials. It might be taken over by untutored politicians."

As mentioned earlier, one way to reduce political influence in an organization of "experts" would be to disassociate them from governments. In selecting official representatives to the Fund and Bank, the United States apparently avoided appointing men from private financial circles (though many applied for the positions) and placed government officials, who were familiar with the political considerations involved, in the more responsible positions. See the attack on this policy in the *New York Times*, May 22, 1946, by its associate financial editor, E. H. Collins.

[40] Harrod, pp. 638–39.

[41] An outsider can have little knowledge of the detailed workings of either organization, so the conclusion cannot be firmly drawn that petty questions were not decided on the basis of power.

[42] The National Advisory Council itself has expressed the idea that the Fund more or less automatically follows the policies of the United States or, at least, that it could force the Fund to do so. When reporting on the U. S. official attitude toward the use of the Fund's resources, NAC wrote: "The National Advisory Council [in formulating] United States policy with respect to the Fund . . . has tried to avoid the extreme, on the one hand, of acquiescing in the virtually automatic use of the Fund's resources to meet any type of current deficit, while also, on the other hand, avoiding the extreme of *insisting* upon such rigid standards as would practically have suspended the Fund's currency operations until

One evidence of possible political influence by the United States in the International Bank is the practice, due largely to the fact that most of the loan funds came from the United States government's contribution or the American capital market, of the U. S. executive director's being asked for the official American view on any loan application received by the Bank even *before* it is submitted to the executive directors as a group for consideration.

Despite the probability that the American position is formed as much on political as on economic grounds, a strong case can be made that the International Bank has, by and large, lived up to the intentions of its founders that it be a means of avoiding the political pressures which formerly surrounded international (public and private) lending. It extended loans amounting to more than $1 billion during 1947–1950 without any borrower charging imperialism or interference in its domestic political affairs. Most of its loans were for specific projects in countries which needed construction aid or were programming economic development. But it cannot be argued that the Bank has completely avoided political pitfalls and remained "exclusively technical," as some members have argued that it should be.[43]

Although the Bank is explicitly prevented by its Articles of Agreement from extending (or not extending) loans for political reasons,[44] considerations of political conditions and positions of members were taken into account. Bank officials recognized early that in the disturbed conditions in the postwar period, political uncertainty and instability were prime considerations in the determination of whether a member was a good economic risk for a long-term investment.[45] Political considerations were cited by the Bank as being most significant in determining its policy on loans to Europe during the time of the European Recovery Program.

Considerations of political instability could, of course, be taken into account

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greater progress had been made toward general elimination of exchange restrictions." (*Second Special Report on the Operations and Policies of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Washington, D. C., May, 1950, p. 13; italics added.)

[43] See statement of Pierre Mendes-France, Chairman of the Board of Governors during the Fourth Annual Meeting, *Proceedings*, September 13, 1949, p. 4.

[44] "Article IV, Section 10: *Political Activity Prohibited*:

"The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I."

[45] "It is unfortunate but nonetheless true that the existing political difficulties and uncertainties in Europe present special problems which have thus far prevented the Bank from making loans in those countries. The Bank is fully cognizant of the injunction in its Articles of Agreement that its decisions shall be based only on economic considerations. Political tensions and uncertainties in or among its member countries, however, have a direct effect on economic and financial conditions in those countries and upon their credit position." (IBRD, *Third Annual Report*, 1947–1948, p. 14.) See also *Second Annual Report 1946–1947*, pp. 16, 17, and statement of John J. McCloy, *Proceedings*, Second Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, October 31, 1947, p. 7.

in determining the economic soundness of a loan without power politics or political alliances greatly influencing the decisions. In fact, however, the Bank apparently has been guided in some of its decisions by the political ideologies of applicants. In 1947, Czechoslovakia applied for a loan of $350 million and Poland for $600 million. Negotiations by the Bank with these two nations resulted in a scaling down of the amounts, but early in 1948 (after these countries, at the insistence of Russia, failed to join in the Marshall Plan) negotiations were suspended, no reason being made public by the Bank.[46] During the Third Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (October, 1948), there were some expressions of "fear that the Bank was, to some extent, influenced by political considerations in making loans," and Czechoslovakia has repeatedly charged "discrimination" at successive meetings. Poland withdrew from both the Bank and the Fund on the ostensible grounds that the Fund, at least, had become "a submissive instrument of the Government of the United States, whose economic and political expansion is in direct contradiction to the purpose to be served by the Fund."[47] (The Fund did not, of course, admit these allegations, saying that they were refuted by its history and actions.)

The Bank did, however, hold on for some time to the "a-political" requisites for its lending and attempted to negotiate during late 1947 and early 1948 some special loans for financing exports of timber from Eastern European countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, and Yugoslavia) to Western Europe in the hope of expanding the volume of East-West trade. Such loans were worked out in 1948 with Finland and Yugoslavia, but Poland and Austria stated that they would not need the financing and withdrew, while Czechoslovakia withdrew only after it found it impossible to work out payments agreements with importing countries.[48] In actuality, therefore, no loans were extended to help increase a rapidly falling volume of vital East-West trade in Europe; but whether any volume of loans would have stemmed the decline is questionable given the contract terms demanded by Eastern European countries and Russia's apparent aim of turning the trade of its satellites toward itself.

The obverse side of the above policy is illustrated by the extension of aid to Yugoslavia in increasing amounts after it showed a tendency to become independent of Russian influence, with the International Bank making a loan of $9 million in 1949. Yugoslavia was still, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, communistic, but its defection was politically and strategically important and was the basis for financial support from the West. Some additional political influence on Bank lending arising partly from the rift of the West with Russia can be seen in the loans to economically under-developed countries *outside* the Soviet orbit. These loans were explicitly stated to be in line with the Point IV Program—none were given to support the Molotov Plan for Eastern Europe—and no small percentage were justified on the ground that they would increase the supply of raw materials needed for mobilization programs of the West.[49]

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[46] The loans were apparently denied because of the closer political and economic affiliation of the applicants with Russia. They were not denied because of the size of the requests: Yugoslavia, France, and the Netherlands made loan requests of $500 million or over, which were scaled down but granted. And political instability could not have been the sole criterion, since loans were granted to Yugoslavia, where a like uncertainty existed.

[47] IMF, *Annual Report*, April 30, 1950, p. 102; membership in the Fund is a prerequisite of membership in the Bank.

[48] IBRD, *Fourth Annual Report, 1948–1949*, pp. 28–29, and *Fifth Annual Report, 1949–1950*, p. 34.

A final example of the injection of considerations of political alliance into Bank policy is that of the repeated requests by Czechoslovakia that the *de facto* rule of the Communist regime in China be recognized by admission of that government to the Bank and Fund and by the ejection of the Nationalist Chinese representative. In 1951, on a motion by the governor from the United States, seconded by the governor from the United Kingdom, the resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia was not acted upon.[50]

These observations on the impact of political considerations and alliances on the Bank's lending operations should not be construed as an indictment of Bank policy. They do, however, refute the view that the Bank is a purely technical body, divorced from international political pressures. The Bank should not have been expected to stay aloof from politics; that it has been able to reduce the influence so much among Western members is a result of its dealing with specific projects needing capital rather than with governmental programs or "credit worthiness" of members.

The record of the International Monetary Fund on "political lending" is similar to that of the Bank, but it has been subjected to more severe attack by members because its rejection of applicants involved some ranking of nations as to "credit-worthiness." Like the Bank, the Fund did not allow drawings from its resources by Poland or Austria,[51] and it extended credit to Yugoslavia, in 1949, only after its break with the Comintern. An exception to the pattern of lending only to countries sympathetic to the cause of the West was a $6 million drawing by Czechoslovakia in the fiscal year 1948–1949 even after it had refused to participate in the European Recovery Program and had turned its economic and political orientation toward Russia. This has been the only credit to Soviet-oriented nations, however, and, as stated above, Poland withdrew in protest over the Fund's policy on lending and Czechoslovakia has repeatedly charged the Fund with discriminating against its requests. It would be difficult to prove such discrimination, however, for public records do not report all requests or rejections or the reasons therefor. Further, Fund policy on use of its resources underwent a sharp change in 1948, and while most Western European nations received no credits from the Fund, Czechoslovakia did. The ostensible reason for the restrictions on Fund operations with Europe from 1948 through 1950—no loans at all were made in 1950—was the large volume of aid received under the European Recovery Program, but underlying the action was the existence of political and economic instability in Europe.

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[49] The Bank has allowed some of its funds to be tied directly to the development program of the British Commonwealth through Britain's release in 1953 of some of its "18% subscription" for use in lending only to Commonwealth borrowers. The Bank's Articles of Agreement allow a member to determine whether or not the 18% of its initial subscription, made in currency of the member, shall be loaned, but they do not provide for limitation on the countries to which the funds shall be loaned. The Bank may pick the projects and the receivers, within the limited number of Commonwealth countries, but this sort of identification of lender and borrower was a characteristic of international lending which the Bank was to eliminate.

[50] For detailed arguments, see the IMF, *Summary Proceedings*, Fifth Annual Meeting, 1950, pp. 63–72; and IBRD, *Proceedings*, Sixth Annual Meeting, November 30, 1951, p. 27.

[51] The Allied sector of Austria did receive grant-aid from the United States, directly and indirectly, from 1945 on.

During 1948, political instability in Europe and the "need" of governments to institute large-scale investment and social service programs—despite their tendency to accelerate an already rising inflation—made it apparent that any use of the Fund's resources by European members would tend to remove the pressure to make the reforms which were necessary to reduce the deficit in international balances of payments.[52] The decision was based in large measure on political considerations and their impact on the economic soundness of the use of additional resources. Another political aspect was evidenced in the pressure the United States apparently put on other members to restrict Fund operations through the exercise of its great bargaining power arising both within the Fund and through the projected ERP aid.[53] The Fund, therefore, like the Bank, found that it had to take political conditions and alliances into account. The decision was apparently (regardless of its correctness) an example of what Keynes had predicted in the use of political power to gain action on questions which, in many minds, should have been dealt with on purely economic grounds.

The explicit recognition in 1948 of the existence of a bi-polar world and the resulting truncated internationalism discussed above were followed in U. S. policy by a desire for greater control over financial assistance and for a closer identification of aid programs with political objectives. The policy of "containment of Communism" was supported by a regional association of European countries based on bilateral agreements with the United States, stressing the unity of economic and political objectives among the signatories.

IV. THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION

Under all economic assistance programs until 1948, the needs of and assistance given to each country were determined with little consideration of programs for other countries. The volume of aid given to each country under UNRRA and post-UNRRA was inadequate to meet even its relief "needs"; thus, it would have made little sense to attempt to integrate the supply of relief items among all countries receiving assistance. Also, loans by the International Bank and drawings of members from the Fund were considered in the light of the needs of individual members and not with a view to assisting two or more countries as a group. Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza contended that this country-by-country approach was a prime factor in the slow recovery of Europe prior to 1948:

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[52] Fund officials justified their action in restricting use of its resources by potential borrowers by emphasizing that "the purpose of the use of the Fund's resources is to give them time to make necessary readjustments and not to avoid the necessity of such readjustments." (*Annual Report, April 30, 1948*, p. 47.)

[53] *The Economist*, September 19, 1949, p. 576, reported sometime later that the decision to suspend the Fund's facilities for use by ERP countries was taken "despite the opposition of prominent member countries. . . ."

> The task of making peace was viewed as a series of separate problems, to be dealt with through a process of endless bargaining which resulted almost always in a success for Russian tactics and an extension of Soviet influence. European problems were never viewed as an organic whole, and economic reconstruction was looked upon as a problem of procuring emergency aid which would set in motion again a mechanism which had supposedly only jammed. In other words, each country tried to carry on from day to day by means of American aid, without plans and, as a result, often with a waste of relief funds. Naturally there was no European recovery.[54]

This criticism places an excessive burden on the one factor of the *form* of cooperation and overlooks many of the more fundamental internal obstacles to recovery, which Sforza, if directly questioned, would probably not deny. But there was a growing view among official circles in both Europe and the United States to the effect that Europe's political and economic problems needed to be faced as a unit, thus preparing the way for the regional approach when a large-scale effort at European recovery was made with U. S. assistance.[55]

Although the United States did attempt to look at the problem of Europe as a whole at the beginning of the European Recovery Program, it found that the task was too difficult in the time available, and the volume of aid was determined on the basis of a summation of individual countries' estimates of their needs for foreign assistance and then scaled to fit what the Administration thought it could get through Congress. On the question of reduction of monetary barriers to intra-European trade and payments, however, the United States met with some success in urging a regional approach.[56] In 1947 the European countries agreed to set up an intra-European clearing scheme and did so with the blessing of the United States; subsequent years saw the revision of the initial scheme and the institution in 1950 of a European Payments Union. The point to be emphasized here is that the United States had adopted a different approach to international cooperation from that which it had originally espoused. Previous efforts at internationalism were along the functional line—each organization dealing with a specific problem facing the world as a whole, supposedly without the influence of national or regional considerations of power. Under the ERP, the United States turned to regionalism in an effort to meet pressing political problems and to concentrate on a variety of intractable economic problems within a more closely defined geographic area. The concentration on Europe *as a region* was because of a supposed interdependence of European economies and a desire to reduce duplication of reconstruction projects among the recipient nations. The concentration on *the region of Europe* rather than another area or areas was due to Russian opposition to European recovery, the belief that Europe was of primary importance in the fight against communism, and the necessity to husband scarce United States resources.[57] The adoption of the regional approach was not, therefore, due to any inherent advantage of that type of cooperation over the "world-wide" organization in performing the functions given to each; rather, the new approach was adopted because political conditions made it desirable to consolidate Western power against Russian opposition at the most dangerous point. The consolidation of effort was facilitated by placing all functions under one agency rather than by trying to coordinate the operations of all world-wide agencies so as to concentrate assistance in one area—especially in view of the fact that political differences existed as to the importance of one area compared with another.

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[54] "Italy, The Marshall Plan and the 'Third Force'," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 26, pp. 450–51 (April, 1948).

[55] It must be admitted, however, that the association of European nations into a continuing organization to oversee the use of economic assistance was an idea originating not in Europe but in the United States—and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established mainly at the insistence of the United States. Sforza asserts (above, n. 54) that the United States waited too long to urge economic association on Europe; that immediately after the war there was widespread feeling among European countries that some new type of economic cooperation was necessary and feasible. It may be doubted, however, whether the "feelings" of various enlightened individuals could have been translated effectively into concrete association, especially in view of the strong desires of each country to regain its prosperity as quickly as possible without outside interference and without having to cooperate in helping others to reconstruct. Evidence of the soundness of this doubt exists also in the variety of means by which each country pursued its goals, in the reluctant fashion in which the ERP-countries grasped the idea of economic integration, in the slow process of their "study" of a customs union (see the voluminous work of the European Customs Union Study Group on the single, and technical, problem of tariff nomenclature and classification), and in the faltering steps toward a Benelux union and in unsuccessful efforts to form a union between France and Italy. See the report of progress in *Survey of United States International Finance, 1949* (cited in n. 14), pp. 144–46.

The programs of foreign aid made political considerations increasingly significant in international financial cooperation, since the process of aiding one region more than another left some areas relatively less well cared for. For example, aid was not available to consolidate inter-American relations through assistance in economic development or to assist certain Asiatic countries in attempts to establish free and independent governments. Although the United States had long supported a regional approach to the problems of Latin (and North) America, it did not extend any significant amount of financial aid to Latin America in the postwar period. The necessity of meeting what it considered to be first problems first and of conserving its resources at a time of world-wide inflation required the United States to direct its extraordinary assistance, in the main, to the area which was most crucial in the maintenance of political stability and which could contribute most to the attainment of the goal of liberal trading systems. Prior to 1950–51, therefore, there was little interest on Capitol Hill in extending to Latin America aid other than technical assistance in small amounts through the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It is probable that the dollar balances which the Latin American countries held at the end of the war were the overt reason why there was little congressional or private interest in assistance to these republics. However, Latin America had a legitimate complaint that it was unable to use its dollar balances effectively during the immediate postwar period because of U. S. export controls, inflation, and shortages. Latin American countries considered that since they had cooperated with the United States during the war (at the cost of rising prices and depletion of some material resources), they had a claim to extraordinary assistance. Individually and as a group they made such requests, but U. S. officials argued that the International Bank and Export-Import Bank should be the sources tapped for capital needs of the American Republics. However, the International Bank did not consider the projects presented to it by the developing countries well enough prepared or thought out; therefore, it extended only a few million dollars of loans to Latin America prior to 1949.[58]

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[56] J. W. Beyen and others pressed during 1944 for just such an approach to the problems for which the International Monetary Fund was created, on the ground that it would facilitate a gradual movement to the world-wide convertibility of currencies sought by the Fund. See his *Money in a Maelstrom* (New York, 1949), pp. 147–51, 158–61, 175, 204.

[57] Under-Secretary Acheson stated on May 8, 1947, that the United States would have to concentrate its "emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United States." (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, pp. 993–94.)

In an attempt to placate the South American countries, who "demanded" an Inter-American Development Bank with $5 billion capital at the Bogota Conference of the American Republics in early 1948,[59] the United States announced dramatically[60] that it was proposing to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by $500 million. This announcement, however, was received in a stony silence—"one of the coldest and most unanimous rebuffs in the history of Pan-Americanism," according to a United States correspondent on the scene.[61] Former Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that "the feeling against this country at the Bogota Conference was more bitter than at any inter-American meeting since the Havana Conference in 1928."[62] As it turned out, not even this $500 million from the EIB was made available, because of the unwillingness of Congress to approve the increased lending authority.

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[58] Since the International Bank does not publish data on loan requests rejected, it would be difficult to determine the number of applicants turned down. The Bank does announce the receipt of applications for some loans, but it is not certain that all applications are reported. Furthermore, as stated above, requests are presented to the U. S. executive director for an opinion even before they are considered by the Bank's directors as a group, and some may be rejected at this juncture. Finally, applications which are in effect rejected may be reported as "still pending investigation."

[59] For an excellent examination of the policies and practices required of the Latin-American countries to make effective any assistance in development and for an indictment of their attitude that the United States had a responsibility to help, see Acierto (pen-name necessitated by the "official duties of the author"), "A Marshall Plan for Latin America," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 1, pp. 3–20 (Sept., 1947).

[60] The announcement was translated in advance into Spanish for additional effect. See W. L. Neumann, "Bogota and The Marshall Plan," *American Perspective*, Vol. 2, p. 69 (May, 1948).

The only "extraordinary" assistance from the United States of which Latin America had been definitely assured was through the use of ERP dollars in "offshore" purchases. The Administration had asserted that some 30 to 40 percent of total purchases might be made outside the United States, and Latin American countries were expected to be large recipients of dollars from this source.[63] In reality, the vaunted assistance through ERP did not materialize, largely because of the release of pressure on United States production by bumper agricultural crops and the improvement of European production of items purchasable in South America. Moreover, many Latin Americans expected that ERP aid might have the effect that United States capital goods desired by Latin America would be in even shorter supply and that investment funds otherwise available to Latin America would be channeled into domestic production in the United States.[64]

Some United States officials, "led by former Under-Secretary of State Sumner

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[61] *Washington Post*, April 9, 1948, cited by Neumann, *loc. cit.*

[62] "Bogota's Lesson," *Washington Post*, April 20, 1948, cited by Neumann, *loc. cit.*

[63] See *Latin America and the European Recovery Program*, Preliminary Report No. 23, House of Rep., Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 80th Congr., 2nd sess., March 13, 1948; also for typical news stories stressing ERP gains for Latin America, see *New York Times*, April 4, 1948; *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1947; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1948; *Washington Post*, February 5, 1948; and H. H. Hutcheson and S. Matthews, "ERP and the Underdeveloped Areas," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 24, October 1, 1948. A Latin American view on large-scale aid from the United States was given later by Herman Max, "Significado de un plan Marshall para paises Latin-americanos," *Panorama Economico*, Vol. 3, pp. 18–19 (June, 1949).

[64] Henry C. Wallich listed this among several complaints by the Latin American countries in 1948: "Chief among their complaints are these: (1) wartime exchange accumulations, derived from exports to the United States at OPA ceiling prices, have melted under the heat of American inflation; (2) development loans, which at Bretton Woods were intended to have equal priority with reconstruction loans, have not been forthcoming in any volume; (3) international monetary conditions, which were to be straightened out by the Monetary Fund, continue in disorder; (4) attempts to free international trade through the ITO Charter, appear to be aimed primarily at depriving growing countries of their protective devices instead of securing broader markets for them; (5) nothing at all has been done for long-run commodity price stabilization; and (6) the recent development of the European Recovery Program threatens to perpetuate the shortage of investment goods as well as of investment funds available to Latin America." ("Some Aspects of Latin American Economic Relations with the United States," in *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States*, ed. Seymour E. Harris [Cambridge, Mass., 1948], p. 156.)

Welles, defended the view that the other American republics were entitled to large-scale economic support and that their demands could not be ignored without incurring their lasting ill will and jeopardizing [United States] leadership in the hemisphere."[65] In spite of these considerations, the official policy of the United States was that since its resources were not unlimited first priority had to be given to European recovery. Secretary of State Marshall stated (at Bogota) that the United States was prepared to assist Latin America but that it could finance "no more than a small portion of the vast development needed."[66] Further, the United States emphasized the desirability of the creation by Latin American countries of a "favorable climate" for private foreign investment and the presentation of carefully considered developmental projects to the International Bank. The Latin American countries were not receptive, in the main, to the "favorable climate" idea; but the International Bank did make a few more loans to the republics in 1949 and 1950.

Thus, though the United States had a long-standing tradition of regional cooperation with the Latin American republics, it made little effort to implement it in the financial field.[67] So long as all financial assistance was channeled through "functional" international organizations (those related to a single problem, world-wide in scope) there was little thought of "favoritism" to other countries outside South America, but when a concerted effort was made to help Europe (on a regional basis), jealousies arose immediately, and the United States did not make any comparable effort to dispel them. These results are further evidence of the impact of political considerations on international cooperation, especially when the latter is tied to financial aid distributed on regional lines.

Problems in international financial cooperation with the Far East arose in quite a different manner. Whereas Latin America had a close association with the United States but did not receive much economic assistance, some of the Far East countries received economic assistance even though there was no regional cooperation among those receiving aid nor any consideration by the United States of "regional" problems. Asiatic countries (chiefly China, Japan, and Korea) received the second largest amount of American economic aid provided any region during the period 1945–1950. But the Administration argued, correctly, that the Far Eastern nations were not developed sufficiently to profit by the type of economic cooperation facilitated by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). It did, however, make a token effort at a "regional" approach to aid in 1950 when it combined aid to Korea and China in one measure at the insistence of those members of Congress who were particularly interested in the Far East. The Administration was not enthusiastic over this approach, since it apparently thought that the elevation of assistance to Asia to a "regional" basis would be cause for greater insistence that aid be extended, and it was of the firm belief that, as a bulwark against Communism, Europe should be taken care of first. In addition, aid was not on a sufficiently large scale to make regional coordination worthwhile. The total volume of aid was less than one-ninth of that going to Europe after the initiation of ERP. U.S. economic cooperation with the nations of the Far East continued to be on a bilateral basis or through the international organizations established in the immediate postwar period although officials did state that regional association[68] would be looked on with favor by the United States.

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[65] J. C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), p. 372. See also Wallich, *op. cit.*, p. 157: "For the United States, however, this lull in relations with Latin America, temporary though it may be, poses a rather serious question of principle. If the attitudes of our own public and the policies of our government are subject to considerable short-run fluctuations, how will it be possible to find international acceptance of American world leadership which circumstances seem to impose upon this nation? Clearly, there can be no confidence in any country's leadership unless its policies, whatever they may be, are clearly defined and reasonably stable."

[66] Quoted by Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 368. For comment on U. S. policy see *The Economist*, March 27, 1948, p. 505; May 18, 1948, p. 762; and June 12, 1948, pp. 958–59.

[67] For a report that anti-American feeling is still growing in Latin America as a result of the slighting of Pan-American cooperation (and aid), see *New York Times*, June 17, 1952.

The United States adopted a different approach to international financial cooperation in the case of Europe than with respect to Latin America and the Far East mainly because of its high estimate of the importance of aiding Europe, as compared to the developing areas of the world, in combatting Communism. This view is borne out by the increased interest of the United States in a regional grouping in Southeast Asia after the Communist attack on South Korea. There is, of course, nothing inherently contradictory in following a policy of international cooperation through "world-wide" agencies responsible for single problems and at the same time through regional associations directed at broader economic and political relations. However, the absence of a consistent policy toward a region (as with Latin America) and the probability that some members of a region will feel slighted (especially if the cooperation is tied to U. S. aid)[69] are important limitations on the regional approach, if an effort is to be made to reduce political forces in the decisions of the agencies involved. Experience also indicates that regionalism tied to aid has no geographical stopping point. Just as no nation within a region can be neglected, so must no area of the world be left out.[70]

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[68] For a review of efforts at cooperation, see C. H. Schaaf, "Economic Cooperation in Asia," *International Conciliation* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April, 1950); and *Survey of United States International Finance, 1950* (cited in n. 14), pp. 61–64.

[69] Just such jealousy arose pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, in which equal amounts of aid were allocated to Israel and all the Arab states combined. Nationalistic elements in the latter called for a rejection of the aid on the ground that the distribution was "an insult" and was based on a "dangerous principle" of equality of importance of five Arab states with Israel. (See *New York Times*, June 26, 1951.) The U. S. government was reported in early 1953 as reconsidering its distribution of aid to the Middle East, with the intent of wooing the Arab states from Russian influence by equalizing aid to each nation in the area.

The regional approach to financial cooperation under the Mutual Security Program was adopted not only to treat similar economic and financial problems more effectively but also to support political and strategic objectives. The inclusion of all regions outside the Soviet orbit was largely justified by the political purpose of containing the spread of Communism. The United States, by 1951, had travelled a long way from its early anticipations of international financial cooperation on the purely technical level. Due partly to the East-West split and partly to the inherently political nature of intergovernmental decisions, international financial cooperation and foreign aid policies were directed at political, strategic, economic and financial problems of the various non-Soviet regions, thus integrating questions and considerations which should never have been separated.

V. SOME QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

The experience of the postwar period shows clearly that political factors cannot be divorced from economic and financial policies and problems among nations, and there is an increasing recognition among governmental and private circles that problems in international relations must be faced on several fronts at once and through overall programs and policies. The marriage of political forces with financial and economic factors is difficult, however, because it must be done on two scenes successfully at the same time—the domestic and the international. Success in the former requires, for the United States, close cooperation among Congress, the Administration and official and private experts. Difficult problems arise in getting the public, in general, and Congress and the Administration, in particular, to see the problems in an inclusive context and to act in a fairly consistent fashion in both the political and economic realms. Success in the latter scene requires coordination of domestic policies of nations in the pursuit of agreed-upon ends. A major problem here is what institutional form the cooperation should take. Should it be of the early postwar "world-wide" character, with the institutions employing "constitutions" and criteria of action supposedly applicable to each and every member despite the widely diverse political and economic systems in each? Should it take the form of associations based on regional proximity, despite the ideological and economic conflicts within the regions as well as among them? Should it take any form which requires "ranking" of nations under common criteria or through voting schemes? Or, should it take the form of bilateral diplomacy or diplomatic bargaining (more or less on an *ad hoc* and flexible basis) among ideologically similar nations which have expressed a desire to pursue the same long-run principles of economic and political action?

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[70] Witness the 1951–1953 presentation and justification of the Mutual Security Program by four regions covering the entire non-Soviet world.

Intergovernmental cooperation is required now more than during the nineteenth century because of the absence of the "automatic" mechanisms of commercial and financial adjustment and the former inducements to flow of goods and capital which were largely divorced from political positions of governments. Governments now act readily as buffers for the domestic economies and must take on a larger responsibility for coordination of their economies internationally. The problem of what is the most effective form of international financial (and economic) cooperation to gain the politico-economic goals of the Western nations is a crucial and as yet unanswered one.

NATURE OVER ART: NO MORE LOCAL FINANCE*

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In 1866 an uncommonly knowledgeable gentleman, Alexis de Tocqueville by name, wrote as follows: "Je pense que dans les siècles démocratiques qui vont s'ouvrir l'indépendence individuelle et les libertés locales seront toujours un produit de l'art. La centralisation sera le gouvernement naturel." Four score and five years later a distinguished compatriot documented the triumph of nature over art which de Tocqueville contemplated as a possibility, and analyzed at some length the instrumentality through which *le gouvernement naturel* has established its primacy over *les libertés locales.* Professor Jean Boulouis has recently pronounced a plaintive requiem for French local self-government culminating in these words: "On pourrait presque avancer, sans beaucoup d'exagération, qu'il n'existe plus de finances locales, mais tout au plus une localisation des finances nationales."

The two most striking phenomena of local government finance in recent decades are, first, the absolute increase in the amount of money disbursed by local governments, and second, the substantial expansion in the proportion of local government disbursements financed from intergovernmental transfers of funds—grants-in-aid, shared taxes, and various other devices by which money is shifted from one level of government to another.

Before we get too far into the highly debatable notions and concepts to which discourse about local government finance inevitably gives rise, perhaps it would be just as well to suggest some of the areas that are reasonably noncontroversial. It is, I take it, possible to approach this problem with a purely pragmatic attitude toward the proper level of municipal expenditure—to assume that local governments should spend whatever is needed efficiently and economically to perform the functions assigned to them. It is likewise reasonably clear that all our governments—national, state and local—belong eventually to the same shareholders, although the equities of some shareholders appear to be larger than others. It should also be possible to agree that even in a society embracing pluralistic values and highly complex aspirations it is desirable to keep the lines of responsibility and authority of our political institutions as clear and unequivocal as those commonly thought to be salutary in administrative organization.

I

Local government, as has been pointed out many times, is the institution which accommodates the special and the differentiating geographical elements in political life. The superior governments, operating over relatively large areas and relatively large populations, must function within a context of uniformity and of equal protection of the laws. They are unable to adapt themselves directly to the special and unique characteristics which local conditions and community organization produce. Local communities are different, both as to the type of services they require, and the amount of service. Some communities, for example, insist upon topping their primary and secondary educational systems with full-blown municipal universities. Others, equally wealthy and equally populous, settle for the more customary public school system involving eleven or twelve years of instruction. Sometimes private or sectarian educational institutions fill the need for local higher education; frequently, the need remains unfilled and even unfelt. Equally drastic differences in the felt and unfelt needs of communities exist in other functional areas—streets and highways, public safety, public welfare, sanitation, public health, recreation, and a dozen more.

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* Adapted from a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Buffalo, New York, in August, 1952.

However much variation in the standards at which services are maintained, there is a clearly evident uniformity in the services in which the center of gravity as far as actual operation is concerned is centered at the local level. While certain striking exceptions are in every category apparent, five functions are in overwhelming preponderance locally administered by local employees reporting to locally responsible governing bodies. These are (1) education, (2) welfare, (3) safety, (4) sanitation, health and hospitals, and (5) highways and public works. There are, except in a small number of states in which virtually complete financial responsibility for education, welfare, preventive public health, and highways has been assumed by the superior government, few localities in which these five activities are not locally administered and for which the aggregate operating cost amounts to less than 85 per cent of total expenditures for operations.[1]

There are many reasons, not all of them based upon dispassionate analyses of relative efficiency and economy, for the maintenance of at least nominal local administrative responsibility. Part of the national bias in favor of local administration of certain of these services undoubtedly stems from the political philosophy enunciated by Mr. Jefferson, although it may be noted that Mr. Jefferson's ideas are most often honored in the breach in the very region of which he is the most distinguished and ornamental flower, and the most frequently quoted as well as the least adequately understood prophet. Partly it stems from historical accidents which became precedents which tend quickly to be identified with the eternal and immutable American Way. When we consider the relatively short time in which there has been any significant assertion of national and state interest in some of these functions which have been the concern of local communities for centuries, the apparently instinctive, or at least visceral, resistance to centralization becomes understandable. With respect to some of these functions it is still true that they seem to confer benefits only in the immediate area of performance and are thus logically a local responsibility. And in large part the preservation of local administration through which state and federal governments exert indirect influence on citizens is explained by the way in which political power is organized in the United States. Assertions of national or state interest must be made by legislatures whose locally-elected members seek to minimize disturbances in the political power structure of their districts and insist on channeling central government activity through local instrumentalities which they understand, or think they understand, how to control.[2]

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[1] See International City Managers Association, *Municipal Year Book 1952* (Chicago, 1952); U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Survey of City Government Finances in 1951* (Washington, 1952).

Education. Let us examine first the factors which have served as the basis for at least nominally centering the control of public education at the local level. An educational historian who looks upon the fleshpots of federal subsidies for education and finds them beautiful, gives an historical explanation:

> From its early days in seventeenth century Massachusetts American education has enjoyed a substantial measure of local autonomy. Although the Puritan theocracy, and later the state, enacted laws requiring localities to maintain schools, the details of carrying out such statutes were left almost entirely to the discretion of the community. As the country expanded and more settlements came into being—often at scattered points and at a distance from the older communities—school districts were established to minister to the educational needs of the new localities. Out of these arose the district school system, which still has its lingering survivors in many parts of the nation. Under the conditions that produced the district school system, the local government enjoyed a virtually unhampered freedom of action in education.[3]

Throughout the country, the local government, or school district (which is merely a special sort of local government) remains in immediate charge of public education. Although in a few states the district for school administration is the county, most schools remain neighborhood or community affairs. As recently as 1948, there were eleven states in which over 75 per cent of the school districts employed less than ten teachers. At that time, twenty-three states had more than 1,000 school districts, eleven had more than 4,000 districts, and five Midwestern states reported over 6,000 each.[4]

Although in most parts of the country the one-teacher school district seems to be passing, few Americans appear to be interested in more than minor consolidations at the local level. The report of a Hoover Commission task force undoubtedly mirrors the prevailing sentiment:

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[2] David B. Truman's chapter, "The Web of Relationships in the Administrative Process," in *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951) is especially illuminating on this latter point. Using as one example the conflict over the U. S. Department of Agriculture's attempts to carry on its newer activities in direct relationship with the farmer, rather than through the land grant colleges and their agricultural extension services, Truman analyzes not only the legislative but also the bureaucratic and interest group opposition to new administrative organization that threatens existing political relationships at the grass roots. This aspect of the power struggle is probably not the least consequential factor in Secretary Benson's program for the reorganization of the USDA.

[3] Adolph E. Meyer, *The Development of Education in The Twentieth Century* (New York, 1949), p. 349.

[4] Council of State Governments, *The Forty-Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 54–55. In view of these data it seems a little premature to dismiss the district school system as a "lingering survivor."

> The American people have evolved a system of schools which make educational opportunities available on a scale unknown elsewhere in the world. This system is testimony to our belief in the worth of the individual, and the priority of the individual over the State. It is founded on the view that the development of individual intellect and understanding is essential to the health and development of our democracy. Historically, this program has been largely initiated and developed through energy and vision in local communities and the several States, by public and private enterprise. Because of our national cultural homogeneity we have developed a national type of education without the rigidity imposed by a uniform national system.
>
> Our tradition of local control of education, an outgrowth of the isolation of the pioneer community, still exists, supported by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and by our basic belief that the local community and State must be the cornerstone for all matters concerning the welfare of the individual and his participation in democratic society. This tradition has been strengthened by our zeal for freedom and individual liberty. We have a compelling desire to keep power decentralized in all matters which concern influence over the thinking of the individual; we abhor deeply anything savoring of centralized or totalitarian control of thinking through education. Among the varied and numerous activities of government, there is none closer guarded from excessive Federal control than education. The decentralization of administration and control of public education should be maintained.[5]

Welfare. In the field of public welfare the doctrine of local control, although not local government control, is of equal dignity and long-standing to the principle of locally-centered administrative responsibility for education.[6] Curiously enough, the Covenanter theologian and Edinburgh professor who is given credit for the "theory of locality," the Reverend Thomas Chalmers, was also an implacable enemy of governmental responsibility, which at the turn of the seventeenth century was local governmental responsibility in accordance with the Elizabethan Poor Law. His notions concerning the parochial organization of charity and care for the poor, and the philosophy of a small "geographical vineyard" as the area for the mutual assistance of human beings persisted and dominated thinking about and organization for welfare administration for centuries after the context of economic and social organization within which they might have had some validity had disappeared completely. Despite the phenomenal development of private philanthropy in the United States, and the piecemeal attempts to meet larger emerging problems of social welfare by state action, such as the passage of workmen's compensation legislation and other social insurance laws, virtually the entirety of public welfare responsibility remained in the hands of private and religious organizations and agencies, with local governments providing a modicum of institutional care at or slightly above the level of the poorhouse, until the depression beginning in 1929.

Even the depression did not shake the belief that interest in and administrative responsibility for public welfare should be essentially local. As the resources of private charity and philanthropy were exhausted, the local governments assumed the responsibility and increased their expenditures and expanded their welfare organizations. Not until late 1931 did any of the states undertake any poor relief programs, and even these were in the form of grants or loans to local relief agencies. In mid-1932, when the federal government signified its loss of faith in exhortation, public works, and predictions of prosperity "just around the corner" as depression stoppers by making funds available for direct relief, it chose the method of making RFC loans to state agencies with the clear understanding that these funds were to be merely supplemental but not in lieu of state and local financing. In the Roosevelt administration the funds available were drastically increased, and provided as grants rather than loans, but the theory of ultimate local responsibility was never officially abandoned. It seemed wholly natural that the federal government should not operate directly but work through the states, and that the state governments would in turn work through the local agencies; even Harry Hopkins had come to the federal government from a temporary job granting New York state funds to localities for relief, after many years of welfare activity in New York City.

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[5] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Public Welfare* (Washington, 1949), p. 277.

[6] Arthur P. Miles, *An Introduction to Public Welfare* (Boston, 1949), pp. 131 *et seq.*

> Relief administration was built up in the United States in pyramid formation with thousands of local units covering the whole country tied together in forty-eight state administrations and through them to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.[7]

This type of administrative experience was one of the ingredients in the thinking which led to the Social Security Act of 1935. The idea of a federal policy state and locally administered was thoroughly familiar and was adopted as the basic means of implementing the Act. Regardless of where the policies and the funds originate, it is the local welfare agency, in most cases, which takes them to the client.

It is not inaccurate to say that the Social Security Act changed in a very fundamental way the pattern of financing of public welfare costs, and universalized a minimum standard of benefits and subsequently a minimum standard of administration. It did not result generally in any considerable change in popular attitudes toward, or affect the continued acceptance of, the essential principles of the poor laws.[8] As one writer points out:

> The longevity of the poor laws has been phenomenal. While many of the Elizabethan principles are deterrents in a modern society one cannot ignore the fact that one of the basic principles—public responsibility for the care of dependent persons—is compatible with the democratic way of life. But along with this principle we have also been forced to continue others that are regressive and, from a social point of view, undesirable . . .
>
> It was quite natural in the days of Queen Elizabeth that the localities should assume responsibility for the administration of public assistance. Local government was at that time the only area of government that directly reached the people . . .
>
> Another Elizabethan principle that is unsuited to an industrial society is family responsibility. The poor laws in most of our states still specify that parents are to support their children and grandchildren and vice versa . . .

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[7] Marietta Stevenson, *Public Welfare Administration* (New York, 1938), p. 30.

[8] The popular success of recent attacks on the confidentiality of the names of public assistance recipients is fresh evidence on this point.

> The principle of legal settlement which was enacted in England in 1662 as a logical corollary of the principle of local responsibility makes each community responsible for the care of its own poor . . .
>
> . . . the Elizabethan poor law principles with emphasis upon local responsibility, legal settlement as an eligibility requirement for public aid, and family responsibility are still with us . . . The "poor law mentality," as the Webbs characterized it, is still the guiding star of our general assistance programs in the various states; indeed, very few states have legislated the poor laws completely out of existence.[9]

Public Safety. The police and fire protection functions are deeply rooted in local communities and remain essentially local, in almost all aspects. The urban fire protection function is so obviously directly related to the protection of lives and property within the environment which urban conditions create that its performance by local quasi-public organizations or by the municipal governments themselves requires no elaborate explanation. It is interesting to note, however, that to the extent rural fire protection, which is 99.44 per cent forest fire protection, is available, it is in general organized under state supervision with an important part of the cost borne by the federal government.

The bias in favor of local control of the police function is likewise deeply rooted in American politics. After contrasting the development of local police institutions in England and America following their transplantation to the colonies, which led to a high degree of centralization in England and an equally high degree of localization in the United States, Bruce Smith points out:

> All of the federal forces are controlled by the constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction over crimes, and for the most part are concerned with the enforcement of special groups of federal statutes directly relating to the governmental department within which each force operates. Thus through constitutional limitations and a series of historical accidents, the federal police system is rather closely limited . . .
>
> Likewise in the sphere of state police there has been no real centralizing tendency. On the contrary, general police authority has been denied to many of the state forces, and when granted by statute in some jurisdictions it is exercised only within carefully defined limits. Even in those states which have conferred full police powers, severe restrictions upon the numerical strength of the state force sometimes have prevented application of a really vigorous law enforcement policy, while the evident antipathy of a considerable number of county, township, village and city police units operates to impose geographical limitations upon state police which were not contemplated by law.[10]

Smith tells us that in terms of the personnel available for performing the police function, the distribution is as follows: 120,000 local urban police, 14,000 state police, and 20,000 federal police.[11] No data seem to be available on the aggregate number of employees of sheriffs' offices, rural county police forces, and rural constables.

Local administration and control of the police function has been so seldom challenged that it is hard to find ringing declarations of the doctrine. It may be noted, however, that despite the histrionic successes of Senator Kefauver's investigations, his committee's suggestion of a federal commission to assist local crime watchdog commissions was not taken seriously.

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[9] Arthur P. Miles, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–74.

[10] Bruce Smith, *Police Systems in the United States* (New York, 1949), pp. 164–65.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 174, 193.

Public Health. In the field of sanitation, preventive medicine, and hospitals the history of localization has been somewhat mixed. It seems essentially accurate to say that environmental sanitation has from the beginning been a matter of state law locally administered. In its inception, of course, it amounted to nothing more than legislation providing for the abatement of sanitary nuisances, such as the 1692 laws of the Province of South Carolina and of the Massachusetts Bay Colony for the prevention of infection associated with polluted air from garbage and slaughterhouses. Latterly more subtle approaches to environmental sanitation, involving the approval of water supplies and waste disposal systems and other types of regulatory and inspectional operations, have been added, but the locus of the administrative responsibility has in the main continued to rest with local health officers responsible to local boards of health or local governing bodies.[12]

With respect to hospitals, as Dr. Harry S. Mustard indicates, the beginnings of local government activity in this field were corollary to the establishment of almshouses and jails. In the early days almshouses, pesthouses and jails served relatively undifferentiated social functions in the American scene. In 1717 the Boston Selectmen were authorized to lease an acre of land for a contagious hospital. Philadelphia purchased Fisher's Island for a pesthouse in 1743. Charleston built an isolation hospital in 1752. These institutions were used mainly as refuges for shipboard victims of contagious diseases, rather than for the inhabitants of the localities in which they were situated.[13]

Although there are many exceptions, the report of the Commission on Hospital Care seems clearly to indicate that in the course of the years, state governments have assumed primary responsibility for the provision of hospital facilities for the mentally ill and for the tuberculous. The state governments ordinarily maintain general hospitals only as a necessary adjunct of their medical colleges, and do not attempt to provide comprehensive, statewide general hospital service. Local general hospital service remains an obligation of the local governments or of private organizations.[14]

Local activity in the field of preventive medicine is likewise sanctioned by long historical precedent. As Dr. Mustard points out:

> There were two principal situations that precipitated early action in the interest of the public health. The first of these was the epidemic, the second the necessity for providing some sort of medical care for those who through age, poverty, or misbehavior had become wards of the community. Epidemics brought brisk but temporary action in the nature of a board of health. The need for medical care was met by a fairly continuing but limited and somewhat grudgingly provided physician for the poorhouse and jail.[15]

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[12] Harry S. Mustard, *Government in Public Health* (New York, 1945), Ch. 4.

[13] Commission on Hospital Care, *Hospital Care in the United States* (New York, 1947). Ch. 21.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–65.

[15] Harry S. Mustard, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

Baltimore appears to have been the first city to establish a health department, as distinguished from the sporadic *ad hoc* boards of health that were set up in times of epidemic. The Baltimore City Health Department was organized in 1798. Although a substantial amount of direct state and federal administrative machinery has since been established to deal with various aspects of preventive public health work, the burden continues mainly to be borne by local health officers responsible to local boards of health or local governing bodies. As the Hoover Commission Task Force phrased it:

> The local unit is the ultimate health service agency and without it our ever-growing knowledge about health and disease would be of little practical use. When our entire population has available to it adequate local health services, then the framework of good health for all the people will have been established.[16]

In the field of public health, the local health agency seems to enjoy a sanctified status similar to that of the local school district. Congressional hearings in 1951 on a bill to authorize the Public Health Service to make grants to states for the purpose of bolstering up local health agencies produced surprisingly parallel statements from such varied sources as Oscar Ewing and the representatives of the state public health agencies, the American Public Health Association, and the American Medical Association, although there was the inevitable disagreement over the extent and nature of the controls which would go with the grants. On this occasion, Mr. Ewing said:

> Many of the communicable diseases which endangered life in the past have been conquered, but the attack upon the principal disease enemies of the present . . . has just begun. The public is demanding protection against such hazards, and science is providing the methods. Local health units are essential mechanisms in bringing these methods to the people.[17]

In a presidential address before the American Public Health Association several years ago, a working public health officer commented in the following vein about one of the essential aspects of public health work:

> . . . it has been said that public health is the sum total of the health of individuals . . . The education which produces it is therefore something which cannot be supplied to the populace in carload or truckload lots from National or State capitals. It must be dispensed to individuals in ounces, drams, and drops, and its dispensing to those who need it must be insured. This must be done by the local agency who can know how, when, and where individuals can be reached, and who can inspire the local community to want and to support facilities necessary to its general health preservation. It cannot be done in strict accord with any set pattern, for each community has its own characteristics and customs which no transcendentalism or government fiat may affect. It must come from local, voluntary reaction.[18]

Highways and Public Works. The long historical association between local government and roads, which is closely linked to the benefits conferred upon the type of wealth traditionally relied upon for local taxation, hardly needs comment. Despite the movement toward highway centralization in the states, almost 85 per cent of total rural road mileage in the United States is still under local control and, for all practical purposes, 100 per cent of total urban mileage.[19] Less than 8 per cent of all the nation's local or secondary road mileage currently receives federal aid.[20] Although the roads under direct state control are the most important and most costly ones, local governments still disburse almost half of our total expenditures on highways and actually raise themselves about half of what they spend.[21]

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

[17] U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., *Hearings on Local Public Health Units* (Washington, 1951), p. 19.

[18] John J. Sippy, "Local Responsibility in Public Health Administration," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 34, pp. 1139–41, at p. 1140 (Nov., 1944).

With respect to non-highway aspects of public works activities, the responsibility is predominantly local; indices of contracts let for public works, although fluctuating considerably from year to year, reveal on an average a rate of expenditure by local governments over twice that of the state governments.[22] Of course, as contracting "owners" neither state nor local governments are in the running with the Army Engineers, the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Reclamation.

II

It would take a very naive person indeed to be much impressed with the substance of "local" responsibility in many of the various aspects of these functions nominally carried on at the local level. It is not the aim, nor is it essential to the purpose of this discussion, to attempt an appraisal of the extent of local self-determination in the performance of any of the functions. Of much more importance is an understanding of the political and administrative rationale of developments which have admittedly shifted the center of policy and standards to a superior governmental level, but which have meticulously maintained doctrinal adherence to local self-government and continued almost exclusively to utilize the local governments as operating instrumentalities.

The history of contemporary public education in the United States is marked by a number of significant facts. One is the substantial elevation of standards in the public school system—the elevation of professional requirements for teachers, the lengthening and standardization of the school term, the enrichment of the curriculum, the expansion of the mission of the public schools, and the leveling-up of educational facilities in the underdeveloped areas. These changes may or may not be productive of improvements of note in the manners, morals or perceptions of the boys and girls, but as professional educators rate progress, we have progressed. Another significant fact is the absolute increase in expenditures for public schools. A third significant fact is the shift in the pattern of school support.

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[19] Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, *Table RM-200*. This is an annual tabulation; the data for 1952 upon which citations in the text were based have not yet been printed.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] See testimony of Thomas H. McDonald, U. S. Commissioner of Public Roads, in U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st sess., *Study of Domestic Land and Water Transportation* (Washington, 1951), pp. 927 *et seq.*

[22] International City Managers Association, *Municipal Year Book 1951* (Chicago, 1951), p. 319.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that all of these things are interrelated. The elevation of standards in the public school system is, in part, a consequence of the profound conviction of education, which in most of the United States has been at least as strong as the conviction of sin, and about which we have managed to do a good deal more. In larger part, however, the elevation of standards in the public school system is due to the fact that it has gotten almost completely into the hands of the educational bureaucracy. There is no sector of American social organization in which, for all practical purposes, the separation of powers has so completely disappeared.

In elevating the standards of the public school system, the prophets of progress have wisely refrained from tampering with the ark of the covenant. The symbols have been preserved, and the rituals carefully respected. But the substance of authority has passed out of the hands of local school boards, local governing boards, and even out of the hands of local school administrators. The means by which this end has been achieved is the grant-in-aid. In the last thirty years expenditures for public schools have increased five-fold, and in the last five years they have virtually doubled—perhaps the only civil function to keep pace with the consumer price index. The more significant change, however, has been in the pattern of finance. Twenty years ago the states paid about 20 per cent of the total cost of public education; ten years ago they paid about 30 per cent; now they pay about 40 per cent. And the end is nowhere in sight. Local contributions have declined proportionately, since all this has been achieved entirely without the assistance of the federal government.[23]

Viewed in the large, it seems that the professional educators have undertaken, with a remarkable degree of success, to push up the standards of the public school system at a rate somewhat beyond either the present fiscal ability or the social and political sophistication of the local governments. The fact that the grant-in-aid systems almost universally emphasize standards of expenditure rather than standards of achievement, and contain virtually no elements of equalization, suggests that what is being overcome at the local level is a certain social and political backwardness rather than actual inability to meet the costs of better public school systems from local funds, although it must be remembered that limitations upon local taxing power frequently prevent local governments from doing as much as they are able and willing to call upon their constituencies to support.

The situation in the field of public welfare is generally similar, except that the federal government is readily at hand for those seeking a whipping-boy to blame for the erosion of the substance of local responsibility and local control. However, it is interesting to note that no less than in public education the symbols and rituals have been carefully preserved. The Social Security Act itself actually centralizes the administration of only one of the categories—

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[23] Council of State Governments, *op. cit.*, p. 112 and Table 48, p. 224.

Old Age and Survivors Insurance—while the other instrumentality in which the administrative arguments for federal operations are overwhelming—the Employment Service—was hastily returned to the states despite the fact that its operation by the federal government during the war clearly demonstrated the superiority of national administration. Its corollary categorical assistance—Unemployment Compensation—has of course never been nationally administered, although the completeness of national control reduces state authority to a very gossamer thread. Nevertheless, in practically all the states local welfare officials responsible to local boards of public welfare or local governing bodies bear the burden of administering old age assistance, aid to dependent children, and aid to the blind, in addition to those welfare functions not provided for in the Social Security Act.

The Social Security Act was, of course, the great national instrumentality for the establishment of minimum standards throughout the country for the alleviation of a number of the most important causes of human suffering and maladjustment. While its sponsors were politically sagacious enough to preserve the symbols, the purpose of the Act was such as inherently to limit the amount of free play which could be permitted in local administration. The Act was far in advance of the political and social sophistication of large parts of the country. And within limits, the standards it prescribed were likewise standards not of achievement but of expenditure. Up to a point, the more you spend the more you get. As in other efforts to persuade state and local governments to operate beyond their current condition of political enlightenment, the grant-in-aid proved to be a necessary part of the plan. By definition, its purpose in such cases is to promote expenditure, not to equalize the burden.

The situation in public health, despite the influence of federal grants and expenditures under certain titles of the Social Security Act and other authorities, is quite the reverse. In the last decade public health expenditures have more than quadrupled, but in the process the federal proportion has declined from about 46 per cent to 29 per cent, while state and local expenditures, principally local, have increased from 54 to 71 per cent. The local governments are, in fact, financing from local sources almost half of the total operating costs of public health departments, exclusive of sanatoria and hospitals. It is interesting to note that public health expenditures from local sources have increased eightfold in the last decade.[24]

The factors which have produced a reasonable degree of integration in health administration are apparently professional rather than financial. Most of the state health departments are organized to provide special services to local health departments or to local governments, or to deal with special aspects of public health work, such as industrial hygiene, etc. The relationships of staff and command in such circumstances tend to become somewhat blurred, but in their essence they tend to rest on the authority of ideas rather than the authority either of men or of money.

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[24] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

In the field of highways, which represents the major share of local public works, it seems likewise clear that the major integrative factor is technological rather than financial. The percentage of federal money involved in aggregate federal-state-local expenditures for the construction of highways is hardly large enough to conclude major issues of policy or management at either state or local levels. On the other hand, the practical utility of maintaining uniform standards of engineering and design on connecting segments of the national highway network is an argument solid enough to overcome the rugged individualism of almost any state or local public works engineer or governing body. There have been times, and indeed there are and have been certain areas, in which this observation is not valid, but (made-work construction in time of depression and road construction for defense access in time of national emergency aside) it is clear that federal grants-in-aid have not been primary determinants in highway development. Moreover, when we come to the sharing of moneys for highway purposes between state and local governments, it is equally significant to note that in the vast majority of states the funds come to the localities in terms which give the state authorities very little control over engineering and design standards, and in many cases little control over whether shared motor-fuel taxes, for example, are even devoted to highway purposes.[25]

As to other public works, the extent of supervision and control has varied enormously with circumstances. During the period when the federal government was promoting construction projects with grants and loans, federal approval of engineering and design specifications was relatively extensive and meticulous. In many states today, state supervision and control of local school construction plans is common, whether or not state financial assistance is extended.[26] Hospital construction under the Hill-Burton Act is generally subject to supervision by the state hospital construction agencies which the Act makes mandatory, although the amount of actual federal control over plans and specifications appears to be nominal. In the main, however, local public works operations appear to be free of significant external controls.

We have now examined in a general way the political and administrative folklore which has produced patterns of apparently accepted thought about the proper geographical level for the performance of certain important public services. We have also examined the way in which such factors as technological development, professionalization of administration, up-grading of standards, and other influences have affected the real locus of authority and responsibility in these services. We have had opportunity to observe that popular stereotypes in federal-state-local fiscal relations apply with a good deal less than complete uniformity—that grants-in-aid do not inevitably produce shifts in policy control in direct proportion which the amount of the grant bears to the total cost of the function, and that in some cases a rather high degree of integration of policy has come about in consequence of factors only indirectly associated with the availability of grants. On the whole, the stars in the federal-state-local fiscal and administrative firmament seem rather remarkably movable.

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[25] Council of State Governments, *State-Local Relations* (Chicago, 1946) points out, at p. 27: "In a number of states, for example, highway grants are not audited by state officials; funds received by counties 'for maintenance and construction of roads' are merged into general county funds and their expenditure for highway purposes is not assured." On the general subject of diversion, see Council of State Governments, *Federal Grants in Aid* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 227–29.

[26] Council of State Governments, *The Forty Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 99–101 and Table 44, p. 219.

III

Let us briefly turn our attention to the political and administrative folklore of revenue source allocation. The cardinal principle in local taxation in the United States is apparently the article of faith relating to the appropriateness of property taxation for local purposes. In some states this has been carried to the extent of constitutional and exclusive allocation of this source to the uses of local governing bodies. In other states, by custom the central government has vacated property taxation in order to permit its unobstructed occupation by the local governments. In part this has been based upon the obvious administrative suitability of property taxation, especially real property taxation, to an area of limited geographical jurisdiction. Land and houses stay put. In part it has been based upon the contribution which many of the municipal services make to the improvement in the value of property. In part it has resulted from the desire of many state tax authorities to eliminate or minimize state-local stresses incident upon equalization. But whatever the motivation, property is principally taxed by local governments, and property forms the principal tax revenue source of local governments.

Latterly, local revenue sources have in many sections of the country been liberalized, or at least changed. Broader—indeed, in some cases, as subsequent experience proved, entirely too broad—powers with respect to the levy of various sorts of excise, income, and license taxes have been extended to local governments, especially urban local governments. In part this broadening of the base of local taxation has been necessitated by the relative decline of property as a significant index of taxpaying capacity. In the modern world, there are too many other forms of wealth, and too many more productive forms of wealth, to justify the large degree of reliance upon property taxation which had come to be placed upon it in the local tax structure. In part it must be regarded as due to the political effectiveness of the organized real estate interests in the determination of local tax policy; local governments, not unnaturally, have always been sensitive to this segment of the local economy, and a great many local governments tend normally to be caudal appendages of the real estate business. In any case, a fairly effective halt on further expansion of property taxation in any measure even remotely adequate to meet rising costs in the established local services, and fiscal requirements for new services, appears to have been called.

In general, the results of the extension of local taxing power have been disappointing. In some states authorities were conferred upon localities clearly beyond the ability of any local government effectively to administer. Munici pal net income taxes, to take an example, appear to be of this character; municipalities do not have access to the records of many persons and corporations doing business and deriving profits from activities within the municipality which are required effectively to enforce a net income tax. Business and occupational licenses, to take another example, in the absence of records available usually only to the state, must utilize indicators so crude—gross receipts, as a general rule—that rates must be kept at purely nominal levels to avoid confiscation in particular cases. Many excise taxes can be levied only at nominal rates in areas of small geographical jurisdiction if wholesale avoidance or evasion is to be forestalled.

There can be little quarrel with the generally accepted bias favoring the preponderant or exclusive taxation of property, particularly real property by local governments, although as long as intergovernmental transfer of funds continues to be practiced in any significant degree it is clearly impossible for superior governments to divest themselves of responsibility for assuring that the necessary preconditions for effective taxation of property are maintained in the localities, and that this source is in fact called upon to bear a just portion —whatever that essentially political determination shall be—of the costs of local government. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that property taxes, however effectively and equitably utilized, cannot support the entirety of the increase in local government costs, to say nothing of contributing anything to the development of relative fiscal self-sufficiency at the local level.

On the other hand, as experience has demonstrated, there are limits upon the possibility of strengthening, without the support of technical assistance, the revenue positions of local governments through the introduction of more sensitive newer local taxes, because of the special need which local government has for fiscal stability, because of the restrictions on administrative efficacy inherent in relatively small size as well as limited geographical jurisdiction, and because of the lack of ancillary regulatory powers essential to the enforcement of many of the newer types of taxes.

Faced with these facts, the states have been confronted with two alternatives: (1) technical assistance could be provided to the localities in an attempt to maximize the effectiveness of local sources, or of sources which might legitimately be made available locally if such technical assistance were available; or (2) raising the necessary funds from state sources and distributing them to the localities in the form of grants-in-aid or shared taxes. In fact, both types of action have been embraced. The work of many of the state tax commissions in the field of property taxation has been, and is, of the nature of technical assistance to the localities in the improvement of property assessment, and some states give the localities a limited amount of technical assistance in connection with non-property taxes. In the main, as is clearly indicated by the expansion of intergovernmental transfers of funds, grants-in-aid and shared taxes have been relied upon instead.

IV

Truth, like virtue, seems to be as relative in the field of public affairs, including public finance, as it is almost everywhere else. "There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so," is as true of subsidies, grants and shared taxes as it was of manners and morals at Elsinore. And this is certainly not the place to reargue the case for and against grants-in-aid.[27] All of the logic adduced in support of intergovernmental transfers of funds has been valid and invalid at certain times in history and with respect to certain types of grants. All of the arguments made in opposition to grants-in-aid have been true and untrue under certain circumstances and with respect to certain sorts of subsidies. In general, it is true that the legal situation confronted by a federal government engenders resort to and continuance of grants-in-aid for the stimulation of programs that must, for constitutional or over-riding political reasons, be carried out by state and local instrumentalities in order to establish and maintain national minimal service standards. What the federal government cannot command it must purchase, and the grant-in-aid is the technique by which state and local concurrent and coordinate action is bought.

The legal situation with respect to state persuasion and coercion of local activity is, of course, quite different, but the political climate has many points of similarity. Few state legislatures would venture to impose mandatory duties involving substantial expenditure upon local governments without at the same time sweetening the pot with additional state funds. Indeed, almost every session of every state legislature is confronted with very steep demands from local government for funds merely to offset the effects of inflation on current programs. And governorships, formerly bought and sold in the smoke-filled back rooms, it is alleged by malefactors of great wealth, are now more likely to be openly and unashamedly bargained for at the state-local relations counter, with wampum made up of intricate old plans and imaginative new programs for pumping more and more state money into local coffers.

So it is probably not very realistic to think of anything like a drastic reversal of public policy which would eliminate intergovernmental transfers of funds and which would establish each level of government on its own discrete financial bottom. It is worth while, however, to take a brief look at the nature of prevailing grant-in-aid programs and their administrative consequences. In the first place, most grants are essentially stimulative of expenditure; as has been pointed out before, the standards they erect are standards of money matched, not missions accomplished. It is of some interest that the only federal grant-in-aid proposal which significantly related its payments to local ability and local effort was the ill-fated Taft bill for federal assistance to education. At the state level the situation is somewhat better, although in the field of educational subsidies the Council of State Governments reports that in 1948 only ten states distributed as much as 75 per cent of educational grants on general-purpose equalization formulae,[28] and that 25 states utilized crude assessed values for educational grant equalization,[29] which is worse than no equalization at all. In most other state grant systems, and obviously in shared-tax systems, there is no element of equalization visible to the naked eye.

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[27] The debate is handily summarized in Council of State Governments, *Federal Grants in Aid* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 41–50.

In these circumstances it is not to be wondered that functional pressures have been set up in local government which effectively nullify integrated and responsible local administration. When it comes to budgetary matters, most local governing bodies are currently little more than trustees in bankruptcy for a small group of residual local functions. The major decisions have already been made in the light of the compelling argument not of local community needs, but of optimum possibilities in securing matching state and federal funds. Since no premium is set upon efficiency, most grant systems have in effect underwritten the continuance of archaic local governmental jurisdictions and irresponsible local administrative structure and procedures.

Frustrating as is the experience of living in and working with community institutions in which responsibility is as difficult to fix, and influence as difficult to exert, as it is in most of the local school systems and welfare departments with which I am acquainted, it is still true that in the aggregate the present allocation of functions offers a better opportunity of achieving a reasonably satisfactory community life than if functional operations had been kicked upstairs along with a large part of the financial burden. It may be sometimes difficult to find our way around in our untidy and illogical county and municipal household, but it is also true that most of the furniture and utensils we need, and for that matter a fair stock of vittles, are there when we are able eventually to find them.

Let us admit that we may, in the future, desire to utilize grants-in-aid for stimulative purposes, and even to distribute them on the basis of expenditure standards. We may even wish on occasion to play fast and loose with principles of equalization. The problem is not one of inviolate adherence to a particular doctrine of intergovernmental fiscal relations, but of intelligent use and modification of systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations in accord with reasonably well agreed general social and political objectives. In short, when stimulation is required, then grants-in-aid, along with interest rates and all other suitable and available forms of social control, should be utilized to stimulate. When stimulation is not required, the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations should be adapted and modified to support consolidation, economy and equalization of administrative services and costs. The fact that in many of the social services, and in other local services as well in the target areas, there are standards below which the nation and the states cannot permit the local government to fall should not imply that these exigencies cannot be met without losing integrity, unity and self-reliance within the institutions of local adminis-

[28] Council of State Governments, *The Forty Eight State School Systems* (Chicago, 1949), pp. 128–31 and Table 55, p. 231.

[29] *Ibid.*, Table 60, p. 236.

tration. Let me suggest a few of the ways in which we might face ourselves in the right direction for achieving this end.

First, with respect to those services in which minimum state-wide or national standards must be maintained, let the superior governments state the requirements in terms of objective service standards, rather than standards of expenditure which are in reality not performance standards at all.

Second, let the states provide technical assistance for assuring, and in fact assure, that proper and equitable use is being made of property taxes by local governments.

Third, let the states provide technical assistance and, in appropriate cases, legal and enforcement support, which will permit effective utilization of newer local taxes, such as business taxes and excises at rates and with economic indicators which will assure progressivity and at the same time secure the just and equitable utilization of these revenue sources.

Fourth, in the event that property taxes at a true rate which defines the equitable state-wide sacrifice, and the additional local taxes at the standard prescribed rates, will not produce a sum equal to the cost of maintaining at the prescribed state-wide or nation-wide standards the essential services, then a local supplemental tax, up to a specified percentage, against the state personal net income tax collected in the locality should be permitted.

Fifth, in the event that all of these measures do not produce funds sufficient to operate the essential services at the prescribed standards, block grants should be made in an amount sufficient when added to locally raised revenues to operate the essential services at the prescribed standards. Such block grants from state to local governments, and from federal to state governments, should seek to equalize, within minimum standards, the resources available for the operation of the essential services.

Sixth, standards for the use of property taxes, as well as standards for the use of the newer local taxes, should be stated in terms definitive of the general equitable rate of sacrifice, but not in terms of maxima. Localities which desire to operate essential services above the prescribed standards, or to undertake other services, should be permitted and encouraged to develop and expand their operations in accordance with the demands made upon them by their constituencies.

STATE ADMINISTRATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE WEST*

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West of the one hundredth meridian, the average annual rainfall is generally less than twenty inches except for higher mountainous areas and the humid area west of the Cascade range in western Washington and Oregon and an area west of the Coast range in northwestern California. With less than twenty inches of rainfall, irrigation and dry-farming methods are required to supplement and conserve the native moisture if successful crops are to be produced. At twenty inches of rainfall successful agriculture is subject to extreme hazards from frequent droughts that call to mind the tragedy of crop failure and dust storms. In the humid Pacific Northwest the dry summer climate introduces another variable limiting successful agricultural production without supplementary water.

American institutional arrangements, sustenance patterns and resource policies were conceived in humid England and developed in the humid regions of the United States. However, the general aridity of the West stands in marked contrast to the humidity that prevailed in the physical environment where American social institutions and traditions were formed. This alteration of the physical environment has caused an important shift in the balance of human ecology requiring significant modification in institutional arrangements and social policy, especially in regard to the control and development of natural resources.[1]

This paper is concerned primarily with an analysis of the role that state governments have played in meeting the peculiar requirements of western resources development. At the outset, however, it must be recognized that the states have operated under a fundamental handicap. While the control and development of water resources is the critical factor in the resources policies of the West, little consideration seems to have been given to structuring the area of the states so as to permit effective control of watershed areas. The rectangular shape of most western states reflects the surveyor's defiance of land forms in drawing state boundaries. Where state boundaries do respond to land forms, the channel of a major river most frequently provides the boundary marker, thereby eliminating the possibility of development by a single state. The Central Valley of California is the only major hydrologic unit in the West that is confined to the jurisdiction of a single state. Otherwise only an occasional tributary, such as the Willamette River in Oregon or the Gila River in Arizona, affords opportunity for systematic development on a comprehensive basis by the state as a unit of government.

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* This paper was prepared for the panel on state administration of natural resources at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Buffalo, New York, August 26, 1952. New developments, especially in state legislation during the 1953 session of state legislatures, are not reported in this paper. However, the few changes which might be made in factual observation do not alter the analyses and conclusions.

[1] Early studies of the aridity of the West and its implications for public policy include John W. Powell, *Reports on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States* . . . (2nd. ed., Washington, 1879); William E. Smythe, *The Conquest of Arid America* (New York, 1900); Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1921); Elwood Mead, *Irrigation Institutions* (New York, 1903).

Despite the lack of attention given to the shaping of an adequate political instrument for the control of the critical factor in the ecology of the West, major responsibilities in the development of water resources were relegated to the states. Subtle differences in the common law, such as distinctions between a usufruct and title-in-fee-simple, resulted in a differentiation between water and land in the administration of the public domain. Title to land and the authority to control the land in the public domain have generally been recognized as inhering in the federal government. On the other hand, control over the acquisition and administration of water rights has generally been recognized as a function of the state governments. Consequently a significant dichotomy of state and federal responsibilities was permitted to develop that has ramified through every aspect of land and water resources administration in the West.

I

The first major change wrought by the western states in the traditional American institutions to control water resources was the abandonment of the common law doctrine of riparian rights and its replacement by the new doctrine of prior appropriation rights. Significantly, the new doctrine was derived from the practice of miners, who, in making claims to precious metals, vested rights on the basis of first come, first served.

The prior appropriation doctrine of water rights permits full utilization of a stream with an assured supply to prior appropriators without the threat of new competitors gaining rights to the water supply simply by the circumstances of location in relation to the course of a stream. The use of water under appropriation is not restricted to lands adjacent to water courses as established in riparian laws. Except for California, all of the western states rely primarily upon the system of prior appropriation in the determination of water rights to surface waters. However, California is still confronted with serious problems arising from conflicts over riparian rights in the development of water exchange arrangements in the Central Valley and in some of the basins of Southern California.[2]

Shortly after the prior appropriation doctrine had been firmly established in the law of western states as a basis for determining water rights, new devices were invented to permit careful control over the actual appropriation of water by water users. Instead of relying exclusively upon the courts as instruments for resolving conflicts over water rights, western states, beginning with Wyoming, placed administrative responsibility for the supervision and regulation of appropriations with the state engineer. Appropriation claims were filed with the state engineer instead of the county recorder. The amount of the appropriation was subject to review in terms of the beneficial use of the water, the actual needs for water, diligence in utilization of water, and the amount of water subject to potential appropriation. By the elimination of paper claims to water, the control of appropriations to prevent filings beyond the potential supplies, and the control of unreasonable waste by prior appropriators, the state was able to avoid open warfare among water appropriators and to establish orderly relationships among water users without their having to resort constantly to expensive litigation.[3]

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[2] Litigation may be instituted to adjudicate water rights in the entire Sacramento River basin as a result of conflicts over diversion into the San Joaquin basin. In the development of the California Water Plan, sensitivity over water rights is unquestionably a motive for plans to divert Feather River water south across the Tehachapi Mountains with a pump lift of approximately 3,000 feet instead of diverting the Kern River on the Sierra Nevada at an elevation high enough to reduce pumping greatly, or perhaps even permit a gravity system.

With the increased efficiency of pumping and the greater demand for agricultural production, the western states have been confronted with a new problem of water rights to underground water supplies. Underground waters are more difficult to administer because of the difficulty of measuring safe yield and determining the nature of the underground water supply. Consequently some of the western states, instead of relying upon the appropriation principle, have permitted rights to vest in owners of overlying lands. In some areas, notably in Arizona, users have pumped water substantially beyond the permanent safe yield of the underground basins.[4] Unless the federal pork-barrel is used to "rescue" users making overdrafts on underground basins, serious human tragedies can be expected.

Utilization of water resources required the development of new social agencies in the West. As Frederick Jackson Turner has observed, ". . . no conquest was possible by the old individual pioneer method . . . expensive irrigation works must be constructed, cooperative activity was demanded in the utilization of water supply, and capital beyond the reach of the farmer was required."[5] Although many early irrigation projects were undertaken by individual entrepreneurs, cooperatives and local public organizations have generally served as the agencies to provide the necessary "cooperative labor and capital" for local irrigation works.

Mutual water companies were organized by early settlers in Utah and Southern California as semi-public agencies to provide irrigation water to farming communities on a cooperative basis. Similar cooperatives have been developed in other states. Beginning in 1887 with the Wright Act of California, western states organized public irrigation districts as special agencies with powers of taxation and eminent domain to provide for the construction and operation of irrigation works. Local government agencies for water resources administration have multiplied until most western states have irrigation, flood control, drainage, water, and utility districts.

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[3] Mead, *op. cit.* Mead was one of the pioneers in the development of the doctrines of prior appropriation rights, and as consultant to the Wyoming constitutional convention and as Wyoming state engineer he was generally credited with the development of the "Wyoming system" of administration of water rights.

[4] Paul Kelso, "The Arizona Ground Water Act," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 1, pp. 178–82 (June, 1948).

[5] Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

The organization of these new local public agencies for the development of water resources and the new system for the appropriation of water permitted people to pool their wealth to develop the country. However, the lack of adequate skill and competent advice in the design of waterworks and the development of irrigation systems produced many poorly conceived projects planned without adequate consideration of either physical or economic feasibility. Consequently many irrigation districts defaulted on the repayment of their bonded indebtedness, creating serious doubt as to the soundness of local resources development. On the other hand, many local irrigation districts have been efficiently managed and operate as successful agencies today.

II

By the early part of the twentieth century most of the water projects susceptible of development on a small scale by local organizations of irrigators and water users had been undertaken. To undertake large-scale projects which these groups were not able to handle, the Reclamation Service, a federal agency, was established in 1902. Most western states have not advanced far beyond the function of providing the permissive conditions for the development of federal waterworks projects and serving as special pleaders before federal agencies to undertake local development.[6] In some states, notably California, the state government has served as the agency within which resource planners have tried to come to grips with problems of comprehensive planning for multiple-purpose water resources development. California's efforts in this direction provide an interesting chapter in natural resources administration by a state government, since that state has the necessary conditions—wealth and control over a large integral hydrologic unit—for active state participation in the construction and operation of its water resources.

In 1919, Robert B. Marshall, who for many years was the Chief Geographer in charge of the Topographic Branch of the U. S. Geological Survey, proposed a plan for the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Rivers in the Central Valley by capturing the flood discharge in a number of large reservoirs on tributary streams and on the upper Sacramento River.[7] By a system of canals along the edge of the foothills skirting the valley floor it would be possible to divert surplus waters to fertile valley lands for irrigation. The Marshall Plan anticipated the irrigation of 12,000,000 acres of land. In addition water would be used to generate electrical power to help establish the feasibility of the total project.[8]

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[6] An interesting venture of state government in the development of reclamation projects occurred under the provisions of the Carey Act of 1894, which permitted each state in the arid West to select one million acres of land and plan for its irrigation and settlement. Some of the largest irrigation projects in Idaho, Montana and Wyoming were developed under these arrangements.

[7] The Marshall Plan was preceded by important preliminary investigations by William

After an intensive effort supported by public power groups, the League of California Municipalities, and farm and labor organizations, the Marshall Plan was rejected by the California legislature. Instead, legislation was enacted and $200,000 appropriated to initiate an investigation of California water resources. The supporters of the Marshall Plan carried the measure to the people at three different elections as an initiative proposal for a California Water and Power Act to create a state Water and Power Commission, modeled after the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission. These efforts were defeated after some of "the most bitterly contested political struggles ever staged in California."[9]

The water investigations inaugurated in 1921 by the state engineer were continued by private subscription after the legislature failed to renew the appropriation in 1923. In 1925, during an increasingly serious drought, an additional $150,000 was appropriated. By 1927 the broad features of a state water plan began to take form; and in 1931 the State Water Plan, together with plans for undertaking the Central Valley Project as the initial unit of the plan, were completed.

In a background of drought and depression, and following the inauguration of the Boulder Canyon Project by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Colorado River Aqueduct by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the California legislature authorized the Central Valley Project by enactment of the Central Valley Project Act of 1933.[10] The legislation was upheld by the voters of California over opposition by the power companies and sectional interests at a special referendum election on December 17, 1933.

The Central Valley Project Act provided for the creation of a Water Project Authority to construct, operate and administer the project. Revenue bonds to the maximum amount of $170,000,000 were authorized for the construction of (1) the Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River, (2) the San Joaquin Pumping System to transport water from the lower Sacramento in the San Joaquin delta, with canals to Fresno Slough for the irrigation of lands in the northwestern portion of San Joaquin Valley, and (3) Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River

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Hammond Hall, state engineer, and Elwood Mead, then professor of irrigation at the University of California. See Hall, *Irrigation in California* (Sacramento, 1888); and Mead, *Report of Irrigation Investigation in California,* Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 100 (Washington, 1901).

[8] Arthur D. Angel, "Political and Administrative Aspects of the Central Valley Project of California," unpub. diss. (UCLA, June, 1944), pp. 40–45.

[9] Rudolph Spreckels, "How the 1922 Water and Power Act Was Defeated," *Public Ownership*, Vol. 6, p. 163 (August, 1929). While Marshall later opposed the Water and Power Act, those who led the fight for the measure took the Marshall Plan as the basis for their conception of the development of the water resources of the Central Valley.

[10] California, *Statutes, 1933,* Ch. 1042.

with canals diverting water south to the Bakersfield area for the irrigation of lands in southern and eastern San Joaquin Valley.

Instead of utilizing the revenue bonds to undertake the Central Valley Project as a state venture in water resources administration, the California Water Project Authority turned to the United States government to secure federal financing and construction. In 1935 the Central Valley Project was authorized as a federal project with administrative responsibility for construction and operation vested in the Bureau of Reclamation. The Central Valley Project has since been pursued as a federal undertaking.

Early contracts between the California Water Project Authority and the Bureau of Reclamation contemplated an agreement upon a new contract to provide for:

> (a) The operation and maintenance by the authority of useful units of the project, upon presenting assurance of payment satisfactory to the United States of the cost thereof.
>
> (b) Appropriate payment by the authority to the United States for expenditures in construction of the project.[11]

By 1939 the Secretary of Interior was rejecting overtures by the Water Project Authority for negotiation of such a contract with the observation that "the Central Valley Project is a federal undertaking to be administered in accordance with Reclamation Law."[12]

After nearly a half-century of effort, California had planned a well integrated program of multiple-purpose water resource development but withdrew from financial, construction and operating responsibilities in favor of federal action. Dissatisfaction with federal administration and control of the Central Valley Project was soon indicated by state officials, including C. A. Griffith, chairman of the California Water Resources Board, who observed:

> At first it was hoped that the interest of these federal agencies in California's water problems would relieve the state of much of its responsibility in that connection.
>
> Unfortunately, these hopes did not materialize. Piecemeal planning at the federal level neither solved our problems nor pleased the people of our state. In fact, it only further complicated an already complex and confusing situation.
>
> We have made costly mistakes by taking half measures. In the light of history we are convinced that our basic planning must be done by our own state engineer's staff, men who know our basic requirements, our California water laws, and have a clear understanding of our water rights.[13]

In 1945, the California legislature adopted the State Water Resources Act to authorize a state-wide investigation of water resources as the basis for the formulation of a plan for the full development of the state's water resources,

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[11] California, Water Project Authority, *Feasibility of State Ownership and Operation of the Central Valley Project of California* (Sacramento, 1952), p. 22.

[12] Quoted in U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, *History of Legislation and Policy Formation of the Central Valley Project*, by Mary Montgomery and Marion Clawson (Berkeley, 1948), p. 10.

[13] Los Angeles *Daily News*, December 2, 1949.

"to meet present and future needs for all beneficial purposes and uses in all areas of the state."[14] In the meantime, action has been taken which points toward state assumption of a more active role in water resources administration in California. The Feather River Project and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Diversion Projects have been authorized as a part of the state Central Valley Project, "separate and apart from all or any other units thereof."[15] Limitations on the amount of revenue bonds that may be issued for the development of the Central Valley Project were repealed. Finally the Water Project Authority was requested to report on the feasibility of state ownership and operation of the Central Valley Project.

No one can predict the outcome of these developments. This may be the beginning of a systematic effort by a state government to undertake multiple-purpose development of its water resources; or it may be simply another chapter in the struggle of those opposing such federal policies as the 160-acre limitation on reclamation projects and preference for public agencies in the sale of federally-generated hydro-electric power, and the introduction of an additional agency in the Sacramento-San Joaquin watershed operating "separate and apart from all or any other units."

Other western states have been even less inclined than California to undertake multiple-purpose development of water resources. In the Willamette River basin, an integral hydrologic unit within the state of Oregon, the legislature of Oregon has created a Willamette River Basin Commission. However, this agency was created at the instigation of the Army Corps of Engineers with authority to act for the state of Oregon in the promotion of the Willamette River Project *as a federal project.* The nature of its program of action is indicated by the statement:

> If we are to make this great river valley the garden spot it should be with all of the benefits we have been promised, we are going to be obliged to keep up a continued fire of messages to our senators and congressmen and others in Washington.[16]

In Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, state governments have been the center of important deliberation on public policies regarding state development of water power. In both Oregon and Washington, the state Granges spearheaded movements to establish a comprehensive program, similar to the California Water and Power Act, for the development of hydro-electric power during the late 1920's and the early 1930's. Initial efforts in Oregon to secure the adoption of a comprehensive initiative proposal in 1926 were unsuccessful. But public power advocates in both states succeeded in winning approval for initiative measures authorizing the creation of local utility districts during the early

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[14] California, State Water Resources Board, *Report on Feasibility of Feather River Project and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Diversion Projects Proposed as Features of the California Water Plan* (Sacramento, 1951), p. 7.

[15] California, Water Project Authority, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[16] Oregon, Willamette River Basin Commission, *Bulletin, Willamette Valley Project,* Salem, January, 1947 (mimeo), p. 5.

1930's. In 1932, Oregon adopted a constitutional amendment which permitted state development of water power with authority for both the generation and transmission of electrical energy.

With the advent of the New Deal in 1933, Bonneville Dam and Grand Coulee Dam were authorized by the federal government as multiple-purpose projects on the Columbia River. This gave new impetus to public power groups to secure public transmission facilities for the new power potentials being created by these federal projects. In Oregon legislation was adopted creating a state power commission with authority to undertake the generation, transmission, and distribution of hydro-electric power. The power companies had the Grange Power Bill referred to the people at the 1934 general election. It was defeated by a narrow margin. Efforts in 1935 and 1936 to secure approval of a state power commission were vetoed by the governor and defeated as an initiative proposal. In Washington, the efforts of the Grange in 1936 to secure an amendment to the state constitution authorizing the state to construct and operate a power transmission system were defeated at the polls. The problem of providing transmission facilities from Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams was finally solved by the establishment of Bonneville Power Administration, a federal agency with general responsibility for the development of regional transmission facilities in the Pacific Northwest.[17]

The public utility district laws authorized by the states of Oregon and Washington continue to serve as the basis of public power policies in those states. In Oregon, a state Hydro-Electric Commission was created, but as a regulatory agency without operating responsibilities. The Peoples Utility Districts have been organized in only eight instances in Oregon. Only four exist as operating agencies today. The Peoples Utility District Act requires that a district tender a deposit in the amount of the value claimed *together with attorney fees* in any condemnation proceedings to acquire a utility system.[18] This practically precludes use of the power of eminent domain in the acquisition of an existing utility.

In Washington, thirty-two public utility districts have been organized and twenty-one are active operating units. The organic act provides ample authority for the public utility district to condemn existing utility systems, but the comparatively small size of the districts, which do not extend beyond county boundaries, has created problems through the piecemeal "cannibalization" of the large private utility systems, which causes excessive severance charges.[19] Efforts of Skagit County Public Utility District No. 1 to purchase the entire power system of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company and to contract for re-sale of facilities to other public utility districts were set aside by the

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[17] Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "The Federal Power Disposal Decisions of 1937." (Paper presented at Conference on Research on the Policy and Administration of Natural Resources, University of Oregon, August 8–9, 1952.)

[18] President's Water Policy Commission, "Water Resource Policy and State Law," Bonneville Power Administration (Staff reports, mimeo), pp. 166–74.

[19] *Loc. cit.*

Supreme Court of Washington as exceeding the authority of a public utility district to operate outside its boundaries.[20]

In response to this situation the Washington legislature in 1949 authorized two or more public utility districts to exercise jointly all power granted to any district. At the same time the Washington Water Power Commission was created with ample authority to investigate and undertake projects for hydro-electric power development.[21] Through one pretext or another, the governor has declined to make any appointments to the commission and the statute remains inoperative.

In contrast to power developments in the northwest states, Arizona in 1944 created a state agency, the Arizona Power Authority, to receive and wholesale the electrical energy allocated to the state of Arizona from Hoover Dam and other federal hydro-electric projects on the Colorado River.[22] The authority is given ample power to construct and operate transmission facilities with the use of revenue bonds to finance improvements. In conformity with federal policies, the Arizona Power Authority Act gives preference to public bodies and co-operatives and requires that the price benefits of low-cost power be passed on to the ultimate consumers in the sale of Colorado River power.

The results of Arizona's experience will be interesting to observe as the state develops its program. The private power companies have vigorously opposed policies of public preference and rate controls. As a possible effort to circumvent these policies, N. D. Houghton, a commissioner of the Arizona Power Authority, has reported the execution of a contract between an electrical district and one of the private power companies in which the company will serve as the operating agency for the district. Counsel for the district challenged the competence of the Arizona Power Authority to exercise any control over these contractual relations. Since public utilities districts are exempt from the utility regulations of the Arizona Corporation Commission there is a legal question:

> If private utility companies can, by contract with such districts, become in recognized legal contemplation, agents of the regulation-exempt districts, then conceivably the companies might be entirely exempt from any state regulations in their sale of district power within these areas.[23]

III

State administration of land resources reflects much the same order of activities and policies as are found in the administration of water resources. Under the American constitutional system title and control over lands in the public domain has been clearly recognized as vesting in the federal government.

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[20] *State* ex rel. *Public Utility District No. 1 of Skagit County* v. *Wylie*, 192 Pac. 2d. 806.

[21] Washington, *Session Laws*, 1949, Ch. 227. This legislation was repealed and re-enacted in modified form in the 1953 session of the legislature. Governor Langlie has declared his intention of activating the Water Power Commission when the new legislation becomes effective in June, 1953.

[22] N. D. Houghton, "Problems of Public Power Administration in the Southwest—Some Arizona Applications," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 4, pp. 116–29 (March, 1951).

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–29.

Through continued reliance upon homestead policies that were never modified adequately to meet the conditions of the West, lands controlling water-holes and streams were homesteaded and conveyed to private ownership, but large portions of the public domain, approximately 150,000,000 acres in area, remained in federal control for want of takers. As a part of federal policy for the conservation of timber and the protection of watersheds and recreational resources of the West, many of the mountainous areas were reserved as national forests, national parks, or national monuments. In total, the federal government owns approximately fifty-four per cent of the land in the eleven western states, which includes eighty-five per cent of the land in Nevada, seventy-one per cent in Utah and sixty-nine per cent in Arizona.

As a part of federal land policy the states were granted substantial areas of public land for the support of public education and other public activities. These state lands have generally been administered as ordinary real estate transactions between private parties without regard to sound land-use and conservation practices. Some of the states admitted to the Union prior to the 1890's squandered this realty by conveying it to private ownership as a means of stimulating local economic development or as political spoils. As a result some states have relatively small quantities of land remaining in state ownership and control.

Other states, such as Montana and Wyoming, have administered their public lands as important potential sources of wealth for the support of public education. With the discovery of oil these state lands are returning substantial sums for the public schools. In Montana, for example, a single transaction recently brought $3,317,428 to school funds for the lease of 260,000 acres of state land for oil development.[24] Montana educators anticipate the time when revenues from school land and the permanent school fund may meet the costs of the state-supported Foundation Program in the public schools.

Even the states that continue to retain large tracts of state land give little attention to the control of land utilization. In his study of public land administration in New Mexico, Holmes concluded that, "Of the three major agencies dealing with land in New Mexico, the state land office gives to those using its land the largest property and imposes the least control."[25]

The western states never developed public instrumentalities to permit stockmen to take public action to manage and improve the range. Actions necessary for the regulation of grazing upon the open range, including the registration and control of livestock brands, have been organized through stock growers' associations. Following the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, grazing districts were established as the basis for the field organization of federal administration of the unreserved public domain. These grazing districts have come to fill the role of a local-government-type agency for range improvements, with the advisory board exercising certain controls over local policies and over the expenditure of funds allocated for range improvement.

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[24] A. R. Oja, "The Oil Boom—What It Means to Montana's Youngsters," *Montana Education*, Vol. 28, p. 6 (Feb., 1952).

[25] Jack E. Holmes, *The Public Land Question in New Mexico* (Albuquerque, 1947), p. 36.

As the mecca of sportsmen, the West has developed state agencies to conserve the fish and game resources of the region. In their dedication to more fish and more game for the sportsman's delight these agencies sought and gained substantial statutory and administrative independence. In many instances, the fish and game commissions have secured control over license fees through earmarked funds free from legislative control over appropriations. Serious questions have been raised as to the consequences of the limited missions served by the sportsman's interests in relation to land resources:

> The Utah State Fish and Game Department, . . . very boastfully points with pride to a record 20-year deer increase from 10,000 head in 1920 to 200,000 head in 1940, but on whose land and at what cost to already depleted ranges? And one might well ask by what scientific authority can the director of our State Fish and Game Department declare that the deer population in Utah is "close to the optimum number." Does it seem possible that the mere purchase for reasons of appeasement of private lands seriously damaged by deer will solve the rehabilitation problem of these depleted areas? Does it not seem a bit incongruous that land once purchased by the Game Department passes to the control of the state Land Board?[26]

Several western states maintain an extensive system of state parks, which are becoming increasingly popular as recreational centers. In some states, the state parks have been used to preserve the beauty of the primeval vegetation as among the redwoods of California or the beauty of the landscape as in part of the Columbia River Gorge. However, little has been done to develop scenic and recreation resources in private or public control, outside the bounds of state parks, except to advertise their virtues in national magazines.

As timber resources become increasingly scarce, the states have been developing more extensive forestry programs. Today, state forestry departments operate effective fire prevention programs with organized fire-fighting forces to control the menace of fire to standing timber. By-product laboratories have been established to experiment with the economic development of forest by-products to reduce the waste of forest resources. The development of reforestation programs on private timber lands has been stimulated by the exemption of reforestation lands from the general property tax in return for a tax on the value of the timber when harvested. In Oregon, the state forestry board can control the harvesting of reforestation lands through a system of licenses and sets the unit value of the timber to be harvested. However this *quid pro quo* includes no arrangement for taxing the harvest of virgin timber, or timber on public lands. Little progress has been made in the regulation of logging practices and no efforts have been made to control logging entrepreneurs to assure responsible operations. The word "gyppo" has an established place in the language of western lumbermen, denoting the small operator whose marginal operations tend to determine the nature of competitive practices in the lumber industry.

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[26] Walter P. Cottam, "Is Utah Sahara Bound?", *Bulletin of the University of Utah*, Vol. 37, p. 37 (Feb. 19, 1947).

IV.

Since river systems generally exceed the boundaries of a single state and the land is held largely by the federal government, extra-state factors are important in the development of the natural resources of the West. The role of the states in resource administration is in part determined by the way the states relate themselves to these extra-state influences.

As the first effort of the western states to cooperate in the development of a major river system, the experience of the Colorado River Compact was a serious disappointment for those who foresaw a "new principle of a regional problem, regionally administered." Arizona refused to ratify the compact until 1944 and then only on the basis of an interpretation contrary to that accepted by earlier contracting parties. The lack of unanimity among the "sovereign" states has provided the consent necessary for federal action but has destroyed any possibilities of effective cooperation among the states in the development of the Colorado River.

In the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress authorized additional arrangements among the states that might have served as a basis for interesting experimentation in regional cooperation by providing consent for the Colorado River basin states to:

> . . . negotiate and enter into compacts or agreements, supplemental to and in conformity with the Colorado River compact and consistent with this Act for a comprehensive plan for the development of the Colorado River and providing for the storage, diversion, and use of the waters of said river. *Any such compact or agreement may provide for the construction of dams, headworks, and other diversion works or structures for flood control, reclamation, improvement of navigation, division of water, or other purposes and/or the construction of power houses or other structures for the purpose of the development of water power and the financing of the same; and for such purposes may authorize the creation of interstate commissions and/or the creation of corporations, authorities, or other instrumentalities.*[27]

However, no development has been undertaken in pursuance of this authority.

In the Columbia River basin, the states for many years have discussed compact arrangements to allocate the water of the Columbia River, without any success except for a minor compact involving the upper Snake River. Demands for a compact have recently been revived, and Congress in its last session again authorized the Columbia basin states to negotiate an interstate compact.

The principal movers for an interstate compact on the Columbia seem to be concerned with "state rights." The original compact bill contained the proviso that " . . . electric power generated from waters impounded must be so allocated as to meet existing and potential needs of the upstream states."[28] If such a provision had been enacted into law, the domains of the Montana Power Company and the Idaho Power Company would have had priority over the rest of the Pacific Northwest for the consumption of low-cost hydro-electric power.

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[27] 45 *Stat.* 1065. Italics added.

[28] S. 817 (82nd Cong., 1st sess.).

In opposition to the Bonneville Power Administration policy of providing power anywhere in the Pacific Northwest at a uniform rate, representatives of the basin states are constantly seeking to secure an allocation of power on a state basis. One of the items listed for study in preparation for compact negotiations includes "establishing authority for allocation of power to the states."[29] Reservation of power development for Idaho in Hell's Canyon on the Snake River between Idaho and Oregon is one of the principal objectives sought by Idaho's opposition to the proposed Hell's Canyon Dam. According to the governor of Idaho, the Snake River is "our river," and "we're going to fight all the way for our sovereignty."[30]

The barriers to effective cooperation on an interstate basis are indicated by intervention of the legislature of Idaho to save the Washington Water Power Company from the condemnation proceedings of three Washington public utility districts by prohibiting a public utility district or any public agency of another state from acquiring any property of an electrical utility in the state of Idaho and making it a criminal offense for anyone to negotiate such a transfer of property.[31] Important generating facilities of the Washington Water Power Company were located in Idaho and substantial severance charges caused by inability to secure the Idaho properties would be an additional impediment to condemnation.

Since so much western real estate is owned by the federal government, tax exemption of federal property is constantly raised as an issue of western resources administration. As a result of pressure from state and local governments, provision has been made for the sharing of income derived from federal lands in lieu of taxes. Federal payments in lieu of taxes are made largely from the sale of timber on national forests and reverted railroad grant lands in Oregon, and from royalties on minerals being extracted from the public domain.

On *O and C* lands in Oregon, seventy-five per cent of the income from the sale of timber is returnable to the counties in which these lands are located. Only twenty-five per cent is retained for administration by the Bureau of Land Management. In 1952, income from these lands was estimated at one million dollars for Lane County, Oregon, alone.[32] Since *O and C* lands represent alternating sections of scattered parcels, the availability of access roads to facilitate competitive bidding is considered important to the administration of these lands by the Bureau of Land Management. Yet the counties have failed to relate their road construction program to the requirements for *O and C* lands to such an extent that Congress has authorized the Bureau of Land Management to initiate an access road program to be reimbursed from the county fund.[33]

Timber sold from the national forests is subject to a twenty-five per cent payment in lieu of taxes. By comparison, reforestation land in Oregon is subject to only a 12½ per cent tax on the sale value of the timber at the time of harvest after being exempt from the general property tax during the period of reforestation.

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[29] George D. Dysart, memorandum, June 23, 1952.

[30] *The Oregonian*, March 4, 1951.

[31] Idaho, *Session Laws*, 1951, Ch. 3.

[32] Eugene *Register-Guard*, July 31, 1952.

[33] *Ibid.*, July 19 and 31, 1952.

It is possible for the states to tax the wealth that is being extracted from public lands, as well as private lands, since extraction under sale or lease involves the conversion of the property into private ownership. Yet taxes on the extraction of natural resources are largely undeveloped among the western states, in comparison to the states of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. Most taxes on minerals in the western states are nominal charges to defray the costs of inspection programs for mines and oil fields. Forest product taxes, in Oregon for example, are limited to timber harvested on private reforestation lands and a nominal fee to support the forest by-products research program. Western states have never experimented with a tax on the harvesting of grass by a charge upon the animal unit in place of the conventional general property tax upon private lands.

In addition to the loss of revenue potentialities, the reluctance of state governments to tax natural resources has deprived them of the opportunity to exercise fiscal control over the extraction of natural resources, a powerful instrument in the administration of conservation programs. The nominal charges made for inspectional programs generally follow the pattern of ear-marked funds that serve to make the agency a captive of the groups paying the money and prevent effective legislative and executive control in relation to the broader public interest in an inter-related resource program.

Another aspect of federal-state fiscal relations in the resource programs of the western states is the extent of federal aid to state administrative activities and the use of federal funds for public improvements in the West. Through programs in stream pollution abatement, fish and wild life, reforestation and fire control, soil conservation, agricultural extension, and public roads, the federal government makes substantial grants to finance state resource administration. In addition, federal research programs, such as the work done by the U.S. Geological Survey, provide the essential data about western resources which no western state, with the possible exception of California, could provide as a basis for resource planning.

The availability of non-reimbursable federal funds for flood control, navigation, recreation, and fish and wild life is another important influence on state activities in resources administration. Pursuit of this pork-barrel is one of the principal activities of state and local resource agencies. As a result, the Corps of Engineers' concept of project planning has dominated much of the thinking in state resource planning, and state agencies have become thoroughly committed to playing the Engineers' game of "grass roots" politics in an endeavor to establish project feasibility, authorization, and finally appropriation.

Few of the champions of state rights in resources administration are willing to include state responsibility for financing the development and control of natural resources, or even independent research and investigation into resource problems and potentialities.[34] Rather, new ways are sought to gain access to federal finance. In the last session of Congress, for example, a bill was introduced authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make non-interest-bearing loans to states for the development of small reclamation projects involving areas of not more than 5,000 acres of irrigable land. Any item in a small project involving "public benefits" might be made non-reimbursable as provided under existing law and the states would be exempt from repayment of these costs.[35]

CONCLUSION

As units of government, the states were not conceived in terms that are relevant to resources administration. Only California constitutes an adequate hydrologic unit permitting multiple-purpose administration of an integral watershed area. Major land-use patterns transcend state boundaries and cause the states to determine the nature of their resource programs by a standard of competitive relationships with each other.

The states as constitutional units within the American federal system of government are inclined to conceive of their relationships with one another, and, to some extent, with the federal government on the basis of concepts of sovereignty and states' rights which presume inherent authority and power to decide without compulsion to come to agreement in the interest of a transcending public concern. "Interstate action is in the stage of international relations before the League of Nations,"[36] except that force is not resorted to when these relations come to an impasse. Yet the major problems of resource administration require regional solutions that transcend state boundaries.

The nature of our federal system necessarily restricts the usefulness of the state governments in providing the institutional arrangements and changes in resource policies that the people of the West require to meet the challenge posed by circumstances of their environment. As Eldon L. Johnson has observed:

> It is folly to expect the administrative problems of a particular governmental level to be solved by a concatenation of the powers of many units at a lower governmental level. Just as international problems are not solved by adding together the separate national powers or state problems solved by adding together local powers, so regional problems will not be solved by appeals to the cooperative instincts of the states. The appeal has to be made to the next level of authority, which is the federal government at the present; or if such a level does not exist, it must be created. Tasks requiring day-to-day attention

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[34] A correspondent active in the affairs of local public utility district and municipal utilities has made the interesting observation: "Significantly these lobbyists in their anti-federal tirades frequently plead for 'state rights' in order to obtain home rule or local autonomy but they bitterly fight any home rule at the county, city or power district level or other real local control."

[35] H.R. 7084 (82nd Cong., 2nd sess.).

[36] Eldon L. Johnson, "The Pacific Northwest States and the Development of the Columbia," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, December, 1949.

cannot be handled by conferences, resolutions, voluntary quotas, and treaties and entreaties."[37]

Despite these limitations, the states, quite as much as water courses and land forms, are realities. However inadequate as basic units, the states have provided political instrumentalities through which westerners have sought to develop and control their natural resources. Through the states the necessary permissive opportunities were provided for individuals or local groups of persons organized as public agencies to undertake resource development. On the other hand, the states have not become important operating agencies in the utilization and development of natural resources when compared with either the federal government or with local government agencies such as the cities of Los Angeles, Seattle, Tacoma or Denver, the East Bay Municipal Utility District, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, or numerous irrigation and utility districts.

In most states some resource agencies are doing an effective job on some phases of resources administration, such as the development of state parks, the management of state lands, forest fire prevention and the conservation of wild life; but no state is carrying on a well coordinated multiple-purpose program of resource administration. It is questionable whether the states have either a legislative or administrative arrangement competent to define or to satisfy the public interest in the effective control and utilization of all natural resources. Rather, the states seem best organized to serve the purposes of groups of users relating to a particular resource utilization. Separate resource agencies with their constellation of user groups have multiplied in the state administration of Oregon, for example, until the commercial fishermen have their Fish Commission and the sports fishermen their separate Game Commission. Some resource agencies, through ear-marked funds, are practically removed from legislative control over appropriations. No manner of councils and committees in which each of the constituents retains its particular value orientation and operating assumptions can develop an integrated resource program.

If the western states are to assume a greater role in the conservation and development of natural resources, they must first put their own houses in order. Resource programs need to be developed in terms of a comprehensive review and re-definition of agencies, values, assumptions and policies. There are a few signs on the horizon which indicate that possibly some states, California for example, may lead the way in an effort to redefine the role of the western states in natural resources administration. Otherwise, so far as resource development is concerned, the states are apt to become anachronisms like counties, to be tolerated as they muddle through.

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[37] *Ibid.*

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN COLOMBIA

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A public administrative system is the product of its environment—particularly of its political environment. It is not discrete, but is an aspect of this same environment, affecting and affected by the tendencies of the society of which it is a part. In the rapidly changing present, the complex of social pressures and tensions have created over large areas of the globe an unsettled environment for public service. At a time when effective public administration is more than ever needed to reduce areas of social conflict by achieving generally acceptable solutions to accumulating social problems, the public service in many countries lacks the unity of purpose and technical skill to meet the challenge.

This is notably true where nations, undergoing rapid social transition and attempting uncertainly through democratic government to bring traditional values and practices into line with contemporary needs, must mediate amidst a variety of pressures and counter-pressures. Democratic administration is never easy, even in countries with long histories of democratic government and with well-developed techniques of organization and management. Where the spirit and practice of democratic self-government have not become a living part of the environment and where the political tendencies of the community are contradictory or obscure, the situation of the democratic public official is truly difficult.

Finding no clear direction in which to move, the public administrator sometimes seeks safety in inaction—maneuvering for the security of authority, but evading a responsibility fraught with unpredictable personal consequences. If, rather than risk responsible decision-making, the public administrator bogs down into a state of semi-paralysis or seeks protection through administration by legal rote, he cannot work effectively to reduce instabilities, and his ineffectiveness may further weaken the political order in a cycle of deterioration.

In many parts of the world where there is no well-developed tradition of voluntary community self-help, or few organized means apart from government for the initiation of social or political reform, the public service holds the chief hope for checking the course of social disintegration. To the extent that the administrative system can be developed into a stable, competent and confidence-winning instrument for democratic public action, this achievement will itself influence the environment in a direction favorable to further constructive public effort. For better or for worse, the public service unavoidably will modify its own environment. For this reason public administrators, whatever they may prefer, cannot confine their influence merely to execution of the law. They may reinforce environmental factors resisting change, or their action may—even inadvertently—promote change. But if the public service is to provide leadership in constructive social effort, its administrators must somehow surmount some of the environmental limitations and learn to maximize environmental advantages.

A means increasingly employed toward this end is the enlisting of technical assistance from outside the immediate environment—usually from international organizations or technically advanced nations. The primary task of technical assistance in public administration is to introduce certain catalytic factors into the public service which will strengthen and stimulate innate constructive tendencies. Technical assistance is not in itself administrative reform (which is essentially political in nature); it may indeed be an instrument of administrative reform, but its functions are analytic and advisory rather than policy-deciding.

The acceptance and success of technical assistance depends, therefore, upon the preservation of its proper character. Even though disinterested, assistance toward administrative reform can never be hermetically sealed from political controversy. But to the extent that it becomes diverted into direct administrative reform efforts, it becomes unavoidably involved in the politics of personality, party and administration. Becoming immersed in the cross-currents of the political environment, it hazards its unique purpose: to stimulate and assist the constructive tendencies in the environment through analysis, demonstration and interchange of ideas and experience. This does not preclude the installation of new organizations, procedures or techniques which the assisted government has made up its mind to adopt. Assistance in practical application may be of educative value. And this is perhaps its greatest value; for effective, long-run administration of innovations will depend in large measure on their being understood and accepted throughout the public service.

Because maladministration is often the outgrowth of unfavorable political conditions, public administrative reform is usually a delicate business. It frequently must deal with arrangements and practices that are direct consequences of political ambitions, fears, and controversies. Administrative reform almost inevitably will favor some persons and policies over others. Yet if the reform is to promote enlarged areas of cooperation and to win acceptance for new ideas and methods, the reform measures ought not unnecessarily to intensify resistance to these objectives.

Technical assistance in public administration therefore requires most careful consideration in relation to its effect upon administrative reform. How much and what kind of technical assistance will assist constructive reform efforts cannot be determined without consideration of the environment within which the administrative reforms will be attempted. Thus some insight into the politics of administration in the particular environment is needed to determine what forms of technical assistance may prove useful, and to forecast the probable consequences of their application.

Because all of the possible effects of administrative reform never can be foreseen, the ultimate success of technical assistance in public administration cannot safely be assumed. Accumulating experience—reported and evaluated—

should, however, make it possible to avoid the more obvious errors and to widen the margin of predictability. Insofar as this may be true, the following description of the political circumstances affecting public administration in Colombia and of the character and course of recent administrative reform efforts may be instructive.

I. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A comparative approach to the study of public administration presupposes certain similarities or parallel situations in the processes of administration wherever they occur. The unsettled political environment of Colombia, whatever its particular or local circumstances, is generically characteristic of many other places in which technical assistance in public administration has been undertaken. Our concern is therefore with those aspects of Colombian government which illustrate the difficulties and problems encountered in administrative technical assistance under comparable conditions in other countries and on other continents. Within the limited scope of a single article one obviously cannot deal adequately with all relevant environmental factors nor give a really comprehensive picture of Colombian government. Emphasis falls logically upon the difficulties of Colombian public administration rather than upon its successes, since it is the difficult areas with which technical assistance is concerned.

For five years Colombians have lived in a state of latent civil war punctuated by sporadic outbursts of violence. The Conservative party, deeply divided against itself, maintains an uneasy hold upon the political machinery of the state. The Liberal party, ostensibly tolerated, has in fact been driven underground and its leaders proscribed—with those of its adherents who remain in public office maintaining a precarious tenure.

Levels of Political Conflict. The issues between the parties are ambiguous. On the surface the conflict appears to be a matter of "ins" versus "outs." But beneath the surface of partisan recrimination are the seldom articulated and often emotional differences among Colombians as to how their hitherto dominant traditions (cultural, religious, economic and political) should be related to the rapidly changing conditions of the contemporary world. The technological and social changes which many Colombians embrace (even while some of them reject the consequences) have not grown out of Colombia's past. In common with much of the rest of the world, the Colombians are confronted with the difficult and dangerous task of reconciling deep-rooted traditionalism with the dynamism of contemporary industrialized democratic society, and with not easily assimilated ideas and methods brought into Colombia from abroad. It is this basically unsettling political situation rather than the particular issues and personalities in the Colombian political conflict that has long-range significance for public administrative reform. In the several administrative reform efforts described later in this article, particular and local factors frequently had to be taken into account. But it is the general relation of the political environment to reform of the administrative system that has the wider instructive value and therefore deserves the focus of attention.

Architecture of Mistrust. Although Colombia has enjoyed extended periods of political tranquillity, its history and the experience of its neighbors prompted the establishment of a governmental structure designed to make difficult the usurpation of political power. Reversing the maxim *divide ut regnes* the Colombians have subdivided and balanced their governmental structure so that it cannot readily be made the instrument of an aggressive, purposeful and determined minority. Even under the pressures of the present civil conflict, dictatorship has not been established in Colombia—nor could it be without a far more drastic modification of the constitution than has allegedly occurred since the ninth of April, 1948, when commenced the chain of disorders leading to the unhappy present.

The Colombian constitution, in common with the formalized fundamental law of many other countries, reflects the uncertainties, compromises and contradictions that attended its framing. A document of idealistic social and civil guarantees, the constitution provides, through state of siege, for the suspension of certain of these guarantees when need for them may be greatest. Colombians, mindful of the Gran Colombia of Simon Bolivar, which fell apart to form four separate nations, have established a unitary republic. But administrative convenience, combined with difficulties of communication and strong feelings of local pride, has required the maintenance of regional subdivisions called departments, which enjoy certain semi-autonomous powers specified by the constitution.

Governors of the departments are appointed by the President of the Republic, but each department (there are currently sixteen) has an independent popularly-elected assembly which, however, may be indefinitely prorogued during a national state of siege. The departmental governors are therefore not necessarily popular leaders in their communities (although some are). They appoint the mayors (*alcaldes*) of the municipalities into which each department is divided, but municipal councils are elective bodies and, except under state of siege, may frustrate an unpopular mayor by removing from his jurisdiction a substantial portion of the local administration.

The constitution of the Republic prescribes for the national government the classical tripartite division of public power—legislative, executive, and judicial —but declares hopefully that although the congress, the government, and the judges have separate functions, they are to collaborate harmoniously in the realization of the ends of the state.

The congress of Colombia consists of two houses, a senate and a chamber of representatives, both popularly elected from districts established on a basis of population. However, since November of 1949 the nation has been governed under a state of siege and the congress has been convened only in extraordinary session. Although the government possesses discretionary power to assemble the congress in regular session, it has not done so, and during the past three years has governed by decree.

The President of the Republic is popularly elected for a term of four years and is ineligible to succeed himself directly. He names the ministers who preside over the principal administrative agencies of the central government and may re-group the various units of the administration and reassign functions under the several ministries without recourse to the congress. But the President does not enjoy the exclusive executive power of the President of the United States—for the executive power of government in Colombia belongs collectively to the President *and* to the ministers of state.

The heads of the thirteen ministries[1] constitute the Council of Ministers, with which on certain matters the President is required to act in concert, and which under state of siege must approve certain acts of the departmental governors. Except in exercise of his power to nominate and to remove official personnel, no action may be taken by the President with respect to any of the administrative agencies of the national government without the collaboration of the minister concerned. The ministers are required to report to the congress at each general session and thus do not owe an exclusive responsibility to the President.

The authority of both President and ministers is substantially diminished by the placing of many important public functions (presently to be described) in semi-independent agencies outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Some of these agencies are subject to only nominal public administrative control.

Two principal officers of the national government (the controller-general and the attorney-general) are independent of the President. The controller-general is elected by the chamber of representatives for a two-year term and is neither nominated nor removable by the President. The attorney-general, elected by the representatives for a term of four years from a list of three (*terna*) submitted by the President, heads the *Ministerio Publico,* which defends the jurisdiction and interests of the nation and prosecutes and enforces the laws governing official conduct.

Court of final appeal on the legality of administrative acts at all levels of government is the Council of State, with subsidiary administrative tribunals in each department. Councillors are selected by congress from *terna* submitted by the President. Supreme consultative body to the government in matters of administration, its purpose and functions reflect the influence of French administrative law.

II. DESIGN FOR INEFFECTIVENESS

The foregoing paragraphs describe a government contrived primarily to prevent abuse of administrative power—not to secure energetic or coordinated action. The customary machinery and methods, intended to prevent officials from overtly doing harm, frequently prevent them from doing much good, and in any case from doing it very fast. Cumbersome constitutional machinery does not inevitably cause ineffectual administration, as the experience of the United States has demonstrated. But this is largely because in an environment of confidence, the checks and balances are rarely applied in a jealous and literal manner. In an environment in which the spirit of democratic give-and-take has not become natural, technicalities of legal procedure may be observed more in the letter of the document and less in the spirit of the broader objective. This is the situation in Colombia.

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[1] Government; Foreign Relations; Justice; War; Finance; Agriculture; Labor; Health; Commerce and Industry; Education; Mines and Petroleum; Posts and Telegraph; and Public Works.

The following paragraphs illustrate the manner in which the environment of political instability and mistrust has given rise to administrative arrangements which reduce the government's effectiveness for constructive public service. These are among the defects which technical assistance in administration has found most difficult to remedy and they are recognized by Colombians of all political persuasion as detrimental to effective public service. Actually these impediments to public administrative reform—federalism by expediency, diffused executive power, legalistic accountability, politics of office-holding, and confusion in public enterprise—lie mostly beyond the reach of technical administrative assistance. Each of them represents primarily political rather than technical aspects of administration. But they so directly condition the application of technical reforms that they must be recognized and reckoned with in any effort to improve the existing administrative machinery.

Federalism by Expediency. The theory of unitary national administration has substantially given way in Colombia to a species of *ad hoc* federalism. There is no consistent pattern of relationship between the nation, the departments and the municipalities. The so-called "national" police, for example, are supported and administered by the departmental governments. Registration and licensing of motor vehicles, originally national functions, were turned over to departmental and municipal administration in 1950. Public education in theory is organized as a single national system with functions divided among the three levels of government; but neither nation, department, nor municipality adheres consistently to its respective functions—and confusion, waste and inequity have resulted. Public health and agricultural programs are separately administered at national and departmental levels, but a measure of coordination is provided for health programs by intergovernmental contracts, and for agriculture by intergovernmental councils. National and departmental public works and highway programs operate independently without benefit of effective coordination.

Although there has been some nationalization of departmental and local functions—for example, railways and certain local secondary schools—the recent trend has been for Bogotá to push responsibilities onto the departments and for the departments in turn to shift their burdens onto the municipalities—this devolution, however, seldom being accompanied by financial assistance. In 1945 the national congress established a comprehensive system of social security for employees of larger private enterprises and for all public agencies. No adequate calculation of the total cost of the system was made, but employee contributions were limited to a low fixed percentage of income, the employer to provide the balance. The departments and municipalities have thus been required to provide benefits which may cost as much as 20% of their annual payrolls. This obligation was irresponsibly mandated by national law, but no assistance (even by allowing additional sources of revenue) was forthcoming from the national government.

Failure to develop a consistent pattern of national, departmental and municipal relations has resulted in confusion and uncertainty in the public administration of Colombia. As departments cannot foresee in which areas national action may next be taken, they are reluctant to initiate programs of their own, or to commit themselves to expenditures for facilities which the nation may presently provide. Concurrent action at all levels of government is most effective if skillfully coordinated; but coordination premises order of some kind—and one could argue that the inconsistencies in Colombian intergovernmental relations have resulted in a confusion that cannot be coordinated.

Political expediency rather than administrative logic or a consistent theory of federalism has shaped the general course of intergovernmental relations. Technical reforms in many areas (notably in public education) are delayed or prevented by the unwillingness or inability of any level of government to assume a role of leadership and initiative. Nevertheless, in specific areas of administration (notably in health and agriculture) the basis for an orderly distribution of responsibilities is being developed. In time a rational compromise between unitary theory and federal practice may emerge.

Executive Power Diffused. Government by *junta* is a characteristic feature of public affairs in Colombia. There is a pervasive distrust of the individual administrator, and even the President of the Republic is not free to exercise many of his executive powers without the cooperation of the Council of Ministers or of the particular ministers most concerned. Great powers, particularly under state of siege, are vested in the President, the governors, and the mayors; but the practical effect of many of these powers is reduced by the administrative arrangements through which they are exercised.

At no level of government do principal public officers possess the resources of information, personnel and finance to enable them effectively to use the powers at their disposal. Particularly is this true of the departmental governors, who, bereft of budget officers, personnel administrators, competent statisticians and management experts, are in effect "power poor"—unable adequately to fulfill the important role which is theirs by law. Moreover certain programs administered at the departmental level are so tied into national policies and programs (as in education, public health and social security) that there is relatively little a governor can actually do about them.

The mayor might play a more significant part in the administration of local affairs were not many of the municipal services removed from direct municipal supervision and placed under special *juntas* of which the mayor may not even be a member. Moreover, several important local officials are named by the municipal council, which often places strategic administrative functions under its own appointees independent of control by the mayor. Thus the actual scope for exercise of the powers of mayor is narrowed and no official body exists which can coordinate municipal policies and programs.

A consequence of government by *junta* and of the many circumstances requiring concurrent action by the President, governors, mayors, and their administrative colleagues, has been a system of multiple management. Its characteristic feature is collective irresponsibility. Most clearly responsible of all public officials is the President of the Republic, who, however, is subject to certain constitutional provisions which restrict his administrative authority especially in relation to the ministers of state—and, potentially at least, subject his administrative acts to reversal by adjudications of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts, as well as by the Council of State. In Colombia, as in other countries, party politics sometimes enables the government to bridge the gap between constitutional formalities and administrative objectives. Quite as often, however, political tension and mistrust have accentuated constitutional checks and accelerated the divisive tendencies encouraged by the structure of government. But whatever the case, Colombian officials are provided with abundant opportunity for avoiding responsibility. There are always others to whom they may point in extenuation of their own conduct.

Legalistic Accountability. Encouragement of collective irresponsibility in Colombian government also in part derives from holding public officials accountable not for the effective administration of their programs, but rather for conformance to detailed and often time-consuming legal formalities. Obviously by no means unique to Colombia, accountability for conformance rather than for performance slows the operations of all public agencies, occasions bureaucratic pettifogging over minor legal provisions, discourages energy and initiative in public office, and encourages time-serving. Methods of accounting and control are cumbersome and complicated, inspired it would seem by deep-seated mutual mistrust and going beyond the ordinary precautions required to prevent misuse of public funds. Sound principles of accountability are thus distorted by excessive legalism and consequently are badly applied in practice.

Relatively simple transactions become unnecessarily involved. Multiple approvals, seals, and signatures are personally required of high-ranking officials for matters which might appropriately be delegated to subordinate levels. Authorization of a single scholarship of 40 pesos per month for secondary school attendance may involve as many as eleven official signatures in duplicate, including those of the departmental director of education, secretary of finance, budget officer, controller-general, and treasurer. Correction of a fiscal error of four cents may require promulgation of an official decree signed personally by the governor and all of his top departmental administrators.

The making of contracts is particularly time-consuming, requiring extensive consultation, multiple signatures, and review. Responsibility for contracts is thereby so widely diffused as frequently to prevent any one officer or agency from being held accountable for performance of the contractual provisions. Where all are responsible each may more easily disclaim responsibility. Purchasing procedures are likewise encumbered by numerous approvals of dubious utility. Purchase vouchers in one Colombian city must be authorized by the mayor, attested by the *personero,* authenticated by the head of the department making the purchase, approved by the treasurer, and finally must be audited and recorded by a revisor and an accountant.

The waste of time involved in these procedures is not an inevitable concomitant of official accountability. And after attempting to guard against all eventualities of official carelessness or misconduct, the government of Colombia still lacks many of the most useful records and procedures for genuine control—particularly for managerial control. Absence of valid historical series on many statistical matters, incomparability of related statistical and financial records, insufficiency of data to support findings, unevenness in the accuracy of component parts of cumulated public records such as vital statistics, agricultural reporting and school attendance—all these deficiencies in tools of managerial control make difficult any ready appraisal of the Colombian public service.

Means for measuring effective management do not exist within Colombian government. Their absence is not explained by lack of knowledge of their availability but rather by fear of their political consequences. The tools of scientific management might strengthen the coercive potential of the officials who possess them, but they might likewise (as in personnel reform) restrict personal or party manipulation of the public service. The "successful" administrator, therefore, signs innumerable documents, conforms to all the technicalities of the law (usually sufficiently complex to permit some measure of flexibility through adroit maneuvering) and seldom concerns himself with the degree to which the public may benefit from his performance.

Politics of Office-holding. Frustrating legalism induces devious administration; diffused responsibility discourages individual initiative. Both make public service in Colombia a matter of routine office-holding rather than of effective management. Public officials of exceptional energy and insight do attempt to accomplish something, but they are likely to incur distrust to a degree discouraging to all but the most persevering.

There may be as much faithful and disinterested devotion to the public service in Colombia as in many other countries; but public service as an ideal appears to arouse little popular enthusiasm. The concept of public office as a public trust and the sense of dedication to public service have not become ingrained in the national political ideology. Holding high office is traditional among many of the prominent families—but the practice belongs rather to the Latin sense of *noblesse oblige* than to the Jeffersonian notion of a tour of duty. Tenure of public office is brief at all levels of responsibility and officials are not inclined to undertake long-range reforms of benefit primarily to their successors and of inconvenience and disagreeable difficulty to themselves.

Merit system and career service ideas are generally conceded by Colombians to be impractical in the present national state of development, and nearly all appointive positions are frankly filled by patronage. Changes in top officialdom even within the same party are likely to be followed by a sweep through the ranks. Moreover, in comparison with private opportunities, the financial re-wards lawfully pertaining to public office are not great; filling the more responsible positions with suitable incumbents is not easy. In Caldas—one of the most prosperous and best governed departments—the number of mayors in its forty-five municipalities has averaged 2.6 per year since 1949, with some municipalities having as many as four, five, and six mayors per annum. Inexperienced and untrained personnel are consequently too numerous for the efficient operation of the public services. Top officials, unacquainted with their own offices and duties, and only vaguely aware of their relation to the total structure of government, cannot direct the work of their subordinates more effectively than the blind can lead the blind.

Among the practical consequences of uncertain and ineffectual management is easy-going indifference among the rank and file employees. In many public offices there is evidence either of too many employees and too little work, or of inadequate planning and direction. Conspicuous numbers of employees do not appear to be engaged at useful tasks with sufficient regularity to justify the present organization of their duties. Their days are passed in intra-office visiting, reading newspapers, drinking coffee, and looking out of the windows. Criticism of this state of affairs is not wanting within as well as without the public service, but effective corrective measures have been slow to win acceptance because they entail changes in points of view and practices (such as adoption of civil service reform) for which most Colombians appear to be unprepared.

Confusion in Public Enterprise. Well-defined distinctions between public functions and private interests do not exist in Colombia. The relation of government to economic enterprise is, for example, determined more by convenience and expediency than by theory or logic. Influences of laissez-faire capitalism and trade union socialism have been insignificant in shaping the economic role of government. The most consistent practice in the organization of public services of an economic character is to place their control in agencies not directly amenable to political pressure.

Because personal or partisan patronage rather than technical competence has been the primary criterion for appointment to public office, the public service generally does not enjoy a high degree of popular confidence. Popular distrust of "political" administration has led to the establishment of a large number of semi-public agencies outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Some of these are virtually private organizations which have secured official status and support and to which important public administrative functions have been delegated.

At the national level there are at least nineteen of these semi-autonomous privately managed public enterprises—more if one counts their affiliates. With a few exceptions, such as the National University, they may be divided into three groups: (1) financial, (2) developmental, and (3) agricultural. Although certain of these organizations are administered under single managers, most of them are directed by boards or *juntas* which undertake to decide detailed questions of policy and management.

Chief among the financial agencies is the powerful *Banco de la Republica*, which is in many respects the central fiscal and monetary agent of the government, and which holds, among numerous auxiliary enterprises, concessions to operate the state-owned salt and emerald mines. Other semi-autonomous fiscal enterprises include the Farm Loan Bank, Exchange Control, Stabilization Fund, Central Mortgage Bank, and the *Instituto de Credito Territorial*, which is the chief national public housing agency.

Developmental enterprises at the national level include the Industrial Development Institute, the Institute of Water Resources and Power Development, the national hydroelectric plants, the Paz de Rio Steel Company and the National Navigation Company.

Among the agricultural agencies, by far the most important is the National Coffee Federation, which is the principal organization concerned with coffee economics and production, the national and departmental agricultural agencies having almost nothing to do with the chief national agricultural product. The federation is financed primarily by a national tax on coffee shipments, the proceeds of which are turned over to the federation-controlled *Fondo Nacional del Cafe*. Other semi-public agencies established and controlled by agricultural producer groups are the National Cotton Institute, the Cattle-raisers Association, and tax-supported funds for the protection or development of tobacco, wool, cocoa, and wheat. Closely related to agricultural production and entirely apart from the Ministry of Agriculture is the National Institute of Supplies, concerned with price support for agricultural products and the importation of foods, and the *Instituto de Parcelaciones, Colonizacion y Defensa Forestal* which controls colonization of public lands, provides credits and supplies to settlers, and is now beginning work in forestry and reforestation.

There are at least seventeen additional agencies which perform functions germane to certain of the regular national ministries, but which for various reasons (again chiefly distrust of political administration) have been placed outside of the ministerial structure of the government. Seven of these are public employee retirement systems. Others include such important enterprises as the National Railways Administrative Board and the National Telecommunications Company.

The officialization of privately controlled enterprise at the national level has been paralleled by the privatization of certain public services at the municipal level—a consequence of the invincible tendency of government in Colombia to surmount all difficulties by the easy expedient of borrowing money. The banks and other lenders have been understandably reluctant to rely upon the good intentions of a transitory officialdom to redeem the public debts when due. To protect their loans the banks have required municipalities to pledge for debt redemption the revenues of certain self-supporting public services. To ensure that these revenues will be available when due, the banks have further insisted that the revenue-yielding municipal enterprises be separated from direct municipal control and be reorganized under special boards (*juntas de las empresas delegadas*) consisting of three members, two of whom are in effect representatives of the lending agencies.

Characteristically these *empresas delegadas* include water-works, sewers, refuse disposal, street lighting, public markets, slaughterhouses, and sometimes municipal telephone companies. Servicing of the debt is a first charge on revenues; thereafter the *junta* at its discretion may provide for operation, maintenance, improvement or expansion of the services—and the funds remaining may then be turned over to the municipality. Actually, in spite of what appears to be an unfavorable arrangement, the Colombian municipalities derive substantial revenues from the *empresas,* which under professional management and with stability of employment usually provide better service and more revenue than comparable enterprises under direct municipal administration.

In spite of this segregation of delegated enterprises there is commonly widespread confusion between the fiscal operations of revenue-yielding services and of municipal services generally. As a matter of both official and public convenience the delegated enterprises have sometimes been designated as official agencies for the collection of the municipal real estate, street lighting, and industrial and commercial taxes. In principle this suggests tax farming, as the agent must be allowed something to cover the cost of collection. But the terms of collection are subject to at least periodic public control by means of contract, and the public has greater confidence in the impartial application of the tax laws than it would have under "political" administration.

The foregoing characteristics of Colombian government (and others which might be added) almost ensure the ineffectuality of public administration. There are, of course, public programs such as the national system of real estate evaluation which in spite of environmental handicaps apparently provide a high quality of public service. But in general the conventional administrative attitudes—exacerbated by current political disorders—have laid a profound malaise upon the public service. These are conditions which must be changed if the Colombian public service is to become a more effective instrument of the public welfare. Each of the five characteristics of Colombian public administration which have just been described have grown out of a political environment which technical assistance cannot alter directly or at once. Yet these are the kinds of conditions which will prevent or frustrate administrative reform efforts. They afford a most stubborn challenge to technical assistance in public administration, and in the Colombian experience to date are areas in which administrative reform has moved most slowly.

III. INTERNATIONAL BANK AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MISSIONS

Administrative conventions institutionalized in the structure and procedures of government persist with great tenacity in Colombia as elsewhere. But not all Colombians view their administrative difficulties as trials to be forever endured. In the past, Colombians who have considered public questions from other than positions of personal self-interest, have inclined toward theoretical and juristic analysis. During the past three years, however, interest in a critical and concrete approach to problems of public administration has developed. Since 1949 at least four major economic and administrative studies have been sponsored by Colombian governments with technical direction or assistance from abroad.[2]

The first of these studies was undertaken by an economic mission organized in 1949 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the invitation of the Colombian government. The purpose of the Bank mission was to recommend "a comprehensive integrated development program for Colombia."[3] Although its concern lay primarily with economic matters, the International Bank could not disregard the relevant influences of the public services and public finance. Commenting on the organization of the government for planning and administration, the mission observed "that the Government at its various levels is not now well adapted either for comprehensive economic planning or for the efficient implementation of such planning."[4] The limited effectiveness of previous foreign technical missions to Colombia was in part attributed to these deficiencies. "A continuation of this situation," the Bank report declared, "raises serious questions as to the extent to which Colombia might effectively take advantage of the international technical assistance program."[5]

Following the report of the International Bank Mission, the Colombian government sponsored two supplementary studies. One of these was undertaken by the Committee for Economic Development, a group of six prominent Colombians appointed by the President of the Republic for the purpose of reviewing the report and recommendations of the Bank mission. Although the committee, on the basis of further studies and changed conditions, revised some of the details contained in the Bank report, it adopted the recommended program and endorsed the majority of its specific proposals. The findings of the committee were submitted to the government through a series of reports to the various ministries concerned and the final comprehensive report was printed by the *Banco de la Republica.*[6]

The second and more extensive follow-up on the Bank report was the Public Administration Mission headed by the former chief of the International Bank Mission, who also acted as consultant to the Committee on Economic Development—thus providing coordination for all three efforts. Work of the Public Administration Mission extended from June, 1950 to March, 1951 and was conducted concurrently with the studies of the Committee on Economic Development, to which it was in large measure complementary. The task of the Public Administration Mission was to study the administrative organization and procedures of the Colombian government and to recommend to the

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[2] This development is not entirely novel. As early as 1923 the Colombian government adopted certain financial and monetary measures recommended by a mission from the United States headed by Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University.

[3] *The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia* (Washington, D. C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1950), p. xv.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Comite de Desarrollo Economica, Informe Final—Septiembre 1950—Agosto 1951* (Bogotá, 1951).

President proposals for its improvement, particularly improvements required for the success of the basic economic program. The Bank report had pointed out certain areas in which more efficient production and utilization of resources were contingent upon improvements in the organization, personnel and procedures of the government. Attention of the Public Administration Mission was concentrated on these areas. The studies and final report of the mission dealt largely with the overall organization and central top-level management of the principal ministries and agencies of the government concerned with internal economic affairs.[7]

The fourth study followed from the first three, but did not relate directly to the work of the International Bank Mission. In 1952 the Governor of Caldas sponsored an economic and public administrative study of the third most populous department of Colombia. A small technical staff of Americans and Colombians undertook the basic survey work in the capital city of Manizales, with extensive field observation throughout the department.[8]

As in the national public administration study, attention in the Caldas report was directed first to the economic and social needs of the department, and second to the organizational, financial and procedural changes in the government which were necessary to enable public administrators better to meet these economic and social needs. The Caldas mission, with the background of the earlier studies, in many ways came closest to the immediate needs and problems of Colombia. It required extensive and first-hand acquaintance with local budgets and office-holders, with local institutions and with popular hopes, prejudices, and inclinations. Only through this detailed analysis considered in relation to comprehensive long-range objectives was the mission able to develop recommendations that would answer current needs and provide a basis for future administrative reforms.

IV. PROSPECTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Administrative practices in common with all human institutions are products of the mind—and minds must be changed if administrative reforms are to be accomplished. Thus, although the economic and administrative studies in Colombia have been perforce concerned with material, structural, and legal problems, the real source of Colombia's difficulties is in the habits of mind associated with the cultural environment. The traditional patterns of social behavior dominant in Colombia have given rise to political and administrative practices that under changing conditions of the present are often inconsistent with effective government. The bitter political struggle between the Conservative and Liberal parties is destroying old relationships without providing a new orientation for the nation's public service.

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[7] *Reorganizacion de la Rama Ejecutiva del Gobierno de Colombia* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1952).

[8] See Horst Mendershausen, "Economic and Fiscal Problems of a Colombian Department," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 6, pp. 49–89 (Spring, 1953); also *Caldas en 1952: Informe de la Mission Currie al Gobernador del Departamento* (Manizales, Imprenta Departamental, 1952). Since the Caldas study several departmental surveys have been projected by the National Planning Council and a five-year development program for Atlantico has been completed.

Public administration in Colombia operates today in an environment of political instability. Although there is widespread genuine desire for administrative reform, there is also general skepticism about the survival of reform following a change in government—even under the same political party. But if the present partisan disorders could be terminated, Colombia would still face the difficult and painful adjustment of long-established methods of government and administration to new circumstances and new demands—a process of transition that has become the characteristic condition of government over most of the world.

The course of this adjustment in any given country depends in some measure upon the strength and adaptability of its public administrative system. And the ultimate effectiveness of efforts toward improvement of that system will depend in large measure upon early practical accomplishments that will advance the achievement of long-term reforms. In appraising the accomplishments of technical assistance for public administration in Colombia, distinction should be drawn, therefore, between immediate results and long-range consequences.

The interrelatedness of governmental processes often makes one reform contingent upon another, and a sequence of administrative changes inevitably encounters an area of administration which for political reasons cannot be touched. Such measures as are at first adopted therefore tend to be isolated or fragmentary. The recommendations of the economic and public administration missions which were most readily accepted related closely to pressing economic needs and were tied into specific action programs: notably in transportation, exchange control, and agriculture. Administrative reforms in these areas gained political acceptance as they could be shown to enhance the prosperity and well-being of the Republic.

Recommendations for reform of administrative organization and of personnel, accounting and management procedures have been less enthusiastically received, although the need for reform is widely admitted. But even when reforms in these areas have won approval in principle, desire for improvement does not easily overcome doubt regarding the wisdom of attempting to put them into practice. Unlike the measures clearly necessary to economic development, there is no present compelling pressure for their adoption.

That which may be accomplished very soon is not always readily distinguishable from that which requires the assistance of time. Foreign experts themselves need time to acquire a sense of the receptivity of a people toward change. Although both the earlier and more recent economic and public administration reports in Colombia propose broadly comprehensive programs, there is a perceptible difference of emphasis in the national public administration survey and the program subsequently recommended for Caldas. Both reports considered the long-range future. The national report recommended in considerable detail reforms which in retrospect appear to be realizable only at some future date when environmental factors are more propitious. The Caldas report tended to emphasize reforms of more immediate probability, but its recommendations took into account the effects of short-term progress on long-term objectives.

Thus the Caldas report, unlike the national public administration report, did not make comprehensive recommendations for non-partisan reform of the public personnel system. Clearly, improved personnel practices are needed both in the national and departmental governments; but present political circumstances preclude any early adoption of merit-system principles. Accordingly the Caldas report, after urging consideration for the ultimate establishment of a permanent non-partisan system of public employment, concentrated upon specific improvements of personnel organization and procedures under existing conditions. But the measures proposed (a central personnel office; establishment of job descriptions and minimum qualifications for positions; employee training) could be put into effect at the present time and would provide a foundation upon which a workable non-partisan career service might in time be based.

If it is asked what may be learned from the Colombian administrative reform efforts, no simple answer can suffice. Insight into the processes of technical assistance in public administration is more likely to be gained from the comparative study of numbers of experiences reported from different places (under both similar and contrasting circumstances) than from an account limited to a specific country. The Colombian experience briefly described in this article has been used to illustrate some of the difficulties and problems of technical assistance in public administration under unsettled political conditions. Although certain conclusions have been drawn upon the basis of Colombian experience as it appears to the author, the article has proceeded upon the level of illustration rather than of generalization.

What may be learned from Colombian experience depends in part upon what may be learned from administrative reform efforts under comparable circumstances elsewhere. Thus the value of a particular experience is not necessarily to be found solely in the experience itself, but rather in relation to other events which taken together afford a basis for valid generalization. Implicit in the comparative approach to the study of administration is the accumulation of descriptive data which in time may afford a basis for generalization.

What has technical assistance in Colombia accomplished in overcoming the impediments which political conditions have placed in the way of administrative reform? This paper has dealt with five "political" aspects of Colombian administration which obstructed administrative reform efforts, and their disadvantage to the Colombian public service was pointed out in the economic and public administration reports. But it is questionable whether the proper role of technical assistance is the launching of a headlong attack upon them within the public service; nor are these conditions of a character which may be exorcised by official command. They can be removed only as they can be replaced by institutions and practices more consonant with effective administration. Specific recommendations of the missions which might be realized promptly through administrative action did, however, get at some of the roots of maladministration. Realistic accounting procedures, reliable statistical methods, improved personnel machinery—each can contribute indirectly toward at least a partial modification of the political environment of the public service.

Essential to an evaluation of the Colombian experience with administrative reform is the factor of time. One cannot with finality assess contemporaneous efforts to reform a public service system. One must see how the efforts work out in practice. But neither can one safely wait until an indefinite future to begin the appraisal of these efforts, for some may take effect at once, others at differing rates over an extended period of years. The proper question would therefore seem not to be: What can one learn from administrative reform efforts in (for example) Colombia? One may better ask: How much may we fail to learn in the future if we do not now secure adequate data regarding the course of many different attempts at technical assistance in public administration?

Adequate data includes more than mission reports. It requires study of the circumstances leading to the enlistment of outside aid, and it requires follow-up studies on the ultimate results of technical assistance efforts. The problem of implementation of the technical assistance report becomes relevant from the very inception of the intention to seek outside aid. Decisions taken at the beginning of a technical assistance project may fundamentally affect the final outcome of the effort.[9] Thus the comparative study of technical assistance requires a comprehensive approach which takes into consideration all relevant ecological factors; and this approach demands not only depth in detail, but also breadth in time.

In Colombia time will be needed for the more comprehensive recommendations of the economic and public administration missions to win substantial acceptance. But in this respect Colombia, even if relieved of her internal political difficulties, would hardly be unique. In the United States basic reforms in budgeting, departmental organization, accounting and personnel practices were proposed years—even decades—in advance of their adoption. These reforms in the idea stage, like leaven, slowly worked changes in the political environment. Assisted by collateral developments, they prepared a public opinion favorable to their ultimate adoption. Given the unsettled political conditions in Colombia, the results of the economic and public administration missions have already been considerable. The larger plans for the reform of public administrative organization and procedure remain yet to be fulfilled; tokens of hopes that may one day be realized as Colombia achieves a political environment more favorable to public service.

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[9] The inter-related character of the several aspects of technical assistance was discussed by Roscoe C. Martin, "Technical Assistance: The Problem of Implementation," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12; pp. 258–66 (Autumn, 1952).

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

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I

During the past four years several Middle Eastern countries have experienced governmental changes in which the army took an active part. In Syria and Egypt the army deliberately intervened to overthrow discredited regimes and to depose the heads of state. In Lebanon and Iraq the heads of state, themselves alarmed by an intense struggle among rival political parties, invited the army to intervene in order to maintain order. In Lebanon the army refused to crush the opposition, acting only as a caretaker; in Iraq the army agreed to support authority against disorder and the effect of its intervention cannot yet be foreseen.

This control of government by the military is indicative both of serious defects in democratic processes in the Middle East and of the eagerness with which Middle Eastern leaders seek high political office. In Western democratic countries, traditions have developed which tend to keep the army isolated from domestic politics, although military advice has often been sought on foreign policy, and persons whose careers have been in the military service are not infrequently elected, or appointed, to high political positions. This is a quite different matter, however, from the military's choosing to occupy high political office through the weapons of its own profession.

There is an almost nostalgic longing in the Middle East, common to all political groups, for a "strong" regime which will tolerate neither multiplicity of political parties nor anarchy of ideas. This is due in part to the failure of democracy to provide agreement on fundamentals. Beyond this, however, the forces set in motion since the First World War have artificially speeded up the process of Westernization beyond the ability of the people to adapt the imported ideas to their social needs. Such abstract concepts as sovereignty, self-determination, and democracy were thrust upon the people of the Middle East without their having been prepared for them. If the Western powers, in taking an active part in the re-organization of the Middle East after World War I, had known the Eastern countries better and had had a greater appreciation of the historical process that had been going on, the Eastern peoples might have been given an opportunity to adapt Western political concepts and institutions more slowly and would probably have developed their own form or forms of democracy to fit their own needs and aspirations. It did not help that the Middle Eastern leaders who cooperated with the Western powers never tried to reconcile Western concepts and institutions with existing institutions so as to avoid conflict with religious and conservative groups. As a result, democracy from its very inception failed to command general respect, and when adequate reforms were not achieved democracy had to bear the blame. Opposition to democracy came from the right (religious) as well as from the left (socialist and communist) parties and groupings; and when neither side could muster sufficient support to achieve power, the army intervened to carry out a moderate program of reform by force.

II

For centuries Islam provided for the believers a way of life, the validity and perfection of which no pious Muslim ever questioned. As a divine system, Islam set up the principle that authority belongs to God; but the caliph, though enthroned by the people to enforce God's law, was not constitutionally responsible to the electorate. However, the caliph and his subjects were both bound by the divine law, the violation of which would make them equally liable for punishment. Such a theory of the state, placing ultimate responsibility in God, is not inherently democratic. However, since Islam is regarded as the embodiment of God's will and justice, its believers derive satisfaction from the moral conviction that their political system, though authoritarian in nature, could not possibly be matched by any other system. Further, Islam is regarded as immune from foreign encroachment or attack, for, as the power of Islam is God's power, no other community could successfully launch an attack on it: failure would certainly be on the side of the infidels, since success could not be divorced from Islam.[1]

The pious Muslim, witnessing the change of Islam under the impact of Western ideas and institutions, is undergoing a moral crisis. Not only is he shocked that Islam should be divorced from the caliphate and the divine law replaced by secular legislation, but also that the West should be encroaching upon Islam with impunity. The challenge of Westernization has been responded to differently by the various shades of opinion. The agnostic new generation, attracted by the positivistic philosophy of the West, advocated a complete break with the past and the adoption of Western secular institutions. Following the First World War, when democracy had become fashionable, the new generation accepted democracy without trying to adapt it to existing conditions. The learned doctors of the divine law, supported by the older generation, objected to the introduction of Western institutions because of their incompatibility with Islamic institutions. Apart from the slogan "go back to Islam," however, they had little to offer in the way of a constructive program of reform which might have combined the best of Islam and Western institutions. Thus the conflict that ensued was between two extreme schools; the new denounced the old as incompatible with modern life, and the old, witnessing a sudden break with the past, emptied the vials of its wrath upon those in authority for permitting this change.

Nor was the experiment of the new generation with democracy a happy one.

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[1] For a more detailed statement on the nature of the Islamic state, see M. Khadduri, "The Juridical Theory of the Islamic State," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 41, pp. 181–85 (July, 1951).

For no sooner had democracy begun to operate, with its complicated procedural problems of electioneering and parliamentary debates (to say nothing of the endless quarrels that developed among rival parties and politicians), than the people began to learn how scandalously its processes could be misused by unscrupulous leaders. To the old school, democracy failed to command the respect or allegiance of the people in the same way as God's law had done in the past. The activistic character of democratic politics appeared too vulgar and too worldly in the eyes of pious Muslims who have habitually revered the awe-inspiring traditional institutions. Further, democracy as practiced in the West seemed to emphasize liberty, not equality. But to peoples who for centuries have been accustomed to authoritarian regimes, liberty could not possibly be as much appreciated as equality, since it permitted the enrichment of the few at the expense of exploited masses. What rendered the situation more difficult was, of course, the absence of any significant middle class with interests intermediate to those of the few rich or of the many poor. Such a middle class would have championed democracy against autocracy and feudalism as did the middle classes of Western Europe. But a sudden rise of the middle class is hardly to be looked for in predominantly agricultural countries where feudalism has persisted for a long time. In such countries the freedom permitted under democracy only rendered competition more acute, and the desperate masses, bent on improving their economic condition, were bound to fall under the influence of radical ideas. The people of the Middle East, not unnaturally, judged democracy by the results achieved rather than by its theoretical soundness. The judgment to which they have come is that they have been deceived by those in authority and that democracy has failed them.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, a good start in Islamic reforms was made by a number of enlightened teachers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who saw no harm to Islam if the believers borrowed Western ideas and concepts. Muhammad Abduh offered a formula of reform which advocated the "modernization," not the "secularization," of Islam. Although he was opposed at the outset by the Azhar University of Cairo, Abduh's approach gradually gained the support of Muslim opinion, and the Azhar graduates were eventually dominated by the Abduh school.[2] After the introduction of democracy, however, the Azhar, without carrying the constructive reforms of Abduh forward, supported the existing regime and hence could no longer attract liberal Muslims; these consequently preferred to go to the Westernized schools and thus lost touch with Islamic learning. As a result, there is no moderate Muslim reformer such as Abduh who can offer a reform program combining the best of Islam and Western civilization.

This situation gave an opening to lay religious leaders, who revived the traditional religious zeal combined with intense nationalism. The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) may be cited as probably the best expression of this lay religious revival. Contemporary critics still differ on the significance of the Brotherhood's contribution to the modernization of Islam. While it is true that Western technological inventions have been readily accepted, the Brotherhood could hardly be credited with having improved on Abduh's contribution in the realm of non-material values. One could even discern in the Brotherhood a falling away from Abduh's religious toleration by arousing religious fanaticism mixed with nationalism. Moreover, since the Brotherhood derived popular support by its opposition to the existing regime, it was critical of democracy. Lacking the constructive approach of Abduh, it was unwilling to attempt the reconciliation of democracy with Islam, and instead advocated the re-establishment of theocracy. Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, leader of the Brotherhood, came very near to achieving power during the Palestine war, but he came out into the open too soon and clashed with the ruling oligarchy. He was criticized for having resorted to violence and terrorism and the government used this as an excuse (after he was treacherously assassinated) to close the headquarters of his organization. The Egyptian government could not completely suppress the movement, which has been permitted to resume its activities, but the movement suffered seriously from the blunders committed by its leaders.[3]

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[2] See Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933); and H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1946).

Even if the Brotherhood had achieved power (with the consequence that similar moves might have been attempted in Syria and Iraq), it is unlikely that its members would have enjoyed a long term of office. The Brotherhood's program was too Calvinistic in spirit to be tolerated for any length of time. The re-establishment of a theocracy, regarding all other states as inferior, would have been incompatible with the new international order. Furthermore, the theocratic emphasis on the solidarity of the faith and the strict enforcement of the divine law, an emphasis which disregarded the medieval methods by which these objectives might be achieved, would have been strenuously opposed. The Brotherhood and other religious movements overlooked the fact that in a modern society, under the impact of a world-wide trend to regard religion as a matter of individual conscience, no such solidarity is achievable.[4]

It has become a popular slogan, repeated again and again by Muslim as well as Western publicists, that the one power which is equipped to serve as a barrier to communism in the Middle East is Islam. On purely doctrinal grounds Islam, probably more than any other religion, is hard to reconcile with communism. As a system which evaluates all values of life in terms of a divine juridico-theological code, it is opposed to dialectical materialism and, of course, to atheism. To the pious Muslim performing the daily prayer and conforming strictly to the rules of the divine law, communism appears to reduce life to a mere mechanical process, stressing earthly rather than spiritual values. Further, Islam recognizes the institution of private property and free enterprise, and the divine law regulates all kinds of possession and disposal of property, including its transmission to the owner's children and the near kin by inheritance. Even the rights of the state to own or to dispose of property are limited by the divine law during both war and peace.[5]

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[3] For a discussion of the origins and ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, see J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950).

[4] See Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London, 1951), p. 132.

Yet there are a few Muslim thinkers, witnessing the present plight of the poor and the exploitation of the landlords, who argue that Islam is equally opposed to the great disparity between rich and poor. They cite traditions to the effect that the Prophet Muhammad often expressed his aversion to poverty. From early Islam the doctors of law and theology often have advised the caliphs to pay proper attention to the poor, since the law required the distribution of alms among them. Modern Muslim thinkers, regarding Islam as an ideal system of social justice, argue that Islam is inherently opposed to exploitation and poverty and that it is the duty of the community to regulate its economic life on an equitable basis. "Social justice," said one of them, "is like the *jihad* [holy war], a collective duty upon all Muslims," i.e., its enforcement is required by the law; if it is not fulfilled, all the Muslim community, including those in authority, fall in error and become liable for punishment.[6] But these moderate Muslim thinkers had little influence on the ruling oligarchy or the Azhar, who seemed to be satisfied that the oft-quoted sacred citations, and the sermons given in the Friday prayers in support of property rights and capitalism, would provide moral strength against poverty and unemployment.

Such attitudes quickly gave an opening to the rise of militant leftist groups who either argued that Islam could be reconciled with socialism or tried to turn their faces completely against Islam in favor of communism. The moderately leftist groups maintain that Islam is not opposed to socialism, arguing that the early Islamic creed, divorced from later accretions, was in accord with socialist ideas. Their socialism is based on the Islamic principle of equality, which recognizes no differences in society on the basis of wealth. No social or economic distinctions, they maintain, were imposed by God upon the believers; although, as revealed in the *Qur'an*, He "created you of male and female, and made you races and tribes," He recognized no differences among them save on the basis of "piety" and "Godfearing."[7] The socialists cited as evidence for their argument the case of a companion of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu-Dhar al-Ghifari (whom they regard as the first Muslim socialist), who criticized the caliph for his departure from Muhammad's puritanical life by acquiring wealth and ignoring the interests of the masses.

Communists, deriving their ideas from the teachings of Marx and Lenin, repudiate almost all national and religious institutions as the bulwark of the reactionary classes. The Middle East extremists, who argue with Marx that religion is the opium of the people, attack Islam and its teaching with an antireligious religiosity. Their program, advocating a complete reorganization of society based on the doctrine of world communism, is probably the most constructive (as well as destructive in its sweeping denunciation of existing conditions) so far offered by any Middle East group in opposition to the ruling class. Its appeal to the masses and malcontents, who have not grasped the most elementary principles of communism, is due to the persuasive ability of the local leaders, who present communism as the panacea for all social ills. The discipline and solidarity displayed by the communists (though they often quarrel on procedural matters) and their tenacity in fighting repression have rendered their work effective and enhanced their prestige among the masses. However, despite their outcry against exploitation, graft, and corruption, they still have a long way to go before they can claim active support from all the masses. Except perhaps for those who are regular members of secret communist parties (all Middle East countries have either refused to permit, or have suppressed, communist organizations), most of their followers may be classed as sympathizers who probably have certain mental reservations about the doctrine. Communism's opposition to religion and its disdain for other mores, to say nothing of its affiliation with a foreign power, are but a few of the factors which still make many hesitate to accept *in toto* the communist creed. If, however, these sympathizers were forced to choose between the existing regimes and communism, it is not unlikely that their choice would fall on communism.

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[5] For further details on the relations between persons and property, see my *Law of War and Peace in Islam* (London, 1941), Ch. 9.

[6] See Muhammad al-Ghazzali, *Islam and Socialist Programs* (Cairo, 1951), pp. 35–37. See also Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Cairo, 1950). (Both in Arabic.)

[7] See *Qur'an*, XLIX, 12–13. (Palmer's translation.)

The failure of any of these platforms to gain full support from the masses, as well as the vulnerability of the democratic regimes, made the people look elsewhere for leadership—toward the army.

III

The interest of the Middle Eastern countries in building up strong armed forces probably goes back to antiquity when the power of the monarch was dependent on two pillars—the clergy and the army. The king, in addition to proclaiming himself god or the son of a god, was the army chief and often took the field as the actual commander of the army. This tradition of the close association of rulers with the army persisted down through the centuries under Arab and Ottoman rule. So closely connected were the army chiefs with the caliphs and sultans that often the viziers and grand viziers were chosen from among the army officers who served in the royal courts. Not infrequently they established matrimonial relationships with the reigning dynasties. The Arab and Ottoman armies, at times when the army chiefs had become more powerful than their masters, often deposed one ruler after another at their pleasure. Just as the Praetorian guard dethroned one Emperor after another, so the Arab legion and Ottoman Janissary put to death one sovereign after another, replacing them by their own nominees. The struggle between army officers and sovereigns degenerated to the throat-cutting level, so that either the army or the dynasty had to be liquidated. When society was subjected to this kind of internal struggle, the very foundation of its political organization reached a breaking point and a radical change in the regime became inevitable. This significant feature in the history of Eastern societies, which often recurred (it is not suggested that it is inherently cyclic in nature), indicates that recent events in the modern Middle East should not be surprising.

In the modern Middle East, following the old established military tradition, keen interest has been shown in organizing well-disciplined national armies along European lines. Even such new countries as Iraq and Syria, when they were under a Mandate and there was no real need for armed forces, aspired to organize small national armies for future enlargement. When both Iraq and Syria had attained independence, special care was given to reorganize and enlarge the national forces, which were deemed necessary to act as guardians of the newly won independence. In countries which had an earlier independent status, the army figured even more largely in national life; in the case of Turkey and Iran, the Kemalist and Pahlevi regimes owed probably as much to the army in their establishment as to the strength of character and the statesmanship of their founders. In Egypt, from the time of Muhammad Ali, founder of the ruling dynasty, the army proved to be the chief personal preoccupation of the viceroys, who spent on it lavishly for the consolidation of their power. From the British occupation (1882), however, to the declaration of independence (1922) the army was reduced almost to a police force. But the interest in reorganizing a national army was revived, especially after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, not only to repel foreign aggression, but also in order that the army should become the symbol of the new national life.

Most of the Middle East army officers are drawn from the middle class or the ruling oligarchy: very few have come from the poorer classes. The soldiers, as a rule, are drawn from the peasant and working classes, and most of them have been recruited on the basis of national conscription. The majority of the soldiers are illiterate, but many of them who have remained in the service long enough have received elementary education in addition to military training. It is the officers, rather than the soldiers, who have been instrumental in involving the army in politics. Elementary and high school education carries with it indoctrination with a spirit of intense nationalism. Moved by patriotism as well as by personal ambition, many high school graduates enter the law colleges or military academies with the idea that a career in law or military service is a stepping-stone to high government position. Not infrequently high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions or believing their ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service. General Najib is not the only one who had a background in law before he entered military training, and those who for a short time served as teachers may be counted in the hundreds.

Even in military training, where discipline and the military profession require the isolation of the army from politics, nationalist indoctrination is continued. Army officers often play an active part in the decision of national issues. A case in point is the Assyrian uprising in Iraq. The army officers moved to suppress the uprising not only because they were bound to do so by military order, but also because they had their own views on the matter and decided to solve the problem in a manner satisfactory to their own national consciousness. This explains why certain excesses were committed by the Iraqi army officers in handling this problem. The Palestine war, by far the most important issue and one which had a far-reaching effect on almost all the Arab countries, may be cited as another case in point. The views of the army officers, we now know, differed on many points from those of the politicians in power. Not only was the advice of the military regarding purely technical matters (such as the general command and the supply of weapons) not heeded by the politicians, but also the military had disagreed with their governments regarding the conduct and the prosecution of the war. In this, it is true, the army was under the influence of opposition parties (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), but the army officers also had their own political ideas, which differed from those of their governments. Thus it is clear why, after the Arabs lost the war, the Arab army officers and the politicians in power blamed each other for the blunders committed, and when the army felt it had unjustifiably been selected as the scapegoat, the officers reacted (to mention here only one specific reason) by overthrowing the politicians and punishing them for their mistakes. The recent military intervention in Lebanon has been temporary because of the relatively minor military role played by this country in the war. In Iraq, however, the army has already staged seven military coups, and its recent invitation to carry on the administration may be so tempting that it will once again dominate the political scene. The Jordanian army has long been under rigid British tutelage and therefore no move could be expected. But in the case of the Syrian and Egyptian armies, which were seriously beaten and had had a great deal to suffer on account of their governments' failure to supply weapons (in the case of Egypt the government supplied defective weapons), the army's intervention in politics may be regarded as a vindication of the army's role in the Palestine war and the failure of the politicians to support them.

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Occupying such a high position in the national life of the Middle Eastern countries, the army officers were approached by various ideological and political groups (except perhaps the communists, who were severely punished if they did so) trying to win them to their side. Owing to the conservative and intensely nationalistic background of most of the army officers, it is not surprising that in the Iraqi and Egyptian armies the ultra-nationalistic and religious movements were the most influential, especially the Pan-Arab groups in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Syrian army, emphasizing liberalism before anything else, has paid only lip service to religion and proved to be lukewarm to conservative and religious groups.

The elements which showed intense interest in political activities were the younger rather than the older army officers. Older men occupying high military positions and winning the favors of the heads of states and governments were likely to be more concerned with their own interests than with national reform. Some of these older officers held their positions not because of personal merit but for the purpose of insuring that the army would remain loyal to those in authority. Not infrequently some of them were related to the king or cabinet ministers and their interests thus became identified with those of the ruling oligarchy. As a result the younger army officers often organized themselves into small groups (either at informal friendly gatherings or in secret meetings) to discuss national issues. Not infrequently they broached the idea of the necessity of the army's intervention in order to overhaul the political machine, if not to establish a military dictatorship. The young army officers always chose their leaders from among the older army officers whom they could trust and whose records were clean. Such leaders were often chosen on the basis of seniority in military service, provided that their military integrity was beyond reproach and that they were not self-seeking. Thus Bakr Sidqi rose in Iraq, Husni Za'yim (replaced by Hinnawi and later by Shishakli) in Syria, and Muhammad Najib in Egypt. Their leadership and able command, recognized by all, had been tested in war: Bakr Sidqi in his operations against the Assyrian and Middle Euphrates tribal revolts; Za'yim, Shishakli and Najib in the Palestine war.

The underlying motive which prompted the army officers to engage actively in politics was, of course, the need for a social revolution which it was not possible to achieve by democratic procedures. The army seems to hold relatively moderate views acceptable to the majority of the people and is able to provide strong leadership capable of enforcing social reforms with celerity and a minimum of opposition. The people, ready to give the army officers an opportunity to try their approach to reform, have as a rule initially responded jubilantly to the change, though their enthusiasm, judging by the Iraqi and Syrian experiences, soon cools off, owing to the ruthless methods and continual repression which are likely to follow when reform measures are carried out by force.

The Palestine war has been singled out as the principal reason for the sudden military coups in Syria and Egypt. A state of intense fermentation, however, had long been in existence. Criticism of existing conditions had frequently been voiced, but no better occasion than the defeat suffered in Palestine had yet presented itself. It gave the critics an opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction and to pour out their angry criticism of everything they considered wrong. Books and pamphlets, as well as newspaper articles, were published in an ever-increasing number; some of them—as had rarely happened in the past—went into several editions and were widely read all over the Arabic-speaking countries. Such pamphleteering, a novelty in the Middle East, released many dynamic forces. In his *Meaning of the Tragedy*,[8] Costi Zurayk, then President of the Syrian University, was the first to discuss in a booklet the profound national frustration caused by the Palestine war. He called upon the people to press their rulers for reform. This was followed by another booklet, *The Lesson of Palestine*,[9] written by a Palestinian lawyer, offering a constructive plan of social reform, including a Fertile Crescent unity scheme, and calling for immediate action. Most devastating of all, perhaps, is

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[8] Costi Zurayk, *Ma'na al-Nukba* (Beirut, 1948).

[9] Musa al-Alami, *Ibrat Filastin* (Beirut, 1949). This book has been summarized and translated in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 373–405 (Oct., 1949).

Khalid's *From Here We Start*,[10] written by an Egyptian religious teacher, in which the whole religious system, as interpreted and practiced by Muslims today, is shown to be incompatible with modern life. Khalid rejected the restoration of a theocratic state and advocated the re-interpretation of Islam on a socialistic basis. In another book, entitled *Citizens, Not Cattle*,[11] Khalid attacked the oligarchic regime of Egypt and strongly defended the individual's rights to equality, liberty, education and work. His earlier book was at first suppressed by the government, but upon its release it went into several editions and was read all over the Arab world. Neither the government's opposition nor the severe and even vulgar criticism of his opponents could discourage Khalid from publishing his second book, which is even more trenchant than the first in its sweeping criticism of social conditions. These, as well as other less significant books, have been widely read and have had a far-reaching influence on public opinion.

The Palestine war brought matters to a head, since it directly involved the army in a struggle with the civilian politicians. The ruling oligarchy watched carefully lest it lose its hold over the army. When the Arab governments lost the war, the military, in spite of public statements that the war was satisfactorily conducted, were blamed for the defeat. This set in motion the movement, both in Syria and Egypt, to investigate the causes of defeat; but before investigations could reveal the malefactors, the politicians tried to influence the investigators. This aroused the army officers—who feared that the responsible politicians might escape punishment—and prompted them to act.

IV

Four Middle Eastern countries may be specifically cited as having experienced military coups d'état: Turkey under late Ottoman rule, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Two military coups took place in Turkey (1908, 1909); seven in Iraq (1936–1941); four in Syria (1949–1952); and two in Egypt (1881, 1952). (In Iraq the army has once more come into the picture in 1952, but this time by the invitation of the head of the state to maintain public order; in Lebanon the army acted only as a caretaker during the interim of a governmental change.) These fifteen military coups by no means exhaust the list. They have been selected as instances where the army has clearly taken control of the actual conduct of government, not merely where former army officers—as Kemal Atatürk and Shah Reza Pahlevi—played the role of the politician.[12]

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[10] Khalid Muhammad Khalid, *Min Huna Nabda'* (Cairo, 1950). For a short summary of this book see Nicola A. Ziadeh, "Recent Books on the Interpretation of Islam," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 506–8 (Autumn, 1951).

[11] *Muwatinun La Ra'aya* (Cairo, 1951).

[12] It is not the writer's purpose in this article to give the history of the various Middle Eastern military coups, but rather to discuss the general character of military rule as well as its impact on politics. For the history of military rule, see Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 4, (Jan., 1950), pp. 1–12; Rashid al-Barrawi, *The Military Coup in Egypt* (Cairo, 1952), in Arabic; M. Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (London, 1951).

All of these military coups took place either with the avowed purpose of re-establishing a constitutional regime (as in the case of Turkey) or of "cleansing" an already established democracy of evil influences which paralyzed its working. The military sought the active cooperation of nationalist elements and at the outset their rule was conducted in close cooperation with and was supported by the liberals. Later on the military dominated the scene and the liberals (if not the nationalists) were either pushed to the background or dropped from power. The religious groups have as a rule been reluctant to support military rule (except perhaps in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood gave its blessing to General Najib), either because they had come to terms with former regimes (as in Turkey) or because their ideas proved to be too reactionary to be tolerated by the army (as in Iraq). In Syria the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it opposed the pre-military regime, failed to give support to the military because of their active cooperation with liberal elements.

The military pretended that they had assumed power either to prepare the way for liberal reforms or to carry out the reforms themselves. In reality they seized power without having been prepared for, or having had practical experience in, carrying out reforms. Their move to clean the Augean stables met universal approval, but this is a negative approach to reform. The Herculean task would be to carry out real social reform in a manner satisfactory to all. At best the reform program of the military was eclectic; it included various ideas and proposals that had become popular among the people, but these have rarely been integrated into a broad reform program, and plans for their implementation were lacking. A few liberal thinkers, such as Zia Gok Alp in Turkey and the Ahali group in Iraq, tried to formulate broad social programs for the movements they supported, but such philosophical apologiae had little or no influence on the minds of the military.[13] Probably more serious attempts at agrarian reform have been considered, though not actually undertaken, under the military regimes of Syria and Egypt (the distribution of state-owned land among the peasants in Syria and the limitation of land-ownership to a legal maximum of two hundred acres in Egypt).[14] But though these platforms have become popular among the masses, it would seem that the improvement of economic conditions depends primarily on finding new means of increasing agricultural production, not on merely distributing (as in the case of Syria) or re-distributing (as in Egypt) the land among a larger number of people. Syria needs both the capital and know-how—which she has refused to receive under the Point IV program—for the exploitation of its vast undeveloped territory, and Egypt, an already over-populated country, needs new means for increasing production, agricultural or otherwise, to make possible the achievement of social reform.

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[13] For an evaluation of Zia Gok Alp's ideas and influence on the Committee of Union and Progress and the military, see Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1950).

[14] See texts of the Syrian land decrees and the Egyptian Land Reform Law in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 7, pp. 69–81 (Winter, 1953).

The suspension of democratic life in favor of military rule, although greeted with almost universal approval, has its own weaknesses and evil influences. Most dangerous of all seems to be the difficulty in persuading the army, once the job of overhauling is done, to withdraw from politics or relinquish power. In spite of repeated assurances by leading army officers that their intervention was only temporary, the lessons of history are not reassuring. Military rule in Egypt (1881–1882), Turkey (1908–1918) and Iraq (1936–1941), showing no signs of withdrawal in favor of civil government, persisted until it was overthrown, in all the foregoing instances, as a result of war with foreign countries. In Syria the military have survived a period of four years and no indication has yet been given as to when military rule will end. They have avoided fighting with a neighboring country, which is still technically at war with Syria. Such a contest would test their strength and ability to survive. Their silence about war with Israel, a war which originally had given them an excuse to overthrow civilian rule, as well as their alignment with one Arab country against another, reflects their apprehension lest the military regime collapse from within or be overthrown by an attack from without. In the circumstances, military rule is likely to continue for an indefinite period in Syria as well as in other Arab countries, so long as public opinion remains dissatisfied with the civilian politicians and the army officers can maintain their reputation as the guardians of national interests. If, on the other hand, the army leaders should engage in an internecine struggle for power, as has happened in the past, there is a possibility that the military regime might eventually collapse from within.

Nor is the effect of politics on the military a happy one. "A general has only one aim," said Müffling, "a general who is also a sovereign must have two; his actions as a soldier will always be subordinate to politics."[15] Politics imposes restraints upon sovereigns who, in their careers as generals, should not submit to political forces in order to achieve the highest military success. If the general ever proved to be a successful sovereign, he must have submitted to restraints which no successful general would tolerate. Sudden rise to power seldom permits its victims, except perhaps in exceptional cases, to adjust themselves to the new positions they occupy. The all-powerful leader is tempted to assume a charismatic character which often alienates his supporters and admirers. The Middle East experience with army rule demonstrates again the truth of the saying that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." New leaders who swept to power to rid their people of arbitrary rule and corruption often could not avoid developing in themselves what they hated in their enemies.[16] And this seems to have been true of Husni al-Za'iym and

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[15] Müffling, *Die Feldzüge der Schlesischen Armee*, p. 52, cited by Yorck von Wartenburg, *Napoleon As a General*, trans. W. G. James, Vol. 1, p. 151.

[16] An Arab poet once remarked on the arbitrary rule of the military regime of the Young Turks who had overthrown Sultan Abdul-Hamid's regime in 1909:

"There was only one Hamid a few days ago,
But today of Hamid there's a thousand or so."
(Translation done in verse by Miss Katherine Parker.)

Shishakli in Syria no less than of Bakr Sidqi in Iraq. It is to be hoped that General Najib will be an exception to the rule.

Finally, a word may be said about the opinion prevalent among the Arabs, both military and civilians—comparing the progress made under the Kemalist regime with the state of anarchy and confusion in their countries—that each Arab country needs its own Kemal Ataturk to carry out reform with a strong hand. They often quote with approval the saying of Sayyid Jamal al-Din, a Muslim leader who advocated Pan-Islamism during the latter part of the nineteenth century, that the East cannot possibly be reformed save by a benevolent despot. When the Kemalist regime, after Ataturk's death, was transformed into a working democracy, it bolstered the army's argument that a great deal of spade work had to be done in the way of "cleansing" before the civilian politicians could be permitted to govern along democratic lines. The military, however, failed to understand that the Kemalist regime was not established overnight by entrusting power to the military, but that Kemal from the beginning made it clear to his fellow army officers that they had to choose between the army and politics. He launched his social reforms in the formative period by democratic methods, spending endless hours in trying to persuade his opponents, displaying patience and tolerance rarely to be found among statesmen with a military background. It was not until the Kurdish rebellion of 1925, when Kemal's prestige and power had already been established, that certain repressive measures were employed. The so-called loyalty trials, purging the regime of obstinate opponents, represented the only purge in the history of modern Turkey.

Ataturk's imitators in the neighboring Arab countries, misunderstanding the nature of Kemalism, tried at first to influence political decisions from behind the scenes, only to discover (facing non-cooperation or opposition from civilian politicians) that they had to take over the control of government themselves. In so doing, under the pretext of purging the regime of dangerous or corrupt personalities, they inaugurated a regime of repression which aroused anxiety and fear instead of inspiring order and security. General Bakr Sidqi not only exiled the leading ministers of the Cabinet he overthrew but also ordered the assassination of General Ja'far al-Askari and persecuted a dozen others; Colonels Za'yim and Shishakli arrested and exiled honest as well as corrupt people; and General Najib, following the same pattern, after forcing King Faruq to abdicate, arrested the King's entourage as well as other politicians on the grounds of corruption. There can hardly be an end to repression once it starts and it soon involves persons of integrity. The control of government by the military, ruling according to their light with no direct public restraint, creates a governmental problem no less difficult than the problem which prompted the army to seize power.

V

The basic factor underlying the passing of authority from civilian to military hands is the assumption that democracy has "failed." The people of the Middle

East, without handing over authority to either right or left (the religious or the communistic) elements—though both of them came very near to seizing power—resorted to an old trick, which has now become fashionable, of removing the undesirable sovereign by turning his own Praetorian guard against him. While the military has reduced the danger of right or left rule, a greater difficulty has arisen. Once the army officers were firmly installed in the saddle, how could they be removed from their newly won positions? This seems to be —at least in the writer's opinion—the greatest of the dangers of military rule; for, conceding the valuable contribution of the army in carrying out certain reform measures quickly, the experiment may not be worth trying at the expense of suspending for an indefinite period the democratic processes of government. It is true that the operation of democracy has met with dissatisfaction in almost all Middle Eastern countries. This does not necessarily negate the generally accepted principle that government belongs to the people and, therefore, must be controlled by the people. If democracy has failed in the Middle East, it has failed only because it was transplanted into a social milieu unprepared for it.

The return to democracy, whatever the means to be employed for its restoration, seems to be the safest way towards ultimate stability and progress. In countries where the force of the old local traditions is still strong, it is not to be expected that the working of democratic institutions would admit of comparison with their operation in Western countries accustomed to democratic traditions. As Aristotle often affirms in the *Politics*, the citizen must be educated in the spirit of the constitution under which he lives. At present, the value of democracy must be regarded as mainly educational: that is, it must help to develop democratic habits and traditions necessary for the functioning of democratic machinery.[17] If democracy has "failed" at all, it has failed because in a shrinking world the Middle Eastern people have become aware of their backwardness in comparison with the West; but it is not the fault of democracy that they did not catch up with the West. The fault lies with the people themselves. Not until the people are cured from within—socially and economically no less than politically—can they live a salutary democratic way of life. And this approach is not new to the Middle East. The Prophet Muhammad, in a Qur'anic injunction, reminded his people "Verily God changeth not that which is in a people until they change that which is in themselves." This change from within can be achieved only by sound education—which is lacking among the great majority of the people—an education which will provide them with the spirit of the constitution under which they live.

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[17] See my *Independent Iraq* (London, 1951), pp. 34–35.

PARTISANSHIP AND COUNTY OFFICE: THE CASE OF OHIO

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The textbooks contain singularly little systematic analysis of the role of party in local government. They abstract the relevant statutes. They expound more or less orthodox suppositions. Voting on local candidates corresponds closely with presidential voting. Party groups compete for control of local government more or less as they do on the national level. Or, the contrary notion is argued that party has little place in local politics. Personal followings or essentially non-party courthouse cliques determine all. This paper represents a modest attempt, by analysis of Ohio data, to test a few of the standard suppositions and to suggest lines of inquiry that might be fruitful in the study of local politics.[1]

Relation of voting for county and presidential candidates. Contrary to the belief that the presidential tide almost invariably carries with it the local candidates of the winning party, the Ohio record indicates a fairly high degree of independence of national party trends in the selection of county officers. Although in most instances a Republican county presidentially chooses Republican county officers and a Democratic county, Democratic county officers, the departures from this consistency are of sufficient magnitude to excite attention. Figure 1 charts the proportions of the state's counties with Democratic presidential pluralities and the proportions of county offices won by Democratic candidates in presidential years from 1916 to 1948.[2] If the presidential candidate pulled all his fellow partisans into office with him, the two graphs would coincide. In fact, the cycle of party control of county office fluctuates over a considerably narrower range than does the cycle of county presidential pluralities. In periods of ascending Republican presidential strength, a goodly number of Democratic county candidates withstand the storm. At times of ascending Democratic presidential strength, Republican county candidates demonstrate staying power.

Although Figure 1 indicates the broad relationship of presidential and county polling, Table I on the 1948 election permits a more complete analysis. In that year in those counties at the extremes of party strength, as measured by the presidential vote, nearly all county offices went as did the presidential plurality. Counties with over 60 per cent of their vote for Dewey filled almost all their

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[1] I wish to acknowledge helpful criticisms of several Ohio colleagues: Ben A. Arneson, Wilfred E. Binkley, E. Allen Helms, and Howard White. While their comments were most beneficial to me, they should not be taxed with any responsibility for the content of this article.

[2] The county offices included in the computations underlying the graph were those listed as "county offices" in *Ohio Election Statistics;* legislators and judges are not so listed. Over the period covered by the graph there was change from time to time in the offices filled in presidential years.



FIG. 1. Percentage of Ohio Counties with Democratic Presidential Pluralities and Percentage of Ohio County Offices Won by Democrats in Presidential Election Years, 1916–1948.

local offices with Republicans. Counties at the other end of the spectrum gave their votes generally to local Democrats as well as to Truman. As the presidential margin narrowed, the correspondence between presidential and local preferences declined sharply. Dewey carried 26 counties with 50–54.9 per cent of the vote but in these counties Republicans managed to capture only a few more than one-half of the county offices. In the close counties, a small amount of ticket splitting, of course, has a maximum effect.

The data of the table also permit a measurement of the gross local independence of presidential trends, while the spread between the curves on the chart indicates only the net difference between presidential and local voting. The Republican local winners in Democratic presidential counties and the Democratic local winners in Republican presidential counties accounted for a little more than one out of five county officers chosen in 1948. About the same ratio prevailed in 1944.[3]

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[3] Just prior to the 1940 election the ballot form was changed from a straight party-column ballot to a double ballot with one ballot containing the presidential candidates and another the remainder of the candidates. The move was a stratagem to deprive state and local candidates of the benefit of the Roosevelt popularity. From Figure 1 it would seem unlikely that the change in ballot form had a great immediate effect.

TABLE I

RELATION BETWEEN COUNTY VOTE ON PRESIDENT AND ON COUNTY OFFICES: PARTISAN DIVISION OF OHIO COUNTY OFFICERS ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, 1948

Democratic Percentage Presidential Vote, 1948	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
0–39.9	14	125[a]	7	5.6	118	94.4
40–44.9	26	234	36	15.4	198	84.6
45–49.9	26	234	102	43.6	132	56.4
50–54.9	11	98[b]	75	76.5	23	23.5
55 and over	11	99	97	98.0	2	2.0
	88	790	317	40.1	473	59.9

[a] One office filled by an independent not included in tabulation.
[b] No election to one office in this group.

Short-term resistances to presidential trends. Closer inspection may permit identification of types of situations in which local candidates and party groups are able to retain power despite a presidential trend to the opposite party. It is commonly thought that local candidates, especially in less populous counties, depend for success on the ties of friendship and personal acquaintance rather than the vote-pulling power of party. Such an explanation does not account for the regularities apparent in Figure 1. Evidently local candidates share in high degree the fate of the head of their ticket yet some local candidates of both parties resist the swing of popular sentiment against their national ticket.

One type of resistance to national trends may be of a short term nature. Those counties with an increasing Republican presidential strength may tend to retain for a time some local Democratic officials while those counties moving toward the Democratic party nationally by the same token may keep in office Republicans for a time. Various factors probably contribute to this effect. At times local organizations may knife the presidential candidate or at least drag their feet in the campaign. At other times the boosters of a presidential candidate may deem it inexpedient to say much about their local ticket. In some instances inter-party understandings may mitigate the hazards of party competition. Personal followings of individual local candidates may remain loyal despite the trend.

No simple test can be made of the supposition that there is a tendency for local candidates to overcome the effects of a short-term presidential trend toward the other party, for it is difficult to measure simply such a trend. Yet Table II represents an attempt to test the matter by an analysis of those counties Republican by a narrow margin in the 1948 presidential voting. It was assumed that the greater the number of times such a 1948 Republican county had gone Democratic in the four preceding presidential elections, the greater would be the likelihood that local Democratic officers and candidates had established a claim on the support of the community. Save for the exception of a category containing a single county, the distribution in Table II supports the assumption. In those counties narrowly for Dewey, Democratic county candidates had about seven chances out of ten to win if the county had given FDR pluralities at three of the four preceding elections. In those that had given a plurality to FDR only once in the four preceding elections, the Democratic local candidates had only about two chances out of ten to win.[4]

TABLE II

LOCAL RESISTANCE TO PRESIDENTIAL TRENDS: PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN COUNTIES NARROWLY REPUBLICAN (45–49.9% DEMOCRATIC) IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN RELATION TO COUNTY VOTE IN PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Times Democratic in 4 Preceding Presidential Elections	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
4	1[a]	9	2	22.2	7	77.8
3	7	63	43	68.3	20	31.7
2	12	108	49	45.4	59	54.6
1	4	36	7	19.4	29	80.6
0	2	18	1	5.6	17	94.4
	26	234	102	43.6	132	56.4

[a] The deviate county is Ross.

The same test, applied to those counties Democratic presidentially in 1948, yields the results shown in Table III. Those 1948 Democratic counties that had found no occasion to vote Republican in the preceding four elections had little use for Republican county candidates, although this ungenerous view came in part from the fact that some of them had quite high Democratic presidential percentages. On the other hand, 1948 Democratic counties that had taken advantage of two of the preceding four chances to vote Republican filled nearly one-fourth of their county offices with Republicans.

If these statistical manipulations give us a measure of short-term presidential trends, they indicate that the factors of friendship and personal acquaintance operate within a range of opportunity fixed by the general party trend. Sometimes that trend makes it easier for local Democrats to make friends; at other moments, the facility of Republicans in these matters appears to be superior. Yet it seems apparent that these local factors, be they "personal" or "party" in nature, operate to keep the fluctuations in party control of local office in a narrower range than would be the case if the tie between local and national party were closer.

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[4] These calculations are on the assumption that all local offices were contested. In 1944 almost 30 per cent of Ohio county offices were filled without contest in either the primary or the general election. The proportion filled without contest, however, declined as the presidential voting became closer.

Roots of local party groupings. Although some of the local-presidential differential in close counties may be a result of a short-term lag, it seems possible that in some counties the power groupings underpinning Democratic local success in counties Republican presidentially may be social structures of extraordinary durability rather than friable alliances susceptible of erosion by the storms of a national campaign or two. Clues pointing toward such a conclusion come from a closer examination of the 26 counties for Dewey in 1948 by 50–54.9 per cent of the vote. These counties elected Democrats to 43.6 per cent of their county offices. Some counties in the group elected the entire local Democratic slate; others chose some Democrats and some Republicans; a few elected only Republicans. Crawford, Fairfield, and Holmes put Democrats into all their county offices. These counties had gained some notoriety for Copperhead activity in the Civil War. Crawford County went Democratic in the gubernatorial elections of 1859, 1861, and 1863. In 1863 troops had to be sent into the county to complete the draft enrollment.[5] Fairfield County, Democratic in 1859, 1861, and 1863, was the home of Edson B. Olds, a political leader whose outspoken reservations about Lincoln's war in 1862 led to his arrest and detention on a charge of discouraging enlistments in the Union Army.[6] Holmes County had been the scene of Copperhead disturbances that succeeding generations reminisced about in the journals of the historical societies.[7] Ancestral peccadilloes are minimized but the descendants seem to continue electing Democratic county officials.

TABLE III

LOCAL RESISTANCE TO PRESIDENTIAL TRENDS: PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN COUNTIES OVER 50 PER CENT DEMOCRATIC IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN RELATION TO COUNTY VOTE IN PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Times Republican in 4 Preceding Presidential Elections	Number of Counties	County Offices				
		Total	Democratic		Republican	
			No.	%	No.	%
2	8	71	55	77.5	16	22.5
1	5	45	39	86.7	6	13.3
0	9	81	78	96.3	3	3.7
	22	197	172	87.3	25	12.7

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[5] Wood Gray, *The Hidden Civil War, The Story of the Copperheads* (New York, 1942), p. 137.

[6] G. H. Porter, *Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period* (New York, 1911), pp. 106, 157.

[7] W. W. Pennell and J. R. Vance, "Holmes County Rebellion—Fort Fizzle," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 40, pp. 23–51 (Jan., 1931).

Such specific examples suggest that at least under certain circumstances local party structures may have extremely strong powers of self-perpetuation. Differences between presidential and local voting are not solely short-term lags but may be, in part at least, the product of local power groupings that persist for almost a century. To test this notion the rural counties, Republican in 1948 by 50–54.9 per cent, were extracted from Table II, on the assumption that in rural counties party groupings would have been least disturbed through time by such factors as immigration and urbanization. Of such 1948 Dewey counties, those that had been Democratic[8] in the gubernatorial election of 1861 gave more than one-half of their 1948 county offices to Democrats; those that had been Unionist[9] in 1861 gave only one-fourth of their county offices to the Democrats. The details are set out in Table IV.[10]

These data suggest that once a structure of power develops to link the local government with the community and to provide channels to positions of leadership, that structure, in the absence of inundation by migration or other external solvents, has a capacity to perpetuate itself over long periods of time even in resistance to national party trends. All of which points to the need for a better understanding of the socio-political structure of the community as it relates to local government, perhaps in particular to local rural government. The apparent durability of these community structures may be at the bottom of the frustrations of generations of reformers of county government as well as the immalleable quality of institutions of rural government.

Explanations of the durability of local party groupings must be sought in their historical development. In most of the 1861 Democratic counties in Table IV, for example, German settlers formed the core of the Democratic party.[11] In other rural Democratic strongholds the principal sources of settlement were southern. The faithful Republicanism of areas settled by New Englanders is well known. Detailed examination of voting in the state suggests the relevance of a political geology, an analysis of electoral behavior in terms of the strata of attitudes and loyalties precipitated by different waves of settlement and of structures of attitude crystallized by great cataclysms such as the Civil War.[12] This sort of theory may seem to rest on an assumption that contemporary political groupings may have a ghostly family tree reaching deep into a politico-historical subconscious.[13] Be that as it may, the relationships between past and present partisan behavior do not seem to be a matter of chance. To understand the mechanism by which local party groups are constructed and maintained through time might provide a better basis for comprehension of broader questions about the nature of party.

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[8] Adams, Auglaize, Clermont, Darke, Fairfield, Holmes, and Perry.

[9] Athens, Coshocton, Greene, Guernsey, Highland, Jackson, Lake, Ross, Vinton.

[10] A similar analysis of those counties Republican in 1944 by 50–54.9 per cent and under 50 per cent urban showed that in 1944 the 1861 Democratic counties filled 71.1 per cent of the county posts with Democrats; the 1861 Unionist counties gave 22.2 per cent of their county offices to the Democrats. Of the twelve counties under 50 per cent urban and 50–54.9 per cent Republican in 1940, the 1861 Democratic counties filled 80.6 per cent of their county offices with Democrats; the 1861 Unionist counties gave only 25.0 per cent of their local offices to the Democrats.

[11] Lest "Germanism" and the peculiar behavior of counties of German origin in the presidential voting of the 1940's be accepted as accounting for the success of Democratic local candidates in these counties in resisting the presidential tide, it is in order to examine those counties whose local Republican candidates withstood the great upsurge in Democratic presidential strength in 1936. Fourteen counties under 50 per cent urban in 1940 gave Roosevelt in 1936 a plurality by between 50–54.9 per cent of the two-party vote. The nine 1867 Unionist counties of this group filled 72.8 per cent of their county offices with Republicans; the five 1867 Democratic counties filled 46.7 per cent of their county offices with Republicans.

TABLE IV

PERSISTENCE OF PARTY LOYALTIES: 1948 PARTISAN DIVISION OF COUNTY OFFICES IN OHIO COUNTIES 45–49 PER CENT DEMOCRATIC IN 1948 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING AND UNDER 50 PER CENT URBAN ACCORDING TO COUNTY PLURALITY IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1861

	Democratic 1861	Unionist 1861
Number of counties	7	9
Number of county offices	63	81
Offices Democratic 1948	33	21
Per Cent Democratic	52.4	25.9
Offices Republican 1948	30	60
Per Cent Republican	47.6	74.1

Comments. While these bits of evidence point to no earthshaking conclusions, they do pin down a few propositions and suggest lines for further inquiry.

1. While the trend in party control of county government moves with the presidential trend, local candidates of both parties in considerable degree withstand the tides that batter their presidential ticket. This differential points to a relatively high stability of partisan attitudes of electors with respect to local government, especially local rural government; it also points to the obverse

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[12] Local histories constitute a source that remains to be exploited by students of politics. Although the production of local chronologies does not seem to attract first rate historical talent, local histories, perhaps fortuitously, record data that are often most revealing when viewed through an appropriate analytical framework.

[13] In fact, it also seems that ghostly descendants remain of partisan groups that once were far more corporeal. In 1944 Ohio had 28 rural counties that were predominantly Republican in the presidential voting in that year, that is, less than 40 per cent Democratic. Of the 28 counties 21 had been Unionist in 1867. In the seven 1867 Democratic counties, the Democrats in 1944 had nominees for 68.2 per cent of the county posts; in the twenty-one 1867 Unionist counties the Democrats had nominees for only 35.4 per cent of the county posts. In the seven 1867 Democratic counties some sort of Democratic group or tradition must have lingered on to produce competition for county office in spite of the fact that the counties had long since moved over to the Republican side of the fence.

phenomenon, perhaps more significant, of a relatively high volatility in the presidential vote.[14]

2. Local resistance to presidential tides seems to be based on local party groupings or loyalties with impressive capacities of survival. The analysis throws no light on the nature or mechanisms of these groupings save that they seem to maintain themselves over extremely long periods of time.

3. The success of local party groups, Republican and Democratic, in resisting swings against them in the presidential vote indicates that ticket splitting or "independence" represents not solely the chance differentiation of the merits of particular candidates or the random distribution of individual skill in cultivating the electors but in large measure a systematic resistance to the drag of the presidential trend. Local political competition seems to occur within a framework fixed by the presidential trend and the balance between local groups with roots in the far past. That is, the chances for the local candidate to separate himself from the presidential trend depend, perhaps at times unbeknownst to himself, on long established characteristics of the structure and behavior of his community as well as on the stage in the political cycle at which an election occurs.

4. The evidence gives some empirical basis for the old maxim that realistic state and local leaders should concern themselves chiefly with getting a presidential nominee able to pull their own slate into office. The systematic lag between local and presidential shifts supports the inference that, at least in rural counties, presidential candidates receive little help from their fellow partisans in county organizations. County cliques save themselves rather than stem the tide against their presidential candidate. County candidates of the local outs probably benefit from, rather than push along, a presidential tide toward the head of their ticket. All of which may contain implications of some importance for the nature of presidential politics and for the place of local organizations in the national party structure.

5. Even this sketchy analysis provides clues that could be followed up in the intensive study of individual counties. This suggests that comparative statistical analysis might be a means for elevating the case study of the specific local political situation from the human interest and anecdotal level to a status of usefulness in the general study of the political process. Differential statistical analysis may both aid in the perception of salient characteristics of particular situations and facilitate the production of pieces of research susceptible of being added together to enlarge the meager store of systematic knowledge about local politics.

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[14] The relationships shown in Figure 1 probably reflect the peculiar circumstances of Ohio, yet somewhat similar relationships appear in the Iowa data. That may be seen by placing on a chart the following series, in which the Democratic percentage of county offices is listed first after the date and then the percentage of counties with Democratic presidential pluralities: 1920, 12.0, 0.0; 1924, 15.4, 0.0; 1928, 12.9, 6.1; 1932, 36.5, 93.9; 1936, 34.8, 81.8; 1940, 21.9, 35.4; 1944, 16.7, 33.3; 1948, 20.3, 53.6. The figures were built up from the listing of county officials in the Iowa bluebook. The 1928 and 1932 figures may not be exactly comparable with those of other years as the bluebook did not list county supervisors for those years.

BRITISH BY-ELECTIONS, 1952

RICHARD M. SCAMMON
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In October, 1951 Winston Churchill returned to head Britain's government; the Labor ministry which had held power since the summer of 1945 had been narrowly defeated in a general election and Clement Attlee's six years as Britain's first Minister were ended. But this change of leadership marked no change in the British political wars—and one of the most interesting, and most revealing, of the areas of these wars has been that of the by-elections.

These by-elections, special votes to fill vacancies in the House of Commons, took place in ten widely separated districts during the fourteen months from the general election of October, 1951 to the end of 1952. Four of the vacancies they were held to fill were caused by the death of a sitting MP, two by resignation, and the other four by elevation or succession of the incumbent to the House of Lords.

Of the elections, seven were held in England, one in Scotland (East Dundee) and two in Northern Ireland. Though six of the ten constituencies involved are so-called "borough" seats and four "county" seats, eight were, in fact, urban, two of the "county" seats (Cleveland and Farnworth) being actually urban areas despite their legal designation. With two of these urban constituencies strongly Tory seaside towns (Southport and Bournemouth), the percentage totals for the parties shown in Table I are slightly more inclined to the Conservative side than the national percentages for the last general election.[1]

To fill these ten vacancies only nine actual contests were held. In the North Antrim district, the then "Father" of the House, Sir Hugh O'Neill, resigned

TABLE I. VOTE FOR CANDIDATES IN CONTESTED 1951 GENERAL AND 1952 BY-ELECTION CONSTITUENCIES, UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF COMMONS

Candidates	October, 1951 General Election	1952 By-Elections
Nine Conservative candidates	221,820 (50.5%)	167,209 (49.4%)
Nine Labor candidates	201,441 (45.9%)	158,778 (46.9%)
Liberal candidates (three at GE, two at 1952 by-elections)	15,693 (3.6%)	7,449 (2.2%)
All other candidates (none at GE, three at 1952 by-elections)	— —	4,914 (1.5%)
Totals	438,954	338,350

The totals above exclude the uncontested North Antrim seat; the Conservative figures include the Ulster Unionist candidate at South Belfast and the "Conservative and National Liberal" candidate at East Dundee.

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[1] The percentage division of the 1951 general election popular vote was 48.77 for Labor, 47.98 Conservative, 2.55 Liberal, and .70 for all other candidates.

his seat after 37 years of parliamentary service, to be succeeded by his son—Phelim O'Neill. At the general election and at the by-election the return of the Ulster Unionist O'Neills was unopposed. The politics of Ulster, mixed as they are with strong religious feelings, change little. Unopposed returns are not uncommon in this area and the North Antrim seat (and the double-member Antrim constituency preceding it) has been without contest in six of the nine general elections since 1922.

As has been generally the case with parliamentary by-elections, voter interest fell below that of the general election in October, 1951. Without exception the participation was lower at the by-elections than at the general vote, the average decline being around 11,200 votes. Only in the Wycombe division did the participation even approach that of the general election. In this constituency, won by the Conservatives with a narrow 1753 vote majority in 1951, the drop in total vote was only 1015, but in all other seats it ran much higher.

Politically the majority of these ten districts must be regarded as "safe"—Leeds and Small Heath for Labor, Bournemouth, Southport, North Antrim, and South Belfast for the Conservatives. Two others have substantial Labor majorities—Farnworth and East Dundee. Only two could be regarded as peripheral—Cleveland and Wycombe. Given this political complexion, it is not surprising that there were no changes in the party loyalties of the constituencies involved—five remained Labor, five remained Conservative. Moreover, the percentage shifts represented in Table I (overall) and Table II (constituency-by-constituency) are small indeed. For the whole United Kingdom the shift is but a single vote in a hundred, this single elector moving from Conservative over to Labor.

This shift appears to have been somewhat stronger in the first half of the year as represented by Leeds, Southport, and the single summer by-election—East Dundee. In the Fall, however, the balance appears to have been almost equal, with no one of the by-elections in October and November showing shifts of as much as a single percentage point, save at Small Heath, where the absence of a Liberal candidate made the circumstances non-comparable. In the four Fall by-elections excluding Small Heath and North Antrim (unopposed), Labor gained in two (seven-tenths of a percentage point at Farnworth and eight-tenths at South Belfast) and the Tories in two (seven-tenths of a point at Cleveland, three-tenths at Wycombe).

Of all the by-elections, Labor bettered its position in six, the Conservatives in two, with the circumstances of two not comparable. At South-East Leeds, South Belfast, and Farnworth, Labor polled a higher percentage vote in a straight fight. At Southport and at Small Heath, Labor gained more from the Liberals' lowered poll or failure to fight than did the Conservatives.[2] At East Dundee in July Scottish Nationalist and Independent candidates polled

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[2] This is to be especially noted in the light of the generally accepted proposition that Liberals forced to choose between Labor and Conservative tend to vote in the ratio of 2:1 or 5:3 for the Conservative candidate.

TABLE II. *COMPARATIVE POLLING PERCENTAGES*

Class A. Constituencies with straight Labor-Conservative contests at both the General Election and the By-Election:

		Conservative	*Labor*
South-East Leeds	GE	39.5	60.5
(February)	By	36.8	63.2
Cleveland	GE	45.2	54.8
(October)	By	45.9	54.1
Wycombe	GE	51.7	48.3
(November)	By	52.0	48.0
Farnworth	GE	40.8	59.2
(November)	By	40.1	59.9

Class B. Constituencies with Liberal candidates at the General Election, the By-Election, or both:

		Conservative	*Labor*	*Liberal*	*Independent*
East Bournemouth and	GE	63.3	25.1	11.6	—
Christchurch	By	61.8	23.4	10.1	4.7
(February)					
Southport	GE	60.2	24.8	15.0	—
(February)	By	62.0	28.5	9.5	—
Small Heath	GE	30.9	63.4	5.7	—
(November)	By	33.0	67.0	—	—

Class C. Constituencies with multi-partite contests at either the General Election or the By-Election, but uncontested by Liberals:

		Conservative	*Labor*	*Independent*
East Dundee	GE	46.2	53.8	—
(July)	By	35.6	56.2	8.2

Class D. Constituencies in Northern Ireland:

		Ulster Unionist (Conservative)	*Labor*
North Antrim	GE	Unopposed	—
(October)	By	Unopposed	—
South Belfast	GE	75.8	24.2
(November)	By	75.1	24.9

8.1 per cent of the vote, but Labor still managed to increase its 1951 strength by 2.5 percentage points while the Conservatives lost the difference—10.6.

At Cleveland and Farnworth the Conservatives made their only gains—small percentage increases in straight fights with Labor—and in two constituencies the circumstances of the by-election made comparison with the October, 1951 vote of no value. In one of these—North Antrim—an Ulster

Unionist (Conservative) was returned unopposed at both elections; in the other—Bournemouth—a by-election Independent polled 4.7 per cent of the votes, drawing about equally from Conservative, Labor, and Liberal, and leaving no definable trend for the division.

Given the small shifts involved in these by-elections of 1952 it would be impossible to predict the course of the next British general election with any surety, the more so since the later by-elections have not small, but tiny, changes. However, past by-elections have been very sound in predicting at least the general trend of subsequent general elections and there is no reason to believe the future will be any less reliable than the past. For those concerned with the results of the next British general election, the by-elections of 1953 and 1954 should prove most revealing.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Contemporary Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching. A Symposium Developed by UNESCO. (Paris: UNESCO. 1950. Pp. 714. $5.00.)

Social Science Research Methods. By Wilson Gee. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 1950. Pp. vii, 391. $4.00.)

Field Theory in Social Science. Selected Papers by Kurt Lewin, edited by Dorwin Cartwright. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1951. Pp. xx, 346. $5.00.)

One of the first projects UNESCO undertook, so we are told in the introduction to the volume *Contemporary Political Science*, was a review of "methods in Political Science." Among the reasons there given are its "newness," the "uneven character of its present development," and the "distinct trends to be observed." The author of this introduction, Massimo Salvadori, thinks that "certainly" political science is more recent than law, political economy and sociology. This seems a strange assertion in view of the fact that the Greeks, who started many of the modern sciences, recognized a distinct political science of high sophistication, while they did not initiate a science of law, and did not recognize a distinct science of either political economy or sociology. As to the scientific claims of sociology, the world of scholarship is divided to this day. But the view expressed by the writer of the introduction does not seem to be shared by many of the contributors to the volume, who variously trace political science back to the sixteenth century or to antiquity. Salvadori himself speaks of the foundation of the chair of politics at the University of Upsala in the seventeenth century. (The date is not 1662, as here given, but 1622, as correctly stated by Hastad on page 150.) The only reason for mentioning this matter is that there would be little basis for undertaking such a review, if political science were so recent a newcomer; actually it is probably one of the oldest of all sciences. As for the other two reasons, we know of no field of research in which development is not uneven, if by that vague phrase is meant that some aspects of it are more fully developed than others, nor do we know of one in which there are not various distinct trends. In short, we conclude that UNESCO had no particular reason for starting with political science, except that those in charge are interested in it, as indeed they well might be. As regards this point, one is tempted to quote from Thomas I. Cook's able paper: " . . . political science in the United States has grown rapidly as an independent discipline, but . . . is more independent than disciplined, has revolted unduly against its progenitors, and has become as rootless as it is active."

UNESCO's report is divided into two major parts, one presenting individual papers on political science in the various countries; the other, papers on specific fields. The second part is subdivided into four chapters, dealing with political institutions; parties, groups and public opinion; international relations; and the organization of teaching and research. However, these latter topical divisions are actually organized according to the country pattern also, resulting inevitably in a good deal of overlapping. Part One is rather ambitiously entitled: "Political Science: Object, Methodology, Theory and Surveys." Austria, India, France, Switzerland, Uruguay, Sweden, the Middle East, Canada, Poland, Argentina, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Japan, Australia, the USSR, Belgium and China are dealt with, and in this order. Why in this order? Because the editors—unfortunately—decided to print the papers in accordance with the alphabetical order of the authors. The haphazard nature of the compilation could not have been more vividly portrayed than by this device. Actually, the United States is represented by three and France by two papers; no explanation is given for this plethora of material. The most striking omission is Germany; it is brought in by the back door, so to speak, in an undistinguished and obsolete paper by Adamovitch, the venerable Austrian judge whose old-fashioned notions are further mangled by a poor translation. The omission is the more astonishing, since a number of the other papers refer again and again to the fact that political science in their countries follows the German tradition, or insist upon the basic importance of such German authors as Max Weber, Hegel or Marx. Yet the editors evidently never caught on.

It is manifestly impossible to do justice to the many interesting perspectives that the several country reports open up. Suffice it to say that the best ones among them avoid the unfortunate tendency of many to present essentially a selected bibliography of recent writings in the broad field of politics. Would it not have been wiser to organize an appendix in which a selected bibliography covering all the countries might have been compiled, thus freeing the authors of these papers for more penetrating analysis? Would it not also have been wiser to group these papers in accordance with such broader regional patterns as Latin America, Scandinavia, and the British Dominions? Surely the report would have gained in both lucidity and comprehensibility from such a procedure.

R. Aron's paper on political science in France and that of B. S. Keirstead and F. M. Watkins on Canada are perhaps the best, with W. A. Robson's on Great Britain following closely. In these three studies there emerges a clear picture of how political science is placed within the totality of the social sciences. Robson's paper, while reviewing particular works, still manages to bring out the vital empirical pattern of British political science; he notes that in spite of fine work in theory and its history, there is an insufficient link between political theory and practice which is perhaps not unrelated to another defect, namely that "political theory in Great Britain has proceeded on the assumption that men are rational beings." A theory cast into such a rationalistic frame cannot but remain remote from studies of political reality. Canadian political science appears to be suffering from the same defect, reinforced by the close association with and subordination to economics which has been Canada's special tradition. France, by contrast, has neither the realistic and empirical studies of Great Britain and Canada, nor the rationalistic theory, but instead "has clung desperately to its inherited ideologies; it has continued the outmoded debate between the ancient monarchy and the revolution; it has concentrated only on the peculiar treasures of her own political arrangements." But even as regards the latter, Aron's paper is filled with questions rather than reviews of work accomplished and he grimly notes that this may be due to the French preference for discussion rather than investigation. What he considers the twofold indifference to fact and theory alike, while certainly noticeable in France, is equally characteristic of most of Europe, with few exceptions.

Needless to say, it is impossible to enter here into a discussion of the numerous substantive papers in the sections dealing with specific fields, such as comparative institutions, local government, parties and public opinion, and international relations. While a number of the individual papers are interesting, the total effect is a considerable hodge-podge, with no attempt to establish any sort of coordination or interrelation. I found the paper by M. Duverger on the study of political institutions in France interesting, though it too is largely bibliographical. The author's bias is revealed in, for example, his firm praise of Charles Maurras. Such praise is, of course, traditional with French intellectuals, and shows their tendency to overvalue brilliance as contrasted with soundness, and literary merit above scientific breadth and thoroughness. Another good paper is contributed by Merle Fainsod on the study of government and economic life. The author's established competence in the field and methodological sophistication oblige him to recognize the limitations of political science in the field of public economic policy, yet he is right in insisting that "the political scientist has an important contribution to make to the analysis of public economic policy." Unfortunately, it remains somewhat uncertain just what this specific contribution might be.

Papers by F. Goguel, Peter Odegard and D. Thomson on the state of research on parties and public opinion in France, the United States, and Britain, respectively, reflect the professional quality of their authors; yet one wonders whether an exchange of the papers among them and eventual consolidation into one comprehensive and comparative analysis would not have been more revealing. For even the basic referents, such as the party, are at variance, and no attempt is made to correlate the several analyses with some of the leading definitions. Similar general comments might be made about the section on international relations. Here we find five papers, dealing with international relations in the Soviet Union, France, Britain, the United States, and "German-speaking countries." The last, by Verdross of Vienna, deals only with international law. The greatest defect in this section is the failure to take adequate account of the very considerable contribution diplomatic historians have made to the field of international relations in Europe; the whole section is rather juridical in its orientation.

All in all, it is very doubtful, in the opinion of this reviewer, whether the approach followed in this volume was the wise one, if an assessment of contemporary political science was desired. For the broader lines of development are obscured, the relations with the other social sciences are dealt with incidentally and inconsistently, and the future course of the field is left obscure. The attempt to bring the Soviet Union into such an appraisal is of dubious value, since no political science worthy of the name does or can exist in totalitarian dictatorships; the virtual omission of Germany gives the whole the quality of a torso.

Two fairly recent studies in method may serve as a contrast to the UNESCO report. One, Wilson Gee's *Social Science Research Methods*, demonstrates that treating the methodological issues of all the social sciences together has distinct advantages. The author, after some rather pedestrian introductory comments on the social sciences and current trends, and on the meaning of research, takes up what he calls the "logical methods," and follows this with a chapter each on the case method, the statistical method, the historical method, the survey method, and the experimental method. Since the book is intended as a teaching aid, each chapter is rounded out by some questions and suggested readings. Yet, curiously, the treatment does not touch upon Max Weber or Pareto, upon Lasswell, Kluckhohn or Mead, in short upon the sharp controversies raging at present. It is, however, built upon certain particular works, e.g., A. Wolf's, the entire treatment proceeding in the form of extended quotations and connecting comment.

Very different is the approach of Kurt Lewin's *Field Theory in Social Science*. For here we have expounded, in a series of papers, the brilliant methodological approach of the late author, one of the outstanding psychologists of our time. Lewin does not actually deal with political science, but the bearing is clear. He asserts that "power does not have the same dimension as psychological force." For that reason, Lewin would not identify the "power field" with the "force field." The greater power of A may not mean pressure upon the lesser power of B. Interestingly enough, Lewin suggests further that values are constructs which have the same psychological dimension as power fields. These are intriguing suggestive generalizations which certainly deserve further exploration by political scientists.

If Gee's is a general survey, and Lewin's is a specific challenge, they yet both have more significance in connection with any discussion of methodology in political science than the vague, inchoate, and contradictory suggestions on the subject contained in the UNESCO volume. It seems very clear that if UNESCO wishes to make real contributions to the international cooperation of researchers and intellectuals, it will have to free itself of the tendency to international kowtowing, of the tendency to avoid conflict and controversy, and of the fear of "taking a stand." This reviewer cannot help feeling that three or four group reports, made after a sufficient number of get-togethers by individuals outstanding in three or four countries where something is happening, and implemented by a discriminating annotated bibliography, would have told the reader a great deal more about contemporary political science than does the volume here reviewed.

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The New Science of Politics: An Introductory Essay. By Eric Voegelin. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 193. $3.00.)

Professor Voegelin occupies an unusual place in American political science. He is one of the most distinguished interpreters to Americans of the non-liberal streams of European thought. To this professional vocation he brings a remarkable breadth of knowledge, and a historical imagination that ranges frequently into brilliant insights and generalizations. With such a peculiar excellence, he reduces the shock to the average political scientist when he is led outside of the presuppositions of liberalism, a shock that is a part both of the process of self-interpretation and self-education.

The current volume thinks of a new political science as the body of theory that is emerging from the obsolescence of positivist liberalism (pp. 8 ff.). A new science of politics will theorize until its principles meet the philosophy of history, and until there is a return to consciousness of principle. According to Voegelin, "the attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge" (p. 20). The author develops his case almost entirely outside of the vocabulary of traditional political science, but this is probably the only way by which the alternative interpretation can be stated with effectiveness. Every society, the author believes, is seeking a principle of self-interpretation and a statement of what it represents. Three levels are offered on which this objective may be stated: the elemental, the existential, and the transcendental. At the elemental level, one may describe the structural articulation of modern representative government; at the existential, one reaches a symbolism or a statement of meaning of the political truth that a society embodies (pp. 59 ff.); and at the transcendental level the great dualisms of human experience return, in which theory at its best may explain death, love, and justice.

It is, of course, the transcendental level and its relation to the science of politics that concern the author. Between 800 B.C. and 300 B.C. the human mind opened; it became conscious of philosophy in the Greek sense, and the idea of the "theory" of politics was born. However, the philosopher was the true type, as he sought the explication of the transcendental experience of men, while the intellectual or the sophist failed to become a "mature man" in the Aristotelian meaning of the word. Likewise, the philosopher was concerned with the relation of man to God, and the judgment of social relations in this light. The psyche became the sensorium of transcendent truth, while society became in measure a representative of it as well. In essence, Voegelin seeks to demonstrate that the maximum differentiation of human experience is to be found in philosophy and in Christianity; here is the orbit of theory; it is here that the emergence of a new science of politics is to be observed; and it is here that the *doxai* or ideologies of liberal revolt attack with desperate but failing hope.

Voegelin describes various historical situations. He deals with the struggle within the Roman Empire between the old representation and the new Christian force; the Puritan ideology, and the caustic analysis offered by Richard Hooker of the new mass movement; and the Hobbesian statement of a civil theology, ending in the totalitarian movements of our time. But what he is concerned with primarily is that the effort to divinize the here and now, the temporal order, means the suppression of the truth of the soul in favor of a civil theology. Modernity in essence began in the ninth century of our era, and it was and has been precisely the effort through knowledge to make society imminent and divine. This Voegelin calls the "Gnostic Revolution," that gained force with Joachim of Flora's "Third Realm" and ends in the present, for the totalitarianism of our time is the "journey's end of the Gnostic search for a civil theology" (p. 163). Modernity is simply the growth of Gnosticism.

The author takes his stand with the truth of the soul and against the civil theology that seeks to unite the existential with the transcendental. During the last half century the reconstruction of a science of man on such a basis has made its advances. Its exponents see that the Gnostic dream world is not the real world, and for them there is no sliding transition from liberalism to communism that may be observed in a modern writer like Harold Laski. Its exponents show no intellectual paralysis before either National Socialism or communism, that is, before modernity without restraint. Among the English and the Americans, thinks Voegelin, one finds the greatest restraint, and here perhaps in the end the truth of soul can resist the modern Gnostic and liberal revolution. Voegelin would insist, and this is surely part of his achievement, that there can be a science of politics that is not mere elemental analysis of power or the group process, and which is likewise not merely the mythology of a total nation; it will not be the currently conventional liberal or secular science of politics, for it will rest on the Greek and Christian vision of philosophy.

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Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor: A Study in Anti-Intellectualism. BY RICHARD HUMPHREY. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. 246. $4.00.)

The Genesis of Georges Sorel: An Account of His Formative Period Followed by a Study of His Influence. BY JAMES H. MEISEL. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr Publishing Company. 1951. Pp. 320. $5.00.)

These two studies (together with Scott H. Lytle's succinct essay in *Modern France*, edited by E. M. Earle, Princeton, 1951) represent the most ambitious efforts yet made in English to interpret the thought of the "baffling, misunderstood, and maligned" Georges Sorel. It is sometimes a minor catastrophe in scholarship when two texts on the same subject appear simultaneously, but such is not the case here. Each author has his own purpose and viewpoint, and each sheds much new light on a complex personality and the intellectual environment in which he lived. Humphrey's work is the slighter of the two, yet stands as a model of well arranged, if not always conclusive, analysis. Professor Meisel's study suffers from loose organization, and incidentally from a distracting lithoprint crawling with mechanical errors; but these deficiencies are more than compensated by his penetrating insights and the richness of his documentation. Of particular interest is his presentation of Sorel's relationships with Croce, Pareto, and Michels, and his discussion of Sorel's influence.

Humphrey starts from the essential point that the "unity of Sorel's work, and its real impetus, are to be found in his unremitting search for some new ethical principle that might bring about a rejuvenation of modern society" (p. 9). This moral impulse was joined to a pessimistic belief that all cultures are subject through history to the forces of entropy and decadence, stayed only by occasional moments of grandeur in which a new faith, an ideology reflecting material conditions yet also the result of individual and social will, recreates a dynamic unity. For his own day Sorel concluded (at least in his *Reflections on Violence*, 1908) that a new morality must be sought in the discipline of creative, autonomous, industrial labor; while a new faith could be borne only through the myth of the general strike, which would bring into play the essential idealism, the sense of personal significance and responsibility, of the proletariat. Violence must be threatened, if not actually invoked, to produce a sharp division between the classes and a decisive result. Finally, from the feelings aroused by the challenge of the syndicalist strike would come the motivations for a substantial advance in the quality and quantity of the industrial product.

What are we to make of this ingenious hypothesis, put together in Sorel's book-cluttered garret in Boulogne-sur-Seine, and flashing the facets of Rousseau's general will, Hegel's free spirit, Proudhon's morality of labor, Marx's class struggle, and Bergson's *élan vital?* Humphrey's thesis is that while Sorel's formula is a disappointment as a description of the actual course of the syndicalist movement, it nonetheless reveals a profound understanding of the causes and the necessary cure of the sickness of industrial civilization. He suggests that Sorel is to be grouped with Nietzsche and Freud. "All three of them saw that the system of organization that was giving man unparalleled power over his environment could at the same time create such an intolerable burden that the individual might well be crushed by it. Whether they set as their ideal the superman, the whole man, or the creatively free workingman, they were seeking in the best tradition of humanism for a set of values that might permit man to express himself in responsible action with his fellows" (p. 218). "All of these images represent . . . man freely conscious of his power and exercising it without fear in the control of his environment" (pp. 220–221).

Humphrey has found the right company for Sorel, but his generosity in concluding that "the basic problem remains as he stated it" (p. 223), strikes one as excessive. It is now too late to admire the glittering paradox involved in verbalizations that assert that the power drive in individuals and in groups must be freed rather than repressed as the condition for the realization of creative harmony. With Sorel the myth of syndicalist violence swallows up any criteria of "humanism" or "responsible action" that might inform the search for a "set of values." The ultimate premise of Sorel's system was stated in his early work, *Le procès de Socrate* (Paris, 1889, p. 44): "According to a law of our nature we wish to have something indemonstrable to believe." Even if one accepts this metaphysic (Humphrey apparently does; this reviewer does not), the difficulties of showing how socially useful indemonstrable values, apart from the value of conflict as an end in itself, can emerge from a context of social violence are not resolved by an appreciation of the poetic character of Sorel's imagery.

Meisel's researches probe beneath the surface of this problem. One key to the puzzle of Sorel he finds in Croce's criticism of Sorel's methodology. Croce had pointed out (in a preface to the Italian edition of the *Reflections*) that Sorel attempts to separate scientific history and religious faith, making the former simply a factual description of the impact of the latter on human institutions. But this is impossible. All history includes a judgment of the causes and consequences of faith, because all history is an interpretation of reality conducted more or less consciously in terms of philosophical categories. Meisel observes: "The most dangerous character of this thrust is obvious; Sorel's rejection of psychologic history, on the surface of it a defense of theology, is also, and perhaps primarily, the vindication of his doctrine of the social Myth as a force impervious to all factual inquiry. If religious faith has to 'show cause' as to its scientific value, then the secularized faith that mirrors itself in a myth, likewise becomes subject to the pragmatic test; in losing its charmed character it preserves little if anything of its usefulness as a suggestive doctrine of political action" (p. 285). Clearly, it is this device of holding the content of the myth sacrosanct that enables Sorel to indulge in the illogic of deriving from it the union of individual creativity with mass action, faith and heroism with material objectives, and increased production with industrial strife.

Meanwhile the prediction of the impact of the myth proved to be something less than scientifically accurate. Meisel traces the present irrelevance of syndicalist theory to the simple fact that "time has run out on the proletariat, heroism or no heroism" (p. 279). It was necessary to Sorel's theory that the capitalist power remain in force. But the shift from a capitalist dominated economy to a state socialism friendly to the workers happened before the proletariat had sufficient time to develop its full strength or its new morality. However, the possibility must be recognized that syndicalist theory may still have its influence in a context not conceived by Sorel; perhaps, as Meisel suggests, as part of a reaction to the bureaucratization of democratic socialism, more probably among those peoples where the workers' interest has become the touchstone of political ideology and where there yet exists some desire to escape the totalitarian impasse reached by Marxism in Russia.

To read these two important treatises is to become aware that Sorel reveals, as few other thinkers, the preoccupations, the subtleties, and the torments of contemporary French politics. His defense of the myth of syndicalist violence as an adequate secular response to a deeply felt need for a unifying ethic illustrates the French capacity for making the rejection of faith a faith in itself.

His ability to project hypotheses unhindered by empirical considerations suggests the gulf that exists between thought and action in French political life. His pessimism is the natural consequence of the fact that every French revolution has ended in a disappointment. He was not so much the prophet of the modern age as the victim of his country's history.

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Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory. BY MAX HAMBURGER. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. Pp. xvi, 191. $3.75.)

The commendable purpose of the present work is to determine "What theories [of jurisprudence] of enduring value" are to be found in Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Rhetoric* (p. xiii). The author is severely critical of the "super-historicism" that confuses the account of "the historical and genetic development of Aristotle's mind and work" with the "essence of his teachings" (pp. xi, xii). This would seem to promise an interpretation and evaluation of Aristotle's legal theory, with the genetic method used only as an instrument to establish the meaning of Aristotle's text. Unfortunately, however, much of the book is a polemic against Werner Jaeger and "his pupil Walzer." The weight of the attack, moreover, bears not on the genetic method, as abused by historicism, but on a specific application of that method by Jaeger. Jaeger had maintained that the *Magna Moralia* was a short manual compiled by a late peripatetic, out of the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. Hamburger asserts that it is an early and authentic work of Aristotle. In the opinion of this reviewer, the method employed by Hamburger is not fundamentally different from that of Jaeger, and is insufficient to decide the question.

It is to the author's credit that he himself states the most telling objection to this method: "Jaeger, in his startling theory, had arranged the eight books of the *Politics* in a genetic sequence III, II, VII, VIII, IV, V, VI, I, supposedly corresponding to diverse 'strata' in Aristotle's development. In the introduction to his recent translation of the *Politics* [Sir Ernest] Barker restores the original order I-VIII. Here the crucial question is whether a 'realistic' method can be distinguished from an earlier 'idealistic' one belonging to a time when Aristotle was still under the influence of Plato. According to Barker—and the present writer concurs—the only conclusion warranted in this connection is that Aristotle handled different themes in different ways" (p. 3). Barker's critique of Jaeger pointed out that the problem of explaining the diverse "strata" exists only if one assumes that the different parts of the *Politics* are mutually inconsistent. And Barker has shown convincingly, I think, that this assumption is untenable.

Hamburger's chronology, like Jaeger's, is determined by the interpretation of the texts it is meant to fit. He takes up a number of juridical topics, then summarizes or paraphrases successively the arguments of *Magna Moralia*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There follows a comparison of the several accounts "with regard to their perfection in relation to pre-Aristotelian thought and to the degree of their perfection" as representations of Aristotelian thought (p. 5). It will be seen from this that everything depends upon how Aristotelian thought in its perfection is conceived. This decided, the chronology follows, so that, e.g., if it is discovered that the formulations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are generally the longest of the three, this can be held to represent the fullness of maturity; but when that work happens to be the briefest on a given point, the superiority of conciseness is acclaimed. It is unfortunate for his general chronological thesis that the author agrees with von Arnim that "the crowning word of Peripatetic Ethics, for which we wait in vain in EN [*Nicomachean Ethics*] or even in EE [*Eudemian Ethics*]" is a passage in *Magna Moralia*. This should make it a late work. Since, however, *Magna Moralia* is held to be immature in comparison with the other works, someone might have concluded that Jaeger was right in regarding this immaturity as a sign of spuriousness. Therefore a passage from *Magna Moralia* was needed, rising "to such heights of lucidity in formulating the leitmotiv of Aristotelian Ethic" that it would be "hard to believe that a Peripatetic of Theophrastus' day, so indifferent to precise definition" could have written it (p. 6). This passage, which is held to represent "the quintessence of Aristotelian ethics strikingly opposed to Socratic-Platonic rationalism," reads: "Speaking generally, it is not the case . . . that reason is the principle of and guide to virtue, but rather the feelings." This opposition is much less striking, however, when the passage is read along with the immediately preceding sentence. There it is asserted that virtue requires *both* right reason and disciplined passions, and that neither alone is sufficient. Similarly, when the author paraphrases Aristotle to say, in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* that "All virtues are a mean between two extremes" he neglects the important qualification that "what is intermediate is [also] an extreme," and hence that virtue is an extreme "with regard to what is best and right" (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1107a9). Finally, the author is so impressed by Aristotle's repeated asseverations that ethics and politics are the sphere of probable, rather than necessary reasoning, that he does not consider that the general context within which they occur might affect their meaning. Accordingly, at the end of the book he identifies Aristotle with John Dewey in the view that "there is no absolute certainty within the domain of morals and law," and with Bertrand Russell in the view that " 'ultimate questions of value . . . are legitimately matters of feeling' " (pp. 164, 165). Yet is there, according to Aristotle, anything more certain than the superiority of the philosophic life to, e.g., the political life? Or that those who feel otherwise are simply wrong? (Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1177a18 and b15 ff.)

These objections suggest the kind of problems which would have to be resolved before the author's interpretation of Aristotle's ethical writings could be taken as authoritative. Without such resolution, his discussion of the chronology of the texts seems destined to be as inconclusive as Jaeger's discussion of the order of the books of the *Politics* appears in the light of Barker's critique.

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Ethics in Government. BY PAUL H. DOUGLAS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 114. $2.25.)

Morality in American Politics. BY GEORGE A. GRAHAM. (New York: Random House. 1952. Pp. xiii, 337. $3.50.)

Ethical Standards in Government. (REPORT OF A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82nd Cong., 1st session. 1951. Pp. iii, 89.)

Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government. (HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. 1951. Pp. v, 577.)

Senator Douglas and Professor Graham were associated in the work of the Douglas subcommittee on ethics in government which made its report in 1951, the Senator as chairman and the professor as a consultant. Each of them has now set forth his own additional reflections upon the troublesome problems of ethics and morality in American government and politics. In the main, they agree in their interpretation of the great wealth of data produced in the hearings before the subcommittee and there is a basic consistency in their proposals for improvement. Senator Douglas concentrates his diagnosis within a narrower range of problems and emerges with recommendations which are more concrete. Professor Graham probes more widely and deeply (in three times as many pages) and is more cautious in his prescriptions.

The most striking characteristic of these three commentaries on governmental ethics is the consensus among them concerning major premises (an agreement shared in considerable part also with Paul H. Appleby's *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*). This consensus may be summarized as follows: Governmental ethics are a product of and can be understood only within the context of the moral climate of American life. Public ethics have steadily if not dramatically improved. The ethical standards of American public life are today markedly higher than the standards of yesterday; one item of proof is the widely felt outrage following recent disclosures which our grandfathers would have taken for granted. The ethics of public life are generally, and must continue to be, above the level of some practices tolerated in non-governmental activities (item: the bribe-giver seldom shares the odium or the punishment of the bribe-taker). There are comparatively few corrupt public officials in the United States; however, they manage not only to do considerable damage to the fabric of public policy but also to tarnish the reputation and prestige of the whole public service. Among the sinners, the bureaucrat is neither the most prominent nor the most frequent offender; there is also considerable ground for believing that the permanent bureaucracy has a record of ethics superior to that of the patronage staffs (although local police seem to supply the notable exception that proves the rule). The severest strictures of the observers are reserved for the legislators.

On causes and remedies there is basic agreement but considerable divergence in emphasis. The Senator sees violations of ethical standards as being concentrated in the "action-laden" areas of governmental activities; he would welcome a swing back toward a free market economy as one remedy, and he urges the development of codes of conduct and procedure as another important solution. The professor does not disagree, but he emphasizes as deeper causes certain habits and attitudes among the American people and persistent weaknesses in our political institutions. His prescription is a broad restatement of the goals which American political scientists have worked out over many years of study for the improvement of our methods of governance. These goals, which the Senator also endorses explicitly or implicitly, boil down in principle to ways of clarifying and sharpening the assignments of authority in our governmental system, of tightening the lines of responsibility in the executive hierarchy, of increasing the visibility of all those who make decisions and of the ways in which decisions are made, and of developing and using standards of good conduct in public life. These standards and their potentialities are a subject of recurrent preoccupation not only for the Senator and the professor but also for most of the witnesses before the subcommittee. Codes of ethics, whether fixed in statutes or in less formal terms, are seen as serving several purposes: providing new aspiration levels for public officials, providing the basis for sanctions and penalties against unethical practices, and introducing new certainties concerning proper conduct where ambiguities now flourish.

These volumes represent not the full diagnosis and solution but a promising beginning of the task of meeting the problem posed by Senator Douglas: "What could be tolerated when government was small cannot be endured when government is big. For its consequences, if not its causes, can be relatively worse."

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Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL CREDIT CONTROL AND DEBT MANAGEMENT. (82nd Congress, 2nd Session. 1952.)

(1) *Replies to Questions and Other Material for the Use of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management.* (*Joint Committee Print, Parts 1 and 2.*)

(2) *Hearings Pursuant to Section 5(A) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress), March 10–31, 1952.*

These volumes present the results of a congressional investigation into the conflict over monetary policy between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board in late 1950. Representative Wright Patman's Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, with the staff assistance of economist Henry C. Murphy, has elicited points of view and factual data from all official and nonofficial groups concerned. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and other less directly affected government agencies have been put on the record concerning their recommendations not only about the substantive content of monetary, credit and public debt policy but also about the process of, and organization for, policy formulation in this field. Questions directed to these officials included the extent of policy guidance from Congress, the powers of policy formulation in the executive branch, the ways of settling policy conflicts among governmental agencies, and recommendations for modifications in existing interagency relationships. The official replies to these questions are printed in the two volumes of the *Joint Committee Print.*

More valuable to political scientists because of the greater degree of attention focused on the process of policy formulation in this important aspect of national economic planning are the *Hearings* before the Subcommittee. The political scientists called to testify were Paul Appleby, James K. Pollock, Harold Stein and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr. Collectively they made a substantial contribution to the theory of political organization for economic planning.

The Subcommittee held several panel discussions. The one entitled "How should our monetary and debt management policy be determined?" produced extremely provocative theoretical discussions of policy development in the federal government. The participants in this panel were G. L. Bach, E. A. Goldenweiser, Jacob Viner, Harold Stein and Lucius Wilmerding.

The economists testifying unanimously supported an arrangement in which the central banking system should be a little outside of the regular policy-making process and have a degree of independence from the political pressures being exerted through the President and the Congress. In general, the economists start with their desired monetary policy, which they recognize is an unpopular policy in inflationary periods but which they regard as crucial for national welfare. Next they see our pressure group democracy bearing down on their sound policy. As a result they support organizational arrangements deemed to be conducive to the formation of "good" monetary policy. Dr. Goldenweiser stated this clearly on page 766 of the *Hearings:* "And so, I think that independence of the Federal Reserve . . . holds out the best promise of correct decisions in this very vital matter." The President and his Secretary of the Treasury are potential violators of the good policy of credit restrictions and stable money, because these public officials are under pressures from inflationary forces and because they face the great problem of managing the public debt. Moreover, Congress itself should be partially checked from interfering with monetary policy as worked out by the Federal Reserve Board. Again Dr. Goldenweiser expresses it clearly: "I would like to add . . . something that may be rude, but it ought to be in the record, and that is that Congress is an inflationary body because the groups in the population that are in favor of inflation are vastly better organized than many millions who suffer from inflation and are not organized, and I think that it is very wise for Congress to have a few hurdles between itself and direct influence on current credit policies" (*Hearings*, p. 776). Thus an independent agency staffed by and thinking along the lines of economists and bankers who possess the motivation for sound monetary policy is a helpful way to achieve the national interest. It is a way of aiding our democratic system to take unpleasant but necessary economic policies.

Political scientists Pollock and Appleby begin with the desirability of having policy conflicts settled by means of the hierarchy of the executive branch for the sake of unified responsibility. They see independent agencies like the Federal Reserve Board as clientele agencies with supporting clusters of special interests. Any policy-making agency should be brought under hierarchical controls so that at each successive level broader responsibility, knowledge and judgment can be brought to bear in behalf of more general public policy. Hierarchical controls provide a channel for general concern by relating conflicting policies to each other and moving toward general public policy. The independence of the Federal Reserve Board derogates from the hierarchical working out of public policy, and it should gradually be converted to a more responsible relationship to the Chief Executive. A central banking system must be integrated with larger governmental administrative machinery in order that its narrow, special point of view may be refined with broader considerations of national public policy with which monetary policy must be reconciled.

The economists and the political scientists, starting with different premises, make appropriate and logical deductions therefrom. There is no meeting point for their arguments.

However, one economist—George L. Bach—and one political scientist—Harold Stein—reveal in the hearings very similar analyses of the way to organize for the achievement of a monetary policy best adapted to the objectives of maximum employment and production for the nation. Both see advantage in having a separate agency which can contribute the greatest influence for a policy of economic and monetary stability and prosperity. A central banking agency to them has the advantage of being trusted to maintain monetary stability. Furthermore, it serves a valuable political function in that its decisions are accepted by bankers and other investors more readily than are the Treasury's.

These men see inflation control as one of the most difficult undertakings facing democratic government. The viewpoint that credit must be tightened in times of threatened inflation will not be adequately represented unless special arrangements are made. The Treasury is naturally impressed by the cost of the interest on the public debt, and the Congress and the President are under pressure from the demands of groups who desire easy credit. The problem, then, to which Mr. Bach and Mr. Stein turn is the design of an organization which will provide a built-in will to resist inflationary tendencies in the governmental process and will give this point of view as much influence as possible in the negotiation of public policy. In so doing they are not disturbed by the theoretical dilemma that, on the one hand, weighting the scales in favor of one point of view appears to violate the political equality of democracy, whereas eliminating the weighting threatens the economic results upon which democracy's survival is partially dependent. With refreshing realism, they admit (without saying it) that our whole governmental system is replete with built-in weightings and they do not even argue the rationale of adding another one. Furthermore, they imply (again without saying so) that a general theory of hierarchical control is not of great use in organizing for policy results in this field (or any other field). Organization is dependent on what policy influences one wishes to stress. The Hoover Commission's top-to-bottom hierarchical control blueprint does not suffice unless one is devoid of policy objectives, and these gentlemen are not.

Operating then on the principle that it is desirable to increase the influence and voice of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board permanently in the process of policy development, they both propose that the independence of the Board be reduced so that its influence can be increased. Previously the Federal Reserve Board, they conclude, has not made its position sufficiently felt in federal negotiations on anti-inflationary policy. Its weakness in policy councils has been the result not of a lack of independence, but rather of too much independence. It is not true (as is commonly assumed) that a commission derives strength from its independence when it operates in an area in which other agencies have major responsibilities. Congress wanted "to impose on itself, and on the President, a kind of barrier, if you like, to too quick response to the electorate, to the way the wind blows today and tomorrow" (Bach, *Hearings*, p. 782). But Congress made an "overadjustment" to the problem. It set up an agency so independent that it is outside of policy negotiation and hence has been weak in its influence in general credit control and debt policy.

Messrs. Stein and Bach reach a high degree of agreement about the way to give the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board more influence with the President and Congress. They point out that as a pure matter of informal organization the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has come to have in the last two years much more influence in policy formulation in the executive branch. This was first due to the assumption of the post of Chairman by Mr. William Martin, who was respected and trusted by both President Truman and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder. Under the Eisenhower Administration, the Treasury is largely staffed in its top echelon with men who accept the Reserve System's point of view or formerly worked in it.

What is needed is formal organization to make this Federal Reserve influence possible as a regular matter, namely, by means of closer working relations for the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board with the President's family of top financial advisers. The President would naturally have more confidence in him if he were designated to serve as Chairman at the pleasure of the President. Shorter terms for Board members would bring the President and the Board into closer relations. Finally, creation of a top-level monetary-fiscal advisory council in which the Federal Reserve Chairman sat would strengthen the voice of the Federal Reserve. As can be seen, these views are quite at variance with the traditional concept that the more independent an agency is from the political branches of government, the more influence it will have.

These gentlemen have then set forth an "operational theory" (although they do not say so) concerning the influence on public policy which different organizational relationships produce. It was derived by examining the relative weights of various groups in this particular area of policy making. When elaborated, this theory enabled them to penetrate beyond the overgeneralized theories about commissions deriving greater strength from greater independence, about independent commissions being closer to Congress than regular executive departments, and about the value of hierarchial controls as the solution of all policy problems and conflicts.

The similarity of the analyses of these two consultants from allied fields perhaps stems from the fact that each has probed the other's discipline. Abstraction of either "economics" or "politics" from the process of formation of public policy is apt to give distortions of viewpoint. The new area of the study of the development of public policy requires a bridging of the disciplinary lines. For this purpose a reading of the *Hearings* and the *Joint Committee Print* of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt Management is a rewarding experience.

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Administration of National Economic Control. BY EMMETTE S. REDFORD. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xvii, 403. $5.50.)

This solid, thoughtful book fills an important gap in the literature of government regulation of business. Its concern is not with issues of substantive public policy but with the administrative processes by which policy is formulated and elaborated and with the instruments and techniques through which it is refined and executed. Professor Redford has provided a comprehensive and unique inventory and synthesis of the kit of tools which has been developed in regulatory administration in recent decades.

While the major emphasis of the study is placed on mechanism and procedure, the political environment in which the regulatory bureaucracy functions is not neglected. One of the most suggestive chapters is devoted to an analysis of relations with interest groups and an exploration of ways in which "publicly-conditioned expertness" can guide and direct pressure politics toward a realization of "community purpose." Here, as elsewhere, the author reveals an awareness of the limits as well as of the potentialities of administrative initiative. His experience with the OPA during World War II has left a residue of lively respect for the obstructive capacities of pressure groups.

Insofar as this volume has a central thesis, it is that the major danger in the field of national economic control lies in the fragmentation and dispersal of regulatory authority rather than in the overweening arbitrary power of bureaucrats. "In our opinion," the author states, "the most serious present deficiency in the system of administrative control is the particularism of the administrative agencies and the claims made on their behalf for autonomy from overhead controls. . . . At the higher level of responsibility, where the President and Congress share authority, control over administration is weakened and dissipated. . . . The separation between the executive and Congress, the weakness of party controls within the Congress, the disintegration of the party system in the country, and the organization and persistence of functional and sectional interests, overextend the power of particularistic influences and weaken the ability of Congress and the President, acting together, to evaluate administrative performance and to use the legislative power as a means of giving new directives to administration."

Implicit in this analysis is a diagnosis of trends which the author never completely articulates but which nevertheless forms the basis of his argument. Put succinctly, it is that government unavoidably and necessarily plays an increasingly crucial role in the management and control of the economy and that this managerial responsibility cannot be efficiently discharged unless more effective means are found to coordinate and direct the autonomous islands of power in Congress and the executive establishment. This conviction leads the author to tilt a lance with the protagonists of the independent regulatory commissions and to advocate that Congress authorize the President to issue policy directives to the commissions in order to integrate their activities with those of other agencies subject to his control.

The author is not unaware of the factors which make for congressional reluctance to deposit such power in the presidency. But his sense of the dimensions and complexities of the problem of economic control impels him to consider the achievement of executive coordination as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of administrative reform. To those who see the role of government in less positive and promising terms and who view the plurality of action centers in administration as a safeguard against excessive concentration of political power, Professor Redford's argument will not be persuasive. On this issue, as in so many other debates on government organization, conflicting conceptions of proper structure grow out of fundamental differences of interest and political philosophy.

Whatever be the ultimate prospect for the strengthening of the President's directive power, the immediate likelihood that Professor Redford's suggestion will be adopted is not bright. Given the hard fact that power is dispersed in the autonomous principalities of the departments as well as in the independent commissions and the congressional committeees, one would wish that the author had devoted more attention to the techniques of inter-agency and executive-legislative negotiation. The search for the creative compromise is not merely a negative virtue. It may represent the most fruitful approach to coordination. But this caveat aside, Professor Redford has written a valuable and informative book. The views with which he disagrees are stated with scrupulous fairness and demolished courteously and effectively. His own modest program of reform is carefully worked out and buttressed by evidence which will be difficult to refute. He has cut a new furrow in regulatory administration and brought together a wealth of material which all students in the field will eagerly welcome.

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Problems of Nationalized Industry. EDITED BY WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 390. $5.00.)

This book, written by fourteen authors, deals penetratingly and authoritatively with the main issues of British socialization during the five year period, 1945–1950, when the Labour Government was putting through its major nationalization measures. In addition, Professor Robson contributes an essay formerly published in this REVIEW (June, 1950) dealing with the similarities and differences between British and French socialization during the same period. The book justifies its claim to its broad title by dealing topically, instead of programmatically, with subjects of universal interest, such as forms of organization, parliamentary control, and methods of judging efficiency. It achieves a new high as a unified, practical, and yet significantly theoretical contribution to the literature of public ownership. And it achieves what is usually so difficult in a symposium: a cohesiveness and completeness that is refreshing. The editor deserves credit for this result, which is doubtless also due in part to the fact that the book grew out of two previous publications: *Public Enterprise*, which Mr. Robson edited in 1937, and a special issue of the *Political Quarterly*, which appeared in 1950. However, of the fourteen essays found in the present publication, only six were included in the *Political Quarterly* symposium; and since the method in *Public Enterprise* was programmatic, while in the present one it is functional, most of the present material is new.

Students of political science and economics on this side of the Atlantic can be thankful for the many studies that have recently appeared on various aspects of British nationalization. John Longhurst's *Nationalisation in Practice* (1950) was largely a case study of civil aviation, but in concluding chapters he dealt broadly with generic problems; Ernest Davies wrote *National Enterprise* in 1946 and D. N. Chester, *The Nationalized Industries: An Analysis of the Statutory Provisions* (revised edition) in 1951; the Acton Society Trust performed a monumental service in sponsoring a series of research papers, *Nationalized Industry*, in 1950–51; and Ben W. Lewis, sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, has recently (1952) published *British Planning and Nationalization*. The Robson volume differs from Lewis' treatment in that it does not include planning; it gives more emphasis to the governmental aspect and to evaluation; and the outline is topical rather than programmatic.

Problems of Nationalized Industry is divided into two parts. In the first, consisting of 14 chapters, the subjects dealt with are the public corporation in Great Britain, compensation in the nationalized industries, the governing boards of public corporations, ministerial control and parliamentary responsibility, labor and staff problems under nationalization, and nationalized industries in Britain and France. The respective authors form a balanced team, having been recruited from Parliament, ministerial offices, chairs of political science and economics, and the nationalized industries themselves. Most of them, like G. D. H. Cole, Sir Arthur Salter, and Ernest Davies, are already well known for their scholarship and administrative accomplishments.

The second part of the book, consisting of almost 100 pages, is the editor's own analysis and evaluation. He examines all of the subjects that have previously been considered, in order to draw all of the threads together, integrate them, and try to indicate what tendencies and problems are likely to be important in the future. This he does with considerable skill and insight, taking pains to point out that most of the subjects dealt with are controversial and that full agreement on all of them cannot be expected. This last point is brought sharply to focus in Sir Arthur Salter's essay entitled, "The Crux of Nationalization," where he takes a generally dim view of Britain's readiness, even now, for experiments in nationalization as extensive as those described in this book.

If in the following I emphasize the highlights of the Robson evaluation more than the excellent chapters contributed by others, it is only because the editor's thesis is brought together in one place and hence lends itself more readily to summarization. The public utility stage of British economic development is over, the country is now in the nationalization era, and real socialization lies ahead. Socialization, interestingly discussed on pp. 346–348, involves "a genuine spirit of democracy." Professor Robson believes that "the outlook for Britain's nationalized industries is generally favourable" and he says on the concluding page that nationalization "has sprung from a great popular revolt against the ethics, the incentives, and the results of capitalist enterprise." I gather, however, that Sir Arthur Salter, and possibly other contributors, would not subscribe to so sweeping a statement. Percentages, says Professor Robson, do not give a true index of changes in the business-government relationship that have taken place. It is not enough to state that one-fifth to one-fourth of the economy has been nationalized and that one person out of four is in public employment. These are the key industries. And it is the spirit and motivation, more than the structure and the administrative method, that have been changed.

Professor Robson makes it clear, however, that a study of nationalization is essentially a study of the public corporation. Prior to 1945, only broadcasting was nationalized in the sense herein described. Since then, large, nation-wide monopolies have been created for electricity and gas, transportation, banking (central, not commercial), coal mining, and in other fields. The local governments, which previously owned two-thirds of electricity supply and rather more than a third of the gas industry, have now been divested of their properties and nineteenth-century municipal socialism of the Joseph Chamberlain variety is passé. The compensation of former owners, private as well as governmental, has been fair or more than fair. The corporate board is the hub of policy and administrative matters. Syndicalism has lost ground. Parliamentary control over public corporations increased under the Labour Government, but not so much as to interfere with corporate autonomy. Public relations is now considered so important that it has been accorded formal departmentation and the public is sometimes critical because the function is emphasized too much.

Among the problems on which further, intensive research is needed, the following stand out: First, as Professor Robson is the first to agree, more reliable and possibly more imaginative methods must be invented for judging the efficiency of enterprises, although I must admit considerable skepticism about the possibility, as suggested, of having a single commission created for this purpose. Second, pricing policies and financial policies generally appear to be in need of careful scrutiny. Third, and in many ways the most important and baffling problem of all, nationalization has brought about so much centralization and accompanying bureaucracy that management problems put the British administrative tradition, which fortunately is one of the best, to a severe test. Growing out of this development, and fourth, is the effect on local government generally, about which Professor Robson expresses serious concern. Fifth is the problem underscored in Sir Arthur Salter's essay, the effect of nationalization on Britain's overseas trade and her general competitive situation. A sixth problem is that of adequate technical and scientific research to support the nationalized industries, a difficulty which the author of an excellent chapter on that subject makes clear is far from being adequately solved. A seventh area involves the relation of claimant groups, and especially labor and consumers, to the nationalized industries, for doubt may arise, and in some cases has arisen, as to whether management can continue to be an impartial "broker of influence." And, finally, there is the whole problem of planning and policy and the relation of Parliament and the Government of the day to the powerful public corporations which are now the British analogues to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

The authors of *Problems of Nationalized Industries* make it clear that Britain may be grateful for a series of studies dealing with the public corporation going back to Herbert Morrison's *Specialization and Transport* in 1933. The intensities of some problems are greater than could be foretold, and a few unanticipated ones have cropped out, but the basic ones such as concentration, monopoly, bureaucracy, and human relations are inherent in technological culture, our own no less than the British or the French.

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Politics, Presidents, and Coattails. BY MALCOLM MOOS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1952. Pp. xxi, 237. $4.00.)

Malcolm Moos has added a useful volume to the still small but gradually growing number of factual studies in American political behavior. *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails* is a study in congressional elections with special emphasis on the interaction of congressional and presidential elections. The main body of statistical material relates to the seven congressional and three presidential elections, by districts, for the period 1938 to 1950. An appendix gives the voting percentages by districts for congressmen and president, and also the percentages for the senatorial elections.

In the first chapter Moos deals with presidential-congressional voting and makes the point that since World War I presidential candidates have received on the average about 12% more votes than the congressional candidates, compared with about 5% before 1916. The second chapter is a regional description of marginal districts—those where candidates receive 45% to 55% of the votes cast. The third chapter, on "Coattail Chasing," compares for a few selected districts the percentages of votes cast for Republican congressmen in the seven elections from 1938 to 1950 with those received by Republican presidential candidates in 1940, 1944 and 1948. The last two chapters deal with the "Politics of Electoral Leadership" and "Congressional Elections and the Politics of Tomorrow."

The statistical part of this study is on the "Coattails." Moos concludes that "Presidential Coattails, apart from the tides of their parties, do not boost significant numbers of congressional candidates into office." He finds 115 marginal districts (60 Republican and 45 Democratic), and only 42 critical districts (25 Republican and 17 Democratic), where the voting range is from 48.5% to 51.5%. Were he writing today, he would undoubtedly add that the difference between Truman's coattails of 1948 when 262 Democratic congressmen were elected and Eisenhower's coattails when 222 Republican congressmen were elected is only about 10% of the total number of seats in the lower house. My own studies show that on the average the difference between party strength in Congress in presidential election years and in mid-term years is the equivalent of only about 25 to 30 seats—about 7% of the total membership.

Nevertheless, the coattail problem is more important than Moos thinks. He tends to emphasize the vote received by the presidential candidate and by the congressional candidate in the same election. This may be a good measure of relative popularity. What is more instructive and significant is the contrast between the vote received by congressional candidates when no presidential candidate is in the field and when there is one. This is a more direct measure of the pulling power of the presidential coattails. Moos's tables, fortunately, give the names of the congressional candidates as well as their percentages, which should facilitate studies in the popularity of particular candidates over several elections with and without benefit of presidential coattails.

Moos recognizes but does not develop the real significance of elections with and without presidential coattails, i.e., the difference between party results in presidential and mid-term election years that may spell trouble for the party in power. I need only cite the Democratic losses in 1938, 1942 and 1950 and point to the troubles the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had because mid-term apathy cut down their working margin and therefore party legislative effectiveness in Congress. The fact that more than a third of the voters are unfamiliar with their congressmen and by not voting cut down the strength of the party in power in mid-term election years is to me the real coattail problem.

In the last chapter Moos deals with the great sectional differences that make for diversity in congressional policy and for conflict between the executive and legislative branches of our government. He presents the various views and proposals for improving our political structure. But he concludes that "our system of congressional elections, conducted though it is astride the contradictions and incongruities of our major parties—has served us well," and that "out of the healthy interaction of presidential leadership and congressional attitudes comes the gradualist tempo of change in public policy that has served us well." Moos does not define what he means by "well."

It is unfortunate that this book was not scheduled for publication six months later than it was. We would have had the benefit of Moos's views on how the 1952 election results fit into his statistical analyses and political judgments.

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Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration. BY EDWIN A. COTTRELL AND ASSOCIATES. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation.)

I. *Characteristics of the Metropolis.* BY EDWIN A. COTTRELL AND HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. xi, 120. Paper $1.75, cloth $2.25.)
II. *How the Cities Grew.* BY RICHARD BIGGER AND JAMES D. KITCHEN. (1952. Pp. xii, 256. Paper $2.50, cloth $3.00.)
III. *Regional Planning.* BY JUDITH NORVELL JAMISON. (1952. Pp. v, 103. Paper $1.25, cloth $1.75.)
X. *Personnel Management.* BY HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. vi, 69. Paper $1.25, cloth $1.75.)
XI. *Governmental Purchasing.* BY PAUL BECKETT, MORRIS PLOTKIN AND GEORGE POLLAK. (1952. Pp. vi, 134. Paper $1.50, cloth $2.00.)
XII. *Schools.* BY HELEN L. JONES. (1952. Pp. xi, 103. Paper $1.25, cloth $1.75.)

One of the challenging problems in the field of local government is subjected to detailed study and analysis in a series of sixteen monographs under the general title *Metropolitan Los Angeles: A Study in Integration.* The series will include, in addition to the monographs here reviewed, studies of law enforcement, health and sanitation, fire protection, highways, water supply, parks and recreation, libraries, finance and taxation, and intergovernmental relations, with a concluding volume entitled *The Metropolis: Is Integration Possible? Characteristics of the Metropolis* and *How the Cities Grew* serve as basic studies which lay the foundation for the other fourteen monographs. One-third of *Characteristics of the Metropolis* is devoted to what has been done in twelve American and three foreign cities towards integration. With this background of experience elsewhere, the physical, social, economic and political picture in the Los Angeles region is presented, and comprehensive proposals thus far made for governmental integration in the region are discussed. The problem and the challenge are clearly presented. One gets the feeling that something needs to be done; the remedy is left to the studies which follow in the series. In *How the Cities Grew* we have a detailed historical analysis of how the situation developed, when new cities were incorporated and why, annexation and consolidation experience, and the record of disincorporation. The authors reject, or at least qualify, the standard of efficiency and economy as the test for solving the metropolitan area problem. They question the wisdom of the Virginia plan of placing decisions as to annexation in the courts since this tends to deny the doctrine of home rule. They believe that if a city grows too large in physical size and population there is a loss of sense of community, and they prefer a "confused but healthy pattern of local government than a simple and efficient but impersonal and regimenting metropolitan-wide bureaucracy." This is carrying the principle of local self-determination further than many persons would accept. The authors do recognize the desirability of basing administration on a larger area and would accomplish this by greater use of intergovernmental contracts or joint boards for administration of municipal services.

Regional Planning sets forth, on the basis of the experience in Los Angeles, the obstacles that must be overcome before any complete coordination of planning in a metropolitan region can be attained. Since the City of Los Angeles comprises only 11 per cent of the total county area but furnishes 55 per cent of the property tax base for Los Angeles County, the taxpayers of the city object to the county's furnishing urban-planning services to the unincorporated areas and smaller cities at the expense of the City of Los Angeles. The difficult task facing a regional planning agency which serves merely as a means of coordination of the activities of many local governmental agencies is shown in the Los Angeles experience. The variation from other metropolitan areas is one of degree rather than of kind.

The results of cooperative efforts by local governments in the Los Angeles area in the field of personnel administration are reported in *Personnel Management.* It is both an interesting and encouraging story, showing how much can be accomplished by cooperative effort to reduce the duplication, the conflicts and the lack of economy in public personnel administration resulting from many separate governments operating in the same area. Extensive use is made of intergovernmental contracts—between local governments, and between local governments and the state—where personnel services are handled by one government for another on a contractual basis. The City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, and the Los Angeles Board of Education cooperate in testing candidates for certain positions and in other aspects of personnel administration. While some suggestions are made for further cooperative action, the study deals primarily with what has been done.

In *Governmental Purchasing* it is shown that only limited progress has been made in cooperative purchasing by local governments in the Los Angeles region; a chapter on "Co-operative Purchasing Outside the Los Angeles Area" is more encouraging. The authors believe that "some form of functional coordination in governmental procurement is imperative" in metropolitan areas and recommend steps in this direction in Los Angeles. The report on *Schools* will be of limited interest to persons outside the Los Angeles area.

A detailed study of metropolitan government in one community, as contrasted with a comparative study in many areas, may not only disclose what is wrong and what needs to be done in the region studied, but may also result in conclusions of general applicability. *Metropolitan Los Angeles* has the improvement of conditions in Los Angeles as its principal goal. The findings and the conclusions will, however, be of general interest and value, and all persons interested in metropolitan government will be grateful for this study.

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Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of Politics and Morals. BY R. E. MONEY-KYRLE. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1951. Pp. 183. $3.00.)

With sharp intellectual and literary discipline, the author of this solid little book succeeds admirably in accomplishing the purpose specified in the subtitle. Insofar as the quality of thought is concerned, the content remains constructively provocative throughout, though some of the conclusions reached are highly debatable. Despite the incomplete development of some ideas and the unsatisfactory documentation of others, the author sets forth his views directly and clearly, without the cumbersome and self-conscious apparatus of scholarship which our American profession seems increasingly to affect; moreover, this is accomplished without the extremes in overgeneralization and subjective judgment which occasionally characterize British books.

In certain specifics, the book is a series of reflections on the author's experience as a member of the German Personnel Research Branch of the Control Commission created at the end of the war and concerned with two aims: a social survey and the selection of "suitable Germans" as leaders for a democratic society. More broadly, however, it involves the application of a generalized synthesis of psychoanalytic theory to the roots of certain political phenomena. In this latter aspect, the contents provide a fruitful basis for comparison and contrast with similar efforts, particularly those by Franz Alexander and Harold Lasswell.

The formal organization follows two closely related paths of development: first, the establishment of "A Theoretical Basis for a Psychological Approach to Politics"; second, an examination of "Some Aspects of the Psychology of Politics" with chief reference to inter-group relations, group-individual relations, and the state as an influence upon the development of moral character. Perhaps the most interesting and central feature of the book from the political science viewpoint is this latter topic, for the author produces a universal, systematic and functional definition of both the "good state" and "normal character," and then seeks to defend them on entirely empirical grounds. This attempt is but one illustration of the plain implication throughout the book that the "moral relativism" which has so largely characterized social science in this century is a doctrine of diminishing returns and that its utility has been largely, if not entirely, exhausted.

The numerous points at which functional definitions of "authoritarian" personal and social character are developed in contrast to "humanist" tendencies should be of special interest to those pursuing the lines of inquiry pioneered by Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and others. The contents are also useful in comparison with such current studies as the supervision projects under Likert at Michigan and others elsewhere.

In his German personnel studies, the author found that the two conscience types which he defines—humanist and authoritarian—correlated both with home and occupational types. In the later consideration of group-individual relations, a detailed comparison of German "authoritarian" and English "humanist" movements broadens the above conclusion by providing "clear evidence of a causal link between two types of state and two types of character. In both, a change in the nature of the state, either towards the authoritarian or the humanist end of the scale, tended to be reproduced in the home and school, and so favoured the development of a character that modified the concept of the state still further in the same direction" (p. 122).

The "good state" defined by the author embodies "a high degree of freedom, a wide choice of creative sublimation, and the sympathetic, rather than mechanical, provision of security and welfare" (p. 137). The author claims no originality for this concept, beyond asserting that it "has been arrived at by new arguments that, perhaps for the first time, permit it to be defended empirically" (p. 137). Considerable stress is placed, however, on the point that psychoanalysis provides no magic formula for resolving political tensions, for the approach "presupposes that they [authoritarians] are at least prepared to listen" (p. 178).

The concept of "normality" in individual character is summarized as the integration of a person "whose mind has nothing permanently hidden from itself, and who is rational in the sense that the belief-systems governing his behavior are true within the range of his experience because they have been consciously tested" (p. 44). This is said to be "the kind of standard needed if we are to get beyond the relativist position in either politics or morals" (p. 45). The ultimate problem arising in the development of Money-Kyrle's arguments is, of course, the definition of "truth." Much depends on whether the reader accepts the "reality test" and the "test of consistency" (p. 40) as valid and adequate.

A most interesting line of inquiry in regard to party politics may be derived from the observation that "without the paranoid disturbances in thought produced by the mechanisms of splitting and projection, the party system as we know it would not itself be possible. Differences of opinion and differences of loyalty would of course remain to divide us into parties. But since each new issue would produce a new alignment, the parties would not stay the same" (p. 163).

Three points in the book are particularly questionable, notably the unqualified assertion that "political activity is designed to make widespread changes in the structure of society and of the state" (p. 123). Obviously, it may as often be devoted to the preservation of existing conditions. Secondly, the repeated equation of consciousness with insight and the asserted automaticity with which such equation occurs is not adequately supported. The comments on prejudice (pp. 27 ff.) are especially subject to this fault. Thirdly, in the correlation of authoritarianism and political immaturity (p. 135), the author fails to account for the fact that in the long course of history mankind has attained what freedom exists despite authoritarian systems.

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International Political Science Abstracts (with alternate title: *Documentation Politique Internationale*). BY THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES CONFERENCE. (Paris: UNESCO. Distributor in the U.S.A.: Columbia University Press, N. Y. $4.00 per year.)

Since the untimely demise in 1932 of the short-lived *Social Science Abstracts* political scientists have lacked an important tool of teaching and research. Within the United States the deficiency has been somewhat ameliorated by reason of the large number and comprehensive bibliographical coverage of our domestic professional journals. Even so, none of them pretends to anything approaching systematic analysis or even notation of all significant foreign material, especially that appearing in periodical publications. The initiative of the International Political Science Association, with the collaboration of the International Studies Conference and the financial underwriting of UNESCO, in establishing the *International Political Science Abstracts* as a quarterly review of world-wide coverage of the significant periodical literature in the field of political science, goes a long way toward correcting this deficiency.

Six issues of the quarterly have appeared to date, abstracting on a selective basis the literature of the field which has been published since the beginning of 1950. Volume I, which attempted the ambitious task of abstracting the literature of 1950 as well as the first nine months of 1951, contains summaries of 1447 articles, which appeared in 84 different periodicals. As a matter of policy, all articles in ten leading political science journals were abstracted, while selections were made from 74 other periodicals. Of the ten journals completely abstracted six were of American publication. Of the 74 selectively abstracted 14 were of American publication. However, the *Abstracts* even go behind the Curtain, with items from *Voprosi Filosofii* and *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* from Moscow, *Sprawy miedzynarodowe* and *Państwo i Prawo* from Warsaw, and *Tarsadalmi Szemle* from Budapest. The two issues of Volume II which have appeared to date cover the fourth quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952. They contain digests of 683 articles which appeared in 97 periodical publications, of which ten, as in the previous volume, were completely abstracted.

The quarterly is published in French and English. In the first two volumes, articles of French or English origin were abstracted in the language other than that of origin, while articles in all other languages were abstracted in the language chosen by the writer of the abstract. Beginning in 1953, however, all articles appearing originally in English will be abstracted in English, and all articles appearing originally in other languages will be abstracted in French. Each number is comprehensively indexed in English as well as in French, and a cumulative annual index is provided in the final number of each volume.

There is inevitable variation in the standards of the abstracts, but in the main they appear to be of an extremely high order of reportorial conciseness. It is, of course, possible to quarrel with the conceptual structure within which the editorial policy was erected, and even to question the validity, especially at the international level, of abstracts in a field less comprehensive than the totality of the social sciences. But when all the criticisms and comments have been made, there remains the monumental and imaginative achievement of the editors of *International Political Science Abstracts* in planning and executing a veritable *tour de force* in behalf of better teaching and research and closer international professional relations—all on a shoestring. The profession has ample reason for profound gratitude to the editorial board—Jean Meynaud, Saul Rose (recently succeeded by H. R. G. Greaves), and Bruce L. Smith—and especially to Jean Meyriat, the managing editor, as well as to the International Political Science Association and to UNESCO, for a significant contribution to the improvement of the tools of our trade.

ROWLAND EGGER.

University of Virginia.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Primary Elections in the South: A Study in Uniparty Politics. By Cortez A. M. Ewing. (Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 112. $2.75.)

This statistical study of southern primaries is based on the returns of 3,843 primary elections in eleven southern states between 1900 and 1948. These returns are processed into 36 tables in order "to determine . . . whether the intra-party struggle produces results that are at variance with the demands of democratic procedure."

Ewing varies the usual definition of the southern states by substituting Oklahoma for Virginia. Although the 3,843 primary returns do not comprise a complete collection of all primaries in the last half-century, anyone who has attempted to collect primary returns will realize that accumulating that many is a remarkable feat. Included are Democratic state, district, and local races plus a handful of Republican primaries.

The author examines the number of candidates who enter the primaries, the number of unopposed nominations, the advantages enjoyed by the incumbents, the closeness of the races, the variation in voter interest among offices, the frequency of runoffs, and the relation of top place in the first primary to victory in the runoff. In treating each subject the analysis covers the variations among states, among types of office (legislative, executive), among levels of government (local, district, statewide offices), and between the single- and the double-primary systems. Among his more important findings are that 40% of all nominations are unopposed; that incumbents, who are involved in three-fourths of all races, are virtually impossible to beat in non-local races; that most races are won by lopsided margins; and that in the double-primary system 84% of nominations are settled in the first primary. The last chapter, dealing with participation, has a somewhat different statistical basis and offers less new material.

The author's interpretations of his findings are not always as convincing as the basic statistical findings. No one will quarrel with the IBM machine's conclusions as to the average number of Democratic candidates for governor in each state. Yet when the author gives his explanation of why the average number is 7.38 in one state and only 3.56 in another, he resorts sometimes to broad generalizations about southern politics. Most of these generalizations coincide with my own prejudices, yet they are unsupported by arguments that would convince a skeptic.

The study attempts no startlingly new interpretation of southern politics. However, it gives us much new and detailed information on the workings of the Democratic primary and provides statistical proof that a one-party system is a feeble mechanism for democracy.—Donald S. Strong, *University of Alabama.*

Soil Conservation Districts in Action. By Robert W. Parks. (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 242. $3.50.)

The American people have come to realize the complexity as well as the importance of their conservation job. Recognition of the need for action to preserve the nation's soils has been followed by realization that the matter cannot be left entirely to the whim of the individual farmer. Governmental guidance, persuasion, and assistance are required, but no one level of government is equipped to do the job singlehandedly. A pooling of the peculiar competencies, energies, and resources of each level is indicated. Out of these conditions and needs, Professor Parks points out, grew the concept of the soil conservation district and an attempt to secure through it a new working arrangement which could merge in its operating process the values of both national and state programming and local democratic determination.

Over 2,400 districts have been established, and the number is growing. Some twelve thousand farmers now act as district supervisors—governors of their districts. Professor Parks records with competent scholarship and with objectivity the results of his six years of study and observation of the districts in operation. The district is analyzed and appraised as a governmental arrangement which has taken precedence over national, state, and county government as the administrative device for assisting farmers in getting conservation on the land. The critical question identified and considered by the author is: "Has the district so met the two large tests of effectiveness and democracy that its creation in addition to the traditional units of government has been justified?" The conclusion set out in an excellent final chapter on the future of the districts is hopeful but cautious: "The soil conservation district has not yet been sufficiently weathered by time for its value in future agricultural administration to be projected. Thus far, however, the district has demonstrated promising potentialities in developing a new working integration between national and local government as well as between the lay citizen and his government."

Soil Conservation Districts in Action should be widely read by participants in the affairs of these new units of local government, by others concerned with problems of agriculture and conservation, and generally by students of government and administration. The book will reassure those who fear that the federal government through its agricultural agencies has gained too much control over the farmers of America. Legal coercion and administrative standards have been less important in the affairs of the districts than the persuasiveness of the technical personnel of the Soil Conservation Service, skilled in both conservation and human relations, and working with supervisors and farmers. The significant information on operating relationships which Professor Parks presents deserves a great deal of consideration as methods and machinery for administering agricultural programs are restudied.—LAWRENCE L. DURISCH, *Tennessee Valley Authority.*

Civic Victories. BY RICHARD S. CHILDS. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xvii, 350. $3.50.)

It must be recorded that the most remarkable thing about this volume is the insight it gives about its author. For Richard S. Childs is the grand man of all local government reform in the United States. And this is the story of reform at the grass roots—its philosophy, the evils needing remedy, its proposed cures, its success—as Richard S. Childs sees it. *Civic Victories* will undoubtedly serve as an inspiration to those who are working the fields of reform; but to the systematic political scientist its most valuable function is that it reveals something of the nature of the reasoning, the scope of activity, and the vitality, conviction, and emotion of the reformer.

Most of the philosophy, evils, remedies, and successes will be quite familiar to political scientists, although at a number of points Mr. Childs presents reasoning or facts that are refreshingly new. The author is given to making sweeping generalizations about human nature and behavior which go largely unproved and sometimes seem to be 100 per cent correct and at other times 100 per cent wrong. Thus we read (p. xiv), "Human nature being much the same everywhere. . . ." This assumption about the uniformity of human nature leads him into several curious statements. After reviewing Cincinnati's fight for better government he says: "The governmental mechanism changed, but Cincinnatians remained the same people before and after!" (p. 4). Is this really true? Most reformers seem to feel that it is, but they do themselves an injustice in making this point because one of the most salutary effects of a successful reform movement is the change in human behavior that takes place in the process. The local citizens behave in a different manner than formerly—their motivations, their values, their responses are all likely to change. This may not be altering human "nature," but it comes very close to doing it. Along the same line of thought, the author (p. 79) apparently believes that our parties can be made to function much like the English parties if only we simplify governmental structure. Logical enough if human nature is everywhere the same. Consistent with the idea that human nature is uniform is the contention that partisan politics tends to follow the pattern of the most notorious bosses and machines of the large cities such as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. This is difficult to accept, and it is to be regretted that Mr. Childs did not spend more of his life outside the confining atmosphere of New York politics.

While the argument pursued is not always consistent, while adequate proof is often lacking, and while the book is poorly organized and the style somewhat awkward, *Civic Victories* remains an important and worth-while volume. It is the best statement of local reform politics to date, and it will be an invaluable guide to reformers as well as an instructive case study for the scientist. The breadth of political understanding of the author, who has been employed in business most of his life, as well as the extent of his activity in behalf of reform, will be something that no reader will soon forget.—EDWARD W. WEIDNER, *Michigan State College.*

Gentlemen Freeholders: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia. By Charles S. Sydnor. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 180. $3.50.)

Gentlemen Freeholders is a comprehensive, scholarly, and well-written portrayal of the organization and operation of practical politics in Virginia during the last half of the eighteenth century, a period which saw the transition from colonial to state and national politics and during which the Virginia political system underwent little change and produced more than its share of outstanding political leaders. The whole political and elective process is described: the leadership of the gentry in the county oligarchies, the role of the ordinary voter, the conduct and control of elections, and the operation of the system in the House of Burgesses. Prominent political personages are frequently mentioned. A unique blending of aristocratic and democratic elements and a quasi-federalism characterized the system, and these, the author feels, had an effect upon the original nature and spirit of our federal constitution.—O. Douglas Weeks, *University of Texas.*

Appointed Executive Local Government: The California Experience. By John C. Bollens. (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation. 1952. Pp. xi, 233. Paper: $3.00; Cloth: $3.75.

A study of California city and county experience with appointive chief administrators, which directs attention to the manager plan and the chief administrative officer plan. Extensive data are presented in a variety of ways, including several brief case reports.

How Human Rights Got Into the Constitution. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Boston: Boston University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 81. $2.50.)

Three lectures in which the inquiry moves backward, first to "The American Background," then to "The English Background," and finally to the special story, told inspirationally, of the English background of "The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution"—Habeas Corpus.

Frontiers for Freedom. Edited by R. Gordon Hoxie. (Denver: The University of Denver Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 327. $3.75.)

A representative collection of papers, presented at a symposium marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver, exploring prospects for meeting basic issues of freedom on various challenging frontiers of human development.

Conduct of Judges and Lawyers: A Study of Professional Ethics, Discipline and Disbarment. By Orie L. Phillips and Philbrick McCoy. (Los Angeles: Parker and Company. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 247.)

Some years ago the American Bar Association undertook the sponsorship of a project which came to be known as *The Survey of the Legal Profession.* This book is one of the reports which have resulted from this undertaking. The report is confined to a study of professional ethics, discipline and disbarment based upon a survey of the practices now in operation in the United States. The conclusions reached are that there is a need for the restatement of professional ethics, a tightening up of disciplinary procedures, and an improvement in relations between the bar and the citizenry.

NOTE ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TEXTBOOKS

Since January, 1950 some thirty books have been published expressly for use in American government courses. With greatly expanded student enrollment and growing interest in government, beginning courses—most often courses in American government—have offered a lucrative market. Coincidentally, increasing discussion of teaching goals and methods has stimulated in many a desire to produce a textbook with a "new approach." Thus the college teacher faces an unprecedented range of choice in selecting a text for his beginning course.

One of the complicating problems in making this selection is that for many of this greatly expanded and expanding body of students, professional requirements so fill their class schedules that this one course will be their sole college contact with political science. Hence for the greater number of participants the course is regularly both introductory and terminal. How the needs of this body of students are to be reconciled with the needs of the smaller number who take the course as the first of many in the field is a question that has not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of anyone, though many authors have been willing to make the attempt with their proffered publications.

Political scientists frequently say they are training their students for "citizenship," and usually preface the term with the adjective "good." This objective is rather fully discussed in Chapters II and VII of *Goals for Political Science* (1951), the Report of the American Political Science Association Committee for the Advancement of Teaching. This survey indicated that the most friendly disputants fail to agree on what subject matter should be included or excluded in citizenship education. One group, in trying to reach some conclusions on course content, presents the point of view that the beginning course in American government should train young people for active participation in political party affairs and procedures. Thomas H. and Doris D. Reed have ably and vigorously sustained this contention in two publications recently issued by the Citizenship Clearing House of New York. The first, *Evaluation of Citizenship Training and Incentive in American Colleges and Universities*, appeared in 1950, and the second, *Preparing College Men and Women for Politics*, in 1952.

This approach has met with a good deal of criticism. Participation does not necessarily lead to understanding, and action without understanding may have disastrous consequences. There is no question as to the ease with which action may be started. Millions of deluded Germans actively participated in the politics fostered by Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, *et al.*, seemingly without any comprehension or understanding of what it all meant. The tragic consequences of that active and strenuous "participation" in politics without understanding have not yet run their course. Evidently something more is needed.

Teachers of political science have attempted to furnish this necessary "something more" through courses which give background and understanding to the student. Once the student has learned the nature of the problems which have been present in times of crisis in the past and how they have been solved, current difficulties which bring the old problems up again in a new disguise no longer seem insuperable. It was study of this general nature which nurtured such eminent practitioners of the art of politics as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.

In this broad context there have traditionally been used three general approaches to the teaching of American government. The older approach emphasized a factual presentation of the structure of the governmental system. The second is the functional approach, in which the functions exercised by government agencies are stressed, with federal, state, and local activities being shown in each functional area. A third emphasizes the concepts underlying the functions performed by government and de-emphasizes the presentation of detailed factual material.

In the structural approach, the usual procedure is to start off with the structure of the federal government, whose foundations were thoroughly laid in the Constitution, and then to proceed through most of the year at this level leaving only the last few class periods for a quick and cursory glance at local problems. It may be that a more vital approach would be to devote some time to principles and theories of political forms and then to apply them to the seeable, known, and understandable issues of local government. From that point it would be logical to progress to and through state problems, interstate relations, state-federal matters, and then to talk about the federal government and its operations. The terms concerning government as they would appear in this arrangement of subject matter might become intelligible to the student and the subject matter more vital. Since, however, such an approach would mean revising whole reams of lecture notes and the rewriting or writing of textbooks in a new manner, it is usually considered impractical.

In reviewing a textbook, or in using it, anyone can find errors; but in a majority of cases these are not really significant. What is important is the organization of the volume and the kind of presentation which the author has made of his material. In discussing these points a reviewer should not be pedantically critical and should keep in mind the differences in preferences among teachers. Some persons prefer one kind of presentation, some another. No cursory examination and no statement based upon it can give a true picture of any text; it must be used in class work before comment has complete validity; hence the frequent question of the value of reviews. Even when there is close affinity, the author and the user will rarely agree in all points. It is not meet then to condemn a text out of hand. Thus, when this reviewer reads the volume by

Professors Carter and Rohlfing, he finds a greater emphasis upon business and economic activities and upon legal decisions than he likes, but understanding the value of this type of presentation to many teachers he can commend it to them on this ground. The purpose of a textbook is to stimulate thinking and to integrate materials, and here, as is so often true, "what is one man's meat is another man's poison."

Turning to the twenty or so texts prepared for American government courses which have appeared during the past three years, we find in the first group seven volumes using the traditional approach through a structural or institutional discussion of the national, state, and local governments, with from two-thirds to three-fourths of the space devoted to the federal government alone. The volumes tend to approach or exceed a thousand pages, and usually suffice as a text for a year course. Brief comments on each of the seven texts follow.

Introduction to American Government. By Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 10th edition. 1951. Pp. viii, 1063. $5.50.)

This is the last revision of the famous production issued by Professor Ogg before his death. It is a monumental work, though strongly criticized by many because of its encyclopedic nature. It is a volume which has been used for years by teachers of American government as containing a mine of information and as a source to which they could turn for accurate information when they needed it in a hurry. It is an excellent volume to use as a springboard for subjective interpretations of the processes of government, since the student can always weigh the instructor's words against the accumulation of data in the text. This publication is also the epitome of careful scholarship constantly striving to check every point in order that it may be accurate and in the right context.

Essentials of American Government. By Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 7th edition. 1952. Pp. x, 774. $5.00.)

This is a rewritten short form of the text above, designed for those who do not care for such a heavy dose of government as is offered in the larger volume. The book was entirely rewritten by Professor Ogg and had been completed, except for the proofreading, before his death. It is of the same high caliber as the text described above.

The American System of Government. By John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 2nd edition. 1950. Pp. xii, 1042. $5.00.)

This, like "Ogg and Ray," is completely traditional in its organization of material, but makes considerable use of charts and maps as illustrative matter. It is well written and covers the field of government structure. There are also film strips which are designed to accompany the text, and are available for use when the proper payment is proffered. They provide an interesting correlation of older lecture methods with newer audio-visual teaching aids prepared under the direction of the same individuals.

A Grammar of American Politics. By Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2nd edition. Revised and enlarged. 1952. Pp. xix, 1059, xxiv. $6.00.)

The enlargement of this text results for the most part from tacking on a section on state and local government to make it conform in organization and length with the other standard texts. As in the first edition there has been a conscious attempt to make the writing more of a narration than an exposition. There is a particularly good section on pressure groups with an excellent transition to political parties. Though the style of writing is different this is a traditional textbook in approach and organization.

American Government, National, State and Local. By Claudius O. Johnson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Company. 1951. Pp. xx, 1068. $5.00.)

Here the reader finds a rewriting and rearrangement of Professor Johnson's *Government in the United States*, 5th edition, mentioned below. In his preface the author says that he dare not say that the students may read his text "with pleasure," but this reviewer believes that they might do just that. The style is interesting and there is a profusion of charts, graphs, and figures to lighten the presentation. The book is deliberately arranged in the traditional manner for purposes of competition, but the personality of the author stands out and the functional approach in his other works colors this excellent text.

Government and Politics in the United States. BY HAROLD ZINK. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 3rd edition. 1951. Pp. x, 1008. $5.50.)

Professor Zink attempts to explain the structure of American government on the three levels in terms of the functions performed and their effects upon the citizens. The section on national administrative activities and that on citizenship and its responsibilities are especially good.

The American Government and Its Work. BY EDWARD W. CARTER AND CHARLES C. ROHLFING. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xv, 875. $6.00.)

This is based upon the older text, *The New American Government and Its Work*, by JAMES T. YOUNG, and in most respects is a new edition of that work. In this revision the organization is generally traditional, with some slight rearrangement in the federal section. Legal decisions are extensively used to illustrate the authors' points; and the relationship of government and business is heavily stressed, with a tendency toward a conservative interpretation on all such matters. There is considerable repetition in the organization, and too little stress is placed upon local government, which is discussed in one chapter only.

A second group of texts follows the traditional approach found in the series above, but limits the material to the federal government. The textbook may have been specially written for this form of presentation, but usually the federal government section is lifted bodily from a larger study and given a separate binding. This is particularly true of the first two listings below where no further comments are needed in addition to those made for the full volume.

Introduction to American Government, the National Government. BY FREDERIC A. OGG AND P. ORMAN RAY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 10th edition, 1951. Pp. 771. $5.00.)

The American Federal Government. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND DEAN E. MCHENRY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 2nd edition. 1950. Pp. 816. $5.50.)

American National Government. BY CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1951. 3rd edition. Pp. xix, 810. $4.25.)

Interestingly written, this third edition of Professor Johnson's text brings the material up to date, revises the organization to some extent and has a new chapter on "The Conduct of Foreign Relations." Charts and graphs are used to clarify points touched upon in the printed pages.

Principles and Problems of American National Government. BY JAMES M. SWARTHOUT AND ERNEST R. BARTLEY. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xl, 700. $4.25.)

This text is organized in the traditional manner to a greater degree than usually found today. Only 135 pages of material on "line functions" of the government are included, a rather cursory treatment of a most important part of the government activity of the United States. This was deliberately planned because the authors wanted to explain the principles which underlie the American political system. The authors have done an excellent job in writing, presenting the material in an interesting style, and the product is a good example of the newer shorter form of text devised for classroom use.

American National Government. BY HAROLD R. BRUCE. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 836. $5.50.)

This is the only newly written study in this group, and marks Professor Bruce's first effort in this particular field. The writing is well done, and the organization is traditional. Every chapter is keyed with several standard collections of "readings," thus making it easier for the instructor and the student alike to find supplementary information. Good use is made of cartoons, graphs, maps, illustrations of ballots, and other aids. This increasing trend toward the use of visual-aid material seems to be a part of the trend toward "picture" books that is so evident in our culture today. A careful perusal of all the volumes noted will show that somewhat greater use of illustrations of all kinds can be discerned in the newer books as compared with those that were issued during the first year covered in this survey. This type of material livens up the appearance of the publication, and perhaps makes it more interesting to many students, but its real value may have to wait the test of time.

Somewhere between the two categories listed above comes a new presentation of American government on a very much simplified scale.

American Federal Government, A General View. By Herman C. Nixon. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1952. Pp. x, 476. $4.00.)

Deliberately designed to give the essential outline of the material and yet permit the instructor to go out on his own paths, the use of the book shows that this concept has certain values. All three levels of government are treated from the usual outline, but with merely a nod given to the state and local levels. Here too, much use is made of visual-aid materials. For a one-semester course this text will meet with much favorable comment. For a backward class, it is the best volume in the field to get the material across.

A third category is composed of those texts which, for lack of a better term, can be called a "composite" type. Their approach has been called the functional one, but this is not fully descriptive. All of the books in this class are strongly traditional in that they cover the three levels of government, but the state and local discussions are merely tacked on to a full discussion of federal activities.

Our American Government, the Citizen's Approach. By Helen Miller Bailey, Eugene L. Lazare, and Conrad H. Hawkins. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1951. Pp. ix, 566. $4.25.)

The three authors have obviously attempted to bridge the gap between the secondary school and the junior college, and have produced a book that is not quite satisfactory for the latter. It certainly is not of the caliber that is usually associated with college work. The style is lucid and one enjoys reading the chapters, but in so doing one gains the impression that the work is designedly "corny," if one may be permitted to use the language of the group for which the book is intended. The illustrations are in line with the age level of the proposed reader. The authors are to be commended for their effort to write a government text for younger readers, but the product should be retained there.

Government in the United States. By Claudius O. Johnson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 5th edition. 1951. Pp. xviii, 1064. $5.00.)

In this fifth edition of an already widely known and used text Professor Johnson has continued the approach which he has formerly used. There is much use of illustrative material all through the text. It is interesting to note that the material is so arranged that the author was able to lift chapters, and sections of chapters, bodily from this volume, do a little rewriting in some cases, and then by reorganizing this collection of unattached writing produce the traditional "structural" volume commented on above. To this reviewer this rearrangement seems to prove that what is often acclaimed new and different may be merely a better and more effective method of presenting the old material. In this instance it makes little difference in what form the material is organized: the results are still interesting reading.

In connection with his texts, Prof. Johnson has prepared two pamphlets which are available from the publisher. The first is titled, *Teaching Suggestions to Accompany Textbooks by Claudius O. Johnson.* It contains some pertinent suggestions from a long-time teacher to newcomers in the profession. It also contains a few sample objective questions taken from the second pamphlet, whose title is *Objective Tests to Accompany Textbooks by Claudius O. Johnson.* This pamphlet contains 440 multiple-choice questions and an objective examination on the Constitution. Together these publications represent a worthwhile attempt on the part of an author to make his brain-children more useful to teachers.

American Government in Action. By Marshall E. Dimock and Gladys O. Dimock. (New York: Rinehart & Company. Revised edition. 1951. Pp. xvi, 1004. $5.00.)

This interesting product of joint family authorship marks a decided break with the usual presentation. While it organizes the material in relatively the same sequence as any other text, it is deliberately designed to explain government from the functional approach. Its chapters have to stand on their own merits and cannot be rearranged into a traditional textbook. The reviewer's criticism here is that the state and local discussions are tacked on at the end of the federal material. It may be that this is an inherent difficulty that cannot be overcome, but it will be interesting to see if someone will be able to weave all the functions of all governments into a single narrative in such a manner that the reader may be led through the full story without having to adjust to the abrupt transitions that now mark the presentations. Visual-aid material appears throughout the pages of the Dimocks' text.

Closely related to the above group is the composite type of textbook which is concerned only with the national government. The production of each author varies markedly from the other volumes in this category, and the freshness of approach makes each one stand out by itself. These three attempts may well mark the beginning of a new trend in textbook writing, since they are in many ways traditional and yet make new paths plain.

American Democracy in Theory and Practice. By Robert K. Carr, Donald H. Morrison, Marver H. Bernstein, and Richard C. Snyder. (New York: Rinehart & Company. 1951. Pp. xiii, 1094. $5.00.)

The outstanding feature of this work is the treatment given to civil liberties and the rights of citizens in this nation. This might be expected because of the first author listed, and is a good illustration of the way in which an author's major interest can color his whole interpretation. Excellent bibliographical material is presented for each chapter, a matter of some importance both for the teacher and for the student.

The Theory and Practice of American National Government. By Carl B. Swisher. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1951. Pp. viii, 949, xix. $5.00.)

Because of Professor Swisher's well known interest in legal matters it is somewhat surprising to find that the treatment of civil rights and the judiciary receive less space here than in many other texts. There is, however, much reliance upon legal decisions, and there are few of the leading cases in constitutional matters that are not cited at least in the footnotes. The material is well presented. The approach is one which should develop much interest, in that students are made to feel a relationship with what they read.

Government by the People; The Dynamics of American National Government. By James M. Burns and Jack W. Peltason. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. xvii, 946. $5.50.)

Few of the current crop of proffered adoptions for American government read better than this product of two newcomers to the field. The chapter headings are intriguing. Once in them, the chapters lead one on and on. That is probably the chief difficulty with using this book as a textbook. All the interesting materials are presented by the text. This leaves to the instructor the task of supplying the oftentimes dry, but necessary facts with which the student must be furnished if he is to understand what he reads. From the teacher's standpoint it is far better to have the textual material furnish the skeletal basis of a course. This permits the lecturer to direct his students into the most interesting and intriguing bypaths of the subject matter. Accordingly, a good many instructors may find Burns and Peltason a bit "thin" because they frequently interest the student and do not inform him.

A paper-covered brochure by the same authors, called *Government by the People: The Dynamics of American State and Local Government*, has recently appeared. It is a short printing of 158 pages, and will probably make its later appearance bound in at the back of the larger volume above. It is obviously an effort to meet requests for a coverage of American government through a more standard form of publication.

This review would not be complete unless some attention were paid to the several collections of "readings" which have appeared simultaneously as companion pieces for classroom texts. The "readings" more clearly even than the textbooks show the predilections of the authors, and one can almost watch the mind of the compiler work as the collection is studied. No two of these works are the same, and yet each to some extent follows the same basic pattern. Every one fills a need, and the only trouble is that it is impossible to use them all. There is of necessity some overlapping, but the remarkable thing is that the selections vary as much as they do, since they must relate to the same subject matter.

It is as time-saving devices that the "readings" appeal most to teachers. There is such a mass of good illustrative material in current periodicals, government reports, and literary offerings that most instructors become lost in the forest; hence the value of these collections. In an effort to assist students to find pertinent data for themselves and thereby gain the thrill of discovery a new type of supplementary volume has appeared.

A Guide to the Study of Public Affairs. By E. E. Schattschneider, Victor Jones, and Stephen K. Bailey. (New York: William Sloane Associates. 1952. Pp. v, 135. $1.50.)

Government documents, court decisions, and directories are reproduced, together with newspaper clippings and facsimile headlines. On each there are to be found the penciled notations of explanation by the editors. Every illustration with its notations is an integral part of a discussion on "How to use ———————." Together with explanations from the teacher this handy guide should make clear to every student what has too often been a mere collection of terms. It could prove to be the most important time-saver at the disposal of the instructor. The illustrations showing how to study the work of the real estate lobby, and the record of a congressman, are classics in themselves.

American Government; Basic Documents and Materials. By Robert G. Dixon and Elmer Plischke. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company. 1950. Pp. xx, 420. $2.90.)

There is probably no record of the number of times any given teacher has said that he wished he could put his hands on that copy of a legal warrant, or other document, which he had been saving to use in class but which is out of the file. That complaint need not arise again, for here in a compact form is the answer to the problem of filing such illustrative displays. All that are needed are included, and when used to supplement any standard textbook no student need ever say he has never seen an example of a legal document. The inclusion of statistical charts and graphs adds to the coverage, since they are usually related to the official forms reproduced.

The five collections noted below follow the sequence of the traditional structural textbooks and each one presents a good series of excerpts.

Outside Readings in American Government. Edited by H. Malcolm Macdonald, Wilfred D. Webb, Edward G. Lewis, and William L. Strauss. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 2nd edition. 1952. Pp. x, 884. $2.95.)

In the revision of their excellent collection the collaborators have removed some illustrations which were out of date or otherwise not as acceptable as when first included, and have added newer ones of current significance. The editors are to be commended for using complete articles or chapters in most of the selections.

Readings in American National and State Government. By David Fellman, Lane W. Lancaster, and A. C. Breckenridge. (New York: Rinehart & Co. 1950. Pp. xi, 399 and ix, 347. $2.40.)

There are more Supreme Court decisions here than in most collections of readings and this gives the student an approach he might not get otherwise. The selections are well chosen but the reviewer would have preferred shorter articles so that less excerpting would have been required.

Materials on American National Government. By John M. Swarthout and Ernest R. Bartley. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. xviii, 571. $2.95.)

Designed to be used with the textbook written by the same authors. The reviewer would have been better satisfied if there had been less use of short extracts which, while well chosen and meaningful, still leave the reader wondering what came next.

The People, Politics, and the Politician. By A. N. Christensen and Evron M. Kirkpatrick. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. Revised edition. 1951. Pp. xiv, 1042. Cloth $4.50, paper $3.25.)

While considered as supplementary material, this volume is almost a textbook in itself. It has been extensively revised in illustrations used, but remains as challenging as ever. It represents the work of two collaborators who have a flair for choosing the dramatic in presenting material representing their personal opinions. There are many excellent lengthy readings which give the student the point of view of the writer chosen. Since there are only 120 articles it is easily seen that the average length is well above the normal presentation.

Basic Issues of American Democracy. By Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Second edition. 1951. Pp. xiii, 449. $2.25.)

The collaborators have taken 32 topics, and arranged them in sections which follow the normal pattern of textbook organization. Each topic ordinarily includes two authors who are frequently antagonistic. This technique, plus the quality of the selections, excites students and elicits immediate reaction and discussion. In some instances, however, the selection suffers from lack of originality.

Two final volumes reflect a different approach. While both are labelled "problems" the Lane publication is an attempt to use cases in presenting the material, whereas the Riemer volume presents a pro and con argument followed in each case by leading questions.

Problems in American Government; An Introduction to Political Analysis. By Robert E. Lane. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1952. Pp. viii, 373.)

Here is a disposable workbook. The pages are perforated for easy removal. Thirty-seven cases are posed by presentation of the material; there is an answer sheet to be filled out and a sheet for criticizing "propositions for discussion." Presumably a case would be assigned, discussed and the answer sheets filled out and turned in for a grade. The cases are well chosen and give rise to varying interpretations. This reviewer does not like the use of answer sheets which by their form seem to imply that the correct answer can be given in a fixed number of words in a uniform blank area. If the answer sheets were being used only to help direct the student's analysis of the case and to marshal his answers much of the criticism would vanish. The workbook ought to be widely used to see if it is really a new technique for teaching or if particular men and the schools in which they teach are the major reason for the success which the case method has so far had.

Problems of American Government. By Neal Riemer. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 356. Cloth $3.75, paper $2.75.)

Professor Riemer has chosen seventeen problems for his contribution to supplementary texts. Each has a subject which is highly controversial and is guaranteed to cause disagreement even before the material is read. Problem 12, for example, is entitled, "Administration: Does Big Government Mean an Irresponsible, Tyrannical, and Wasteful Bureaucracy?" The selections from three authors and the ten leading questions which follow them will almost certainly bring forth an animated classroom discussion, which in turn will cause closer scrutiny of the textbook for more ammunition.

This discussion of textbooks for American government has not touched at all upon another long series which has appeared during the same calendar interval. These are the publications for use in courses covering state government, state and local government, local government, and municipal government. When these are added to the texts noted above, we have a total production that exceeds anything that has gone before. Perhaps the time has come to insist that no new book in this crowded field shall appear until it has been shown by a judgment of a jury of the profession to be sufficiently new in approach and notable in presentation to make a real contribution. While this might affect the publication rule for promotion of teachers, it would save much wear and tear on the teacher looking for some new way to approach a standard field.—Andrew E. Nuquist, *University of Vermont and State Agricultural College.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

France under the Fourth Republic. By François Goguel. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 198. $3.00.)

This book is the third of a series on postwar problems of France and Italy undertaken at Cornell University. Written by one of the best French political scientists, it is a useful addition to the growing literature on postwar France. The title of the book is misleading since more space is given to the electoral reform and the election of 1951 than to the whole history of the past five years of the Republic.

A stimulating last chapter on the "fundamental problems of French political life" attempts to redress the balance. Up to that point, however, the book, while satisfying the specialists, may well have confused the less sophisticated students of French affairs. A different organization and particularly the addition of a section on political parties would have helped. This is not to detract from the value of the book: particularly helpful is the section on electoral geography illustrated with many maps. There is, incidentally, no bibliography.

"It is important to understand," Mr. Goguel wisely states, "that the dissensions which make the French political situation so confusing have their roots in specific historical and social circumstances and are not simply the reflection of a sort of congenital French incapacity to adopt a reasonable and effective political conduct" (p. 146). He succeeds in clearly stating some of these factors, particularly the coexistence of pre-industrial and modern France. His analysis of the problem of institutions and of the chronic weakness of democratic government in France is rewarding, as are his interesting suggestions for institutional and electoral reform.

Some questionable assumptions of the author have led him to mistaken prognostics as to the immediate evolution of French politics. Among them is the assumed impossibility for the Center parties to form a lasting coalition due to dividing issues, including the religious one, and to the rigidity of the new party system. This assumption coupled with the belief that the Gaullist R.P.F. is a democratic party interested above all in governmental effectiveness and in social progress led him to look upon a probable alliance of the R.P.F., the Catholic M.R.P., and the Socialists, as the only way to escape the impasse into which the Republic had strayed. But the Pinay Government upset this prediction and led M. Goguel to explain the "miracle" in the epilogue of the book. Of course, the miracle continued after Pinay gave way to Mayer, supported as the latter was by a conservative coalition including the R.P.F. and the M.R.P. However desirable it might prove to be, the "progressive" coalition of Socialists, Catholics, and Gaullists is still not in sight.—Charles Micaud, *University of Virginia.*

The Civil Service Today. By T. A. Critchley. (New York: John de Graff, Inc. Pp. 150. $3.00.)

How the Civil Service Works. By Bosworth Monck. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1952. Pp. vi, 258. $5.00.)

Modern Staff Training: A Survey of Training Needs and Methods of Today. By F. J. Tickner. (London: University of London Press Ltd. 1952. Pp. 159. 12/6 net.)

The books by Mr. Critchley and Mr. Monck are valuable for their information about changes introduced in the British public service during the war and reconstruction periods. We learn that the essential character of the Civil Service has remained the same but that there have been important modifications in past practices in order to adapt the administrative machine to changing political and social conditions. Mr. Critchley's well-written volume very adequately fulfills his purpose "to describe as accurately as possible the Civil Service as it exists today." The author deals in considerable detail with the organization of the Service and with the conditions governing public employment in Britain. He also takes his reader into the government offices and gives something of the atmosphere that can seldom be gained from the reading of command papers, annual reports, or Treasury circulars. He discusses the use of precedent books, which have almost the sanctity with civil servants that the reported cases have with the judges; the work of the departmental registries; the handling of the great volume of correspondence coming to government offices; and the practice of minuting. We learn how official rank is indicated by carpets, armchairs, one-piece telephone sets, and grate fires. Mr. Critchley's comments on the Service and its problems are temperate and judicious, as befits his position as a civil servant.

Mr. Monck also writes from experience. He was a war-time civil servant, and he was chairman of a group which prepared a Fabian Society report entitled *The Reform of the Higher Civil Service*. His purpose is not only to describe but to challenge. "Efficiency in administration," he says, "concerns everyone, and I believe that in a democratic society, people should be encouraged to say their piece on it." Saying his piece takes Mr. Monck a good bit beyond the Civil Service, for he discusses practically the whole organization and the total processes of the central government. In his introduction he proposes some changes which would have important effects upon long-established Civil Service principles. It is disappointing that he does not discuss these proposals at more length, for their merits cannot be judged in the summary form in which they are presented. In Part IV, entitled "The Public Service and the Government of the Day," he considers some ways in which the Civil Service could, in his view, be made a more effective instrument to carry out the policies of a cabinet and those of individual ministers. He rejects "large scale alterations on the American model" and instead proposes dynamic leadership by ministers, careful appointments and promotions to key departmental positions, more contacts between members of Parliament and civil servants, and occasional appointments from outside the Civil Service. None of these is revolutionary in character. Part V, about half of the book, is a useful summary of the functions and activities of the administrative departments of British government.

Since the last war the British government has paid a great deal more attention than formerly to the post-entry training of its employees. One sign of this new interest has been the appointment in the Treasury of a Director of Training and Education to stimulate and guide training activities throughout the Civil Service. *Modern Staff Training*, by the present occupant of this position, F. J. Tickner, is an excellent survey of the whole subject of employee training. It deals with training problems and methods in both the public service and private industry and for the executive as well as the clerical worker. For the most part the book is as applicable to American organizations as to British. Every page of this volume reflects common sense, and it is highly recommended to all persons interested in personnel administration.—H. M. STOUT, *Washington, D. C.*

Contemporary Foreign Governments. BY HERMAN BEUKEMA AND ASSOCIATES. (New York: Rinehart & Company. 1953. Pp. xx, 610. $5.50.)

Third edition of a textbook written by members of the department of social sciences of the U. S. Military Academy. The new edition leaves out Italy, but adds a short introductory chapter on some essentials of political science and goals of the comparative study of governments. Other useful innovations are: a glossary of terms; lists of questions after each chapter; and an appendix with texts of the constitutions of countries discussed. Because of its relative brevity and concentration upon essentials it is a very useful text for beginners' courses in foreign governments at the lower division level.

British Government. BY HIRAM MILLER STOUT. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 433. $5.00.)

An adequate and up-to-date description of the British system. Despite a seeming preference for administrative detail over the processes of policy formation, the book is on the whole well rounded and the account is presented in a clear and straightforward manner.

The British General Election of 1951. BY D. E. BUTLER. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 289. $4.25.)

The third in the excellent series of Nuffield College studies of recent general elections by an Oxford scholar who also assisted in the preparation of the other two.

Strikes: A Study in Industrial Conflict with Special Reference to British Experience between 1911 and 1947. By K. G. J. C. Knowles. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xiv, 330. $8.75.)

An extended analysis of strikes, drawn primarily from British experience. Deals first with the concept, sources of labor union militancy, and legal controls, then with causes and consequences, with emphasis on the use of statistical techniques.

The Choice before South Africa. By E. S. Sachs. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. ix, 220. $5.75.)

Written by the vigorous and controversial labor leader "Solly" Sachs, this book is addressed primarily to South Africans.

The Peoples and Policies of South Africa. By Leo Marquard. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 257. $3.50.)

Also written by a South African, this volume deals more broadly with the historical background and with current problems. Like Sachs, Marquard pleads for a reintegrating racial partnership.

Assemblée Nationale. *Recueil des textes authentiques des programmes et engagements électoraux des députés proclamés élus à la suite des élections générales du 17 juin 1951, dressé par les soins du Secrétaire général de l'Assemblée Nationale.* (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale. 1952. Pp. 1045.)

The compilation of the party programs of the deputies elected to the French National Assembly on June 17, 1951, is arranged alphabetically by departments from Ain to Yonne, with Algeria, the overseas departments and constituencies at the end. This continues a similar publication of the Chambre des députés, from 1881 to 1936, commonly referred to under the name of its founder, Barodet. Work on the compilation for the first legislature of the National Assembly was undertaken at such a late date that the material when assembled was not printed but left in the Archives of the National Assembly. The present volume, which is the first of the new series of the *Barodet,* is indispensable to an understanding of the French political scene.—J.B.C.

Le Conseil d'Etat: livre jubilaire, publié pour commémorer son cent cinquantième anniversaire, 4 Nivose an VIII*-24 décembre 1949.* (Paris: Recueil Sirey. 1952. Pp. 693, plates.)

The book of essays to mark the 150th anniversary of the Council of State contains a section devoted to its legislative and administrative activity (pp. 377–477). The second part consists of papers from seventeen different countries dealing with administrative law in each and tracing any and all patterns stemming from the French Council of State.—J.B.C.

Wahlkampf und Machtverschiebung: Geschichte und Analyse der Berliner Wahlen vom 3. Dezember 1950. By Dr. Stephanie Munke with A. R. L. Gurland, Editor and Collaborator. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1952. Pp. xix, 282.)

An exhaustive analysis of the Berlin elections of December, 1950, overpacked with masses of minute detail. Voters, candidates, parties, the electoral campaign and results, and many other related items are discussed in an encyclopedic manner.

Verslag van de toestand van het eilandgebied Aruba over 1951. (Oranjestad, Gezaghebber van het eilandgebied Aruba. 1952. 135 leaves, mimeographed.)

Under the Eilandregeling Nederlandse Antillen of March 3, 1951, promulgated in the Dutch *Staatsblad,* 1951, no. 64, concerning autonomous government given to the West Indian colony formerly known as Curaçao under the name of Netherlands Antilles, provision was made for special self-government of the island of Aruba. An elective Island Council (Eilandsraad) was installed on July 2, 1951. The report begins with a statement on the election, and includes the details of the new administration. The ordinances (legislation) for Aruba are printed in small octavo format under the title *Aankondigingsblad Aruba.*—J.B.C.

Jammu and Kashmir Government. *Rules of business and procedure (Legislative Assembly).* (Jammu: The Ranbir Government Press. 2009 [i.e. 1952]. Pp. 40.)

The rules regulate the business and procedure of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly while functioning as the Legislative Assembly, under the authority of the Constitution Act, 1996, as amended by Act XVII of 2008. At the end of each session, the debates on the floor of the house are printed in both English and Urdu (Hindustani). The State of Jammu and Kashmir has a peculiar importance owing to the continuing discussion between India and Pakistan as to its status.—J.B.C.

República de Cuba. *Reglamento del Consejo Consultivo.* (La Habana: Editorial Atalaya, S. A. 1952. Pp. 27.)

When the 1940 Constitution of Cuba was suspended in the early part of 1952, the bicameral Congress was dissolved, and an Advisory Council was set up. The rules of Council as approved by the Council of Ministers, on May 9, 1952, were first printed in the *Gaceta oficial*, May 14. The *Diario de sesiones* of the two chambers of the Cuban Congress were usually a year or two late in appearing, and it seems likely that the *Diario de sesiones* of the Council will also not appear very promptly.—J.B.C.

Corte electoral. *Elecciones uruguayas (Elecciones del 16 de Diciembre de 1951). Plebiscito de la Ley constitucional de 26 de Octubre de 1951.* By Julio T. Fabregat. (Montevideo. 1952. Pp. 13.)

The publication of the Uruguayan National Electoral Board contains the text of the constitutional amendments approved by the plebiscite of December 16, 1951. It also presents a table showing the total registered voters as of that date to be 1,158,939, and another showing the results of the vote of December 16, 1951, when only a total of 429,760 votes were cast, the amendments being approved by a vote of 237,076 to 197,684. Other tables give electoral statistics, 1925–50, percentages by party, by departments, total votes by party for president and for representatives.—J.B.C.

República Portuguesa. *Constituição politica da República Portuguesa actualizada de harmonia com a Lei n.º 2:048 de 11 de Junho de 1951.* (Lisboa: Assembleia Nacional. 1952. Pp. 170.)

The text of the 1951 amendment relating to the Acto Colonial among other things refers to colonies as "provincias ultramarinas" and changes the name of the Ministério das Colónias to the Ministério do Ultramar. Texts of previous amendments are included as notes. The volume has an index by topic.—J.B.C.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea. (Pusan: Office of Public Information. 1952. Pp. 33.)

The English text of the 1948 Constitution as amended in July, 1952, was prepared by the Office of Public Information of the Republic of Korea. The unicameral National Assembly is transformed into a bicameral body under the same name with a House of Councilors and a House of Representatives. Members of the National Assembly holding office at the time of amendment are to function as members of the House of Representatives. The President and Vice-President are to be elected by direct vote, and not by the National Assembly.—J.B.C.

Federation of Malaya. *Report of Select Committee appointed on the 11th day of July, 1951, to examine and report to the Legislative Council on the Bill, the short title of which is The Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951.* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press. 1952. Pp. 35.)

The report of the committee on the Federation of Malaya citizenship act, which became effective on Sept. 15, 1952, was presented in the summer of 1952, and contains the technical statement in reference to the drafting of the measure as well as the draft for consideration.—J.B.C.

Israel. By Norman Bentwich. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1953. Pp. 224. $3.75.)

From long experience with the British administration in Palestine and as a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the author provides a concise introduction to modern Israel: the physical setting, recent political history, the Arab problem, and an especially valuable description of government, law, and social and economic organization within the state today.

Russia and Her Colonies. By Walter Kolarz. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. xiv, 334. $6.00.)

A critical analysis of Soviet policy in relation to non-Russian peoples within the U.S.S.R., based on a variety of Soviet sources —from textbooks and newspapers to novels and poetry. The author's conclusion can be summed up in the following sentence from the concluding chapter of the book: "If the Soviet régime continues in its present form there is no future for the peoples of Russia in the sense of a genuine political and cultural development."

My Uncle Joseph Stalin. By Budu Svanidze. Translated by Waverly Root. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. xviii, 235. $3.00.)

An intimate and mostly non-political biography by a Georgian relative who escaped to the West. The period covered extends from around 1903–4 to November, 1945. Includes also some sidelights on Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov and other well-known Soviet figures.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Collective Security: A Progress Report. By Andrew Martin. (Paris: UNESCO. 1952. Pp. 244. $1.25.)

By commission from UNESCO, Dr. Martin, of Ruskin College, Oxford, has undertaken to analyze perceptively the present state of "progress" toward collective security. Realizing that "collective security" is a concept on which there is no formal agreement, and that it remains undefined as a technical term in international law, Dr. Martin looks upon it as a "state of affairs"—distinguishable from "world government" or the "organizational product of a network of treaties"—in which, in the proximate sense, "attempts to change the *status quo* by violence are unlawful and doomed to frustration through opposition in overwhelming force" (p. 14). He thus frees himself from the limitations of the purely legalistic approach, and is enabled to appraise the many ingredients—political, social, and military, as well as legal—that enter into this state of affairs. Dr. Martin expresses the optimistic viewpoint that might be expected from the sponsorship of his work: "The system of the United Nations, though by no means perfect, is viable in the long run, and, given sufficient moral cohesion among the majority of Members, it is even in the short run capable of curing the ill-effects of imperfect implementation" (p. 26). He balances the "over-optimistic" assumptions of 1945 against the "over-pessimistic" assumption that the United Nations would collapse as soon as the peace was broken or seriously threatened by one of the principal powers: "The system has survived both the severe shock of the open breach and the attrition of continuing threat" (*ibid.*).

Dr. Martin focusses his argument around the development of three principal sets of policies: (1) the regulation of armaments (pp. 27–86); (2) the pacific settlement of disputes (pp. 87–105); and (3) collective action (pp. 106–78). These principal policy-complexes are separately explored, with consideration, in each case, of early modern precedents, of the program of the League of Nations, and of the evolving experiences of the United Nations. A comprehensive "postscript" carries the story from May, 1951 through February, 1952. In his anxiety to develop a consistent argument, Dr. Martin occasionally makes assertions of facts which this reviewer considers questionable and draws some conclusions which might have been examined more closely. On the whole, however, the volume is stimulating to the imagination, challenging to the mind, and provocative of reflection on the course we have traversed since 1945. The viewpoint is fresh; the data are current; and such problems as the relationship of law to politics, and of universal to regional security, are examined in a cogent and realistic manner. —H. Arthur Steiner, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1947–51. By William Diebold, Jr. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xi, 488. $4.50.)

Diebold discusses the various attempts since 1947 to integrate the economies of Western Europe. His book grew out of a chapter he contributed to Howard Ellis's volume, *The Economics of Freedom* (1950). Both books are publications of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Integration means creating—or at least progressing towards—a single economy for Western Europe in which goods can move as freely as within the United States. It would enable European producers to get greater benefits from mass production and would concentrate output of all articles where they can be produced most cheaply. Although as Diebold warns, "there is no adequate basis for judging how great an increase in production . . . Western Europe could expect" (p. 406), many informed people have been enthusiastic about the possibilities.

The logical first step towards integration was to create a method for paying for intra-European trade. Part One deals with the European Payments Union and its predecessors. EPU is a kind of clearinghouse in which trading debits and credits of a member get balanced against each other (or cleared) irrespective of the fact that they were incurred in different currencies. Thus, if a country earns money by exporting to one member, EPU enables it to spend the proceeds in any of the others. EPU is a creaking, unsatisfactory piece of machinery if compared to the pre-1914 gold standard, but it is a great improvement over what immediately preceded it.

A clearing union creates only the opportunity to trade. It must be followed by removing barriers such as quotas, tariffs, and cartels. On paper, a good deal of progress was achieved in breaking down the worst obstacles, but Diebold shows in Part Two why the progress was less than it appeared.

Part Three takes up the various attempts to form customs unions, the most notable being Benelux. It had been hoped that integration of the economies of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg would be easy at the end of the war because all three would be starting from scratch. The problem of vested interests demanding protection from foreign competition would be at a minimum. Unfortunately, the ruined Netherlands was liberated only after Belgium had made a substantial start towards recovery. Hence, Benelux was unable to commence with all three economies at zero. Progress towards a full customs union has been slow and disappointing.

Diebold's economics is sophisticated rather than profound. For a book dealing with complex economic problems, it is comparatively easy reading. The author was concerned with what has been, not with what might have been; though he gives the pros and cons of the various proposals discussed, he refrains from giving advice, deals more with what governments did than with what they said, and ignores the esoteric proposals of his brother economists. He pays little attention to the Schuman Plan, which he promises to take up in a subsequent volume.—Rendigs Fels, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Commonwealth of Man: An Inquiry into Power Politics and World Government. By Frederick L. Schuman. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xi, 494. $5.00.)

After six months on a grant from the Foundation for World Government, Professor Schuman has reassessed the "times in which we have the misfortune to live" (p. 252) and has found a "mad America" (p. 275) in a "demented world" (p. 281). Directly or by implication, he declares repeatedly that those who do not accept world government as the one road to salvation are fools, blind, or dishonest.

The Commonwealth of Man starts out as an inquiry into the validity of the proposition that world anarchy threatens man with destruction from which only world government can save him (p. 19). The inquiry soon becomes special pleading in elaboration of the argument which the author introduced into the fourth edition of his *International Politics.* Once again, where we might have profited from a theoretical and philosophical approach to the problem or from a comprehensive report on the federalist movement, we are subjected to a jeremiad on the state of world politics.

Behind a screen of confusing titles, Schuman first reexamines the nature of war and of the state, the unity of mankind, tribalism, and the origin of the brotherhood of man concept. What he calls the "world states" of the past are then analyzed with reference to the four "preconditions of all government and therefore of world government": myth, adaptation, authority, and a ruling class (p. 118). The same treatment, but at greater length, is given the two "world states" of today, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., neither of which, the author concludes, can achieve world mastery and hence world peace. He passes on to such means to peace as functionalism (principally the international unions, both public and private) and collective security and attempts to demolish the claims made for both. The latter is "futile . . . beyond reasonable doubt in the minds of reasonable men" (p. 369), and the United Nations receives some of his most savage attacks.

Only after four hundred pages of power politics do we get to consider world government. A somewhat conventional treatment of federalism is followed by an all too sketchy account of the federalist movement. Here for a space the darkness recedes before a small flame of hope only to close in again as the author, *adagio lamentoso*, describes the failure which thus far has beset the Cause. The failure is ascribed largely to the want of a Myth by which to bring substantial numbers of men to embrace the Cause (p. 475).

Professor Schuman's argument leaves him with little hope. More faith in man and less in "the most recent findings of the social sciences" (see the jacket blurb), a more balanced view of this country's role, a more accurate analysis of history, and he might face a less dismal future.

The Commonwealth of Man has been written in anguish and passion born of deep conviction. But so prejudiced is the author's handling of his material and so extreme are his views that his argument loses much of its force. Moreover we must wade through purple passages, alliterative allusions, catalogues of instance and example, and long-winded digressions whose effect is to deter all but the hardy and the converted. Nor is the going made pleasanter by the author's weakness for sweeping or extravagant statements: "All statesmen by nature crave power" (p. 15); "War is a habit which men enjoy as they enjoy drunkenness . . . fornication . . . and crime" (p. 45); "the dismal hypothesis that the American course is primarily a phenomenon of psychopathology" (p. 230); and for diction such as in the following: "Thus far all federations . . . have not been the offspring of any process of political parthenogenesis but have been the polygamously conceived progeny of the coupling of the federal concept with . . . national patriotism" (p. 474). But perhaps most trying are the denunciations with which the book abounds. Schuman lays about him with the vigor, if not the happy effect, of Samson at Lehi. He will hardly expect his philistines to get up and applaud.—JAMES T. WATKINS IV, *Stanford University.*

Free India in Asia. BY WERNER LEVI. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1952. Pp. 161. $2.75.)

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India and chief formulator of his country's foreign policy, places "independence" in approach at the apex of his hierarchy of guides to international affairs. Those for whom the communist issue dominates all others experience perplexity, if not annoyance and hostility, at this introduction of a confusing element in a situation which seems so clearly a two-sided affair. The communists (Indian and otherwise) and the Free World join in questioning India's ideological position—on differing grounds and with contrary sympathies, but with equal vigor. The result is that a Cold War is being fought with unique persistence in India, the reluctant host playing referee at the same time that he gropes for a domestic and external policy that will best serve the rising demands of the Indian people. It is to this dramatic and powerful issue that Werner Levi has addressed himself in *Free India in Asia.*

The author wisely chose to concentrate his analysis upon one major aspect of the total problem. India's interest in Asian affairs has a history of thousands of years. More recently British rule and the impact of Western ideas and institutions have obscured an older Asian relationship. With independence it is natural to observe the redefining of India's interests in which her immediate neighbors (minus Pakistan) take a goodly measure of friendly priority. But, as Levi observes, Asia is a continent in which differences and conflicts, *inter se*, are as formidable as common interests are obvious.

Having chosen an historically fundamental theme, the author has been able to write a book of lasting significance in which topics of timely importance find their roots in the more basic traditions and circumstances. This reviewer would have appreciated greater emphasis upon the external implications of India's domestic policy, an interrelationship that seems particularly pertinent in India's case. The chapters on communism, imperialism and democracy, on the other hand, represent a most excellent presentation of the ideological issues posed in Indian perspective. More than an American's critique of Indian foreign policy, this book is a series of reflections by a careful student of international affairs on India's underlying motivations in the conduct of her foreign relations.

The few typographical errors are minor defects; excellent references and a full index add immeasurably to the value of this book for classroom use.—RICHARD L. PARK, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Woodrow Wilson and The Far East. BY RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1952. Pp. xv, 383. $5.00.)

Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913–1917. BY TIEN-YI LI. (New York: University of Kansas City Press—Twayne Publishers. 1952. Pp. 268. $4.50.)

As their titles indicate, the two volumes on the Far East under review do not touch directly upon the present grave international crisis across the Pacific. They deal with American policy in the Far East under the Wilson Administration, one covering both presidential terms, the other the first, and to that extent they are complementary. But they are both exceedingly valuable and timely studies: for (1) they augment significantly our growing fund of accurate and detailed knowledge of a recent period of American diplomacy relating to the Far East, each predicated upon pertinent and trustworthy documentary sources and containing an excellent working bibliography; and (2) they provide at the same time highly instructive object lessons from which the United States, as the leader in world affairs today, could profit in any move to resolve the extremely critical situation in the Far East. To scholars and students of American diplomatic history and to all who are interested in an efficacious American Far Eastern policy in these parlous times, they are unreservedly recommended.

When President Wilson assumed office in 1913, the United States was confronted with another assault of Western financial imperialism in China as the infant Chinese Republic was struggling to stand on its feet. He decided that the United States should have no part in it. At the same time he sought to bolster the strength of the young republic by according it the recognition of a major power. But before much good could be accomplished by this policy, Japan, on the outbreak of war in Europe, and therefore relatively free of international restraints, launched a determined attempt to dominate China, following the expulsion of Germany from the Far East. With Shantung in possession, she was on her way. Wilson resorted to diplomacy to curb her. But, as the United States became inexorably drawn into the European conflict, and the Far East thereby receded in importance, Japan met little or no opposition. Nor at the Paris Peace Conference did Wilson find success in thwarting Japan, for Britain and France were on Japan's side, and he had also to submit to the compromising of his principles in order to bring to birth the League of Nations. Although Japan seemingly suffered a reversal at the subsequent Washington Conference of 1921–22, convened by the Harding Administration, Japanese imperialism had reaped enough substantial gains to encourage Japan to undertake the bold and reckless outburst of conquest of the Far East a decade or so later.

President Wilson fell regrettably short in his efforts to head off the imperialism of Japan. The host of causes and circumstances that accounted for his failure is admirably discussed and analyzed by the two authors. Today it is Soviet imperialism in the Far East, more masterful and powerful, against which the United States has taken the leadership. The United States is faced with a situation which is comparable and analogous in a great variety of ways. Will there again be failure?—N. Wing Mah, *University of California, Berkeley.*

The Korea Story. By John C. Caldwell in collaboration with Lesley Frost. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1952. Pp. 180. $3.00.)

This short volume is the highly personal account of Mr. Caldwell's experience, first as an information officer, and then as a would-be businessman, in Korea between 1948 and 1950. It is bitterly critical of the State Department, and its standards of documentation and fairness leave much to be desired.

Yet the book is not worthless. When Mr. Caldwell resists the temptation to pass judgments beyond his knowledge, and when he is not engaged in over-arguing his own controversial case (he resigned under pressure in 1949), his observations are often of real interest. There is a sound of sour truth in his general description of the American colony in Seoul, and his own work as an information officer, especially at the time of the 1948 elections, is described with real skill and enthusiasm; even in his clearly embittered account of his battle with Washington, he scores some telling points. The student who discounts for bias and weighs lightly for lack of evidence will find useful raw material in this book. He will also look for other and better sources.—McGeorge Bundy, *Harvard University.*

Democracy and Foreign Policy: A Case History: The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931–33. By R. Bassett. (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. 1952. Pp. xxiii, 654. 42/-net.)

An extraordinarily detailed study of what was said and done in Great Britain about the "Manchurian crisis" of 1931–33, by a Lecturer at the London School who is interested in determining how much what was done was really affected by what was said. In what is in many respects a public opinion study, the author succeeds admirably in pointing out how the passage of a few years has brought a very complex and controversial issue to be treated simply as a matter of "Japanese aggression," and he appears to have left no newspaper, Parliamentary report, or public document unturned in building his case.

Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy. By Joseph W. Ballantine. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1952. Pp. xi, 218. $2.75.)

Here Formosa is given the typical Brookings "problem paper" treatment by a former Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department. An introduction describes the physical setting and summarizes the history of Japanese rule, the second section traces developments on and affecting Formosa since 1945, and the conclusion poses the unresolved questions of U. S. policy toward Formosa. Included is an estimate of the viability of the Nationalist government, the place of Formosa in Far Eastern and United Nations affairs, and the position of Formosa in any long-run approach to a new China policy.

Our Love Affair with Germany. By Hans Habe. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. 247. $3.00.)

A veteran reporter of the European scene, who watched the occupation from both official and private posts in Germany after the war, concludes that the whole affair has been mishandled since the first demand for "unconditional surrender." If there is war Germany will be overrun by the Russians and will opportunistically support the occupiers; if there is peace German governments will move progressively nearer National Socialism, although probably under another name.

Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill. BY PAUL A. VARG. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 141. Cloth. $3.50; paper $2.50.)

A brief study of the diplomatic career of W. W. Rockhill, who is best remembered for his part in drafting the Open Door note at the turn of the century, and who subsequently served as Minister to China, Ambassador to Russia, Ambassador to Turkey, and closed his career as adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai of the new Chinese Republic. There is no revision of history here, but interesting use has been made of the Rockhill papers.

United States Treaties and Other International Agreements; Vol. 1, 1950. BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. ix, 932, ix. $5.75.)

Reorganization Plan No. 20 of 1950 transferred the editing of the *Statutes at large* from the Department of State to the Federal Register Division of the National Archives and Record Service, with the exception of treaties. The Act of Sept. 23, 1950, authorized the Secretary of State to edit an annual volume of treaties, which are no longer included in the *Statutes at large.* Arrangement is in the numerical order of the publication in pamphlet form as *Treaties and other international acts series,* cited as TIAS. Treaty texts are reproduced in all languages in which they were concluded. The Department recommends that the annual volume be cited as UST.—J.B.C.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1934. Vol. V, The American Republic. COMPILED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1952. Pp. lxii, 674. $2.75.)

Papers concerning Latin-American relations in an uneventful year, marked mainly by the withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti, the opening of conversations regarding trade agreements with several governments, and an interesting exchange concerning payment of the Panama Canal annuity in gold or "devalued dollars."

Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study. BY FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. xvi, 196. $3.95.)

A brief, readable, and reasonably familiar approach to the problem of modern nationalism, by a University of Illinois sociologist who suggests that cultural nationalism is a greater force than political nationalism, that the former often persists without the latter, and that hope for a peaceful future more probably lies in cultural cooperation and the development of a world culture than in any world government.

The Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries. BY NORBERT MUHLEN. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. 310. $4.50.)

A current journalistic report on how people are thinking and living, and what their leaders are saying and doing, in the two Germanies. The tentative conclusion is that the Soviet experiment is failing in the East, that the democratic experiment in the West has not yet succeeded, and that Germany still remains a central problem for both sides in the world struggle.

World Without End: The Middle East. BY EMIL LENGYEL. (New York: The John Day Company. 1953. Pp. 374. $3.75.)

Avoiding the usual country-by-country approach of similar surveys, this is a useful introduction to the entire region—people, geography, cultures, internal problems, and the interaction of domestic politics and world events. The author urges greater direct participation in the area by the United States.

The International Labour Code, 1951. (Geneva: International Labour Office. 1952. 2 vols. Pp. clv, 1181; xxxix, 1220. $10.00.)

A two volume codification of the Conventions (intended as creating international obligations) and Recommendations (intended as defining standards for member countries) adopted by the International Labour Conference from 1919 to 1951. Usefully arranged by subject matter, and preceded by a valuable introduction and explanatory notes as to the nature of the code and procedures involved in its development.

Economic Stability in a Changing World: Essays in Economic Theory and Policy. By John H. Williams. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. vi, 284. $5.00.)

A collection of previously published papers and essays by an outstanding economist, heavily oriented toward policy making and empiricism. The central section consists of six "Marshall Plan Papers," preceded and followed by more recent and earlier papers on the policy implications of Keynes' work and issues in international trade policy.

Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation. (New York: United Nations Publications, Department of Social Affairs. 1952. Pp. v, 180. $1.75.)

An ambitious attempt to reach some general conclusions and to point up some of the most pressing problems concerning population trends, health conditions, food supplies, housing, education, income levels, and living standards. Three concluding chapters deal more specifically with Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia.

India, Pakistan, and the West. By Percival Spear. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. 251. $2.00.)

Second edition of a useful introductory volume, with an additional chapter briefly tracing political events since partition.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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* Prepared with the assistance of Mr. John H. Schaar.

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Communist Doctrine and the Free World. By Marguerite J. Fisher. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 288. $4.50.)

In seventeen chapters and nearly 300 pages, Mrs. M. J. Fisher, professor at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, attempts to give—not in her own words, but in the words of the main prophets (Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin)—a summary of the ideological framework of communism. There is also a running commentary, lively and concise, and in the last chapter an able refutation of some basic communist tenets. Quotations and comments are kept strictly separate.

The collected works of the prophets include scores of volumes. Most of their content is of course repetitious and an application of the basic creed to specific problems and situations. Having ploughed through the volumes (at least those available in the English language), Mrs. Fisher has condensed the fundamentals so as to give a clear picture of the whole ideological system. Her book should be read by all those needing a clear notion of what modern communism is.

Mrs. Fisher rightly stresses the importance attributed to theory by the communists. In the current conflict the realm of reason plays a role which is too often ignored on our side. It is an unpleasant paradox that we who stress freedom because we believe in man's responsibility based on his rational powers, are often more ignorant of the reasoning underlying our position than the communists are of the reasoning underlying theirs. They seem to realize more than we do that clear ideas are a necessary preliminary to clear action. We may laugh at times at the rather scholastic discussions taking place among communists, on the fine points of distinction between one faction and another—but we should not laugh too much. Communists are dogmatic in their thinking but theirs is a dogmatic rationalism; they call themselves materialists but in practice they recognize the importance of the mind and keep a close connection between mind and action.

It would have helped the readers if it had been made clearer that the book deals with one school only of communism, specifically with the Marxist-Leninist school. Of the 150-odd quotations which form the bulk of the volume, more than half are Lenin's; the rest are from Marx, Engels and Stalin. Through the efforts of Lenin and of the Stalin who wrote the *Foundations of Leninism* and the *Problems of Leninism*, there is a body of doctrine to which the term "Marxism-Leninism" rightly applies. Not even Marx can be identified entirely with this type of communism: whatever his stress on a scientific method (which he used most clumsily), Marx remained basically a utopian socialist endowed with only a vague notion of what a socialist or a communist society would be. Lenin belonged to a different world. Many maintain that Marx would have been horrified by what Lenin did in 1918–22. Possibly they are right.

In consulting the book, the reader should be aware that there is a danger in describing an ideology on the basis of quotations only; often the letter of the doctrine may not correspond to the interpretation given by those who are inspired by that doctrine. Moreover the mass of written evidence is such that a quotation can be found to prove practically any point; which quotations then should be selected? Mrs. Fisher has an understanding of Marxism-Leninism which I believe to be correct. She has chosen her quotations to substantiate her understanding. But millions of communists, many in good faith, would refute that understanding and could bring as many quotations to substantiate a different interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The book gives us a picture of Marxism-Leninism as we see it. However, the movement can be evaluated correctly only if we know what picture is seen by those who belong to it.

An immediate and important problem is raised by Mrs. Fisher's book: To what extent does the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism (indispensable for the correct appreciation of the policies of Lenin, and of Stalin during the early years of his rule) help us to understand the movement with which are identified at least ten of the twelve communist-governed states of today, six million party members in non-communist countries, and about twenty million voters in states where free elections take place? Most quotations in *Communist Doctrine and the Free World* are taken from books written before 1928. We know that in the Soviet Union and in the satellite states of Europe and

Asia, the official doctrine is called Marxism-Leninism. Actually, today's Soviet communism may be as far, in practice and in theory, from Marxism-Leninism as this was from Marxism. In spite of plentiful evidence, not enough attention has been paid in the free countries to the revision of Marxism-Leninism which has taken place since the middle thirties and its gradual replacement with what, for lack of a better term, may be called Stalinism. The doctrine of Stalinism is at present in the state in which Marxism-Leninism was before Stalin himself crystallized the doctrine of his predecessor in *Foundations of Leninism* and in *Problems of Leninism.* There is already available, however, enough material to complete Mrs. Fisher's book and to present the arguments supporting the foremost twentieth century doctrine devised for the rational justification of despotism.—MASSIMO SALVADORI, *Smith College.*

The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom. BY ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 303. $5.00.)

The role of liberal values in present-day democratic societies has become a question of mounting concern to many Western intellectuals, as the liberal creed has gradually declined in favor, and as totalitarian movements have steadily gained. The question is central in this book, written by a sociologist.

The author's apparent purpose is to sound a warning for all democrats: If you do not want to slip into a totalitarian morass, you must deliberately build a pluralist society. Only in a pluralist society can we have both freedom and democracy. The author elaborates his plea for "pluralist democracy" in the now familiar sociological terms of "community."

Professor Nisbet claims that prior to the advent of liberalism, Western societies abounded in local associations like the family, guild, church, and village. These intimate associations performed meaningful functions in men's lives, and they satisfied the psychological need for "community." But during the 19th century the ties holding men together in these associations were cut by rampant individualism. The prime liberal values were the free individual and the sovereign people. With the realization of these values, the state became the sole association for achieving the goals of individuals, as well as the single locus of allegiance and authority. Standing alone as just one of the masses, the individual was confronted by the impersonal, centralized nation state. But in the context of the mass state, liberal values ceased to have meaning, for even these values depended upon the context of local associations. So we find 20th century man in quest of "community." Yet the only remaining link between the atomized mass of individuals and the total state is the ideology of the absolute political community.

What is to be done? We must regard the "individual" as a member of free associations, and we must regard the "people" as an arrangement of quasi-sovereign groups, with the state merely one of many associations. We must revive the intimate "intermediate" associations by vesting them with functions meaningful in the lives of men today. For it is these plural communities which must curb the authority of the state, if that essential balance between order and freedom is to be maintained in democratic societies. So endeth the lesson.

This thesis—which is familiar to those acquainted with recent political thought of Christian inspiration—is no doubt plausible. Yet the argument has a hollow ring. Perhaps it is because the discourse is admittedly within the realm of morals, and because moral arguments have that unfortunate quality of being unconvincing if you do not agree at the outset, and superfluous if you do. Or perhaps it is because the argument remains throughout at a level of abstraction which approximates pure sound. Such generality may be required to get at the big picture, and the big picture may be important to understand. But to be significant the big picture must portray what it represents, and ten thousand words are no assurance of this.

Beyond these reasons, however, the argument rings hollow because it is almost entirely an enterprise in logic. Logic has its uses, but it is a poor substitute for experience in political analysis. Perhaps individualistic liberalism does logically develop into the absolute political community. But Professor Nisbet has prepared his lesson for warm-bodied democrats, and they must perforce ask: Does our experience show that "individualistic liberalism" was ever more than a dream, or nightmare? Does our experience show that "intermediate associations" were destroyed in democratic societies? Does our experience show that associative life, say in America, is now sparse and sterile? Or does our experience show instead the inadequacy of Professor Nisbet's assumptions?

Though the author fails, in the opinion of this reviewer, to make a convincing case for his thesis, this book is still rewarding. Not only is it written in a lively style, but there are many stimulating insights and interesting observations. These passing thoughts, taken altogether, furnish a provocative if deficient discussion of the role of liberal values in democratic societies.—Currin V. Shields, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Human Problems in Technological Change: A Casebook. Edited by Edward H. Spicer. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952. Pp. 301. $4.00.)

Technological innovations are being rapidly introduced into many backward areas of the world, usually with serious consequences in social disintegration and loss of morale to the communities concerned. Fifteen such cases ranging from simple to complex in the problem presented are analyzed from the point of view of finding basic concepts and principles which would be of value to the innovator attempting to direct such cultural changes. The book is primarily a text, making suggestions, provoking thought, and attempting to analyze the nature of technological change.

Faktoren der Machtbildung: Wissenschaftliche Studien zur Politik. Edited by A. R. L. Gurland. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1952. Pp. 200.)

A collection of five political studies on varied topics touching upon the problem of power in politics. Written by German political scientists, mostly members of the Institute for Political Science in Berlin. A brief concluding article deals with American polls of public opinion and related topics.

Henri Comte De Saint-Simon (1760–1825): Selected Writings. Edited and translated by F. M. H. Markham. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1953. Pp. li, 116. $2.00.)

Selections designed to give a picture of the development of St. Simon's thought from 1803 to 1825, including, among others, excerpts from *Letters from an Inhabitant of Geneva, Essay on the Science of Man, Reorganization of the European Community, On Social Organization,* and *The New Christianity.* The volume represents the only available English translation of St. Simon's work and therefore fills a definite gap in the literature dealing with French Utopian Socialists.

Bentham and the Ethics of Today. By David Baumgardt. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xiv, 584. $9.00.)

A reexamination of Bentham's ethical ideas expressed in his publications and unpublished manuscripts with a view to correcting misinterpretations and reassessing the fundamental importance of these ideas for the ethics of today.

Political Tracts of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley. Edited by R. J. White. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. xliv, 303. $6.00.)

Edited reproductions of Coleridge's *Statesman's Manual* and *A Lay Sermon,* Wordsworth's *The Convention of Cintra* and Shelley's *A Defence of Poetry* and *A Philosophical View of Reform,* all originally published between 1809 and 1821 and most of them not hitherto easily available. Some non-political passages have been omitted. An introduction by the editor is included.

Selections from Bayle's Dictionary. Edited by E. A. Beller and M. duP. Lee, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xxxiv, 312. $6.00.)

A reproduction of eighteen articles from Pierre Bayle's *Historical and Critical Dictionary,* first published in French in 1697, with an excellent introduction by the editors in which they assess Bayle's rightful place as a seventeenth-century thinker and his significant influence on eighteenth-century liberal thought.

Planning for Freedom: And Other Essays and Addresses. By Ludwig von Mises. (South Holland, Illinois: Libertarian Press. 1952.)

A series of essays and addresses by Ludwig von Mises during the period 1945–1951. Collectively they express the well-known economic and sociological views for which Professor von Mises has become famous and serve to underscore the positions taken by him in his *Theory of Money and Credit, Omnipotent Government,* and *Bureaucracy.*

A Christian Commentary on Communism. By Edward Rogers. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Pp. x, 238. $3.50.)

Originally appearing in England under the title *A Commentary on Communism,* the present work constitutes the Rev. Edward Rogers' Femly-Hartley Lectures for 1951. The author traces the evolution of the communist ideal from its classic beginnings through modern communism and concludes that modern communism fails to take into consideration the full nature of man. He finds a solution to the problem in the broader philosophy of Christian supernaturalism.

The Quaker Approach. EDITED BY JOHN KAVANAUGH. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1953. Pp. vi, 243. $4.00.)

A collection of essays by leading Quakers of Europe and the U. S., eloquently explaining the Quaker "point of view" on thirteen subjects, as diverse as peace and war, economic life, crime and punishment, science, Quakers and the Russians. The volume commemorates the 300th anniversary of the Society of Friends.

Errors of Psychotherapy. BY SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1952. Pp. 288. $3.00.)

In a book which through most of its pages seems to be unrelated to political science, the argument is finally advanced that "mental disorder and psychotherapy" are "problems of morality and law," and that the "heal-the-breach method" of psychotherapy for the inner man must be supplemented with a vision of order in the outer world, which becomes the responsibility of religion and political science.

Survey of the Social Sciences in Western Germany. BY MAX HORKHEIMER. (Washington: Library of Congress. 1952. Pp. ix, 225. $1.00.)

A list of various Western German institutions, professional organizations, periodicals and books (published and under preparation) dealing with social sciences, mainly sociology and anthropology. The period covered extends from October, 1950 to September, 1951.

Introduction to Government. BY ROBERT RIENOW. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1952. Pp. xxxii, 583. $5.00.)

An introductory textbook, designed for a general course in principles and practices. Major emphasis is on the American system but chapters are included on Britain, France and Russia.

Democracy Is You: A Guide to Citizen Action. BY RICHARD WAVERLY POSTON. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. xi, 312. $3.00.)

Richard Poston, director of the Bureau of Community Development at the University of Washington, envisions democracy as being rooted in citizen concern with, and participation in, community life. This book seeks to indicate the organizational methods that can be employed to stimulate community cooperation in the solution of local problems at the local level.

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Indian Political Science Association was held at the Muslim University in Aligarh on December 25–27, 1952. The Conference opened with an address of welcome by Dr. Zakir Husain, Vice-Chancellor of the Muslim University, and the presidential address of Professor Haroon Khan Sherwani (retired) of Osmania University, Hyderabad. Three main topics were considered during the Conference: "Civil Liberties in India since 1947," "Public Administration in India," and "The General Elections in India." Two public lectures were given, both by American political scientists. Dr. Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and visiting Fulbright professor at the University of Delhi, read a paper on "Factors Shaping American Foreign Policy," and Mrs. Emily Ehle, of Philadelphia, cultural evaluation officer of the United States Information Service in New Delhi, discussed "Techniques of Public Opinion Analysis in the United States."

The following were elected as officers of the Association for 1953: Professor B. D. Sharma of Punjab University, president; Professor R. Bhaskaran of the University of Madras, general secretary; Professor S. V. Kogekar of Fergusson College, Poona, managing editor of the *Indian Journal of Political Science*. Professor D. N. Banerjee of Calcutta University and Professor S. V. Kogekar were designated as representatives to the International Political Science Association. The sixteenth session of the Indian Political Science Conference is to meet at Sangor University in December, 1953.—N.D.P.

On invitation from the Citizenship Clearing House, representatives of six colleges and universities met in an all-day session in the Law Center of New York University on November 8, 1952, to discuss their individual courses and methods to promote more effective preparation of college students for participation in politics after graduation. The group also discussed at length ways and means to measure the effectiveness of academic training for political participation. Colleges and universities represented were: Allegheny College, Pennsylvania College for Women, Ohio Wesleyan University, Boston University, Hamline University, and Washington Square College. Each of these institutions, as well as the Citizenship Clearing House, is conducting programs under grants from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh to aid in the training of college students for political responsibilities.

The Grinnell College Institute of International Affairs, under the chairmanship of Joseph Dunner, held a spring session on the general theme, "Will There Be a United States of Europe?" The chief participants were: Gontran de Juniac, Minister Plenipotentiary of France; J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, U. S. Department of State; and Karl Loewenstein, of the Department of Political Science, Amherst College.

The Fourth National Conference sponsored by the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO will be held at the University of Minnesota, September 15–17, 1953, on the theme "America's Stake in World Affairs." The purpose of the Conference is to bring together a group of leaders, broadly representative of American life, to consider ways to improve our understanding of and participation in world affairs, particularly through the kinds of international cooperation represented by UNESCO. Invitations will be extended to national organizations and cultural institutions to send delegates.

The U. S. Section of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences met on March 8 in Washington, D. C. The forthcoming international Congress of the Institute, to be held in Istanbul, Turkey, September 6–14, 1953, was discussed. The tentative agenda of the Congress includes sessions on the administration of economic undertakings, international administrative jurisdiction, international administrative tribunals, grants-in-aid as techniques of administrative direction, training of public, including international employees, problems in the conduct of economic development programs, personal performance and ethics in government, case studies in the conduct of technical assistance programs, and identification and correction of administrative deficiencies. Those interested in attending this Congress are invited to get in touch with Mr. Edwin T. Haefele, Secretary, U. S. Section, 1313 East 60th St., Chicago 37, Ill., regarding travel arrangements, hotel accommodations and conference registration. Mr. Haefele would also be glad to know of Americans planning to be in the Near East area next fall who should be invited to the Congress.

A UN-UNESCO Conference on *Social Aspects of Executing Technical Assistance Programs* was held at United Nations, New York from March 30 to April 4, 1953. Walter H. C. Laves, vice president of the Governmental Affairs Institute, served as Director and Chairman. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together a selected group of United Nations Technical Assistance Resident Representatives, experts who have served in Technical Assistance Programs, administrators of the program from headquarters and a few academic specialists in Technical Assistance Programs. The latter included Thomas C. Blaisdell, Bert Hoselitz, Wilbur E. Moore, Morris Opler and Anibal Buitron (Pan American Union). The Conference gave special attention to problems of timing and balance in technical assistance programs; the development of participation by governments and peoples of underdeveloped countries; the adjustment of technological knowledge to the needs of underdeveloped countries; the selection and training of experts for service in underdeveloped countries; problems of evaluation of technical assistance programs; and working relations with national and local officials. The Conference was limited to about 30 participants and 30 observers. It was opened by the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, Mr. David Owen. It is expected that a report on the Conference will be published later this year.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

At the annual meeting held in Berkeley, California on April 10, new officers were elected for the Northern California Political Science Association as follows:

President—Joseph P. Harris, University of California
Vice-President—John Selig, City College of San Francisco
Sec.-Treasurer—Robert McKenzie, University of San Francisco

The American University has announced plans for a second Washington Semester program paralleling the present program for a semester's study of government in action in Washington, D. C. Colleges and universities now participating in the Washington Semester are: Allegheny, American, Beloit, Birmingham Southern, Bucknell, Wooster, Denison, Dickinson, Hamline, Hiram, Hollins, Kenyon, Lake Erie, Lindenwood, Millsaps, Oberlin, Transylvania, Westminster, Willamette, and William Jewell.

The new program will emphasize the political dynamics of political parties, public policy making and administration in the national government. Programs are under the supervision of Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, chairman of the department of political science and public administration, and Lowell H. Hattery, associate professor of political science and public administration at the American University.

The Carnegie Corporation of New York has made a grant to Princeton University and the Organizational Behavior Section for a three-year project of basic research in international politics. Known as the Foreign Policy Analysis Project, the operation will be under the direction of Professor Richard C. Snyder of the department of politics, in association with Mr. Burton Sapin (political scientist) and Mr. Henry Bruck (sociologist), both of whom have been members of the Section. Professor Harold Sprout will serve as general adviser to the project. An interdisciplinary seminar comprised of faculty members and pre-doctoral candidates meets regularly as part of the program. It is anticipated that the project will be executed in three stages: first, an attempt to classify and evaluate various approaches to the study of international politics on the basis of a conceptual scheme developed during the past two years in the Organizational Behavior Section; second, an attempt to build analytical bridges between international politics and other disciplines, particularly the social sciences; finally, an attempt to discuss research priorities and problems of research in this field. A publication series is contemplated.

The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh has made grants of funds to Yale University and the College of Wooster to promote the training of college men and women for participation in politics. Yale University received a grant of $65,000 for a four-year program of graduate fellowships in political science. Falk Fellows will receive an average stipend of $1800 and, subject to appraisal of the quality of their graduate work, may have their fellowships renewed for a second year and, in some cases, for a third year. Recipients of the fellowships will be expected to have a particular interest in politics and policy formation.

The College of Wooster was granted funds by the Falk Foundation to establish an Institute of Politics. Its primary objective will be to stimulate more active participation by college men and women in politics within the framework of the established political parties. The Institute will serve as a liaison agency between students and active participants in the political process.

A program to train students for city manager careers will be introduced at Cornell University next September. The two-year graduate course leading to a master's degree in public administration will be directed by Professor Albert M. Hillhouse of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, which will grant the degree. Students will spend more than half the time in business and public administration courses, but will also study such subjects as stream pollution and traffic engineering in the College of Engineering; housing, zoning principles, and regional planning in the College of Architecture; and the law of local government in the Law School.

The Graduate Student Round Table of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, as part of a new series of discussions concerning research problems in major areas of political science, heard the following speakers from other universities during the 1952–53 academic year: Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago (November 25); Professor Stephen K. Bailey of Wesleyan University (March 17); and Professor Herbert Simon of the Carnegie Institute of Technology (April 22).

The American Political Science Association was among the twenty-three national organizations which won top awards in the 1952 Register and Vote Competition sponsored by the American Heritage Foundation. The Association was cited for "the most valuable research" in support of the campaign.

The Institute of Economics and Finance of the University of Rome has extended a special invitation to all American political scientists travelling or doing research in Italy to avail themselves of the library and other facilities of the Institute.

By recent action of the Board of Trustees, the name of Ohio Wesleyan's Institute of Practical Politics has been changed to "The Ben A. Arneson Institute of Practical Politics."

At New York University the Graduate Division of Public Service founded in 1938 has been renamed the Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service. Dr. William J. Ronan has been named Dean of the School.

Harold F. Alderfer, professor of political science and executive secretary of the Institute of Local Government at the Pennsylvania State College, was awarded the Cross of the Commander of the Royal Order of the Phoenix at the Greek Embassy in Washington, D. C., on January 30, 1953, in recognition of his services to Greece as a Mutual Security Agency representative from 1950 to 1952.

Walter Becker, of the Free University of Berlin and during the past academic year visiting professor of law at Columbia University, lectured on judicial review in Germany and related topics at the University of California (Berkeley) in February.

Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Tennessee Valley Authority, formally opened the Case Study on the TVA at Florida State University, on February 16–17, 1953. The new program of Case Studies of important federal agencies was begun last year by the School of Public Administration when the Case Study was held on the Department of Commerce and was formally opened by the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer.

During the past academic year, Professor Taylor Cole of Duke University, in Italy as a Fulbright Research Scholar, participated in the meetings of the Research Committee of the

International Political Science Association and of the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Teaching of the Social Sciences of UNESCO, and lectured at several European universities.

Edward S. Corwin, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus, Princeton University, gave a series of lectures during the fall term at the New York University Law School and at the New School for Social Research.

Dr. Martin B. Dworkis, assistant to the dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service at New York University, has been named Director of Research for the City Affairs Committee of the City of New York.

Professor Charles Hyneman of Northwestern University and Professor Lee Greene of the University of Tennessee were guest speakers at the University of Kansas in January and February. Professor Hyneman addressed a joint meeting of the Kansas-Missouri chapters of the American Society for Public Administration and the County Clerks of Kansas on January 27. Professor Greene, on February 18, spoke to the City Clerks and staff members of the Bureau of Government Research.

Grayson L. Kirk, professor of government, succeeded Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of Columbia University on January 19, 1953.

Kenneth P. Landon, Officer in Charge, Thai and Malay Affairs, United States Department of State, delivered the first of the Tiffany Memorial Lectures on World Affairs at Wheaton College, February 26, on the theme "The Importance of Southeast Asia in World Affairs." These lectures, sponsored annually by the Division of Social Science and the Wheaton College Alumni Association, are presented in honor of Orrin E. Tiffany, who served as professor of history at Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, from 1929 to 1945.

Edward H. Litchfield, executive director of the American Political Science Association, has been appointed Dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University.

Professors John W. Masland, Jr. and Laurence I. Radway of the department of government at Dartmouth College are undertaking a study of civil-military relations. Their work, which is just getting under way and will require two years for completion, is being financed by a grant of $45,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The main study areas are: (1) the utilization of career military officers in positions in which they participate in the formation of national policies, (2) the skills and attitudes that appear to be desirable in military officers who hold such positions, and (3) the extent to which cultivation of these skills and attitudes appears to be an objective in military education, training, and assignment processes.

Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, gave the Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States at Boston University on February 18–20, 1953. The subject of these lectures was "The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Revealed Truth or Power Group, 1930–1937." They will be published in the *Boston Law Review* and in book form.

John D. Millett, professor of political science at Columbia University, has been named President of Miami University. He will assume his new duties on July 1, 1953.

Saul K. Padover, of the New School for Social Research, was in Europe in August-September, 1952, under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association to study European integration. During the fall term, he addressed the Foreign Policy Association in New York, the International Conference on Asian Problems, the Adult Education Council and several other organizations.

Mohammad Tawfik Ramzi, assistant professor of political science at Fouad University in Cairo, who is serving as a visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Michigan, on March 5, 1953, addressed the staff members of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress on the subject "Political Trends and Problems of the Middle East."

Dr. William J. Ronan, Dean of the School of Public Administration and Social Service at New York University, has been acting as Director of Studies for the New York State Temporary Commission on the Coordination of State Activities, the state's "Little Hoover Commission."

Professor Leonard D. White, of the University of Chicago, delivered the Edward Douglass White Lectures at Louisiana State University on March 3, 4, and 5, 1953. The general topic of the lectures was "The States and the Nation," and the specific subjects of the lectures were: "The March of Power to Washington," "Strength and Limitation of the States," and "The Next Quarter Century."

Francis G. Wilson, of the University of Illinois, University Center lecturer in the department of political science at Emory University during the spring quarter, delivered a lecture at Emory University on "Public Opinion and the Intellectuals" and one at Agnes Scott College on "The Secular Democracy."

THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE

The College of Europe at Bruges in Belgium, now in its third year, is a new venture in political education which should be of special interest to American political scientists. For here is no ordinary graduate school of public administration. Ambitious graduates of leading European universities do not go to Bruges merely in order to qualify more quickly for desirable appointments in the administrative services of their several countries, or even in the rising international agencies which are making an ever stronger appeal to the imaginations of talented young men and women in Western Europe. They are taking part in an experiment designed to show that the European Community, when duly organized, can depend on the aid of suitably trained lawyers, economists, political scientists, and other professional assistants in the management of its affairs. They are the harbingers of a new class of European administrators, capable doubtless of serving Western Europe with the requisite technical competence but also, what is more significant, with the necessary devotion to West European, instead of merely national, interests and in a proper West European spirit.

It was with this purpose in mind that the founders of the College chose Bruges for the scene of their experiment. Bruges is a city which still seems to be freshly out of the middle ages, when educated Europeans used Latin as their common language and were not divided against themselves by corrosive national sentiments and bitter memories of ruinous strife. It provides an atmosphere in which intelligent young men and women can try to feel like Europeans again and learn to live with one another as members of a fair sample of a truly European community. In Bruges the members of the student body of the College of Europe reside under a common roof and take their meals together as if they belonged to some new European fraternity. The lectures and other formal academic exercises constitute only a part of the collegiate discipline offered to those in training at Bruges for the future public service of Europe. This intimate community life forms a marked contrast to the unorganized existence at many continental universities. It more than compensates for the imperfect library facilities of a small provincial capital without a university of its own.

The College was planned and organized by the same groups of European statesmen and scholars who sponsored the establishment of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe unanimously approved the foundation of the College and many of its members have taken a leading part in their several countries in promoting the recruitment of its students. Each of the member-states of the Council of Europe is entitled to send a limited quota of students to the College, and nominations for the quotas are made by the state educational authorities or committees of educators in the several countries. In the current year there are students from most of these member-states, together with a few selected refugees from countries behind the iron curtain. The non-European countries represented are Egypt, Indonesia, and the United States.

The faculty consists of a small number of permanent professors and a larger number of visiting lecturers drawn from the staffs of leading European universities and international organizations with European offices. Among the latter, besides the Council of Europe, are the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, several of the specialized agencies associated with the United Nations, notably the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Secretariat of the European Coal and Steel Organization. Besides attendance at lectures and seminars the students take several trips during the college year to places of special interest to students of public administration. These trips are planned also with a view to helping in the development of an esprit de corps suitable for the future administrators of European community organizations. In 1952 the year ended with a trip to Berlin, where the student body and several of the faculty spent three days as guests of the West German government. This was an experience well calculated to inspire a kind of European corporate sentiment transcending the traditional nationalism of the West European state universities.

The financial condition of the College is sound. The direct costs of instruction are allocated to the member-states of the Council of Europe in proportion to their contributions to the expenses of the Council itself. The costs of the students' subsistence are apportioned among the member-states in proportion to the numbers of students which they respectively send to the College. The overhead costs are assumed by the government of Belgium. The living and working quarters are furnished by the local government in Bruges. The total budget for the current year amounts to nearly six million Belgian francs. More income could be used to good advantage, especially for the improvement of the library, but the management has been vigorous and enterprising and has made good use of its limited facilities.

The first test of such a European civil service academy is doubtless the placing of its graduates. Hitherto the opportunities have been limited for employment in genuine European political institutions. A few graduates have found places with the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, and a greater number will doubtless be placed with the new Coal and Steel Community Organization, the Secretariat of which was located in Luxemburg after the close of the last college year. Others have been employed by various propagandist organizations, notably the European Cultural Center at Geneva, the European Youth Campaign, and Radio Free Europe at Munich. A larger number have entered the foreign services of their respective national governments or other branches of national public services. A few have entered the teaching profession.

More important of course than the first positions obtained by the graduates of the College of Europe will be the level of employment reached after ten, twenty, or thirty years. What this may be depends mainly upon the future development of the European community itself and of the institutions which may be organized for its service. From this viewpoint the current efforts of the special Constituent Assembly to organize a West European federal union are the greatest interest.—ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE.

UNESCO'S INVITATION TO ITS MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The 1953–54 program of UNESCO, authorized by the General Conference in December, 1952, contains resolutions directing the Director General to carry on certain programs and other resolutions inviting Member States to undertake certain related and supporting activities. American individuals, institutions, and associations in the social sciences will be contributing in the program evolving from both types of resolutions, which received the concurrence of many nations. But because the responsibility and initiative rests particularly with the Member States in vitalizing the resolutions which they have accepted and addressed to themselves, it is especially important that our social scientists be aware of those which are to be found in the Social Science Chapter of the 1953–54 program.

The resolutions invite Member States:

(1) To encourage studies of the impact of technological changes upon the social and economic structure of communities and to take account of the results of these studies in the training of technicians (Resolution number 3.231).

(2) To undertake surveys of the conditions governing the land reforms which they have already carried out or are contemplating, together with the effects of such reforms (Resolution number 3.241).

(3) To pay increasing attention to the economic and social problems created by the demographic developments of the world as compared with the development of resources, and to facilitate scientific studies which contribute to an international examination of these problems (Resolution number 3.251).

(4) To promote studies relating to the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to publicize the results of these studies and, in particular, by the dissemination of information and by teaching, to combat racial prejudice and discrimination (Resolution number 3.261).

(5) To employ the methods and services of social scientists in an attempt to evaluate

objectively the results achieved through action undertaken in cooperation with international organizations and to report on the experiences gained (Resolution number 3.271).

(6) To collect, in a regular and systematic manner, statistical information on their educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions and to forward such statistics periodically to the Director General (Resolution number 3.31).

Obviously, American social scientists are already contributing much to the understanding of these important problems, in both their domestic and foreign aspects, by research and discussion. We will benefit, along with Unesco, if these resolutions stimulate further expert analysis and action at home and abroad. In some areas of the world, where the social sciences as we know them have lagged, these resolutions may help to encourage local work which will enrich knowledge and inform policies.

If item (6), concerning the collection of statistics, is set aside for the present purposes as largely an ongoing governmental responsibility, each of the problems is receiving considerable attention by various individuals and institutions. If there is any lag it is possibly in item (5), evaluation of international cooperation programs, where, however, research programs have got under way in the past two years.

The question thus arises—What, if anything, can these resolutions mean to the United States? What do we do about them that we are not already doing? Since neither Unesco nor the staff of the U. S. National Commission for Unesco has funds to invest in vitalizing these resolutions, what additional voluntary action might be possible and worthwhile?

Correspondence on these questions would be welcomed by Professor Peter Odegard, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Several suggestions have been made which seem feasible and likely to be helpful. (1) It would be useful if individuals and institutions made certain that their research on these problems reached the Department of Social Sciences, Unesco House, 19 Avenue Kleber, Paris, so that the reporting on relevant American research would be timely. (2) Professional correspondence can be a highly useful form of international cooperation. Already, no doubt, American scholars interested in these problems are in touch with at least some of their interested counterparts in foreign countries. The clearing-house in Unesco, which can also tap some of the data being collected by the field social sciences officers in New Delhi and Cairo, may upon inquiry be able to suggest additional key correspondents. (3) The pertinent associations in their annual meetings might take cognizance of these topics and plan for their discussion so that, ultimately, the results are brought to the attention of Unesco and other agencies.

The following social scientists are presently on the U. S. National Commission: Robert C. Angell (State and Local Government), Gordon Clapp (Federal Government), Frederick S. Dunn (Social Science Research Council), John Hope Franklin (Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools for Negroes), Lewis U. Hanke (State and Local Government), Grayson L. Kirk (Member at Large), Otto Klineberg (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues), Walter H. C. Laves (Member at Large), Rensis Likert (State and Local Government), C. Joseph Nuesse (National Catholic Welfare Conference), Peter H. Odegard (American Political Science Association), Ordway Tead (State and Local Government), and M. L. Wilson (Federal Government).—RICHARD H. HEINDEL.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Elton Atwater, associate professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State College, has been named director of the Foreign Affairs Summer Institute at that institution.

Don L. Bowen, formerly of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed associate professor of government and politics and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research at the University of Maryland.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, recently of Kenyon College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Duke University, effective September, 1953.

A. C. Breckenridge was appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska, effective February 1, 1953.

Edward H. Buehrig, associate professor of political science at Indiana University, resumed his work in the department on February 1, after a leave of absence of one and one-half years to lecture at the National War College and to serve on the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.

Carl H. Chatters, executive director of the American Municipal Association, has been appointed faculty lecturer in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration.

Kenneth Colegrove, professor of political science, emeritus, Northwestern University, has accepted a position at Queens College.

John C. Corson, formerly an executive on the *Washington Post*, Director of the U. S. Employment Service, and Director of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors' Insurance, Federal Social Security Administration, will serve as Director of the Executive Development Programs in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration during the summer of 1953.

Marshall Dimock was a visiting professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico, during the spring semester. He will spend three months in England during the fall at the Administrative Staff College, Henley-on-Thames.

Joseph Dunner has resumed his duties as chairman of the political science department at Grinnell College after a year's leave of absence.

G. Homer Durham, director of the Institute of Government at the University of Utah, was elected Academic Vice President of the University by the Board of Regents on February 9, 1953.

Charles Fairman has resigned his position as professor of law and political science at Stanford University to accept the recently endowed Nagel Professorship in the School of Law, Washington University, St. Louis.

W. O. Farber, head of the department of government at the University of South Dakota, has been reappointed director of legislative research for the South Dakota Legislative Research Council.

Robert Y. Fluno, formerly of Mount Union College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Whitman College and will teach courses in American government and administration.

Andrew Gyorgy has been appointed associate professor of government at Boston University and will assume his duties in September.

Philip S. Haring was a lecturer in political science at Northwestern University during the spring quarter.

John S. Harris has joined the department of government at Wayne University as an assistant professor.

Amos H. Hawley, of the University of Michigan, has been assigned for one year, beginning in June, 1953, to the staff of the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Ferrel Heady, associate professor of political science and assistant director of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan, has been assigned for aproximately one year, beginning June, 1953, to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, where he will serve as director and chief adviser.

Richard H. Heindel, deputy director, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State, will return this summer to be consultant-lecturer for the second Institute of World Affairs at the Pennsylvania State College.

Francis Heller, on leave since May, 1951, from the University of Kansas, resumed his position as associate professor of political science in February.

Samuel Hendel has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at the City College of New York.

John Herz, of the City College of New York, was a visiting professor on the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research during the spring semester.

George A. Higgins, S.J., has been appointed chairman of the department of history and political science at the College of the Holy Cross.

Edward H. Hobbs was recently advanced to an associate professorship of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Louise W. Holborn, associate professor of government at Connecticut College, has been granted a leave of absence, effective April 1, 1953, to spend six months in Germany as a participant in the Educational Exchange Program.

Barna Horvath has been reappointed visiting professor of political science on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for 1953–1954.

John A. Houston was recently promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Erich Hula, of the New School for Social Research, was a visiting professor of international law in the department of government at Cornell University during the spring term of 1953.

Philip C. Jessup, former ambassador-at-large, has returned to the department of public law and government at Columbia University.

Hattie M. Kawahara, assistant professor of government at Wayne University, spent the past academic year studying in Japan under a Ford Foundation grant.

Lane W. Lancaster resigned the chairmanship of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska, effective February 1, 1953, but will continue his duties as a professor.

L. Larry Leonard has been appointed visiting professor on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for the summer term, 1953.

James C. Lien, assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), was on sabbatical leave during the spring semester.

Alfred D. Low, associate professor of history and political science at Marietta College, served as visiting lecturer in political science at New York State Teachers College, Albany, during the second semester of the past academic year.

William L. Lucey, S.J., former chairman of the department of history and political science at the College of the Holy Cross, has been appointed Librarian of the College.

Hugo V. Mailey has been advanced to a full professorship in the political science department at Wilkes College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

Robert Matteson, of the University of Pennsylvania, is serving as Assistant to the Federal Security Administrator, Harold Stassen.

Elwyn A. Mauck, formerly director of the State Fiscal Research Bureau of Maryland, has been appointed public administration consultant in the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. His first assignment is to serve as acting head of a newly created department of public administration at the University of Minas Gerais. Dr. Mauck will also serve as special adviser to the City of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in which the University is located, and to the State of Minas Gerais.

Joseph E. McLean, associate professor of politics at Princeton University, is serving as a member of the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, and is a consultant to the Public Administration Service in connection with a study of municipalities in Puerto Rico. He is also doing staff work for the Rockefeller Public Service Awards Program.

Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch has been reappointed visiting professor on the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, for the academic year 1953–1954.

Frank Neuber, formerly of the University of Oregon, has been appointed instructor in political science at Whitman College, where he will teach courses in international relations and comparative government.

Sigmund L. Neumann, of Wesleyan University, lectured one day a week at Columbia University during 1952–1953, as he did in the preceding year.

Richard E. Neustadt, formerly special assistant on the White House staff, has been appointed an assistant professor of administration in the Cornell School of Business and Public Administration, effective June 1, 1952. Mr. Neustadt will also assume major responsibilities for the School's Executive Development Programs for both public officials and business administrators.

Richard Park, recently appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Berkeley), has returned from New Delhi, India, to assume his teaching duties.

Rollin B. Posey has resigned as chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University, effective September, 1953. He will continue as professor of political science.

Luis Racasens-Siches has been reappointed visiting professor in the fields of political science and philosophy at the New School for Social Research for 1953–1954.

Bennett M. Rich, associate professor of political science and director of the Bureau of Government Research at Rutgers University, will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1953–1954 serving as visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Stefan Riesenfeld, professor of law at the University of California (Berkeley), served as lecturer in political science during the spring term to offer graduate work in the international law field, upon the retirement of Professor Hans Kelsen.

Jack D. Rodgers, who formerly taught at Kansas State College, has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

George F. Rohrlich has been appointed Chief of the Division of Actuarial and Financial Services, Unemployment Insurance Service, Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor.

Allan F. Saunders returned in February from a year's service as Fulbright lecturer in the University of Oslo to resume his duties as professor and chairman of the department of government, University of Hawaii.

Richard M. Scammon, chief of the Division of Research for Western Europe in the U. S. Department of State, has served as professorial lecturer in the department of government of Howard University for the second semester of the current academic year.

Roger V. Shumate, professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, was a Nebraska delegate to the General Assembly of the States, which met in Chicago in December, 1952.

Estal E. Sparlin, formerly assistant director of the St. Louis Governmental Institute, has been appointed director of the Cleveland Citizens League and Bureau of Governmental Research, effective February 15.

George W. Spicer, of the University of Virginia, was a visiting professor of political science at Emory University during the spring quarter of 1953.

David Spitz has been advanced to an associate professorship at the Ohio State University. [Editor's note: In the last issue of the REVIEW, Professor Spitz's promotion was erroneously reported.]

Murray S. Stedman, Jr., associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College, has been granted a leave of absence to serve as political science programme specialist with UNESCO in Paris.

Leo Strauss, of the University of Chicago, spent the winter quarter, 1953, teaching at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles.

Shahid Svhrawardy, Chairman of the Public Service (Civil Service) Commission of Pakistan, was at Columbia University this spring as a visiting professor.

Sterling Tatsuji Takeuchi was a visiting lecturer in the East Asian Institute of Columbia University during 1952–1953.

David Thomson, of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, was a visiting professor of government at Columbia University during the spring session.

Garold W. Thumm has resumed his duties as instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania after completing a two-year tour of duty with the Army General Staff in Washington.

Hifsi Timur, of the Faculty of Law at the University of Istanbul, was a visiting professor at Columbia University's Center of Turkish Studies during the spring session.

Daniel W. Tuttle, who has been serving part-time with the Legislative Reference Bureau of the University of Hawaii, will become a full-time assistant professor of government at that institution in September, 1953.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Report of Nominating Committee, 1953

At the coming meeting of the American Political Science Association to be held in Washington, the Committee on Nominations (Joseph P. Harris, Chairman, University of California, Berkeley) will propose the following officers for 1953–54: President-Elect, Charles McKinley (Reed College); Vice-Presidents, Taylor Cole (Duke University), J. A. C. Grant (University of California, Los Angeles), and Claudius Johnson (Washington State College); members of the Council for two years, Manning Dauer (University of Florida), Earl Latham (Amherst College), Arnaud Leavelle (Stanford University), Dayton McKean (University of Colorado), Roland Pennock (Swarthmore College), Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago), Wallace Sayre (Ford Foundation), and Dwight Waldo (University of California, Berkeley).

Program for the Annual Meeting, 1953

The Annual Meeting will be held in the Statler and Mayflower Hotels, Washington, D. C., September 10–12, 1953. The pattern of organization for the Meeting is essentially that followed last year with a few modifications. There will be twenty-seven or twenty-eight panel sections and each panel will have two sessions. In most of the panels there will be a different paper for each of the two sessions but both papers will deal with the single topic announced for each panel section. In each panel there will be a group of specially invited participants who will have read the papers for that panel in advance of the meeting and will, as a consequence, come prepared to discuss the paper, and closely related questions, under the leadership of the panel chairman. The "panel participants" (who will be identified as such in the Final Program) are not to be regarded as some sort of chorus organized to put on a show with the paper reader and the chairman. They are to be in a sense the spark plugs for the panel discussion which will, as usual, be open to all who attend and wish to participate.

The program will emphasize some of the problems which have been of concern to political scientists in recent years and several panels will raise questions on problems which lie ahead of the practitioner and the academician in political science. There is a fair distribution of topics between (1) the activities of political scientists as teachers, researchers, and government officials; and (2) the subjects of study and major interest at all levels of government: local, state, national, and international.

The subdivision of political science into several broad categories has been followed again this year: national government, international relations, political parties and processes, comparative government, political theory, public administration, and state and local government. The order given above follows no presumed logical sequence but is a reflection of the alphabetical order of the seven men who have been responsible for organizing one category each for the program. These men are: Stephen K. Bailey, Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Avery Leiserson, Roy C. Macridis, J. Roland Pennock, William J. Ronan, and Edward W. Weidner.

Planning a program for an annual meeting of the Association is like preparing a dinner for a big crew of workers whose appetites are expected to be huge and whose critical faculties are known to be acute but whose specific likes and dislikes must in the main be imagined. A few good suggestions for panel topics were received before we had to go to press on our Preliminary Program. Every suggestion received was passed on to the appropriate member of the program committee and some suggestions have been embodied in the program. There is still time for members to write to panel chairmen with suggestions regarding the content of the announced panel discussions and to recommend people to be invited as special panel participants. Contrary to the usual dictum about "too many cooks" I believe that the annual meeting will be a better feast if more members contribute ideas and names for participants than if "cooking" is left to only a few hardy souls who are willing to put out this kind of effort for the Association. The members of the program committee have done their best to make the 1953 program appealing, stimulating and satisfying. "Come and get it" in September.—JOHN GANGE, *Program Chairman.*

1954 Annual Meeting of the Association

The 1954 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held at the Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Illinois, on September 9–11.

Association Staff Changes

Edward H. Litchfield, who has served for three years as the first executive director of the Association, has resigned that position to devote full time to his new duties as dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University. On September 11, 1953, John Gange, director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, will become executive director for the period ending with the 1954 Annual Meeting.

Kenneth W. Hechler, formerly a special assistant on the White House staff, has joined the Washington office as associate director.

After two years as assistant to the director, Clifford P. Ketzel resigned as of April 1 and will return to the University of California in order to complete work on his doctorate.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti, recently appointed to the faculty of Duke University, is in Washington this summer as assistant to the executive director, a position which he held in 1950–51.

Congressional Interne Program

Commencing September 1, the first group of Congressional Internes sponsored by the Association will start their work in Washington, D. C. Few programs sponsored by the Association in recent years have met such an enthusiastic response, not only from the academic profession, but also from Members of Congress and the general public. Many Senators and Representatives have inquired as to how they can secure the assignment of an Interne to their offices, and several congressional committees have likewise expressed an interest in having the Internes work with their committees.

The Chairman of each college and university department of political science was asked to nominate the best candidate available for the interneship; despite this screening of applications at the university level, the Association received over 100 applications of a very high caliber. Screening of applications and interviewing of candidates was for this reason extremely difficult. Through this means, however, the Association had brought to its attention an outstanding group of young political scientists who furnish grounds for optimism about the future of the political science profession.

The advisory committee for the Congressional Interne Program consists of Dr. Ernest Griffith, Chairman; Senator Irving M. Ives of New York; Representative Richard Bolling of Missouri; Merlo Pusey, Associate Editor of *The Washington Post;* and Prof. Stephen K. Bailey of Wesleyan University. The Advisory Committee held its first meeting on May 20, in the Senate Dining Room.

The Washington Post carried the following editorial on the Congressional Interne Program in its issue of May 10, 1953: "It would be difficult to devise a better program for acquainting a limited number of advanced students with the operations of Congress than that announced by the American Political Science Association. The five young political scientists to be selected as 'congressional interns' will spend two months studying Congress from the vantage point of the Library of Congress. Then each will become an active member of the staff of some Senator or Representative for four months and spend an additional four months on the staff of a congressional committee. The association will provide each 'intern' with a scholarship amounting to $3500 to $4000 to finance the 10 months of training.

No doubt the planning of these new scholarships was influenced by the success of the various exchange arrangements that are bringing foreign students to our shores and sending American students abroad. In any event students assigned to Congress can serve a national purpose of much wider scope than their own enlightenment. If these young men go into teaching, law or politics, their knowledge of how Congress operates will probably be widely diffused and thus add to public education on a subject of great importance to the success of our form of government."

IN MEMORIAM

Earl L. Shoup, Marcus Alonzo Hanna Professor of Political Science at Western Reserve University, died on January 29, after suffering a heart attack in Lakeside Hospital. He was 67 years of age, and was about to commence a leave of absence due to ill health.

Born in El Dorado, Kansas, he interrupted his college education in order to become one of the first settlers of Clovis, New Mexico, to homestead in that region. Living in a sod dugout, he witnessed one of the last "moving wagon" migrations of people to the free lands of the West, then frequented by the outlaw, Billy the Kid.

He received his A.B. degree from Washburn College in Topeka, Kansas, in 1911. After a brief high school teaching assignment in Kingman County, Kansas, Shoup accepted a position in political science at Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana. Later, he taught at Stanford University and at Kansas State Teachers College. Meanwhile, he received his Master's degree from the University of Chicago in 1919 and his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in 1923, where he was a teaching assistant in the department of government. His advanced studies included graduate work at Yale University where he served as university scholar and as an assistant in the department of history.

After coming to Western Reserve University in 1922, Shoup became assistant dean of Adelbert College, 1926–27, and in 1927 was appointed chairman of the department of political science, which position he held for twenty-four years until 1950. During this tenure, he gained recognition for the quality of young scholars he brought into his department, several of them later becoming presidents of outstanding institutions in the nation. He was named Marcus Alonzo Hanna Professor of Political Science in 1927 and, as a teacher, was known for the exacting standards of quality performance he expected of his students. He promoted political interest by his origination and development of the Annual Model General Assembly patterned after the United Nations, which brought outstanding Greater Cleveland High School students to the University campus.

His scholarship was attested by his co-authorship, with Louis C. Hatch, of *A History of the Vice-Presidency of the United States*, published in 1934, and his widely known textbook, *The National Government of the American People*, published in 1947. He contributed authoritative articles to this REVIEW, the *National Municipal Review*, and the *Western Reserve Law Review*.

Professor Shoup was a prodigious worker and deeply committed to the concept of constitutional government with special reference to the local scene. Having viewed the London, Paris, and Berlin experience of the federation of local units, Shoup wrote: "In my judgment, the goal towards which we should work is a federated government. I should attempt to reach this by using the county as the central unit." In 1934, he was appointed Executive-Secretary of the Cuyahoga County Charter Commission, which was then headed by the present Supreme Court Justice, Harold Burton. The proposed County Charter, which he drafted, failed to be accepted by the voters. However, Shoup continued his interest in county government reform, as well as in the recent proposed changes in the Ohio Constitution, and lent his scholarly assistance freely to these reforms. His advancing age did not deter him from undertaking a trip to Europe last summer to study the workings of the London Municipal Council and other local administrations.

Shoup not only gave of his fullest measure to Western Reserve University as a teacher and scholar, but his deep interest in intercollegiate athletics led to his appointment as chairman of the University Council on Athletics. As a result of his imagination and driving energy there was established in 1946 the Mid-America Athletic Conference, over which he presided with distinction for a number of years. He was, of course, active in the American Political Science Association and was a member of the Masonic Order.—ALFRED J. HOTZ.

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